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The expansion of prison privatisation presents distinctive traits. One of 
them is its peculiar temporal expansion in a comparative point of view. This research 
focuses on the intrastate temporal expansion and more specifically in the case of 
England and Wales. What is researched is the reason behind the delay in the 
emergence of prison privatisation, in other words the asynchrony between the 
introduction of general and prison privatisation policies. This Thesis rejects 
explanatory frameworks based on historical analogies, pragmatic concerns or 
economic arguments and puts the explanation in a discourse of political interaction. 
In this framework, previous approaches related to the concept of globalisation, 
commodification of citizenry and political culture do not provide either suitable 
analytical tools in explaining the asynchrony in question. This research, instead, aims 
to bring forward the class struggle as catalytic agent in criminal justice system 
developments using a Structural Marxist concept of the State and its transformations. 
In the Capitalist Mode of Production the State acquires a unifying role among the 
contradicting classes by promoting the supposed general interest of the society, in 
order to allow the continuation of class domination and labour exploitation. This is 
feasible through the constantly unfolding hegemonic strategy which organizes the 
cohesion of the power bloc and disorganizes the dominated classes. Hegemonic 
strategy substantiates in the State Apparatuses which is not just a tool for policy 
making but rather a point where contradicting class powers condense; policy 
formation as such reflects the vector of class power in the apparatuses. Hegemonic 
strategy is set in motion by the State Personnel which is relatively independent knot 
in the transmission of domination between the power bloc and the dominated classes. 
State transformations are indications of this strategy since they inscribe in the 
structure of the State the vector of the class struggle. Hegemonic strategy took 
interesting contours after the mid-‘60s. The capital over-accumulation crisis on the 
one hand and on the other Authoritarian Statism promoted extensive State 
transformations as in the case of privatisations. Massive reactions, however, caused 
by the labour movement, required their containment and consequently a smoothly 
operating criminal justice system. The entrenchment of prison officers, therefore, 
from the wider changes in the labour status became crucial and a state transformation 
in itself, although by absence. This explains the delay of prison privatisation which 
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The 25th of July 1991 marked a deep transformation in the criminal justice 
system of the United Kingdom. The Criminal Justice Act 1991 allowed for the 
privatisation of the prison system and thereby broke a long tradition of “self-evident” 
State dominance. It's exactly this development that requires the use of quotation 
marks. The prison system was falling exclusively in the governmental purview only 
as an ideal type, while reality proved - by exactly this development - to be much 
more complicated. The quotation marks are also needed for another reason. One 
could question whether the State primacy in imprisonment had ceased to be self-
understandable long ago, since it was twelve years since the introduction of general 
privatisation and in a period in which the wave of those policies never ceased that 
prison out-sourcing emerged.   
This Thesis investigates this development. The asynchrony between the 
introduction of general and prison privatisation policies poses some fundamental 
questions over the way that the criminal justice system is developing. Explaining the 
time gap between the two time points would allow exactly the detection of 
influencing factors and the way they interact within the system in question. Such an 
enterprise, however, exceeds a strictly institutionalized logic. If the emergence of 
prison privatisation is seen under the prism of a wider social perspective, the 
importance of the criminal justice system in the social developments could be 
revealed. On the other hand the same factors that shape the evolution of the prison 
system would potentially be effective in different sectors of social life allowing for 
similar explications in their particular development.  
The methodology employed in this Thesis, as will be seen, prevents any 
comparative perspective between different jurisdictions. It requires, instead, a 
specific conjuncture both in its spatial and its temporal notion. The examination of 
the asynchrony of prison privatisation will be restricted, therefore, to the 
developments in England and Wales that took place in the last quarter of the 20th 
century. Although the causation scope is limited, under the caveat of the particular 
conditions operating in other conjunctures, the stance taken in this research provides
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the analytical tools to extend the conclusions in different Social Formations. More 
specifically this Thesis brings forward the class struggle as catalytic agent in the 
developments of the criminal justice system using a Structural Marxist account of the 
State and its transformations.  
The role of the State in the Capitalist Mode of Production is a unifying one. 
It functions as a cohesive factor among the contradicting classes. This happens 
because it promotes a supposed general interest of the Social Formation. In reality, 
however, it facilitates the continuation of class domination and labour exploitation. 
This peculiar combination of functions is feasible through the constantly unfolding 
hegemonic strategy which itself organizes the cohesion of the power bloc and 
disorganizes the dominated classes. Hegemonic strategy is realized in Apparatuses of 
the State. The latter are not just a tool for policy making in the hands of the power 
bloc but rather a point where contradicting class powers condense. That practically 
means that policy as such reflects the vector of class power in the apparatuses; while 
the overall policy of the State reflects the totality of the class struggle. Within the 
State Apparatuses the hegemonic strategy is realized by the State Personnel. The 
latter constitutes a social category and therefore an independent knot in the 
transmission of domination between the power bloc and the dominated classes. If the 
State condenses the class struggle, State transformations constitute exactly indexes of 
the vector of this struggle. Through the mediation of the hegemonic strategy the 
contradiction between classes inscribes changes in the structure of the State.  
Hegemonic strategy in Britain took interesting shape during the second half 
of the 20th century. The capital over-accumulation crisis that emerged in the mid-
1960s provided the opportunity for extensive State transformations. The latter were 
shaped more permanently in Authoritarian Statism, the form of State that 
corresponds to the political counterpart of the development of Capitalist Mode of 
Production in that period. Privatisations constitute part of the State transformations in 
question. The economic crisis was closely followed by the threat of a political one. 
Massive reactions against privatisations from the labour as well as other social 
movements, required their containment for the smooth reproduction of the capitalist 
relations of production. Consequently, a smoothly operating criminal justice system 
was also required as a “last line of defence” in that reproduction. The entrenchment 
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of prison officers from the wider changes became crucial. This explains the delay of 
prison privatisation which appears indeed at the end of a long socially unstable 
period. 
The first chapter of this Thesis will outline the research question. After 
exploring some contextual issues, the question of the temporal gap between general 
and prison privatisation will be brought forward. The scope and methodology of 
research will be restricted to the developments in England and Wales towards the end 
of the 20th century. Before embarking, however, on a more detailed analysis, 
different analytical frameworks will be tested. The hypothesis of overcrowding and 
fiscal considerations behind the introduction of prison privatisation at a specific time 
point will be rejected as mixing the causes and the symptoms of this phenomenon. 
The hypothesis of economic considerations will also be refuted, indicating that the  
issue of whether prison privatisation is in any case profitable for the State or not 
remains dubious. The analytical framework that will be adopted, instead, is that of 
social interaction with a particular focus on the political level. Previous approaches 
in this framework came from the globalisation, the welfare categorisation of societies 
and the political culture discourses. They are rejected due to their difficulty in 
explaining particular cases of jurisdictions or because of they employ rather abstract 
and incoherent concepts. Lastly, basic Marxian and Marxist approaches on penality 
will be de-constructed with the view of acquiring concepts useful for the following 
theoretical part of the Thesis. In this framework the works by Marx, Pashukanis, 
Ferrajoli, Zolo, Rusche, Kircheimer, Melossi and Pavarini will be critically assessed 
and important conclusions will be ascertained regarding Marxist epistemology, the 
role of the State and the interpolation of value and commodity with criminal justice. 
The second chapter which is the first one in the theoretical part of this 
Thesis will analyse Structural Marxism as widely as possible. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present the main feature of Poulantzas' work, namely that the State is 
not a tool but a relationship between classes. After a brief analysis of class 
construction in Historical Materialism and the relationship among classes within the 
Althusserian concept of 'levels', the State is presented as the condensation of their 
contradictions. The State appears as unifying element in the class struggle while at 
the same time it promotes the extended reproduction of relations among social forces 
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in the Capitalist Mode of Production. This is feasible through the constantly 
unfolding hegemonic strategy of the dominating classes, the manifestation of which 
appears in the unstable equilibrium of compromises that drives State policy at the last 
instance.  
As a necessary appendage to the previous chapter the third one regards the 
realisation of the hegemonic strategy in the State Apparatuses and brings forward the 
role of a special social force, that of the State Personnel. The double functionality of 
the State as cohesive factor and as facilitator of the reproduction of the class relations 
goes through the operation of the ideological, the repressive and the economic State 
Apparatuses. Moreover, their smooth operation depends on the State Personnel 
which becomes a special knot in the transmission of dominance. Due to their position 
in the reproduction of class relations the State Personnel are the first recipients of the 
dominant ideology and its first transmitters. Therefore, this social force presents 
special characteristics since it's affected by the class struggle but in a refracted way. 
Especially important are the Repressive State Apparatuses and their personnel since 
they constitute the last line of defence in promoting subordination when other 
apparatuses and specifically the ideological ones have failed. 
The set of relations up to this point presented the class contradictions in a 
dynamic way but certainly one in which the struggle does not threaten the dominance 
of the power bloc. The fourth chapter refers to the case in which the class struggle is 
so intensified that it prevents extended class reproduction. In the economic level, the 
index of the class struggle is the rate of profit. The more it is strengthened the more 
difficult becomes the extraction of capital out of the production process. Apart from 
the permanently falling rate of profit, the periodic capital over-accumulation crises 
exert even more pressure on the profitability. What is especially important, however, 
is the possibility of transmitting the economic crisis to the political and ideological 
levels. The State, by employing counteracting influences against the falling rate of 
profit, becomes the central factor working against the economic crisis; therefore it's 
the point where the economic and the political levels merge and the crisis is 
transmitted between levels. These are the conditions in which a structural crisis 
emerges. The importance of crises, threatened or actual ones, is that they drive the 
hegemonic strategy towards State transformations that change the external conditions 
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of the class struggle. This is a process that takes place anyway during the normal 
course of contradiction between classes. The crisis, however, intensifies those 
transformations, one of which is the privatisation wave. As a response to the capital 
over-accumulation crisis after the mid-1960s, a set of State transformations under the 
general term of Authoritarian Statism appeared. Privatisations are an aspect of 
exactly those modifications. 
Having established the necessary analytical tools, the fifth chapter of the 
theoretical part brings them together in an explication of the asynchrony of prison 
privatisation. Against the capital over-accumulation crisis of the 1970s privatisation 
policies appeared as the necessary outlet that removed unprofitable State capital from 
the market and at the same time gave the opportunity for private profitable 
investments to cover societal needs. The capital purging policies, however, were 
triggering the labour movement's reaction. This includes the case of the State 
Personnel especially since privatisation was affecting their labour status. The 
entrenchment of the Repressive Apparatuses personnel, including the prison officers 
was more important than ever, if the smooth operation of the criminal justice system 
– the last line of defence – was to be retained. The hegemonic strategy, therefore, had 
to make a tactical withdrawal in order to appease prison officers until the wave of 
privatisations had come to an end. When any possible insubordination had ceased, 
the privatisation of prisons could emerge. This explains the asynchrony between the 
introduction of general and prison privatisation policies. At the end of this chapter a 
section will shed some light on the critique against structural Marxism. The aim is, 
by de-constructing those objections, to further illustrate Poulantzas' theory. After 
Anderson's Gramscian constructs on the State, the debate between Poulantzas and 
Miliband will be critically approached, followed by the debate between Stuart Hall 
and Bob Jessop. Finally, few deficiencies in Poulantzas' theory will be presented. 
The purpose of the following empirical part is to illustrate rather than prove 
what has been concluded in the theoretical part. The sixth chapter establishes the 
prison privatisation policy as State transformation. Through a longitudinal analysis of 
the State involvement in imprisonment, prison contracting-out in 1991 appears as a 
separation from the previous practice. What is particularly important is that the 
asynchrony in the introduction of prison privatisation is a State modification in itself 
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since it shares the same pragmatic, systemic and ideological premises with the 
general privatisation policies. It's a State transformation by absence. If 
transformations are the result of the class struggle, the next issue that needs to be 
established is the conditions of class contradictions in Britain during the period in 
question. The seventh chapter, therefore, regards the evolution of the role of the State 
in the economic crisis of the 1970s with a particular focus on the class struggle. In 
this framework, in 1980 a distinctive break with the previous approaches appeared. 
Tactical appeasement of the trade unions and finally confrontation with them in more 
suitable conditions had been employed instead of full confrontation. In the same 
article the practical implications by Hall et al. construct of Authoritarian Populism is 
also presented in detail and objected. 
The strength of the labour movement that shapes the counteracting 
influences at the last instance is then compared to the developments in the prison 
system in the last eighth chapter. The class struggle in the Social Formation is 
refracted in the prison officers' labour movement especially since privatisation 
threatens to change their labour status. The Prison Officer Association (POA) 
represents a militant and powerful movement the strike of which could cause major 
problems in the smooth operation of the criminal justice system. This is especially 
important in a period of social insubordination. With a number of concessions, prison 
officers were kept content until the labour movement as such and more generally the 
social insubordination caused by the capital purging in the 1980s had ceased. The 
distinctive decrease of industrial actions and working days lost at the end of the 
1980s marks the point at which the privatisation could turn towards its “guardians” 
namely the Repressive State Apparatuses. This explains the asynchrony between the 
introduction of general and prison privatisation policies in the conjuncture, namely 











Prison privatisation is a relatively broad term. A crude differentiation into 
groups would differentiate the spectrum in three broad levels. The first one includes 
“minor” commercial contracts for the canteen or the shop where inmates purchase 
items for personal use. The next level is the delivery of specific services like 
rehabilitation, maintenance, catering, transportation, health care, vocational training 
and several others. The final level is the assignment of the entire operation of a 
prison facility to a private contractor. This case includes all the aforementioned 
services along with the surveillance and custody of prisoners1. Although the profits 
for the private contractor regarding the first level of privatisation are considerable, it 
is the second and the third levels that cause the strongest debate for legal and ethical 
reasons. Thus, the focus will be placed on these aspects of private involvement.  
Historically, the full management of prison, namely the third aspect of 
privatisation, preceded the contracting out of non custodial services. In this 
framework the contemporary appearance of privatized prisons dates back to 1983 in 
the United States2. The status of the phenomenon gradually and slowly moved from 
the “interesting experiment” to the “proven option” only by the end of 1980s, since it 
was then that it started expanding significantly between federal States. The initial 
slow development could be seen in the international expansion as well. Australia was 
the second country to adopt the private provision of correctional services in 1989 
with Borallon prison which opened in January 1990. In this case, however, the 
internal expansion was rather fast, since many other privatized prisons followed but
                                                 
1 A. Coyle 2004.  
2 Regarding the second level of privatisation, relevant contracts were signed from the 1960s in the 
United States. During the same period, in the third level of privatisation, juvenile correctional 
facilities operated by private organisations (in most cases not for profit). In 1979 the first facilities of 
secure confinement for illegal aliens either pending hearing or awaiting their deportation appeared 
also in the United States. In 1983 prison privatisation draw considerable attention because of the first 
contract for a detention centre. Therefore, 1983 is the year in which prison privatisation touched the 
hard end of privatisation. It appeared, though, as a potential many years ago. D. McDonald et al. 1998, 
p. 5. 
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not with even distribution among the federal States. Now Australia has the highest 
number of prisoners held in private prisons in the world. Round the same period 
England and Wales opened the first privatized prison facility. After passing the 
enabling statute (Criminal Justice Act 1991), HMP Wolds opened in 1992 under the 
management of G4S (Group 4 by that time). The internal expansion in this case was 
again spectacular with 11 privatized prisons up to now. Few years after England and 
Wales, New Zealand followed. Although, the intention to privatize prison facilities 
was expressed in early 1990s, due to a long process of introducing a new law and call 
for tenders, the first facility for remand prisoners opened in 2000. Thereafter, the 
process ceased. Canada on the other hand had a long story of political “resistance” to 
prison privatisation until 1996 when the relevant procedure started. It eventuated to 
the first (and only) contracted out correctional facility in 2001. Scotland – being a 
distinct jurisdiction from England and Wales – established the first privatized prison, 
Kilmarnock in 1999. Furthermore, in June 2006 a new contract was awarded for a 
700-places prison in Addiewell3.  
The Continental European countries adopted the second level of 
privatisation in terms of their prison facilities. The “dual management” model, as it is 
often called, requires close cooperation between the public and the private 
administration and a detailed contract that prescribes the responsibilities of each part. 
Privatisation process began in France in 1987, when the enabling legislation was 
issued. Now, there are 21 “semi-privatized” prisons and it’s highly possible that this 
number will increase. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that there is no 
constitutional constraint for full privatisation. In Germany where such a legal 
constraint exists (article 33 of the Federal Constitution), semi-privatisation is adopted 
as well. The first facility opened in 2005 in the federal State of Hesse with the view 
for another in the federal State of Saxony-Anhalt. In the Netherlands a large part of 
the ancillary services are contracted out forming a situation resembling to semi-
privatisation. Nevertheless, this process is not openly pronounced as privatisation 
like in France or Germany4. 
                                                 
3 J. R. Lilly et al. 1992, D. McDonald 1994, A. Coyle 2004, M. Ryan et al. 1989, K. Nossal et al. 
2004, M. Cavadino et al. 2006, pp 304 – 328, R. Harding 1997, pp 1 – 15. 
4 M. Cavadino et al. 2006, pp 304 – 328, A. Coyle 2004.  
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From an intra-State point of view some further information could also be 
derived. In some jurisdictions there has been an exceptionally short period between 
the introduction of general privatisation policies, in respect of other public industries 
or services such as telecommunications, and the proclamation of the first correctional 
privatisation contracts like in Australia where the gap in question was one year or in 
the USA where it was 2 years. The same period in New Zealand was six years5.  On 
the other hand other jurisdiction present a substantial break between the introduction 
of general privatisation policies and the emergence of prison privatisation. This 
happened with Canada, England and Wales where in both cases there has been a gap 
of almost 12 years, while the first correctional privatisation contract appeared in 
Scotland 20 years and in the federal State of Hesse after 21 years after the adoption 
of privatisation policies.  
The previous description is by no means explicit. Prison privatisation 
appears also in other countries both developed and developing. What is significant 
however, is the fact that the wide expansion is not followed by multiplicity of 
providers. Initially there were several firms each running a single correctional 
facility, mainly in the United States. Nevertheless, they didn’t manage to withstand 
the competition by big corporations – most of them being security companies – when 
they entered the market6. This situation resulted to 5 corporations controlling 
worldwide the prison privatisation market. In 1996 Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA) through an extensive network of subsidiaries was controlling 48 
facilities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Puerto Rico and Australia 
(31,357 places). Wackenhut Corporation Inc. through its subsidiary Wackenhut 
Corrections Corporation (WCC) controlled 30 facilities in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada and Australia (22,132 places). Additionally, at that time Group4 
Securicor (previously Group4 Falck and Group4) through its subsidiary GSL, Serco, 
                                                 
5 For the first two countries it's generally hard to define the exact dates of general privatisation 
introduction; in Australia due to the federal system (privatisation has been gradually introduced from 
1988 to 1992 in different federal States) and in the United States because of the general lack of 
governmental enterprises (both central and local) or extended social welfare. In this case the first 
election of Ronald Reagan has been adopted as marking point because of his government’s devotion 
in cutting tax rates and deregulating markets which eventually resulted in the adoption of the 
privatisation ideology and terminology. New Zealand adopted a general privatisation policy in 1984. 
6 Few years after the introduction of prison privatisation in the United States the most notable 
corporations in the correctional field were indicatively Concepts Inc., Corrections Corporation of 
America, Eclectic Communications Inc., Esmor Inc., Prisor Inc., US Corrections Corporation, 
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation. In C. Thomas et al. 1994. 
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Sodexo SA (previously Sodexho) had a significant part in the global market of prison 
privatisation in close connection with the construction corporations Trafalgar House 
plc. in the United Kingdom, Maxim in Canada and Thiess in Australia. In the 
meantime, however, several acquisitions took place between those corporations, 
most notably, the increase of contribution of Sodexo in CCA, the take-over of CCA’s 
European awards by the same company, the take-over of Wackenhut Corporation 
Inc. by Group4 Securicor and the independence of WCC (renamed since then as Geo 
Group) from the emptor in May 2003. As a result, during the recent years the greatest 
actors in this market are Sodexo SA, Geo Group and Group4 Securicor and 
secondarily Serco and CCA. Moreover, partnerships between them are not infrequent 
something that obscures the notion of partners or competitors.   
A parallel development in the whole context is the political and academic 
reaction to prison privatisation. In terms of the stricto sensu politics - that is the 
party, parliamentary and governmental proceedings - there was a more or less abrupt 
termination of the discussion exactly after the each time enabling act was passed. For 
example in England and Wales the heated debates between the supporters and critics 
in the Standing and Select Committees on criminal justice and prison issues during 
the 1980s ceased after the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which enabled 
the Home Secretary to contract out prison facilities7. Regarding the academic 
reaction, a significant production of pertinent publications could be initially 
observed. The relevant literature followed two broad trends and shaped the current 
understanding of the phenomenon. The first one, with remarkable production, was 
devoted to the debate between supporters and critics of prison privatisation8. The 
other trend, which commenced remarkably later, focused more on contextual issues 
like historical development, the role of prison privatisation in legal systems or its 
consequences in societal structure9. In the same way as with the political debate, the 
                                                 
7 This is probably due to the fact that The Act marked a point after which any campaign was felt to be 
futile. See for example M. Ryan 2003, pp 83-91. 
8 C. Logan 1998, J. DiIulio 1988 and R. Harding 1997 summarize well the argumentation and the 
bibliography from both sides. 
9 For example probably the first article on the politico-economical implications of prison privatisation 
by J. Lilly and M. Deflem was published in 1996. 
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From the previous contextual matters, a notable issue arising is the 
distinctive expansion of prison privatisation. This, otherwise profitable enterprise11, 
has a significantly slow expansion. In terms of spatial spread, the vast majority of 
prisons for profit appear in the English-speaking part of the world with particularly 
higher representation in the United States and Australia. In those specific countries, 
however, the intra-State distribution is not even. On the other hand, in terms of 
temporal expansion, the differences are noteworthy as well. The appearance of the 
third level of prison privatisation in the United States in 1983 was followed after 6 
years from Australia and 9 years later from England and Wales. Scotland, New 
Zealand and Canada followed this course after more than 16 years. Moreover, the 
last group of countries is significant because privatisation seems to have come to a 
relative halt after a change in office. Therefore, New Zealand and Canada have only 
one private prison, while Scotland has two including one facility under construction. 
A similar slow expansion could be observed in semi-privatisation as seen earlier.  
Within this framework this research attempts an exploration of the 
expansion of prison privatisation. More specifically, it will try to explain the reasons 
behind the uneven expansion of carceral outsourcing. As seen before, the notion of 
expansion has a dual meaning, spatial as well as temporal. The focus in this research 
will be on the temporal one. Nevertheless, a temporal analysis which locates the 
question in the different time points that some countries adopted the prison 
privatisation policy would hardly be meaningful. Different States, different 
governments, different conditions, different privatisation policies and generally 
different peculiarities don’t constitute a suitable ground for a sound comparison. 
                                                 
10 See also A. Liebling et al. 2002, p. 283. 
11 This is a strongly debated issue, though, as it will be shown later. It is definitely profitable for the 
private contractor but the possibility for public profits varies. Due to methodological issues they are 
not easily comparable; thus, there have been States with some savings after some years of 
implementing this policy and others that saw losses. Differences occur also in the type of the 
privatized facility. In any case, had the governments negotiated better, those contracts could also be 
profitable for the taxpayer.   
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Furthermore, the very concept of “timing” is not understandable unless seen in 
conjunction or compared with a factor; time doesn’t exist on its own but in relevance 
with something else. The introduction of the general privatisation policies and 
consequently the time gap between the former and the appearance of prison 
privatisation offers exactly this factor. For the aforementioned reasons, an 
international comparative approach wouldn’t be feasible. Thus, the research will 
have to focus on a single State. 
At this point an important point should be clarified. If experimental 
terminology could be used in this case, then setting the introduction of general 
privatisation policies as the independent and the appearance of prison privatisation as 
dependent variable in order to examine the temporal difference between the two 
implies exactly that there is a linear relationship among them. More specifically, this 
research setting means that the introduction of general privatisation would lead 
inescapably to prison privatisation. As a matter of fact prison privatisation is usually 
presented by its proponents as nothing else than a more specific policy in the wider 
spectrum of privatisation. But apart from the rhetoric of the proponents, the question 
arising is if there is actually such relationship between the two. Both policies share in 
common the same goals focusing on the need to cut public spending, reorganize the 
public administration, reduce the paternalism of the State and allow space for the 
development of individual entrepreneurship.  
In contrast with that, Ryan suggests that remodelling of welfare State based 
on the 'New Pubic Management' (NPM) concept should be seen as a separate case 
from the process of selling out State enterprises12. It would be difficult to support 
such a separation, unless what he really means to present is merely the historical 
phases of the two. NPM might be a new managerial approach for the public sector in 
contrast with privatisation which is a broad and generic term with a financial 
meaning. Nevertheless, they both follow the same principles, but most of all they 
have the same goals in the pragmatic field (relieving the governmental budget), in 
the systemic (smoothing the reproduction of private capital) and in the ideological 
(inspire a new understanding of governmental functions)13. Therefore, from a 
politico-ideological point of view both periods can be seen as levels in the same 
                                                 
12 M. Ryan 2003, p. 82. 
13 See for example C. Hood 1995 and P. Cairney 2002, p. 380.   
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process. What substantially differs in the case of prison privatisation from similar 
policies is situated in their impact and especially on issues referring to the morality 
of making profit out of imprisonment14. However, the eventual implementation of 
prison privatisation policy in the aforementioned countries shows exactly that the 
aforementioned ethical issues were either not enough after a point or never played 
any role in hindering the whole process15. 
In this framework, England and Wales presents an interesting case. 
Neoliberal policies made their European début in the UK short after their 
introduction in the United States. This further implies that the British society had not 
seen such a wave of State reformation anywhere else in order to be prepared either to 
resist or adopt the changes. At the same time those developments were largely 
publicized as well as politicized, which allows the extraction - to a degree - of the 
political intentions and their reception by the public. The main research question, 
then, is formed as the attempt to explain the temporal gap between the introduction 
of privatisation policies in England and Wales by the Thatcher government and the 
subsequent appearance of prison privatisation in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 by the 





The way that the research question was set allows a broad spectrum of 
explanatory frameworks and even more answers in each of them. It’s necessary, 
therefore, before anything else to select the proper field of analysis. A short analysis 
accompanied by the most important bibliographical contributions will be devoted to 
historical retrospection, the overcrowding and fiscal constraint framework, the 
economic analysis and the societal interaction.  
 
- Historical analogies 
It has been argued that the current trend of prison privatisation has links 
with a previous long similar tradition in the European world, namely Europe and its 
expansion in colonies. More specifically, when describing the historical perspectives 
                                                 
14 See E. Savas 1987 for a summary of arguments from both sides. 
15 See for example M. Ryan 2003, p. 85 for the case of England and Wales. 
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of socio-political phenomena, the reader often comes across the use of concepts like 
“emergence” or its counterpart, namely, “rupture” of continuity. In the case of prison 
privatisation, though, the concept of “resurrection” would be seen much more often 
in bibliography. “Emergence” would imply that the phenomenon of prison 
privatisation is a breakthrough in penology; an approach, though, which faces 
significant objections. Based on some historical facts, part of the pertinent literature 
concludes to the assumption that prison privatisation is the “re-emergence” of an old 
way of criminal justice administration. Before adopting any approach, though, the 
emergence or the resurrection should be examined as connotations embedded in the 
politico-ideological environment of the era under investigation. Otherwise, unless it’s 
taken as given that some ideas exist beyond time or space reference, the danger of 
projecting contemporary notions in a conceptual basis that is not fit to accept them is 
imminent.  
A historical retrospection on facts could go as far as to examine the Roman 
Period, but closer to the contemporary developments are the prison facilities in 
Amsterdam during the 16th century. In the “Rasphuis”, inmates were occupied in 
primary industry (wood rasping); the revenues were exceeding the costs of 
confinement allowing profits to the administrators, a process resembling to the 
contemporary formation of contracting-out prison labour. Later, during the 17th 
century, England adopted the transportation of convicts to colonies as a measure of 
deterrence. Private merchants were transporting convicts and making profit out of 
selling them as slaves. In the 18th century, John Howard reports that the European 
prisons run under a fee system where the jailer levies charges on prisoners or the 
State to lock or unlock the former and to provide them basic services as food, 
bedding, alcohol etc.16. The 19th century saw private involvement being gradually 
reduced and finally eventuating to the periphery of punishment17. It seems, then, that 
there is a long and indisputable involvement of the private sector in imprisonment 
which, however, was interrupted during the late19th or early 20th century. As a 
                                                 
16 A. Durham 1989, pp 110-111, M. Ryan et al. 1989, pp 61-68, M. Feeley 2002, p. 326, S. Dolovich 
2005, p. 450 and M. Cavadino et al. 2006, p. 306. 
17 A. Durham 1989, p. 112, M. Ryan et al. 1989, p. 62, D. McDonald 1994, p. 29 and J. DiIulio 1988, 
pp 71 – 73.  
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result, when in the 1980s private interests were re-involved in imprisonment, this 
phenomenon was registered in penology as re-emergence of prison privatisation.  
As mentioned before, the specific pattern of imprisonment administration 
cannot be seen outside the politico-ideological environment of the each time era 
which further means that solving the question of emergence or re-emergence of 
prison privatisation is highly depended on the way that punishment is treated18. Prior 
to the 18th century the ancient and medieval concept of punishment was largely 
related to lex talionis. Crime and along with it punishment, are seen by part of the 
bibliography as private difference and response respectively19. The power to 
imprison, therefore, is delegated to individuals. Nevertheless, this understanding 
covers a significant detail that is illuminated during the Medieval Times. The 
formation of a political entity in the High Middle Ages that resembles the State in the 
sense of land determined by boundaries, central power and liegemen – and to the 
degree that it does so – would mark according to the previous thesis the gradual 
treatment of punishment as public rather than private issue20. The political system of 
feudalism, though, diffuses the political power among centres of power in a way that 
the public and private spheres are not clear enough and this is exactly the point where 
the current research is differentiated from the re-emergence thesis. More specifically, 
what we acknowledge today as private relations, in previous eras acquire public 
character creating a framework in which the notion of privateer doesn’t exist; social 
relationships for example become institutionalized21. Consequently, the notion of 
private prison does not exist without the distinction between the private and the 
public sphere.  
Modernity is accompanied by the centralisation of power. Law and Order 
had the meaning of suppressing alternative powers and competing sources of justice. 
Therefore, punishment was the reaction towards breaches of King’s Peace. The State 
gradually transforms from a mere materialisation of the actual power of the ruler to 
an established institution. This State monopolizes the power to punish which is then 
                                                 
18 See a more detailed analysis in the eight chapter of the Thesis. 
19 See for example D. Klerman 2001, D. Klerman 2002, K. Bilz 2007 over the issue of “private” 
prosecution in England and Wales until 1879 and the more careful discussion of the same issue by P. 
Rock 2004. 
20 It is also the period in which imprisonment appears more and more often in the expense of capital 
punishment. 
21 This excludes of course the personal or intimate relationships.  
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delegated to peripheral co-essential or allied centres of power and from there to 
individuals who maintain prisons not salaried from the State but receiving fees from 
inmates. Even if the political system had by that time developed the differentiation 
between the public and the private sphere, where the one is identified by the 
exclusion of the other, the act of fee-taking cannot be registered as private 
entrepreneurship. Public services in general were not salaried by the State but from 
the receivers of the services as in the case of the constable, the gate-keeper etc. This 
doesn’t alter, though, the character of this service provision as public or State-related.  
The 19th century saw the expansion of democratisation. The monopoly of 
punishment was based not any more on the sovereign powers of the leader but on the 
“will of the people”. The State institutions of punishment were reflecting the “public 
interest”22. In parallel, the change of justification of punishment was accompanied by 
an expansion of the State in a way that the previously delegated powers to peripheral 
centres of power were seemingly “reclaimed” by the central government. Therefore, 
the State and its Apparatuses became the sole administrators of punishment. This 
situation remained unchanged until the 1980s where the policy of prison privatisation 
appeared. The monopoly of State’s power to punish is delegated to contractors who 
undertake this responsibility with the view of serving the public interest23. Thus, the 
current appearance of private prisons takes place in a completely different conceptual 
environment, that of “Statisation” of punishment not only as a fact but also as 
ideological element of modernity24. Thus, “re-emergence” is rather misleading in 
describing the current trend in contrast with “emergence”.    
The significance of this analysis is that proponents of the “re-emergence” 
approach identify commonalities between periods and especially in the 18th-19th 
century and the current situation. Feeley states that in both periods the private 
initiatives constitute a significant extension of social control25. Hallett identifies 
another commonality in the commodification of inmates. More specifically, prisoners 
used to be profitable for their labour, and now their bodily ability to generate per 
diem payments for their private keepers creates their commodity value26. Finally, 
                                                 
22 D. Garland 2001, pp 29-30.  
23 E. Genders 2002, p. 290, A. Coyle 2004, p. 3 and J. DiIulio 1988, p. 81. 
24 See for example M. Ryan 2003, p. 86. 
25 M. Feeley 2002, pp 334 and 340. 
26 M. Hallett 2002, p. 371. 
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Durham states the common reasons of emergence in both periods, namely, the failure 
of rehabilitation and reform, overcrowding and fiscal concerns27. It seems, however, 
that the previous arguments neglect the role of the State and the qualitative 
differentiations it creates in relation to previous periods.  
In the first approach by Feeley, who focuses specifically in the period 
between the18th and early 20th century, prison privatisation and transportation is used 
to exemplify the extension of social control motivated by the interference of 
entrepreneurs in the criminal justice system that creates a demand and supply 
relationship. He acknowledges, though, that the private interference is supplementary 
(or constitutes an alternative) while the State constitutes the most active and 
influential actor in the network of social control28. As already mentioned, though, 
imprisonment’s and State’s place and role within social control were much different 
between 18th, 19th and the late 20th centuries. This difference becomes more apparent 
when the social base of the each time emergence is explained. Feeley finds that the 
system ‘weak State – strong markets’ is present in both periods and prison 
privatisation is exactly a helping hand in extending the network of social control29. 
Taking for granted, though, the political rhetoric of the 1980s regarding the finite 
powers of the State seems to disregard a whole array of bibliography that points 
exactly the opposite and deconstructs it30. Finding analogies, therefore, in prison 
privatisation seems rather problematic.    
Qualitative differentiation applies in Hallett’s approach as well. Initially the 
commodity value of inmates was related to the value of their labour. Currently, 
because of the interference of the State as guarantor of specific standards of 
confinement, the exploitation of inmates as means of production remains only in 
symbolic level. Durham’s approach, which locates a coincidence in the appearance 
of prison privatisation, attributed to the mixture of failure of rehabilitation, 
overcrowding and fiscal concerns, fails to show the specific links between them and 
the interference of the private sector in criminal justice. More specifically the 
                                                 
27 A. Durham 1989, pp 113, 118 and 122 respectively. The same author argues that those historical 
analogies would provide an understanding of the reasons behind the current appearance of prison 
privatisation and the potential consequences behind it (pp 109-110). See also A. Durham 1994. 
28 See for example M. Feeley 2002, p. 327. 
29 M. Feeley 2002, pp 323-325. 
30 Marxian, Marxist, post-Marxist, Frankfurt school, pluralist or system theories on the State, to name 
only few.  
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centralisation of the State in the field of punishment, which only appears in the 
current context, might ease or obstacle correctional failures exactly because the 
decision making is also central. The responsibility regarding the criminal justice 
system is appointed to one administrative body rather than being dispersed in 
numerous peripheral centres. The understanding, acknowledgement and evaluation 
of the conditions in imprisonment change dramatically between the micro and macro 
levels of administration31. Additionally, it will be shown shortly that the last two 




The mainstream explanation for the emergence of prison privatisation is the 
combination of overcrowding and fiscal constraints. The problems faced by 
correctional systems appear almost as indisputable fact between supporters and 
critics. They are usually presented as a series of causes and consequences in which 
the gradually increasing flow of convicts sets the beginning. This phenomenon even 
if it’s not adopting the characteristics of mass incarceration, leads to overcrowding in 
prison facilities. Furthermore, the aforementioned flow increases the overall cost of 
imprisonment which causes significant fiscal concerns. The combination of 
overcrowding and fiscal concerns leads to inhumane conditions in prisons and failure 
to employ effectively the planned treatment on inmates32. To those problems private 
involvement in corrections provides solutions mainly by meeting the increasing 
needs of space in secured facilities in a small period of time and lowering the overall 
cost of construction and operation of the facility. This implies that prison 
privatisation emerges when these problems reach a “critical point”. 
A notable common characteristic among the problems is that they affect the 
majority of prison systems in the world irrespective of the country’s level of 
development. Among 192 members of the United Nations, there were 112 countries 
exceeding the full capacity of their correctional facilities between 2004 and 2008. 
                                                 
31 See for example J. Savelsberg 1999, for a comprehensive account of the impact of centralized and 
decentralized political leadership of criminal justice over the prison population. 
32 See indicatively: I. Robbins 1997, pp 815-817, D. McDonald 1994, pp 36-44, M. Feeley 2002, pp 
321-322, S. Dolovich 2005, K. Nossal et al. 2004, p. 12, M. Ryan 1996, p. 104, J. DiIulio 1988 and C. 
Logan 1998. 
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There were also 14 more demonstrating occupancy of their facilities between 95% 
and 100%33. The same happens with the majority of European countries including 
the British prison services, France, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg along with the 
United States and Japan. England and Wales presents a considerable long period of 
overcrowding before the introduction of prison privatisation including the periods 
after the appearance either of outsourcing carceral services (1983) or of general 
privatisation policies (1979) indicating that this time gap cannot be attributed to a 









Source: HM Prison Service Monthly Bulletins, Prison Population Brief and data collected by virtue of 
the Freedom of Information Act from the Home Office. From 2002 CNA represents solely the In-Use 
CNA which is the certified normal accommodation that is usable at the time the data are gathered, in 







                                                 
33 Data from World Prison Brief 2008. It should be noted that there are no data for 12 countries. 
Furthermore, the occupancy rates are derived from statistics provided by each country’s competent 
service. 




Source: HM Prison Service Monthly Bulletins, Prison Population Brief and data collected by virtue of 
the Freedom of Information Act from the Home Office. From 2002 CNA represents solely the In-Use 
CNA which is the certified normal accommodation that is usable at the time the data are gathered, in 
contrast with CNA which is certified but not usable. 
 
What is apparent in those charts is the long standing and persisting 
overcrowding problem both long before and long after the introduction of prison 
privatisation which proved not helpful in alleviating the problem in the long term. 
Some short “breaks” in this trend in 1981 and 2000 are irrelevant with the 
introduction of this policy. This is not the same, though, with the course of 
occupation from the mid-1992 to mid-1993 for which the largely liberal legislation 
introduced along with prison privatisation in Criminal Justice Act 1991 should be 
also taken into consideration. This explanatory framework seems unjustified in terms 
of other jurisdictions as well. The same trajectory of prison population in relation to 
the available accommodation could be seen in the prison system of the federal State 
of Hesse; more than 10 years before the introduction of prison privatisation in 2005 
and certainly during a period in which this policy was already internationally 
prominent, overcrowding was endemic34. Similarly, Anne Larson Schneider’s data 
comparison regarding the United States found no connection between correctional 
                                                 
34 Unpublished data from Hesse Ministry of Justice (Hessische Justiz Ministerium) for the period from 
1992 to 2007. 
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privatisation and meeting increasing needs for space in prisons35. The assumption of 
the “critical point” therefore seems to be unjustified36. 
Regarding the fiscal concerns, the existing official data do not provide any 
image of the actual financial needs of prison services. What is closest to such a figure 
is the Governmental Expenditure for HM prison service in a temporal sequence. 
Those data must be used, though, under the caveat that they present primarily the 
State’s response to the prison system’s financial needs. A further problem is the 
change of methodology which hinders a sound comparison. More specifically the 
accounts up to 1992/93 were produced on a cash basis while from 1994/95 on a 
resource accounting basis. Especially the 1993/94 Income and Expenditure accounts 
were produced on a cash basis adjusted by relevant non-cash costs. The same year 
the figures for 1992/93 in order to be comparable to the following years were 
retrospectively restated to £1,333.6 million. Moreover, the data from 1974 up to 
1983 have been defined as the ‘Total Net Expenditure’ and from the following year 
up to 1993 as the ‘Total Prison Service Costs’. For the financial year 1993/94 the 
data refer to the ‘HMPS Income/Expenditure Accounts – net operating costs’ while 
from the next year up to now the data are presented as ‘HMPS OCS – net operating 













                                                 
35 A. Schneider in P. Wood 2007, p. 226. 
36 It could be argued of course that decision-makers’ conviction is a separate fact from its validity. 
This will be duly addressed in the following theoretical part of the Thesis.  
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In m£. Values subject to rounding. Prices have been calculated according to the average inflation of 
2009. Source: Data collected by virtue of the Freedom of Information Act from the Ministry of 
Justice. 
 
The second chart referring to the relationship between the expenditure for 
the public and contracted out prisons presents problems as well. On the one hand, 
there have been a number of changes in the competent authorities gathering those 
data. More specifically, up to 2002/2003 they were included in the HM Prison 
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Service Annual Reports and Accounts. Home Office became subsequently 
responsible up to 2006/2007, the year in which the Ministry of Justice became 
administratively self-contained. On the other hand, the definitions of the presented 
figures for the contracted out prisons change as well. Between 1992/1993 and 
1997/1998 the data are defined as ‘Net Operating Costs’, while for the following 
period up to 2002/2003 they refer to the ‘Expenditure’ as abstract as this term could 
be. For the next year the figure is defined as ‘Outturn’ and for the following as ‘Net 
Outturn’. Finally, the figures for 1997/1998 exclude the cost of three new prison 
institutions that were opened during that year. 
The aforementioned methodological problems would make any comparison 
methodologically unsound. Nevertheless, these data are still valuable in depicting the 
general trends. The linear regression in the first graph shows that the trend of the 
expenditure for the public prisons has been constantly rising, apart from an important 
decrease in the financial year 2005/2006 – a time point which is irrelevant anyhow 
with the introduction of prison privatisation. More revealing, however, is the trend 
presented in the second chart; with the cost of the contracted out prisons steadily 
rising itself, it seems that any fluctuation is attributed to the public rather than the 
private prisons. It could be written therefore, that the introduction of the latter didn’t 
manage to restrain the overall carceral expenditure. Nevertheless, the aforementioned 
methodological caveat, namely that the allocation of funds reflects both a political 
decision and the actual needs of the prison system remains and hinders any firm 
conclusion. 
To that problem, the rising Average Annual Cost per Prisoner could prove 
to be helpful. The combination of the expenditure per inmate with the increasing 
flow of convicts in prisons could be translated into considerable fiscal pressure to the 
Public Expenditure that overarches to a certain extent the factor of political decision 










In £. Values subject to rounding. Prices have been calculated according to the average inflation of 
2009. Source: Data collected by virtue of the Freedom of Information Act from the Ministry of 
Justice.  
 
In that chart the financial years 1993/1994 and 1997/1998 mark two 
separate methodological changes in the presentation of data. Furthermore, from year 
1997/98 onwards the cost in question refers to the establishment level excluding any 
cost in regional or national level; it’s not known, though, what was happening at the 
previous years. As a matter of fact for the last two years the overall cost per prisoner 
that includes the regional and national cost has been £39000 for 2007/2008 and 
£41000 for 2008/2009 as opposed to £27343 and £27704 accordingly which is the 
nominal cost per prisoner at the level of establishments. Leaving again those 
methodological issues aside, the trend is that of a generally stable annual cost per 
inmate with a minor increasing trajectory. Assuming that the fluctuation between 
1993/1994 and 1997/1998 is not caused by the methodological change, then the 
introduction of prison privatisation offered only short term benefits.  
By bringing together all the previous trends it could be concluded that the 
constantly increasing influx of prisoners in the prison system of England and Wales 
in combination with the almost stable average annual cost per prisoner confirms that 
the increasing expenditure for the prison system is not reflecting only political 
decisions but actual needs as well. Apart from the fact that the introduction of prison 
privatisation had only minor and certainly short-termed impact in those trends, the 
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peculiarity regarding its temporal expansion seems difficult to be explained. More 
specifically, this section started with the assumption that overcrowding and fiscal 
pressures could have reached a “critical point” beyond which prison privatisation 
should have been brought forward as a solution. Those “ever-increasing” statistical 
trends, though, reveal that in relevant circumstances there is no point in waiting for 
the “critical point”. Unless a different factor is inserted – as in the case of prison 
privatisation – the prison population and the fiscal constraints will not be diminished 
by themselves37. As a matter of fact since 1984 all the future projections of the prison 
population by the Statistical Department of the Home Office have been showing 
steeply increasing trends38. Therefore, within the “ever-present” problems of the 
prison system, the critical point is also “ever-present”. The previous example of the 
federal State of Hesse presents again a different story. With overcrowding being 
endemic until 2005 as explained before, the expenditure for the prison system being 
slightly increasing but definitely less dynamic than that of England and Wales 
(without the calculation of the inflation rate over years) and finally the average 
annual cost per prisoner place stabilized for years before and after the introduction of 
prison privatisation, the prison system seemed to be either away from a state of crisis 
or within a state of crisis long ago39. Therefore, the idea of the “critical point” is 
unsupported here as well.     
A wider analysis beyond the idea of the “critical point” would reveal that 
this analytical framework suffers also from a basic methodological flaw, namely 
mixing symptoms with causal mechanisms. Overcrowding and fiscal constraints – 
assuming that they are the reason for the introduction of prison privatisation - are 
themselves determined by other factors that could range from administrative 
measures (e.g. sentencing policy or more strict legislation) to even more exogenous 
and “unexpected” reasons (e.g. more people committing crimes or abrupt 
                                                 
37 The Criminal Justice Acts 1982 and 1988 had mixed provisions by reducing imprisonment for 
specific offences and increasing for others. The state of the prisons regarding overcrowding, though, 
was already acknowledged. See for example the comments by S. Jones 1983 on the Criminal Justice 
Act 1982. 
38 The earlier Statistical Bulletin with prison population projections retrieved was from 1984. This 
doesn’t mean, though, that even earlier data exist unpublished. See further in Home Office Statistical 
Bulletins 1984 – 2006. 
39 Data from Hesse Federal State’s Budgets (Hessische Haushalten) from 2003 to 2007, S. Meyer 
2003, H. Entorf et al. 2006, German Federal Statistical Service (Statistisches Bundesamt) 2007a and 
b. 
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demographic change) that are consequently un- or ill-defined40. It would be like 
accusing the gun for the murder and not the person who pulled the trigger.  
 
- Prison privatisation as an economic issue  
Meeting the increased incarceration needs both in terms of space and 
finance is always coupled by the idea that private prisons can lower the costs of 
construction and operation of prison facilities. Although they are “two sides of the 
same coin”, they do constitute different arguments in the sense that even if the prison 
system is not in a crisis, prison out-sourcing is still less expensive; hence, the 
privatisation. More specifically, it has already been shown in the literature of the 
previous section that we know very little about the actual financial demand for those 
services. Therefore, the discussion about the benefits of prison privatisation is 
usually supply-oriented, namely focusing on the provision by private contractors41. If 
this should have been the suggested analytical framework, then the research question 
would have been approached in connection with the terminus in every contract, 
namely, the mutual benefit of the parties. Therefore, the time gap between the 
introduction of general privatisation policies and that of prison privatisation would 
have been related to the changing profitability of investments in corrections for both 
the State and the private contractor.  
In terms of delivering the construction of prison facilities, the otherwise 
fierce criticism from prison privatisation opponents acknowledges that private 
sector’s competence to build them, in a cheap and fast way is significantly higher 
than public sector’s42. Nevertheless, prison facilities’ construction per se, is not part 
of the relevant debate, given that it doesn’t lead to any doctrinal concern. What is 
germane, however, is the delivery of correctional services and the operation of an 
entire facility. It seems to be out of question that for the private sector, investing in 
correctional services is rather profitable. Even if the first appearance had an 
experimental character, the longevity of this enterprise and more importantly the 
readiness of private companies to embark on such contracts lead to the conclusion 
                                                 
40 See for example N. Christie 1993, pp 122 – 125, K. Beyens et al. 1996, p. 255, J. DiPiano 1995, pp 
173-175, M. Ryan 1996, p. 105 and M. Hallett 2002, p. 374 and the relevant criticism in P. Wood 
2007, p. 226 and K. Nossal et al. 2004, p. 13 
41 R. Matthews 1989, p. 7. 
42 J. DiIulio 1988, p. 70. 
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that the consequent repetitions were based exactly upon the success of the 
experimentation, in other words, the significant profits for the private sector43.  
Therefore, the independent variable in the temporal expansion of prison 
privatisation resides with the State and more specifically with the anticipated 
profitability of such a contract. This further means that only under a bidding limit 
from the private provider, the public sector would reduce the expenditure for prisons. 
Therefore, different countries would start privatizing their penal system only when 
cost-effective biddings would be offered. The time point when these biddings would 
appear is not related anyhow with an official call for tenders. The reason is that 
before any actual call for biddings, a government usually proceeds to a wide-scale 
consultation; therefore the competent authorities are aware of the market’s readiness 
to take over such an assignment and by that they minimize the possibility of non-
appearance of bidders when the actual call is released. As a matter of fact, after 
several decades of prison privatisation no case of country could be retrieved that 
called for private tenders and at least one of the biddings was not considered as 
satisfactory. Probably the only such case is that of HMP Brixton in England. This 
exemption, however, is not relevant with the current research since the unsuccessful 
call for bids took place in 2000, namely several years after prison privatisation was 
introduced in England and Wales. Had the previous approach been extended, then 
according to this analytical framework, the time point in which prison contracting out 
essentially starts and therefore the time point upon which a potential temporal gap 
with general privatisation introduction could be pointed, should be sought in the 
period in which competent authorities research the market to determine its readiness 
to take over this service. Such knowledge would have been impossible to obtain, 
though, unless one has internal information from the unofficial negotiations within a 
government or between the government and market actors.  
This obstacle leads the discussion towards a different issue in this analytical 
framework. The profitability per se of privatized prisons for the State is a highly 
                                                 
43 Presenting specific data for the profitability of private correctional corporations faces several 
problems. On the one hand the relevant literature focuses on whether the State economizes capital or 
has any profit out of privatisations (see indicatively T. Pratt et al. 1999 and A. Cooper et al. 2005). 
Retrieving data directly from security companies doesn’t offer generalizable conclusions since the 
exact number of companies operating in the field including their sub-contractors is not defined. The 
most important issue, however, is that due to data protection, access to each facility’s turnover 
depends on the operating company’s willingness to publicize it.    
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contested issue in the relevant literature. Strictly indicatively it could be mentioned 
that on the one hand the State’s profit from prison contracts in the United Kingdom is 
estimated averaging at 10% in the period from 1992 to 1997 and from 13% to 18% in 
the period 1998 to 200044. On the other hand, more or less detailed analyses doubt 
the validity of such data45. For example in the case of the United States there are 
growing evidence showing that the cost difference is insignificant and more 
specifically, the savings from correctional privatisation was about 1%46. In England 
and Wales, the National Audit Office presented some case studies for individual 
prisons where the private contractor increased the expected rate of return by 81% due 
to mistaken estimation of operation costs by the public sector47. In another case, it 
was estimated that had public finance been adopted, the cost would have been the 
same48. In the case of Scotland, a plan to contract out the construction and operation 
of three prisons was based upon a report from an international financial consulting 
organisation showing that the government will profit £700m if the contracts were 
assigned to the private sector. Nevertheless, a detailed financial analysis presents 
several inconsistencies in the plan as well as in the report, concluding that the 
putative savings are questionable49. 
The only valid conclusion derived out of this debate is that there is exactly 
no valid conclusion. Other researches examining the potential cost effectiveness of 
prison privatisation lead to the same ambiguity. In 1990 an independent financial 
consulting organisation concluded that “system-wide cost analysis, either must 
sacrifice distinguishing facility characteristics upon the altar of easily grasped, but 
often misleading, system-wide averages, or it must attempt to discern, list, impute, 
factor, delete, extrapolate, and otherwise massage all such site-specific factors into a 
committee-crafted, distilled unit cost which generally bears little or no resemblance 
                                                 
44 HM Treasury 2000, p. 17 and M. Flinders 2005, p. 225. 
45 See for example A. Coyle 2007, pp 2 and 3 as well as P. van der Wel 2004 for a general assessment 
of Public-Private Partnerships. 
46 US General Accounting Office and US Department of Justice cited in A. Cooper and P. Taylor 
2005, p. 506, 
47 “Rate of return” (or abbreviated as ROR) is the ratio of money gained or lost on an investment in 
relation to the amount of money invested. 
48 National Audit Office 2000 cited in A. Cooper et al. 2005, p. 507.  
49 A. Cooper et al. 2005, p. 518. 
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to any single facility within the system”50. What is more significant, however, is that 
this is not just a theoretical assumption. It would have been naïve to assume that 
governmental decisions regarding long and expensive investment, such as prison 
privatisation, didn’t consider the aforementioned debate in advance and they didn’t 
conclude at the same uncertainty. Turning, then, to the previous assumption of that 
explanatory framework, it seems rather unjustifiable to assume that the time gap 
between the introduction of general and prison privatisation policies could be 
explained by the existence of a time point where the Public Expenditure for prisons 
exceeds the offers made by private companies,.     
Proponents of prison privatisation argue that even if it is impossible to 
compare “apples to apples” in the case or prison privatisation, private involvement 
remains a better option than public provision. The reasons for this are the flexibility, 
the lack of unnecessary bureaucracy, the expertise, the know-how and finally but 
foremost the competitive environment in which such corporations operate which lead 
to considerable decrease in both constructional and operational costs51. It’s not the 
aim of this research to evaluate this argument. Nevertheless, in detecting any 
potential connection with the distinct expansion of prison privatisation two mutually 
excluding arguments arise. If the private corporation’s efficiency is universal and 
acknowledged beyond the need of any comparison with State provision, then any 
government should proceed to the prison privatisation right after the introduction of 
general privatisation policies. If the aforementioned efficiency is ungrounded, then it 
should not proceed at all. The reality of a number of States which continue to 
privatize prisons or halted a longer program shows that an economic explanation 




The previous analytical frameworks, namely the historical analysis, 
overcrowding and fiscal constraints and economic analysis have in common a 
deterministic approach of historical development which excludes the dynamicity 
                                                 
50 Cited in W. Calabrese 1993, p. 176. See also E. Savas 1987, p. 896, J. DiIulio 1990, p. 156, A. 
James et al. 1997, p. 29, D. McDonald et al. 1998 and T. Pratt et al. 1999. 
51 Indicatively: W. Calabrese 1993, pp 179 – 182, R. Matthews 1989, p. 5 and T. Cameron cited in A. 
Cooper et al. 2005, p. 515.  
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offered by interactionist concepts52. In an attempt to avoid this, explanatory 
frameworks focusing on the society itself should be now reviewed. The debate that 
arose in both shores of the Atlantic shortly before and long after the introduction of 
prison privatisation leads to the question whether the fierce criticism could possibly 
account for any delay in the introduction of the relevant plans along with the general 
privatisation scheme. Before anything else, it’s essential to have an understanding of 
the nature of the critical arguments. The largest part of critics’ argumentation is 
already developed. At first they deconstruct the argument of overcrowding by 
arguing that prison privatisation is not a radical solution but only transfers the 
problem to a future point. Regarding the financial effectiveness of the private sector, 
they bring forward the growing amount of evidence showing the opposite. What is 
significant, however, is that they add doctrinal considerations to the previous 
allegations. More specifically, they argue that punishment is a fundamental 
governmental function and its delegation weakens the moral bond between citizens 
and the State. Furthermore, there is a certain degree of immorality in detaining 
persons for profit. Pursuing revenues is different from “making good for prisoners” 
in the same way as public service or its delegation to non-profit organisation is 
different from “making money”53. 
From this crude categorisation the universal character of the doctrinal 
consideration is apparent. Understanding incarceration as governmental function and 
the potential immorality in detaining persons from private entities could be argued 
that is derived from a modernistic approach of the State and the criminal justice 
system which applies to any country that adopted the dictates of enlightenment. 
Therefore, it could not be argued that those arguments have a more or less closer 
relationship to a specific country. Thus, the presence of doctrinal issues as such, in 
contrast with their implementation, doesn’t offer an appropriate explanatory 
framework regarding the uneven temporal expansion of prison privatisation in 
relation with the privatisation in general. 
                                                 
52 Interactionism here is used in a different way from the homonym sociological theory. It shares, 
though, the basic concept, namely, that social processes are the consequence of human interactions.  
53 See indicatively: I. Robbins 1997, pp 815-817, D. McDonald 1994, pp 36-44, M. Feeley 2002, pp 
321-322, S. Dolovich 2005, K. Nossal et al. 2004, p. 12,  J. DiIulio 1988 and C. Logan 1998. 
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The existence of doctrinal issues as such, however, is a separate factor from 
the way that they are raised and promoted in the society and this brings the 
discussion in different premises. The previous frameworks, the doctrinal issues 
included, have a common denominator which seems to be largely ignored and which 
resides – if not being the core – in the societal interactions, that of politics, since 
prison privatisation is a fundamentally political decision. Jurisdictional developments 
are certainly driven by political decisions over the expansion or the contraction of 
penality which has further consequences in prison population and fiscal constraints. 
For example the legalisation or the illegalisation of specific behaviours is established 
by laws passed through parliaments. The case of France with the massive pardons in 
each year’s eve which function as a “decompression” valve in the prison system tells 
the same story; moreover, those political decisions reflect the interactions on the 
level of the society. Additionally, it’s a governmental decision that considers the 
financial efficiency or inefficiency of private prisons, the intentional disregarding of 
the relevant debate included. The same happens with the aforementioned discourse 
over the doctrinal issues. Whether this debate will be taken into consideration or not, 
it’s again a political decision. The last case allows including in the consideration the 
influence that criticism, social movements or other various forms of pressure have in 
the formation of the political agenda and its final outcome, which is exactly part of 
the wider political question. Therefore, this research will place the research question 
in the political framework since prison privatisation as a governmental decision, 
under potential scrutiny in the political arena and subject to opposition or support 





It’s true that the question of the uneven expansion of prison privatisation 
has already been detected from the academia more than a decade ago. Nevertheless, 
only recently some critical approaches appeared examining directly that issue. A 
general overview would reveal the existence of two periods in the production of the 
relevant literature. The older one is limited in presenting the question in connection 
                                                 
54 See also R. Sparks 1994, A. James et al. 1997, pp 1, 9 and 142 and R. Weiss 1989, p. 42. 
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with a loose association with the pronounced problems for which prison privatisation 
appears as solution. It should be mentioned, though, that the main interest in this case 
was the presentation of the reasons of emergence and not the explanation of the 
peculiar expansion, which was only peripheral to it55. The recent trend is much more 
focused on approaching the expansion issue but again the main interest is in the 
spatial rather than (as here) the temporal. Researchers start by assessing theoretically 
the previous arguments and with the support of empirical data they move to new 
combinations of arguments or fundamentally different explanations; the intellectual 
production, nevertheless, until now is rather limited56. The first period is associated 
mainly with the overcrowding, fiscal and economic explanatory frameworks. The 
political character, however, is apparent in the more focused understanding of the 
second period. More specifically the analysis is developed within their political arena 
or at least considers pertinent issues. Nevertheless, rarely the researchers – from both 
periods - rely on a single argument; more often they combine several of them and 
assume that the uneven expansion is a result of their concurrence. In the following 
part of this section, which will be structured on argumentation and not on periods of 
academic literature, the analysis will be focused separately on each argument, in 
order to avoid repetitions. Furthermore, the first period’s analysis, namely 
overcrowding, fiscal and economic analyses, will not be dealt with here since they’ve 
been sufficiently analysed in the previous section. Finally, an important caveat must 
be stressed. As mentioned before, these approaches consider mainly the spatial 
expansion rather than the temporal one or the explanation of the gap period between 
the introduction of general and prison privatisation policies. Therefore, any criticism 
seems improper if arbitrarily taken into consideration in a different level of 
discussion. Thus, this section will only explore the possibilities of extending the 
argumentation in question to the field of the main research question, which further 
means that this is not a direct adoption or negation of these approaches.  
 
 
                                                 
55 See for example M. Ryan 1996, M. Ryan 2003, K. Beyens et al. 1996, N. Christie 1993, J. DiPiano 
1995, D. Garland 2001, V. Stern 2006, A. Worrall 2000, C. Parenti 1999, P. Wood et al. 2003, J. Lilly 
et al. 1992, and J. Lilly et al. 1996.  
56 See for example P. Wood 2007, K. Nossal et al. 2004, M. Cavadino et al. 2006 and R. Harding 
1997. 
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- The globalisation set 
Several researchers find a connection between the distinctive spread of 
contracted out prisons and an international network of exchange and influence. What 
is otherwise called the phenomenon of Globalisation seems to play a distinctive role 
in the developments of the criminal justice system mainly in the economic and 
political dimension. More specifically three international conditions, namely the 
pressure from international markets, the neo-conservative politics and the 
correctional/commercial complex – what shall be called henceforth the Globalisation 
set, seem to influence the expansion of prison privatisation. Starting from the 
economic dimension, the global market of labour-power, capital and natural 
resources has created an environment in which integrated national markets are 
nothing but knots in a wide net of financial relationships. In an environment of easy 
capital movement national politics gradually lose their dynamic since political 
decisions are forced to follow specific, and most of the times common, orientations 
in order to avoid private capital being invested in a tax-friendlier country. Otherwise, 
the country may be isolated in the periphery of development. Therefore, the 
convergence around privatisation and managerialism is to be attributed to the 
globalisation-induced marketisation. Correctional policies are not an exception to 
this logic and as a result prison privatisation emerges and spreads57. The uneven 
expansion of prisons for profit could possibly be subject to the degree that a 
country’s economy is integrated into this network of free markets. 
This argument doesn’t seem to be a useful tool since it exhibits weaknesses 
in modelling the expansion of prison privatisation. As a matter of fact, there have 
been countries that, although they opened the domestic markets to the international 
commercial transactions, reduced interventionism, followed directions from 
international economic institutions and even introduced privatisation, they were 
significantly late in opening their corrections system to the market, as the example of 
England and Wales, Canada, New Zealand and Germany demonstrates. The actual 
problem of that account lies with the fact that it doesn’t provide any in-depth 
explanation for the connection it detects. The decisive importance of globalized 
market is thought either to provide incentives or exert pressure in national 
                                                 
57 D. Garland 2001 pp 163 – 165 and pp 116 - 117, N. Christie 1993 pp 122 – 125 and V. Stern 2006.  
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economies. Nevertheless, the domestic politics still play a significant role as the filter 
through which the exogenous pressures are institutionalized. In this process policies 
may not be adopted or they may take a different form. What is mistakenly perceived, 
in other words, is that political choices are part of a relations’ framework in which 
their relative autonomy is ignored. Patterns of social development, though, may 
produce different outcomes even when the international market pressure is the 
same58.   
The previous argument being rather vague and abstract is often combined 
with the assumption that a complex of interests vested in corrections plays a highly 
influential role in the political decision to adopt prison privatisation. It was shown 
before that the corrections market is dominated by five big companies. There are 
evidences, at least for the United States and United Kingdom, showing that interests 
in correctional industry have well-established links with the legislative and executive 
bodies, the leading parties, sources of expert opinion, wider political networks 
dedicated to the privatisation of public services and financial institutions. 
Indicatively it could be mentioned that Wackenhut was a major contributor in 
George W. Bush’s inauguration in 200159. The case of Westminster politics is much 
more illustrative. In 1987 the chairman of a House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee, Sir Edward Gardner, after publishing a report for the private 
involvement in construction and management in custodial institutions, was recruited 
as Chairman of Contract Prisons, a company founded to exploit the new 
opportunities. His appointment opened the path for other senior Conservative 
politicians, former senior prison service staff, senior civil servants and members of 
the Prison Inspectorate60. From this perspective, what determines the emergence as 
well as the expansion of privatized prisons is the ability of private companies to 
lobby and wield political influence61. 
Although, the so called correctional – commercial complex is a plausible 
explanation, several problems would occur from a deeper evidence-based analysis. In 
the United States the major correctional firms experience a recession from 1998 
                                                 
58 See for example P. Wood 2007, p. 227. 
59 P. Wood 2007, p. 231.  
60 M. Cavadino et al. 2007, p. 254. 
61 P. Wood 2007, p. 232, K. Nossal et al. 2004, p. 17, C. Parenti 1999, pp 211 – 225, P. Wood et al. 
2003, p. 150, J. Lilly et al. 1992, J. Lilly et al. 1996.  
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onwards. CCA faces fiscal difficulties and retreats from the contracts outside the 
United States. Wackenhut, on the other hand, is wholesale bought by Group 4 
Securicor. It could be argued that this development results from the escalating 
competition. Nevertheless, at the same period private firms witnessed a decrease in 
the flow of inmates. In 2002 CCA was running at about 87% of capacity. 
Additionally, all companies were fined at some point for inadequate performance and 
contracts were even revoked in both the United Kingdom and the United States62. 
These being the opposite signs of a favoured relationship the lobbying capacity of the 
correctional - commercial complex could not be solely supported to explain the 
temporal and spatial peculiar expansion of prison privatisation. 
Closely related with the issues of the international market and the lobbying 
capacity of capital investments in corrections is the argument of the common culture 
in countries that prison privatisation had made most headway. Indeed English 
speaking countries like the United States, United Kingdom and Australia are both the 
pioneering jurisdictions and the more advanced in this field. The common language, 
culture, legal traditions, the long-standing financial, investment and trade links are 
held to be reasons that prison privatisation has expanded there63. The serious flaws of 
this argument, however, have already been recognized. Traditional trade links may 
ease expansion in the short term but the profits stemming out of such investments 
overarch cultural differences providing incentives to change political stance. As 
shown before, France was one of the first countries which adopted prison 
privatisation. Additionally, one of the leading correctional corporations is Sodexo 
which is based in France. On the other hand there is significant delay between 
English speaking jurisdictions as well. Canada and New Zealand privatized prison 
facilities almost two decades after it was first introduced in the United States and 
many years after the first State enterprises were privatized. More generally this so-
called lobbying capacity suffers from serious inductive flaws that have already been 
recognized64. 
                                                 
62 P. Wood 2007, p. 233. 
63 M. Cavadino et al. 2006, p. 327 and K. Nossal et al. 2004, p. 17. 
64 See for example the objections raised by L. Wacquant 2009 against the prison-industrial complex 
and an attempt to bridge the opposing views on that issue by I. Papageorgiou et al. 2012.   
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The political dimension in the Globalisation set is provided by the 
dominating position of New-Right governments in the domestic political scene. This 
development is presented as a necessary complement to the pressure exerted by the 
international market and the lobbying action of the capital. The New-Right 
governments introduced in the domestic political field specific international trends 
like the achievement of the highest possible financial efficiency which amongst other 
things requires reduced public expenditure. In parallel New-Right governments’ 
support of conservative societal policies like the implementation of 
“responsibilisation” in managing marginalized population results in an increasing 
percentage of population under the need of welfare support which moreover 
increases the public expenditure65. To these conflicting policies the New-Right 
answer is “rolling back the State”; in other words the delegation of State functions to 
the private sector either through privatisation or Public-Private Partnerships66. 
Bringing now the issue of prison privatisation under this prism would reveal that 
responsibilisation in the context of crime management promotes Law and Order 
policy which has significant consequences in increasing the flow of convicted 
persons in prison and in expanding the expenditure for prison system. Keeping into 
consideration that the criminal justice system is one of the traditional State functions 
posing a very high financial burden without producing any revenue, the private 
sector’s interference would seem unavoidable.  Thus, privatizing the criminal justice 
system and especially prisons stands as a substantial consideration of New-Right 
governments when they actively promote privatisation politics67.  
The dominance of a neo-conservative party in the political scene seems to 
fit as an explanation for the issue of emergence. As a matter of fact, in the cases 
examined until now, it was a Right government that introduced the corrections 
                                                 
65 See for example N. Deakin 2002, p. 138. He presents the three possible explanations of social 
exclusion and the relevant reactions according to them. The neoliberal approach is that social 
exclusion is a symptom of cultural factors and more specifically the inability or unwillingness of the 
excluded to act on their own behalf. It is also mentioned that this approach is an influence from 
international trends originating from the United States. 
66 P. Wood 2007, p. 228, K. Nossal et al. 2004, p. 14, M. Cavadino et al. 2007, pp 27and 29, M. Ryan 
2003, pp 81 and 85 and J. Young 2002, p. 459.   
67 M. Cavadino et al. 2007, pp 28 and 29, M. Cavadino et al. 2006, p. 326, R. Matthews 1989, p. 4, L. 
Wacquant 2001, p. 79, A. Worrall 2000, p. 393, C. Parenti 1999, pp xii and 174 – 177, P. Wood et al. 
2003, p. 150.  
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privatisation policy68. Scotland constitutes an exemption that could be, however, 
explained under the view of the special relationship with England and Wales and the 
political developments there69. The problem, though, lies with the crucial for this 
research issue of the temporal gap between general privatisation and prison 
privatisation policies. Examples like that of the Federal State of Hesse, which has a 
long conservative and neoliberal tradition, entered prison privatisation only recently 
(2005). The case of England and Wales is also illustrative since it took four 
Conservative governments before prison privatisation is legally established in 1991. 
On the other hand, the change of government didn’t always bring correctional 
privatisation to a halt as the cases of England and Wales and Scotland illustrate70. 
In the general framework that has been described above some particularly 
influential analyses need to be mentioned. David Garland in his widely cited book 
The Culture of Control71 brings forward the interplay of the factors analysed above. 
In the development of the criminal justice system in the United States and the UK he 
identified a number of changes appearing after the 1970s72. In accounting for those 
changes, he connects them with socio-political transformations characterising late 
modernity and the reactions to them73.  The theory employed is described as action-
centred problem solving in which socially situated actors reproduce the structures 
that enable or constraint their actions. From a series of possible reactions to the 
problems posed, a process of practical political and cultural selection define the 
emergence of solutions. In this framework, social classes that had once supported 
welfare policies “came to think and feel” that welfare is a luxury in the difficult 
economic conditions after the 1970s when the penal welfarism of the '30s and the 
'40s was “a dim historical memory”74. 
                                                 
68 See K. Nossal et al. 2004 for an overview. 
69 P. Wood 2007, pp 225 and 230 and K. Nossal et al. 2004, p. 15 however, retain some objections in 
this argument based on the fact that the geographical uneven expansion seems to apply at the 
traditional conservative South of the United States. Some of those States, like California, Texas, 
Oklahoma and Florida, outnumber the rest that have a rather mediocre reliance on for-profit prison 
facilities. 
70 It is confirmed, though, in the case of New Zealand and Canada. 
71 D. Garland 2001. 
72 D. Garland 2001, pp 8-20. 
73 D. Garland 2001, pp 78 et seq. 
74 D. Garland 2001, p. 77. 
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This thorough presentation of changes in criminal justice, focuses solely on 
the United State and the UK. Aside some historical misrepresentations75 and the 
peculiar way that classes “think”, “feel” or have “memory” when there appears no 
definition of class, the most important problem is the fact that this is the history of 
the sensitivities of what is understood as middle class neglecting others. As a 
consequence, the economic developments and the political solutions during the 20th 
century, by reflecting this class, appear as inescapable reality. This is a sui generis 
economism, since there appear the consequence of economism, inescapable social 
development, without reference to economic exegeses. As a matter of fact Garland 
addresses the analytical problems by reference to cultural changes that appear as 
autonomous factor in the expense of economic explanations. “Communities of 
choice” instead of “fate”, democratisation, individualism or hedonism might have 
indeed eroded social solidarity but are interrelated explananda along with the 
economy in which not only the middle class but the entire society is active but not 
the explanantia. 
Following Garland's paradigm, Jonathan Simon's book Governing through 
crime76 identifies as well the sequence of changes in criminal justice. In the 1960s 
Criminal Justice System became the “model problem” for governance in the United 
States. Behind the various forms of law there is a coercive background based on 
violence. Given that all governance takes place under a structure of legal authority, 
violence and consequently crime become central administrative feature. As long as 
the rationality of the governance is structured through the action, violence and crime 
become analytical tools for the interpretation of an array of social action as 
governance problems. In accounting for this transformation, he relies on Garland's 
work and specifically on cultural predicates of the American society and the fact that 
crime was the most obvious way to materialise social and political planning against 
the arising challenges77.  
The reliance on Garland's work brings forward the objections analysed 
before. Apart from that, however, a different criticism comes from the overfocus on 
                                                 
75 As in the case of the supposedly unexpected emergence of the 1973 crisis (pp 79-82). See 
analytically in the Appendix. 
76 J. Simon 2007. 
77 J. Simon 2007, pp 14-29. 
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case law, due process, legal texts and the general perception of social contradiction 
through Justice. The legal context provides only a partial index of social interaction 
that excludes the most repressed parts of the society. The latter appear only at a 
second instance as subjects of security. It appears, therefore, that Simon's work is 
like Garland's history of the American middle class. The role of the “voiceless”, is 
absent from the analysis. More importantly, however, Simon's reliance upon legal 
texts constitutes his initial short Foucauldian approach78 a dead letter. The concept of 
governmentality introduced by the latter is much wider than the formation of the 
legal framework and definitely could not be reduced to jurisprudence. 
Nils Christie, in Crime Control as Industry79 has provided arguments that 
fall within the contours of the previous exposition. He analyses the economic 
dimension of criminal justice developments that include the pressure for privatisation 
in conjunction with a new perspective of cultural nexuses80. The basic argument is 
that prison in industrialised countries softens the dissonance of welfare policy with 
the idea that consumption is inextricably connected to production through the 
absorption of the costs for individuals outside the production process. This is feasible 
by reducing unemployment, bringing idle population under control, creating 
underpaid labour force by convicts and by prison system consumption81. He stresses 
the counteracting influences in those developments, assigned, however, in a common 
cultural base among humanity. 
Christie's argumentation is rather a wish than a socio-political analysis 
because of an unsuccessful attempt to balance between materialism and morality. 
The basis of his argument is a valuable materialist approach regarding the 
convergence of various interests behind the emergence of globalisation in criminal 
justice policies. The counter-acting influences, however, are placed in a 
transcendental level of ill-defined societal values82. It seems, therefore, that the 
course of the criminal justice is realistically inescapable but the pressure against it 
abstractly vague.  
                                                 
78 J. Simon 2007, p. 16 et seq. 
79 N. Christie 1993. 
80 N. Christie 1993, pp 122-125 and 175-185. 
81 N. Christie 1993, p. 115. 
82 See for example N. Christie 1993, pp 12-13, 99-103 and 109.  
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Dario Melossi, in Controlling crime, controlling society83, holds that 
changes in penality are connected to the long economic cycles which are induced by 
the actors of the politico-economic clash, namely the workers, the entrepreneurs and 
the State as a third adjudicating party between them. The long cyclical movements 
are caused by the autonomous but interactive economic, political and cultural 
contributions of those actors. Melossi focuses on the migration flows, caused by the 
cycles, in order to explain the development of penality. The “newcomers” lack the 
sense of community and are more likely to pursue personal interests in the expense 
of wider ones. The result is a “bifurcation” in the moral economy of the working 
class between a respectable “old” working class and a “new” fraction subject to 
extensive criminalisation84. Penality does not stand on the superstructure of the 
economy but is constitutive of the production process. From this point of view, 
imprisonment instead of being the product of economic choices is constitutive of 
those choices; it becomes the standard-bearer in a moral vision of the world. Mass 
incarceration, therefore, is not the result of class conflict but integral part of it. It acts 
in a symbolic and cultural level for the “old” working class and as a proper 
containment of the “new” one in leading it towards a “pathway to the secondary 
labour market”85. 
The first problem is that, in a patchwork of cycle theories, he asserts the 
validity of Kondratiev 50-years cycle, focuses on the migration flows of Kuznets 18-
years swing and uses Schumpeter’s concept of 'secular trend' improperly beyond 
macro-economics86. The macro-economic specificity, however, cannot be 
accommodated with the sociological analysis that is compatible with exceptions in 
penality development. In order to address that, culture comes in the equation. 
Assuming that it could be defined somehow in order to become a proper analytical 
tool, the fact that is appointed with complete autonomy obscures even more its use87. 
Finally, the analysis depends on an ad hoc analysis of some defined fields (economy 
and politics) and of an undefined (culture). The most crucial problem, however, is 
that Melossi mixes a concrete reality, namely imprisonment, with an ideological 
                                                 
83 D. Melossi 2008. 
84 D. Melossi 2008, pp. 230 et seq. 
85 D. Melossi 2008, pp 246-247. 
86 D. Melossi 2008, pp 230 et seq. See also T. Sakellaropoulos 2003 and J. Schumpeter 1961. 
87 See K. Polanyi 1944, p, 10 for a materialist sociological approach on culture. 
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construct, namely penality. He approaches the symbolic function of imprisonment as 
equally constructive of class relations and not just their product. Class formation, 
instead of objective reality, becomes a matter of choice; of the choice to subordinate 
to legislation or not88. 
 
- The commodification of citizenry 
The combination of the three aforementioned globalisation conditions has 
been used as a generally valid explanation for the emergence of prison privatisation. 
When this analysis comes to the issue of the temporal expansion of contracted out 
prisons, it seems to suffer from weaknesses. They are indispensable but not sufficient 
conditions in providing an explanation. The existence of one or more conditions that 
obstacle the political decision to privatize prisons could provide an answer before 
any analysis resorts to the randomness of human decisions. In this framework a part 
of the literature argues that globalisation results to convergence as well as national 
differentiations because of social factors that are mainly related to cultures, and 
traditions89.  
Michael Cavadino and James Dignan in their book Penal Systems, a 
comparative approach90 provide a rationalisation of the uneven expansion of prison 
privatisation by arguing that, given the globalisation set of conditions, the degree of 
‘commodification’ of a country’s population could be a sustainable explanation for 
the distinctive spread of contracted out prisons. Based on the analysis by Gøsta 
Esping Andersen they perceive citizens’ dependency to market forces and not the 
State for their well being as of crucial importance. The ‘commodification’ – as this 
process is termed - of non-convicted citizens, by reducing the ideological resistance 
towards the provision of services by the private sector, opens the door for the 
commodification of the incarcerated population as well. Moreover, approaching 
convicted population as a potential source of profit could include amongst others the 
privatisation of prisons91. 
Cavadino and Dignan start from a simple inductive reasoning. They 
observed that countries with extensively contracted out correctional system have also 
                                                 
88 See also D. Melossi 2008, p. 246. 
89 P. Wood 2007, p. 227. 
90 M. Cavadino et al. 2007 
91 M. Cavadino et al. 2007, p. 327. 
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a long history of dependency on market forces to cover citizens’ welfare needs. In 
other words, they observed a connection between citizenry’s commodification and 
prison privatisation. The problem of this explanation is reasoning per se. The 
reference of United States as an example of extended commodification and Nordic 
countries for the opposite is so wide that disregards the case of countries that stand in 
the middle of this spectrum. They employ the discourse by Gøsta Esping Andersen 
over the three different versions of welfare92. In-between the neoliberal welfare State 
and the social-democratic one, the latter includes the corporatist version. In that case 
there is no obsession with market efficiency and citizenry commodification. Social 
rights, therefore, are attached to class and status. Corporatism is subsumed under a 
State edifice perfectly ready to displace market as a provider of welfare but only 
when other social institutions have failed. Practically, in this model de-
commodification is a relative notion. Market dependency of the citizens is rather 
limited; however, they are attached to their class or status and dependent exactly on 
the way that a central authority treats their class or status. As a result the social 
stratification is not based on capitalist or socialist principles; it is rather an elitist 
model, where the elite could be the class of people having that specific status most 
favoured by the State. The unfavoured statuses are suffering from social exclusion, 
which promotes at least dualism instead of solidarity. 
Therefore, the analysis by Cavadino and Dignan disregards the case of 
corporatist States where the notion of citizenry commodification doesn’t exist under 
the criteria set for neoliberal and social-democratic models. As a matter of fact, the 
case of France and Germany are illustrative. Gøsta Esping Andersen places both 
countries in the group in question93. Indeed, a qualitative difference could be 
observed since both adopted semi-privatisation of prisons facilities. Nevertheless, 
France entered the correctional privatisation market in 1987 only one year after 
Jacques Chirac took office and started his privatisation plan. Germany (and more 
specifically, only one Federal State), on the other hand started the carceral 
privatisation in 2005 which is 21 years after the initiation of general privatisation. 
                                                 
92 G. Esping – Andersen 1990, chapter 1. 
93 At the same conclusion arrives Francis Castles 2004 by using a different methodology to provide 
typologies of welfare States. He is based upon detailed indexes of Public Expenditure of OECD 
member countries. 
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Similar discrepancies have already been presented in reference to the neoliberal 
welfare States and most notably for England and Wales which is crucial for this 
research. So the commodification explanation seems insufficient at least in terms of 
the neoliberal and corporatist welfare States. As in the previous explanation related 
with globalisation, the argument in question seem to be only partly valid. Hence, a 
deeper analysis is needed.  
Nicola Lacey's book The Prisoner's Dilemma94 falls in the “country 
typologies” tradition, in an innovative way. Structural theories combine with Marxist 
predicates through cultural filters in an institutional logic. In what she defines as co-
ordinated market economies, the highly specialised production requires the 
protection of labour skills through a welfare net that secures workers in periods of 
hardship. The welfare State increases the redistribution of wealth, the representation 
of interest groups and generally a centre-left bias in political decisions based on 
consensus. That policy leads to proportional voting system that further fosters 
consensus creating a tradition of coalition governments. Welfare in criminal justice 
means that the interlocking of institutions converge towards extensive informal 
social control which supports the cultural attitudes for a lenient system of 
punishment. The other side of the coin, is that those economies tend to be exclusive 
regarding cultural outsiders due to the burden of their inclusion. Liberal market 
economy, on the other hand, is based on less specialised production making 
labourers “dispensable”, the social welfare very weak, the voting system majoritarian 
and the bureaucracy politicised. Those systems are more inclusive to immigrants due 
to the need for cheap and unskilled labour, but they are also prone to single-issue 
pressure groups, especially when they appeal to the anxieties of the median voter. 
The diminished welfare State along with single-party governments increases the 
appeal of those fears and reflects them in the development of criminal justice 
system95. 
As with every country-typology attempt, the extent to which the error 
margins of the central paradigm against exceptions remain undefined, the initial 
enterprise is questioned96. But more serious questions have been raised in a special 
                                                 
94 N. Lacey 2008. 
95 N. Lacey 2008, chapter 2. A schematic summary in p. 62. 
96 See further N. Lacey 2008, p. 61, L. McAra 2011, D. Nelken 2011 and D. Downes 2011. 
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issue of Punishment and Society97. Lesley McAra wonders whether imprisonment 
rates, instead of community sanctions for example, are a safe index of penality98. 
David Nelken suggests the comparison of rates of imprisonment, both as number of 
convicts and days of imprisonment, along with the rates of crime before a safe 
conclusion and wonders if punitiveness and tolerance are the two ends of the same 
continuum99. Those questions echo the aforementioned connection of concrete reality 
with ideological constructs and the previous criticism over the ill-defined culture in 
the framework of Melossi's work analysis. Finally, as Cavadino and Dignan do, 
Lacey depicts a dynamic image of society which still reflects particular constraints 
that reproduce given power flows. From this point of view, it's interesting to examine 
Lacey's conclusions under the current international economic recession which 
reduces the living standards in every system100.  
 
- The political culture 
In the same strand of the literature trying to unravel the effects of 
globalisation by referring to different or common cultures, belongs the approach of 
Richard W. Harding. In his book, Private prisons and public accountability101, he 
makes a hypothesis on the future projections of prison privatisation expansion by 
asserting that, contracting out the full management of correctional facilities will not 
become a feature of the penal practice of continental Europe for the foreseeable 
future.  
He supports this prognosis based on the works of Heike Jung, Uriel 
Rosenthal and Bob Hoogenboom. They hold that the political culture in reference to 
the State in continental Europe is different from the Anglo-Saxon one. More 
specifically, the development of a State-based system of crime control is closely 
linked to the development of the modern State since the period of Enlightenment. 
The monopoly of force is considered as an essential attribute of the modern State and 
                                                 
97 Punishment and Society, Vol. 13:1, 2011. 
98 L. McAra 2011, pp 99-101. 
99 D. Nelken 2011, p. 107 et seq. 
100 See also D. Downes 2011, p. 117. 
101 R. Harding 1997. 
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its sovereignty from both sides of the English Channel102. The public’s perception of 
the State, however, developed differently.  
The continental European State as ideal type is seen as much more than a 
“service institution”. It’s at the apex of the collective hierarchy and its officials are 
sui generis experts. The notion of sovereignty along with centralisation and 
bureaucracy embed into the philosophical approach of the State. What is more 
important though is the fact that, given that people are principally citizens, this view 
of the State is internalized by the public as symbol. As a result issues concerning the 
transformation of the State are always filtered through a discourse on the continuance 
of its organic identity and sovereignty. In contrast, in Anglo-Saxon political culture 
the State has less abstract connotations. The distinction between State and Civil 
Society is rather obvious and it bears no special symbolism but it’s another pattern of 
service provision. Therefore, the issue of central authority functions is primarily 
related to questions of efficiency and effectiveness rather than to issues of State 
transformation103. 
By transferring the previous approach to the issue of prison privatisation, 
the theorists seem to agree that its distinctive expansion could be attributed to the 
political culture divergence between continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon world. 
The reason is that prison contracting-out reflects a State transformation which in the 
first case is considered as attrition of its sovereignty whereas in the second as more 
efficient provision. Therefore, the political culture seems to block in specific cases 
the privatisation of the full management of correctional facilities.  
This analysis seems prima facie to provide a plausible account of the 
distinctive expansion of prison privatisation. In a second reading, though, some 
limitations appear. Regarding this specific research the most significant of them is 
that it refers only to the spatial dimension of the expansion allowing no space for use 
in the temporal one. But even in the framework of its originally intended field of 
exploration lack of dynamic analysis could be witnessed. Based upon a 
contemporary image it projects statically the same view in the future without taking 
into account any possible change of circumstances. But what lies at the heart of the 
aforementioned limitations is a deeper analysis on how the mechanism of political 
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culture operates, how new collective experiences are being inscribed and how they 
affect thereafter the political developments. Such an elaboration would be used in 
affirming or objecting any potential prognosis.  
 
The above analyses have been an attempt to deconstruct the previous 
approaches within their “ideological premises”, namely by respecting the network of 
ideas their using and testing their consistency instead. Nevertheless, if a new 
approach should be structured, the reasons behind the inconsistency in each approach 
should be detected, which also requires taking distances from them and acknowledge 
the specific stand-point upon which this research stand. The ‘globalisation set’ 
explanation uses an approach in which a linear sequence between causes and 
consequences is to be attributed for the distinctive expansion of prison privatisation. 
Although the conditions presented are international and common between the 
jurisdictions that have taken into consideration, it fails to explain national 
exemptions from the basic model. National socio-political formations and more 
specifically their capability of accelerating or halting developments are generally 
ignored and this might account for that failure. The ‘citizenry commodification’ 
explanation avoids the previous conundrum by focusing upon a more fundamental 
relationship between the “character” of a society and more specifically to its 
openness towards prison privatisation. Its failure might be seen in the characteristics 
attributed to societies. They are presented as non dynamic entities that function 
holistically, namely, without diversifications by their parts. Such an approach, unless 
its analytical ability is reduced to a snapshot of the present, is obliged to take for 
granted that societies didn’t, don’t and will not change. At the same time, it has to 
take over-deterministically as given the fact that each Social Formation is expected 
to follow specific paths in prison privatisation. The very effect of this latter drawback 
of the explanation in question is that it doesn’t consider the effects of class 
struggle104. Finally, ‘political culture’ – taking as a given that this concept exists and 
                                                 
104 In the original contribution by Gøsta Esping Andersen, where “citizenry commodification” is 
practically based, the differentiation between the “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” is attributed – 
amongst else – to the notion of social stratification. Its static analysis, however, could only be valuable 
as a snapshot of a time point where class struggle’s effects wouldn’t be visible. Otherwise, it has to 
pre-suppose that there is no class struggle or that even if there is one, it doesn’t have the power to 
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its characteristics are determinable – presupposes that society functions unanimously 
“deciding” according to some vague directions embedded in a collective 
unconscious. This approach could not be disregarded right away. However, unless 
the “mystical” approach of the collective unconscious function is rationalized, it 
leaves no other exegesis than the actual “apotheosis” of the society; the assumption, 
in other words, that a Social Formation is a – literally - living organisation which 
further resembles to projecting upon the whole society the Hegelian approach of free 
will.   
In an attempt to avoid those presuppositions, this research will follow a 
completely different direction. Special focus will be devoted to two elements that are 
implied in the aforementioned approaches but are not sufficiently researched. The 
first one regards the society itself. The concept of People, either as individuals or 
groups, exists indeed in both the ‘commodification of citizenry’ and the ‘political 
culture’. As already pointed, though, in the first case they are presented as passive 
receivers of political decisions, unable to resist them; they are moulded according to 
the needs of the political elite. In the second case the People has the power to shape 
its future indeed but according to an ill-defined and pre-determined mechanism. 
Marxism, on the other hand, and more specifically historical materialism, has exactly 
those analytical tools that bring forward the class struggle in historiography. Those 
tools provide scope for the relevant analysis and therefore for the receptiveness or 
resistance of the society to changes. The second element regards the State. 
Privatisation and more specifically prison privatisation is basically a question over 
the essence of the State, its boundaries – in relation to the Civil Society - and its 
functions. Those boundaries and functions, however, cannot be seen as a fait 
accompli. The very emergence of prison privatisation proves that the State is 
constantly developing and transforming to different forms. Analysing the 
mechanisms of those transformations appears, therefore, cardinal to the issues 
discussed in this Thesis. The structural Marxist strand of theory within historical 
materialism – previously influential but unfairly neglected for some decades - is 
another expedient analytical tool since it brings class struggle analysis in conjunction 
with a detailed approach of the State and its Apparatuses. The State in this thesis is 
                                                                                                                                          
change the direction of developments. “Citizenry commodification” approach faces the same pitfall in 
trying to explain the distinctive expansion of prison privatisation. 
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especially important because it’s not only the field where class controversies are 
materialized but exactly the very result of the class contradictions. This allows for 
some speculation on the temporal emergence of prison privatisation in a different 
perspective from the previous approaches. Having this in mind, the next part of this 
Thesis will reconstruct some basic concepts of structural Marxism in order to gather 
the necessary analytical tools before structuring an explanation of the asynchrony of 





Before that reconstruction, however, it would be useful to critically asses a 
range of Marxist approaches on punishment. The issue of punishment, however, is 
inextricably linked to materialist perspectives of criminality due to the non-ethical or 
anti-Hegelian nature of Marxism. This appears in Marxian analyses, although not 
directly. Apart from a parody text regarding the social need of theft105, the only other, 
non exemplificatory106,  reference to criminal and penal issues appears in the Debates 
on the Law of Thefts of Wood107. This is where Marx observes the class-related origin 
of the property crime and connects that ascertainment with the way that criminal 
justice system fosters class interests since the State is dominated by the same forces. 
In this framework, he identifies a connection between punishment and value which, 
by gradual abstraction, leads him to concluding that modern punishment reflects 
capital reproduction. Property crime is defined by objective limitations; while 
punishment has to correspond to them. The connection between the two is value, 
namely the way that property communicated, measured and limited. Value “must 
likewise be the objective and essential defining element of the punishment”108. Thus, 
economic postulates permeate and engraft the field of penology and become 
centralised. They even reach the level of temporary serfdom of the debtor which 
transforms a civil claim to privatised punishment – an initial reference to correctional 
privatisation. To a degree this is almost a primitive accumulation in the field of 
punishment. In those articles, however, Marx on the one hand presents legislation as 
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The Expansion of Prison Privatisation; a Political Conundrum   49 
 
a direct reflection of private interests, while on the other he projects an idealist 
approach regarding the function of law and the State. It should be noted, though, that 
young Marx wrote those articles under extreme censorship, for propaganda purposes, 
while, he was still influenced by Hegelian idealism. 
The connection between value and punishment becomes the central concept 
in Pashukanis' legal theory. The core of his theory is that law is conditioned upon the 
principle of equivalent exchange, since the fundamental relation in law is that of 
commodity exchange109. The product of labour becomes a commodity because it's 
appointed with value, while the persons that participated in this process become 
owners and potential owners of that commodity. The human being, therefore, 
becomes subject, and subject of law, exactly because it is contrasted to an object. The 
criterion of its legal subjectification is the ownership or potential ownership of the 
produced commodity110. This is vividly apparent in criminal law which re-enacts 
equivalent exchange. Jus talionis, imprisonment or fine refer to measurable values. 
Moreover, the aims of production process, profit making and class domination, 
appear also in punishment. Criminal law is substantially abstract, having discarded 
the perception of private conflict, but essentially material in being a means of 
immediate class struggle.  
Against this delicate theoretical construct a shortcoming regards the fact 
that jurisprudence is linearly connected to the will of the dominant class. According 
to Pashukanis, role of the State is to protect the process of commodity circulation, 
fostering by that the dominant class interests. To avoid instrumentalism, Pashukanis 
suggests that exchange value eclipses if imposed by an authority instead of offer and 
demand. The State, therefore, as impersonal authority but at the same time as the 
collective will regulates the market in favour of a class111. Seemingly plausible, this 
analysis, however, disregards the role of class struggle; while the materiality of the 
State, and along with it the market, the legislation and the judicial system, being 
controlled by the bourgeois classes is reduced to the deception of the masses. 
Nevertheless, Pashukanis remains important for showing that a legal transformation, 
such as the introduction of prison privatisation, reflects in essence a preceding 
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110 E. Pashukanis 2003, pp 113 et seq. 
111 E. Pashukanis 2003, pp 134 et seq. 
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transformation in the field of the State, which, in contrast to a mere legal form, is the 
raison d’être of law. As such, it demarcates the distinction between public and 
private law by its contraction or expansion. Bringing, however, this ascertainment in 
prison privatisation, would reveal a gap in Pashukanis' logic. The contraction of the 
State goes parri pasu the commodity exchange logic in the function of law and State 
but cannot accommodate deception. 
Ferrajoli and Zolo are not providing a Marxist approach as such but flesh-
out three Marxian theses on criminal justice dispersed among his general work. The 
first is the structural character of unemployment in the Capitalist Mode of Production 
which, as criminonogenic factor, marginalises the lumpen-proletariat. This is an 
extension of the already seen Marxian analysis of the class origin of property crime 
common to many Marxist criminologists112. The second is the abstraction of 
bourgeois culpability based on the ideation of the “free and self-determining 
individual”. The third reflects the previous two and requires the intervention in those 
fields for an effective anti-crime policy113. Based on those ascertainments, they reject 
State theories by Lenin or Pashukanis because they lead to criminological 
economism or criminological holism114. The central objection, however, against 
Ferrajoli's and Zolo's article is the way that treat Marxism epistemologically115. They 
acknowledge in Marxism limited scientific status in the sense that it cannot have its 
own methodology or analytical tools. As a non “general science” it cannot dismiss 
other non Marxist sciences. The issues of epistemology and proof seem to be the 
crux of disagreement not only with Ferrajoli and Zolo but with a number of theorists 
such as Reiman116 and Akers117. Marxism, however, is neither a philosophy, nor a 
theory or ideology. It's the science of the evolution of history based on human needs 
                                                 
112 See for example J. Reiman et al. 1981 where he makes an important distinction between crime as 
rational economic behaviour and criminalisation as class-related characterisation of that behaviour 
which is connected, although over-simplistically, with the periodic economic crises and R. Quinney 
1977. 
113 L. Ferrajoli et al. 1985, pp 84-90. 
114 L. Ferrajoli et al. 1985, p. 73. Nevertheless, their understanding of both theories is plagued by 
misunderstandings such as the failure to discern between law and regulation in Pashukanis and the 
identification of instrumentalism or the literal translation of 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in Lenin. 
115 L. Ferrajoli et al. 1985, p. 73. 
116 J. Reiman 1987 where he is ambivalent on the nature of Marxism. He describes it as science (p. 
30), as theory (pp 33-34) or as moral philosophy (p. 30).  
117 R. Akers 1979 where he suggests the testability of Marxism through its various implementations. 
See also M. Cowling 2011 and K. Lasslett 2011. 
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and as such it cannot be tested. It stems from a philosophy, empiricism, but it has its 
own historicity and consistency. A science provides its own methodologies and 
analytical tools and exists as far as it produces theories. Moreover, theories are 
validated against the consistency of their own concepts. Finally, ideologies, being the 
imagined way that a subject perceives its relationship with reality, are by default 
beyond any comparison. 
Moving to Marxist penology stricto sensu, the most prominent works are 
Punishment and Social Structure118 and The Prison and the Factory119. The latter by 
Melossi and Pavarini constitutes an intellectual antecedent of the former by Rusche 
and Kircheimer and both are historical materialist approaches of the specificity of 
punishment. Based on historical data Rusche and Kircheimer conclude that 
punishment corresponds to particular productive relations and among them they 
focus on the availability of labour. Starting from early Middle Ages and analysing 
the development of the dominant ways of punishment until the 1930s they found a 
close connection with the increase or decrease of the reserve labour army. In 
conditions of overpopulation justice tended towards capital punishment. The primacy 
of the production process appears also in Melossi and Pavarini, although with a 
slightly different exegesis. They focus on the emergence of prison but stress the need 
for preparing the future factory workers through the discipline induced by the 
synchronic emergence of Workhouses120. They conclude that, although the prison is 
not a factory per se, “prison is a factory of men” receiving insubordinate convicts 
and transforming them into disciplined inmates121. 
The two works, however, present some shortcomings. Aside some particular 
historical objections raised, especially for the book by Rusche and Kircheimer122, 
both books neglect the role of extensive inflation in the emergence of prison 
labour123. Indeed, from the 15th until early 17th century inflation rose extensively124 
                                                 
118 G. Rusche et al. 2003 
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120 D. Melossi et al. 1981, pp 17-21. 
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because of the massive influx of gold and silver in the European market125. An 
extensive amount of wealth, unevenly distributed, could not buy commodities due to 
the Mode of Production. The introduction of labour in confinement was driven, 
therefore, by the need to supply markets with commodities126. Later, the ease of 
inflation is synchronised with the slowing of production in Workhouses, the 
changing paradigm of convicts' education and the turn towards unproductive labour. 
Melossi's argument regarding the inefficient nature of labour is not an argument 
against productivity as such; it was exactly the need to balance offer and demand in 
market along with profitability for the dominant classes that was leading to 
inefficient labour. Prison is not a factory indeed, it's rather a place where surplus 
value is accumulated; namely an economic apparatus of the State. Nonetheless, 
neither the labour market leverage can be disqualified, nor the actual or ideological 
preparation of the proletariat. What is suggested is the economic side of the previous 
theses which would prevent the over-deterministic approach of Rusche and 
Kircheimer or the over-ideologisation of Melossi and Pavarini. This would readjust 
those theories in accommodating prison privatisation away from the reproduction of 
the 'historical analogy' fallacies127 and the reduction of this policy to its ideological 
function.  
In order to explain the withdrawal of punitive labour one should see that the 
very existence of prisons triggers production128. The changing role of the liberal State 
during the 20th century required its “invisible presence” which is further reflected 
upon its apparatuses129. Hence, the direct leverage of the production by the prison 
system is withdrawn in favour of the indirect. Nevertheless, the leverage upon 
economy remains direct and unmediated. Prison as State apparatus is conditioned 
upon the class struggle in the same way as the transformation of the State. 
Understanding class struggle as a whole requires perceiving prison both as repressive 
and economic apparatus of the State. 
 
                                                 
125 J. Munro 1999. 
126 See also G. Rusche et al. 2003, p. 44. 
127 See further in G. Rusche et al. 2003, pp 63, 105, 108 and 109. 
128 See further in I. Papageorgiou et al. 2012.  
129 See also D. Melossi et al. 1981, p. 36. 
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Aside any particular criticism for each research presented in this section, 
some important conclusions could highlighted. Marxism is a science instead of 
theory, philosophy or ideology. To this extend what could be proven are specific 
theories based on the consistency of their ideas. The State is of central importance in 
criminal justice, not as the product of legislation but as its raison d’être. Criminal 
justice reflects, therefore, class domination through a mediated way. It's a “grey 
zone” between the public and the private spheres, since there is an implicit 
interconnection among punishment and value, commodity exchange and production. 
This transposes the class struggle upon the development of criminal justice. Hence, 
prison is vested with economic, ideological and political roles and functions that 
need to be approached by a State theory, within historical materialist scientific 



















































































A research of the Marxist understanding of the State will soon come across 
the problem that Marxist classics (Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci) did not discuss 
with any systematicity the political field nay the issue of State. Troubled as they were 
with the exercise of the political practice didn’t occupy themselves with a more 
coherent State theory. What could be found instead is a set of concepts on State 
practice which should be viewed and understood in the conjuncture of the era, some 
hints on the theoretical structure of the State but not coherently integrated in the 
structure of Historical and Dialectical Materialism and finally implicit understanding 
of the operation of the State130. Among them, Lenin and Gramsci offer the most 
detailed approaches but again with the previous constraints. Based on those classics, 
neo-Marxist theorists present complete approaches on the State with most notable 
examples those of Miliband and Poulantzas131. It should be pointed right from the 
beginning that this research will clearly take the structural side, avoid the 
problematic of the subject and focus on the issue of class relations viewed through 
the articulation of structures. This chapter, after a brief discussion of the core 
philosophical subjects underpinning structural Marxism will analyse the construction 
of social classes, the formation of the State and within it of the power bloc and of the 
hegemonic strategy in order to depict the operating relationships within the Social 
Formation.   
It must be stressed that both structuralist and instrumentalist theories will be 
treated exactly as theories. That means that they cannot be held as right or wrong, 
proved or not but only as internally consistent or not. In other words, any criticism 
aims at the coherence of their concepts. Consequently, paradigms or facts cannot be
                                                 
130 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 19-20 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 26. 
131 The two theorists have literally marked the future development of Marxist State theory by setting a 
yardstick. This could be seen in the constant attempts of the most recent Marxists either to take sides 
(Bob Jessop) or to overcome the dilemma set by them (Fred Block). Although interested in the genesis 
of the State and less with its operation, the contribution of Frankfurt School should not be disregarded 
(e.g. Franz Oppenheimer).   
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understood as proofs but only as illustrations. The reason behind that is that Marxism 
itself is detached both from the Hegelian purist idealism as well as from the scientific 
empiricism which to a degree dominates the human sciences. Althusser holds that the 
confirmation criteria of a theory have internal character because confirmation is the 
product of theoretical elements (principles, methodological processes et al.) which 
furthermore are inscribed in each science. In this case, namely in the science of 
historical materialism, the confirmation criteria for the existence of a theory or an 
idea lay with its inscription in the social practice. To clarify this point, Althusser 
gives the example of mathematics which don’t need the experimental confirmation of 
their theorems (for example in Physics or Chemistry); in the same way as Physics or 
Chemistry don’t need the technical application of their conclusions. Therefore, 
Althusser coincides with Lenin when the latter writes that Marx’s theory is powerful 
because it’s real. It’s real not because it has been confirmed by its successes or its 
failures but exactly because of its reality it’s confirmable in the successes or the 
failures132. 
The particular State theory presented by Structural Marxism, namely the 
work of Nicos Poulantzas133, shares indeed some commonalities with the 
instrumentalist views. The main among them is the “class character” of the State and 
this is exactly what distinguishes Marxist from non-Marxist approaches, which see in 
                                                 
132 L. Althusser 1999, pp 128-129. See also E. Laclau 1977, p. 60 where he makes some observations 
on the methodological question of the Poulantzas - Miliband debate. He holds that “as Althusser has 
pointed out, the process of knowledge does not begin with real objects - as empiricism supposes - but 
with concepts, pieces of information and ideas provided by the different forms of practice: scientific, 
ideological, technical, etc. These concepts are transformed by theoretical practice into objects of 
knowledge which, as such, are different from real objects. In contrast to the empiricist analysis, 
according to which knowledge starts from the concrete and is raised to general propositions through a 
process of abstraction/generalisation, we accept the epistemological perspective that knowledge is 
knowledge of real objects but occurring wholly on the level of thought and moving from the abstract 
to the concrete. This 'concrete' is not, however, the real-concrete but the concrete-in-thought, to use 
Althusser's expression. So, as we were saying before, in so far as the object of knowledge is produced 
by theoretical practice itself, the methods of verification are part of the theoretical system itself. A 
theory is only false to the extent that it is internally inconsistent, i.e., if in the process of construction 
of its concepts it has entered into contradiction with its postulates”. 
133 The use of the characterisation structural for this strand of Marxism is rather improper. On the one 
hand the main theorists, namely Althusser, Balibar and Poulantzas, soon dissociate themselves from 
structuralism from which they only borrowed some concepts like the idea of structural organisation. 
On the other hand, given the disagreement between the followers of the movement as for example that 
between Poulantzas and Althusser (N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 23) as well as between Poulantzas and 
Balibar (see for example the first note in N. Poulantzas 2001b), I cannot reserve the characterisation of 
Poulantzas’ approach on the State as the structuralist one, in the expense of others no matter if Balibar 
changed his position. In any case, this way of treating Poulantzas’ work has prevailed; hence it will be 
followed by this Thesis with these constraints clarified.   
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the State an objective structure with its own rules and functions that exists aside from 
the class struggle and thus fail to explain why some State policies favour some 
classes in contrast with others134. The difference between the structural and 
instrumental approach to the State refers to the actual nature of this class character. 
It’s not purpose of this section to analyse the differences between the two theories in 
detail135, but the structural objections towards the instrumentalists’ views would be 
helpful in shedding some light to this analytical framework. The following 
paragraphs will deconstruct the instrumental analysis in order to unveil the core of 
the difference. After that the structural Marxist concept of the State will be presented.  
For the basic instrumental approach, the State is subsumed to a class’ 
political power. This further means that the dominant class modifies and uses the 
State according to its will and interests. The State, therefore, is nothing else but a 
class dictatorship136. The question then arising is why the dominant classes are 
“using” the current form of representative democracy in “their” State. Had the State 
been modifiable, dominant classes would set up such State Apparatuses to minimize 
losses and maximize their profits; but in fact although they secure great payoffs, they 
suffer notable losses as well137.  
An enhanced and more plausible instrumental approach holds that the State 
has a dual nature. The kernel of the State is related with the productive powers and 
relations of production; in other words, with the economic base. Upon this kernel the 
other aspect of the State is attached; that which is related to the class struggles and 
creates the class nature of the State. The latter is dominated by a specific class. 
Purpose of this “second nature” is to control the kernel and more specifically to 
control the products of the relations of production138. Prima facie, this approach 
doesn’t seem to be instrumental; a more detailed view, though, would show that in 
this case the “class nature” of the State is practically “class use” of the State.   
                                                 
134 N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 14-15. 
135 The infamous debate between Poulantzas and Miliband (and maybe Laclau) in the “New Left 
Review” is more appropriate for this purpose. 
136 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 38. 
137 N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 15. Social welfare and taxation sustain this policy could serve as an 
example because, to a degree, it exceeds the need for mere reproduction of the labour class and pose a 
serious burden to the Capital’s profits. 
138 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 38 and 2001a, p. 17. The kernel of the State in this approach should only be 
understood as the part of the State that mantles the labour powers and the relations of production. It’s 
not a substitute of the economic base. 
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Both instrumental approaches start from a specific viewpoint of the 
“architectural” metaphor of the economic base and the superstructure. The 
ideological and political (juridico-political according to Marx) superstructure is 
subsumed to the economic base in the following way. Economy is made from non-
developing elements, namely labourers, means of labour, non-labourers and the 
relations of production among them. The nature of the economy corresponds to an 
Aristotelian idea of automatic reproduction and regulation. As a consequence the 
field of economy has some internal limits, which constitute the field non-dynamic. 
Therefore, class struggle is absent in the economic level which is directed by an 
automated process139. This economic monism, in other words economism, in the 
level of the base leads certainly to understanding the superstructures (ideology and 
politics) as mere conceptual tools made to “capture”140 the obscurity of the economic 
process141. Therefore, the mirror-image of economism in the economic base is 
voluntarism in the level of superstructures.  
If we project these lines of reasoning upon the State, there would be two 
possible conclusions corresponding to the above-mentioned instrumental approaches. 
In the first one the State – being part of the political level - is a simple reflection of 
the relations of production. It’s an ensemble of institutions which is used either to 
regulate and/or to implement those regulations in order to facilitate the production 
process and control its outputs. The instrumental role of the State in this approach is 
clearer because of the verb ‘use’ which raises the question of the subject and the 
spontaneous answer is “the dominant class”. This creates, then, the image of a 
personified and conscious class with its own will instead of a transcendental subject 
of the history142.  
The second possible conclusion is that the political and ideological levels 
are not reflections of the economic but they constitute levels with prescribed and not 
overlapping limits in the same way as economy was described above. This is exactly 
how the superstructural autonomy justifies economy’s independence and capacity of 
                                                 
139 N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 19. This makes sense under the idea that class struggle could not change 
anything in a non-changing setting. 
140 “Capture” here is used both as understanding and as seizure. 
141 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 39. It’s obscure to people exactly because they do not participate 
consciously in the relations of production. See also N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 30.   
142 N. Poulantzas 1984, pp 36-37. 
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re-production. Each level has its own essence and independent historicities 
throughout time. The combination of the three levels constitutes the each time Mode 
of Production in a given Social Formation. So in contrast with the first approach, the 
second one substantiates the non economic levels143. The problem, then, is the very 
character of the class nature of the State. There seems to be no dialectical 
relationship between the interests of groups that participate in the production process 
(labourers and non-labourers) and of groups in the political level. In other words, 
because of the clear separation of levels, economic interests are transposed in 
unmediated, uncritical fashion to the level of class political will144. Given that, on the 
one hand there is no class struggle in the economic base, and on the other relations of 
production follow a prescribed process allowing no space for intervention, the 
effectiveness of class struggle in the superstructure is doubted and along with that the 
hope of any change in relations of exploitation (in the economic level) and 





The need to avoid those inconsistencies leads to the need for a different 
conception of treating the economic, the political and the ideological levels as well as 
their weave. This is where the heart of the different point of view between 
instrumentalism and structuralism and consequently the understanding of the State 
lies. For structural Marxism the economic level has never been, in any Mode of 
Production, a hermetic field with its own rules of self-reproduction and operation. 
The political and the ideological levels have always been playing a substantial role in 
the relations of production. More specifically, Marx in the Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy145 in defining Historical Materialism specifies its 
object as the study of different structures and practices (the economy, politics, 
                                                 
143 N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 19-20. They also differ in the way they are handling epistemologically 
the superstructure. For the first approach State and ideology as mere reflections of the economy could 
not set particular scientific objects while the second approach allows the existence of an economic 
science, a political science and an epistemology of the ideas with separate scientific objects and tools. 
But they share in common the fact that they set up an exterior relation between the State and the 
economic level. 
144 See for example N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 36. 
145 K. Marx 1859. A detailed analysis is in the preface of 1857 which was replaced by another in 1859 
and turned to be Appendix I. 
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ideology), “which are connected and yet distinct, and whose combination constitutes 
a Mode of Production and a Social Formation”. The theorisation of those concepts 
leads to the constitution of regional theories. Furthermore, the theorisation of their 
combination constitutes particular theories (theories of the slave, feudal, capitalist et 
al.) which define distinct Modes of Production and Social Formations146. On these 
initial points given by Marx – which support both the enhanced instrumental and the 
structural perceptions of the articulation of levels - Luis Althusser builds definitions 
of the ‘Mode of Production’ and the ‘Social Formation’.  
He does that by initially interpreting the concept of Marxist ‘Whole’ of 
which the Mode of Production and Social Formation are examples. Marxist Whole 
(unlike the Hegelian or Leibnizian) is “constituted by a certain type of complexity, 
the unity of a structured whole, containing what can be called levels or instances 
which are distinct and ‘relatively autonomous’, and coexist within this complex 
structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific determinations, 
fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of the economy”147. Those 
determinations have two basic characteristics. On the one hand, in a structured 
‘Whole’ every element, namely levels or instances, is overdetermined by the 
ensemble of the other elements which mutually determines. On the other hand, it’s 
the economic element (level or instance) which determines in the last instance the 
dominant element in the ‘Whole’. This takes place through the organisation and 
articulation of structures and practices by the economic level in such way so that one 
of the levels (or one of the instances if we see the ‘Whole’ as a temporal sequence) 
becomes dominant at a specific time point. Therefore, the dominant element in a 
Whole is not stable148.  
The most important element of this schema – required to capture the very 
essence of what Althusser concludes – is the idea of the “last instance”. It has 
originally been postulated by Marx and Engels149 and generally ignored. What 
                                                 
146 K. Marx 1859 Appendix I and especially the last section under the title “Production” and N. 
Poulantzas 1973, p. 12 
147 L. Althusser 1970, p. 97. 
148 S. Tsinorema 2001, p. 158.  
149 “According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history 
is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. 
Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he 
transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is 
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Althusser suggests, for example in the case of history, is that if economy is the 
decisive factor in its structure at the last instance (or the ultimate in Engels 
terminology), then there are some other levels (the political and the ideological ones 
in this case) that also affect history150. If those levels were directly depended on 
economy – as economism generally understands - then there would be no reason for 
mentioning them at all outside a discussion which would just describe the way that 
economy determines history. The fact that Engels insists on the “ultimate” 
determination means that the levels which interfere before economy also affect 
history in an autonomous way. Nevertheless, their influence upon history is not 
direct or linear but also depending on similar relationships among other levels and 
the predicate; thus each level is overdetermined by the ensemble of levels. This 
makes them relatively autonomous.  
The Mode of Production, being itself a ‘Whole’, designates a specific 
combination of various structures and practices which appear as many levels or 
instances as the regional structures of this mode151. Those levels and instances 
constitute a complex whole dominated in the last instance by the economic. The 
structure in dominance governs the essence of the regional structures by assigning 
them object and functions. As a result the relations which constitute each level are 
never simple but overdetermined by the relations which take place in other levels. It 
should be mentioned, though, that the fact that the Whole is determined in the last 
instance by the economic does not mean that the economic always holds the 
dominant role. It is determinant as far as it attributes the dominant role to a level or 
an instance152. Consequently, what specifies a Mode of Production is the particular 
                                                                                                                                          
the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure — political forms of the class struggle and its 
results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical 
forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, 
juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas 
— also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases 
preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid 
all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so 
remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible), the economic 
movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of 
history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree”. F. Engels 1972, p. 
294. 
150 L. Althusser 1999, p. 135 and p. 77. 
151 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 13. 
152 For example in the feudal Mode of Production the dominant role is played by ideology through 
religion.  
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articulation by its levels; the ‘Matrix’ of a Mode of Production. It could be said then 
that a Mode of Production is in its essence “the way in which determination in the 
last instance by the economic is reflected inside that Mode of Production”153. 
Both the levels and the Mode of Production as such are abstract objects 
which do not exist in the strong sense in reality. In contrast with that, a ‘Social 
Formation’, namely the ‘Whole’ of a social setting, at a given moment is a real-
concrete object with a particular historical existence. Exactly because of that 
difference in the nature of the two objects there could be an overlapping between 
several “pure” modes of production in a given Social Formation. In other words 
modes of production are only intellectual constructs and their pure versions could 
only be seen in a theoretical level154.  
The Social Formation itself is also a ‘Whole’. It constitutes a complex unity 
of the economic, the political and the ideological practices at a certain place and 
stage of development. Historical materialism is exactly the science of Social 
Formations155. The levels of a Social Formation, namely the different practices, are 
characterized by uneven development and dislocations among them. This is exactly 
the basis for understanding the formation and its development through the concept of 
a history with differential time sequences156. The determination by the economic 
level at the last instance, which here is the economic practice, applies as well. This 
happens through the role played by the dominant Mode of Production in a given 
historically determined Social Formation.  It is exactly the matrix of the dominant 
Mode of Production which marks the ‘Whole’ of the formation. Thus, a historically 
determined Social Formation is specified by a particular articulation of its different 
economical, political, ideological levels or instances. As a general rule - taking into 
account the dislocations - this articulation is that of the dominant Mode of 
Production157.  
 
                                                 
153 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 14-15 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 23. 
154 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 15 and N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 27. 
155 B. Brewster 1970 and N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 12. Practice should be understood as the 
transformation of a definite object (raw material) resulting in the production of something new (the 
product) which often constitutes, or at the very least can constitute, a break with the given elements of 
the object. As it will be seen later, practice correspond to levels of struggle between social classes. N. 
Poulantzas 1973, p. 41. 
156 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 41. 





Before transferring the previous theses into the analysis of the actual 
position of the State, it would be important to present how the dominant Mode of 
Production affects the constitution of social classes. This is not a parenthetical 
section. Poulantzas states that social classes are the effect of certain levels of 
structures of which the State also forms a part158. At the same time, among the 
functions of the State is to be the tenacious bond between the contradictions of the 
social classes159.  
Social classes taken as a social ensemble, is the field in which class 
contradictions are deployed at the same time with class struggles. This further means 
that classes cannot be conceived outside the concept of class struggle; they do not 
exist before the eruption of class struggle. A further consequence is that the 
constitution of classes corresponds to their class practices (struggle). This is 
translated into classes finding their position into the social stratification through their 
contradictions. This specific function of class contradictions designates objective 
positions in the social labour division acquired by class members irrespective of their 
will160. Overall then, social classes could be defined by the position they acquire in 
the ensemble of social practices - that is the social division of labour along with 
ideological and political practices. As a result a class is the objective consequence of 
the articulation of levels in the field of the social division of labour (structural 
determination of classes)161. This will be explained in detail below. 
It should be stressed, though, that class position as determined by the levels 
could be different from class position in the conjuncture162. More specifically, a 
                                                 
158 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 37. Although he gives a complete approach in his main work Political 
Power and Social Classes (first publication in French: 1968), Poulantzas refines it later in the Fascism 
and Dictatorship: the Third International and the Problem of Fascism (first publication in French: 
1970) and more systematically in Social Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (first publication in 
French: 1974) which will be followed here. 
159 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 41. 
160 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 16 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 38. 
161 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 17, N. Poulantzas 1973 pp 67-68 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 37. It could 
be assumed then that since both the “membership” in a class and the position of a class in the class 
struggle are effects of contradiction and over-determination of levels, they cannot be subsumed under 
a voluntaristic approach. 
162 Both Poulantzas 1973, p. 93 and Althusser 1970, p. 98 use Lenin’s approach to ‘conjuncture’ as the 
field of class practices and class struggle in a historically determined Social Formation as exemplified 
in the Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution 1905.   
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class’ position – otherwise mentioned as class consciousness - may not correspond to 
the objective class position. Poulantzas borrows Lenin’s example of labour 
aristocracy which sometimes assumes bourgeois consciousness. On the other hand, 
the petty-bourgeoisie may support either the bourgeoisie or the labour class. 
Nevertheless, an occasional support of another class does not transform the labour 
aristocracy to bourgeois class or the petty-bourgeoisie to the each time supported 
class. This is important if a relativistic understanding of class determination is to be 
avoided163.  
It’s already clear that the aforementioned understanding of the class concept 
comes in contrast with the approach of economism on the field of class relations, 
which is also close to the perception of the Hegelian distinction between the class-in-
itself and class-for-itself164. The separation of the economic level from the political 
and the ideological would result in a thesis that the class objective position is 
determined by the position in the relations of production, while only the class 
consciousness is determined by the class struggle in ideological and political levels. 
Nevertheless, exactly because the objective class position is determined by the 
ensemble of the levels, the political and ideological levels are already there at the 
constitution of the class and this is reflected in the conjuncture through special 
material forms of ideological and political practice. This happens because of the 
particular organisation of the production process which is constituted as the unity of 
labour process and production relations. The first consists of the labourers (labour 
powers165), the means of production and the non-labourers. The combination of the 
three sets up the production relation which are divided into ‘relations of 
appropriation’ between the subjects involved in the process (both labourers and non-
labourers) and the means of production and ‘relations of property’ among the human 
subjects and the product of the labour process. It should be stressed that in those 
combinations the relations of production are more important because labour powers 
are only organized under the former. In contrast with that, economism disregards this 
                                                 
163 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 19. 
164 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 20 and N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 74. 
165 According to Marx ‘labour powers’ is the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities 
existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description, 
while a ‘use value’ is any article or service which has the quality of satisfying a human want. See K. 
Marx 1867 and J. Gillman 1957, p. 11. 
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priority in way in which reduces the unity of production relations and labour powers 
into technicism166. In every society divided into classes the labourer has no relation 
to the product of his/her work, so the relation of property is always in favour of the 
non-labourer. What makes the difference, though, among class societies is the 
relation of appropriation. In feudalism for example the labourer has a direct 
connection with the means of production; the surf occupies the land irrespective of 
the legal status of ownership. In capitalism, though, the labourer has nothing else 
apart from his/her work167. It could be easily seen then, that relations of production 
dominate the labour process since the particular features of labour process (e.g. 
technology) can be substantiated only within an environment of relations where 
value extraction take place. It is exactly this domination of production relations over 
labour process that gives in their unity the character of production and reproduction 
process168. 
The aforementioned domination explains why the ideological and political 
levels constitute along with the economic the class determination in a given Social 
Formation. More specifically, production relations are expressed as class powers; 
powers of non-labourers over labourers. Exactly because production relations emerge 
as powers, ideological and political relations are organically interconnected to 
establish and support them. Therefore, the production and reproduction process is 
also a process of reproduction of ideological and political relations169. If we connect 
this to the previous distinction between objective class position and class 
consciousness in the conjuncture, it could be seen that exactly because a class’ 
position is structurally determined it’s always reflected in the conjuncture 
irrespective, of the each time character of the class consciousness or of an 
independent political organisations such as parties170.  
The question then arising is how the existence of a class could be 
determined. Marx’s political texts approach this problem under the idea that a class is 
distinct and autonomous - and therefore an existing social force - when its connection 
                                                 
166 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 25 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 36 where he makes this point clear by 
mentioning as example that it’s not the technological revolutions that brought capitalism in the 
foreground but the change of relations of production.  
167 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 26, N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 22-24 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 23. 
168 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 26. 
169 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 26 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 36-37. 
170 See also N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 19-20. 
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with the relations of production, its presence in the economic level, is reflected on 
the other levels by a specific presence. The historicist approach finds the ‘specific 
presence’ in the political and ideological levels in the separate organisation of a class 
into a party. Poulantzas in the contrary designates this presence in the reflection of 
the process of production on the other levels by ‘pertinent effects’ which are located 
in political and ideological structures as well as in social, political and ideological 
class relations (class practices). Therefore, the very reflection upon other levels of a 
class’ position in the production process is the 'pertinent effect'. The other side of the 
coin is that this reflection constitutes a new element which wouldn’t be otherwise 
present in the typical articulation of the ensemble of these levels. Therefore, this 
element transforms the limits of the levels of structures or of class struggle at which 
it is reflected by ‘pertinent effects’171.  
The application of the previous analysis in a given Social Formation in a 
specific moment would possibly reveal the existence of several groups whose 
position in the production process is reflected in the economic and ideological 
structures or struggles. Indeed, if the criterion of social stratification was as crude as 
the relation of appropriation and more specifically the relation with the means of 
production, it could be assumed then, that in a Mode of Production there would be 
only two classes to be observed. In a Social Formation, though – as mentioned earlier 
- there exist several overlapping Mode of Productions which result to the creation of 
more than two classes. Nevertheless, the classes corresponding to the dominant 
Mode of Production, as for example the labour and bourgeois classes in capitalism, 
circumscribe the basic contradiction in the Social Formation which further results to 
the under-determination of the other classes172.  
What is described above is not a static image. Tensions between different 
production processes are also reflected in the constitution of the Social Formation. 
Therefore, the decomposition process of the under-determined classes and the 
                                                 
171 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 77-79. Poulantzas borrows the example brought by Marx (1852) in The 
Eighteenth Brumaire and the Class Struggles in France. Under Luis Bonaparte small holding 
peasantry had neither an organisation nor an ideology of its own. Nevertheless, Bonaparte presented 
himself as representative of that group allowing for the corresponding political protection, although in 
reality he was representative of the bourgeois class. This political “representation” marks through a 
pertinent effect the existence of a class. 
172 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 27-28 and N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 82 where he adds that the under-




resistance to this decomposition determines the existence of a class or its 
transformation to ‘social categories’, ‘class fractions’ or ‘social strata’173. Poulantzas 
designates as ‘social categories’ social ensembles with pertinent effects, and thus 
social forces, which present an over-determining relation to structures other than 
economic ones. A characteristic example is that of bureaucracy in its relation to the 
State Apparatus. ‘Social categories’ is a concept which cuts vertically the social 
stratification since it could be constituted by various other social forces. ‘Class 
fractions’ are sub-groups within a class which comply with the criterion of pertinent 
effects exactly as the merchandising or the financial capital do in relation to the 
capitalist class. A class fraction may become autonomous if it constitutes an eventual 
social force174. Finally, a ‘social stratum’ indicates the secondary effects of the 
combination of modes of production on classes as in the case of working class 
aristocracy; on categories as for example on the summits of bureaucracy and finally 
on fractions. Social strata without being social forces can exert influence through the 
pertinent effects which mark them on other classes, categories or fractions175. 
The importance of the previous analysis lies with the fact that classes, 
fractions, categories or strata are placed in opposition. More specifically, social 
relations consist of class practices which in ensemble constitute the field of class 
struggle. These practices can only be conceived in their contradictions, in other 
words in relations of opposition. As mentioned above, classes reveal the effects of 
the articulation of structures in the field of social relations. Therefore, the other side 
of the coin would be that the very struggle between classes, in other words the class 
struggle and finally their existence, is an effect of the form that the contradictions 
between structures take in the field of social relations. All three levels constitute 
fields where relations of domination and subordination between classes take place. 
The realisation of profits in contrast to the increase of wages in the economic level, 
                                                 
173 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 82 and N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 29. 
174 ‘Social force’ is approached here according to Poulantzas’ interpretation of Lenin’s concept. Social 
groups are social forces insofar as they present pertinent effects at the level of political practice in a 
given conjuncture. See for example N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 94. 
175 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 84. In the following sections, for brevity reasons, the term ‘class’ will be 
generally used to replace the use of ‘stratum’, ‘fraction’ or ‘category’ as far as the latter could indicate 
a social force.  
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the struggle for political power in the political level or the ideological domination in 
the relevant level exemplify the struggle in the peripheral levels of the ‘Whole’176.  
Among the different levels of class struggle, the political one deserves 
special mentioning due to its relation with the problematic of the State. Lenin 
understands the political struggle as the one whose specific object is the State power; 
nevertheless, its objective is the conjuncture177. The concept of the conjuncture has 
already been allusively touched178; in more detail though, Poulantzas – always based 
on Lenin – understands the conjuncture as the concept which “captures” the 
articulation of structures and the index of dominance in a given Social Formation in 
the level of political class struggle. The “capturing” process refers to the unity of the 
effects of structures upon political class struggle. Elements of the conjuncture are 
classes and autonomous fractions which are reflected by pertinent effects specifically 
on the level of political practice. Additionally, some categories which manage at a 
specific moment to inscribe pertinent effects in the political struggle level and thus 
they become social forces. Therefore, the conjuncture condenses179 the political class 
struggle in a specific moment and at the same time is the object of the political class 
struggle180.  
Prima facie there seems to be a strange self-reference in this understanding. 
Nevertheless, the interrelation between structures as described above, apply in the 
field of practices as well. Each level’s (in this case, each practice’s) intervention on 
another creates the limits according to which each one modifies the other. The 
delimitation of mutual influencing is effect both of the matrix of a formation and of 
the specific practices which are further themselves determined by their place and 
function in this matrix181. However, apart from the relations in the field of structures 
                                                 
176 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 86. It should be noted parenthetically that there exist dislocations between 
the various practices of a given class. Therefore the economic practice might not correspond to the 
political or the ideological one. This explains to an extent the differentiations in rhetoric between trade 
unions and political parties.  
177 V. Lenin 1902 and N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 92. See also N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 51 and L. Althusser 
1999, p. 81. 
178 Ibidem, footnote 162. 
179 The verb “describe” would be more useful here. Nevertheless, it lacks explanatory capacity since 
the conjuncture is not an image of the political struggle but the very political struggle in a Social 
Formation in a given moment. 
180 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 94-95. 
181 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 95. The relations of differentiating historicities, dislocated articulation and 
over-determination and domination at the last instance take place here too. The difference is that given 
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on the one hand and in the field of practices on the other, there appears a set of 
relations between the two fields, namely between structures and practices. Structures 
delimit the field of practices and the latter intervene in structures. More specifically, 
the political struggle which condenses the other levels of the class struggle is limited 
by those specific other levels and by the ensemble of the class practices. But the very 
field of practices is circumscribed by the effects of structures and their Whole. 
Therefore, the political practice is limited by the ensemble of class struggles insofar 
as the latter is determined by the ensemble of structures. On the other hand, political 
practice intervenes in the totality of practices insofar as the class struggle as a Whole 
intervenes in the Whole of structures182.   
The previously mentioned differentiation between the conjuncture as the 
object and the State as the objective of the political practice is something more than a 
peculiar use of language. On the one hand, the conjuncture is constituted by the 
effects of the ensemble of structures upon practices. On the other hand, the State 
concentrates the contradictions of the structures and allows the analysis of their 
complexity. Therefore, the State as such is reflected upon the conjuncture because 
the latter is the point where structures and practices meet and interact. Obviously the 
term ‘point’ should be understood less geographically and more temporarily, since 
conjuncture is the “specific moment”, the analysis of the historical individuality of 
the ensemble of a formation. Therefore, political class struggle operates in the 
conjuncture as a means to “take over” the State and through that change accordingly 
the articulation of structures183.  
The issue of class struggle brings forward the interconnected subject of the 
ability of a class to capitalize gains or resist the losses within the field of practices. 
Poulantzas defines it as ‘power’, namely, the capacity of a social class to realize its 
specific objective interests184. Given that the concept of power is constituted in the 
field of practices – and therefore in social relations, in contrast with the field of 
structures – it seems that class relations are in essence power relations. This should 
not be understood in a hierarchical relation of any kind. Social relations are not the 
                                                                                                                                          
the political class struggle’s objective – the conjuncture – it concentrates all the other class practices. 
Therefore, it is the over-determining one; see for example N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 92. 
182 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 95. 
183 See also N. Poulantzas’ 1973, p. 96 and V. Lenin 1918 especially in the third chapter.  
184 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 104. 
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foundation of power relations or vice versa. Power relation is rather the specification 
of the effects of the ensemble of structures on the relations between classes in the 
course of the struggle among them185. From that point of view, power cannot refer to 
a single level either as cause or effect of this process. It can only be the effect of the 
ensemble of structures186.  
Some basic characteristics of power could easily be derived from the 
analysis made so far. The concept’s field of application can be nothing else but a 
Social Formation divided into classes. As already mentioned in such societies classes 
by definition exist in opposition; this further means that the realisation of a class’ 
interests obstacles the very existence of another class’ interests. Therefore, the 
relations of domination and subordination among classes are expressed as relations 
of power187. The element of capacity as introduced in the definition of power brings 
forwards some more issues. As mentioned above ‘power’ specifies the effects of 
structures in the relations between classes within their struggle. Therefore, a class’ 
power doesn’t transcribe the structural effects directly but it’s also determined by the 
effects of the ensemble of structures upon other classes. In other words, the capacity 
of a class to realize its interests resides also on the power of the other classes. In that 
sense, the concept of power coincides with the limitations of practices of classes. 
Those limitations show a further consequence in that power revealing the effects of 
structures on the relations between levels of practices among different classes188.  
Probably the most controversial element in the previous definition of power 
is that of class interests. The sensitivity of the approach lies with the fact that an 
application of interests in the wrong field or in the wrong way would inescapably 
lapse the discussion to a peculiar anthropology, in other words to the problematic of 
the subject. Interests are always interests of a class and more specifically of agents 
constituting a specific class; therefore they appear in the field of social relations, 
namely in the course of practices. An attempt to associate interests with the field of 
                                                 
185 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 99. It should be reminded that classes as such are the effect of the ensemble 
of structures upon humans. Therefore, the relations among classes could be nothing else than a 
specification of this effect. 
186 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 100 and 103. 
187 Poulantzas uses the term ‘authority’ as alternative to power for Social Formation with no class 
division. Further, he uses the term ‘force’ to express relations of domination/subordination in 
interpersonal relations.  
188 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 107-109. 
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structures would lead to a strange dualism between the “expected” interests 
according to an analysis of structures and the expressed ones, since classes 
sometimes openly adopt practices against their interests. The functionalist school 
which proposed this approach resolved the issue of dualism by introducing the 
distinction between latent interests, which are their objective aspect and manifested 
which appear in the field of practices. The consequences then are close to the 
aforementioned distinction between classes-for-themselves and classes-in-themselves 
since latent interests establish the first and manifested ones the second; a thesis that 
is related to economism. Equally crucial to the right location of the interest concept is 
its right application. More specifically, class interest in the field of practices should 
not be understood as a return to the problematic of the subject. Since class points the 
effects of structures upon humans and class struggle indicates operation among 
classes within the limits imposed by structures, class interests should be understood 
as extension of the limits of class practice. In other words, class interests – within the 
framework of class struggle - is the ground that exceeds the threshold pointed by 
structures and that could be gained by the class depending on its ‘power’. “Objective 
class interests are the horizon of its action as political force”. It’s needless to mention 
that the capacity of a class to realize its interests depend on the capacity of another 
class to do the same, since they exist in opposition. It seems then that class interests 
cannot be reduced to a voluntaristic approach of subjective selections. In the same 
course, dislocations between the objective determination of class interests and actual 
adoption of targets during the class struggle should be understood under either class 
strategy or illusionary effects of ideology189. 
Finally, another characteristic of ‘power’ is its specificity. That means that 
‘power’ could be seen through the prism of different levels, the economic, the 
political and ideological. There are several historical examples of classes possessing 
economic power but lacking political or ideological. The transition from feudalism to 
capitalism is exactly the process of a class with economical power gaining political 
capacity. Therefore, relations of ‘power’ are relatively autonomous and differentiated 
                                                 
189 See also N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 109-113. The issue of ideology and its role will be discussed in 
detail later. 
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between levels. Along with the structures, they constitute a Whole in which they are 
finally dominated in the last instance by relations in economic level190.  
From the previous analyses it follows that ‘power’ cannot be conceived 
outside the class struggle. Bearers of power are classes and not institutions. This is 
especially important in connection to the State. Poulantzas understands institutions as 
systems of norms or rules which are socially sanctioned. This definition is wide 
enough to include institutions that reside outside the juridico-political level. 
Therefore, aside institutions like the education system, the church or the very corpus 
of the State (see for example the prison system) systems of norms like the company 
should also be seen as institutions. In this framework, structures constitute the 
“organizing matrix” of institutions. Institutions, in other words, are established and 
(hierarchically) interrelated as an effect of the articulation of structures. Therefore, 
structures inhere in the institutions and at the same time are hidden by the function of 
the ideological level191.  
Institutions have an important connection with ‘power’ through their 
relation with social classes. This happens because in the course of the class struggle, 
institutions become the loci of power organisation; in other words they are ‘power’ 
centres and by that they influence the class struggle192. Accordingly, the State 
becomes the centre where political ‘power’ is exercised and exerts influence upon it. 
It is important to stress that this approach doesn’t proclaim institutions and 
furthermore the State as instruments of social classes; Poulantzas insists in their 
autonomy. This happens because institutions, as effects of the articulation of 
structures, constitute fields of class struggle (or application of class power).  At the 
same time, dislocations between levels of class struggle as well as fields of ‘power’ 
result to the fact that ‘power’ relations are not presented in power centres 
unmediated. So the domination of a class is not translated into domination at the 
institutional framework. Furthermore, this combination of structural specificity of 
power centres along with the fact of the differentiated presentation of class struggle 
have as consequence the “displacement of gravity” among power centres; in other 
                                                 
190 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 113-114. 
191 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 115 footnote 24.  
192 Althusser points that it’s already seen in the Classics of Marxism that the “State power” is 
essentially the use of State Apparatuses by the dominant class to promote its interests. Therefore, it 
doesn’t have power itself. L. Althusser 1999, pp 81-82. 
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words, power relations might acquire levels closer to the real ones in certain 
institution rather than others, something which leads to the hierarchy of 





There are now enough elements to turn the discussion on the structuralist 
approach of the State. First, though, a basic issue should be addressed; more 
specifically, whether it would be possible to have a general theory on State194. 
Having adopted a Marxist perspective, this would be impossible. As already 
mentioned, the formation of institutions as well as their organisation depends on the 
articulation of structures. At the same time, institutions being power centres, they 
shape class struggle which shapes back the level of structures. Therefore, there is a 
cycle of constant feedback which affects the State. In other words, the State is not a 
field with its own rules of reproduction and historicity; and this is one of the fallacies 
of the instrumental theories195. As a result the closer we can get to a general theory 
on State is when we limit the scope of structure articulation in one Mode of 
Production and within it, to a given level of evolution. Thus, Poulantzas analyses the 
feudal State and the absolutist or the transitional before he embarks to an approach of 
the capitalist one. Nevertheless, even at this point and exactly because of the 
dynamic character of the State, he only presents some fundamental characteristics of 
the capitalist State rather than a specific exploration196.   
A fundamental characteristic of the society in which a capitalist State 
appears and in contrast with other class societies is that subjects do not appear as 
agents of production. The officially established separation between master and slave 
                                                 
193 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 115-116. 
194 The previous discussion refers generally to the issue of institutions. The State, although it is an 
institution, presents a specificity which attributes special characteristics as it will be later seen. 
195 See also N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 25-29.  
196 See for example N. Poulantzas 1973, Chapter III. From this point of view, it’s not a coincidence 
that apart from two books (Political Power and Social Classes and State, Power, Socialism) he is 
occupied mostly with the analysis of the conjuncture, namely the 3rd quarter of the 20th century. This 
could be seen most notably in Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of 
Fascism, The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain, Classes in contemporary 
Capitalism and The Crisis of the State along with his numerous articles in scientific journals and 
newspapers (N. Poulantzas 1984 and N. Poulantzas et al. 2008 present a collection of the most 
important of them) as well as his personal political course. 
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in the ancient State197 or serf and lord in the feudal State are replaced with terms like 
citizens, individuals etc. covering both sides of the production relations. This causes 
an artificial “absence” of relations of production and the subsequent class division. 
What appears instead is a “unification” of individuals-citizens in the form of People. 
The People is the ‘principle of determination’ of the State which is expressed by two 
modalities. On the one hand, the State is established by the individuals through 
universal suffrage and on the other it serves the common prosperity. The ‘general 
will’ then either as support of the State or as end of its operation appears as the core 
feature of the capitalist State198. This, however, implies the separation between the 
Civil Society and the State and it’s within this framework that the juridical 
superstructure consolidates the different substances of the two concepts199.   
This is only, though, a false image. More specifically, the individualisation 
of agents in this schema and therefore the separation between the State and the Civil 
Society is partly true. As shown earlier, the relations of production lead to the 
formation of social groups, otherwise known as classes. Thus, the individuality of 
agents in the economic level is a misnomer, since they become supports of structures 
not one by one but in unison. Nevertheless, agents are individualized indeed in the 
juridico-political superstructure. The cause of that would be found in the separation 
endemic in the relations of appropriation. The juridical institutionalisation of the 
separation among the usage of the means of production and their ownership implies 
the “merchandising” character of labour relations (selling and buying labour power) 
which further requires the treatment of agents as individuals200. The State as the 
fundamental structure of the political level institutionalizes the previous separation. 
                                                 
197 There was also official division among the free citizens in relation to their rights. For example in 
the 5th century BC Athens, political rights were restricted among the free male populace earning more 
than 200 ‘medimne’ of agricultural products or the equivalent in money per year. This amount was 
also a class threshold since with less income it would be impossible to sustain a slave. 
198 N. Poulantzas 1984, pp 51-52. 
199 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 123 and N. Poulantzas 1984, pp 44-45. 
200 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 46 and N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 127-129. A non merchandising character of 
labour power would have created just another level of feudal social stratification. The importance here 
lies not with the legal concept of ownership of the means of production, since even in feudal societies 
the land – the means of production – legally belonged to the lord or the King. The importance is found 
in the representation of the labourer as an “individual” which freely asks to use the means of 
production and the employer as an “individual” which freely accepts the offer. The concept of 
freedom allows the emergence of negotiations and the introduction of market rules (where the means 
of production are always in scarcity). If labour power is merchandised, then the bearers of labour 




The role of the State is not divided from the economic level; instead, it serves as a 
crucial factor in this process by consolidating it through the legislation but also by 
obscuring the exact position of agents in the relations of production and presenting 
them as individuals201. Those specific legal and ideological structures, determined as 
they are by the distinctive labour process of the Capitalist Mode of Production, 
phenomenally individualize the agents of the labour process in the socio-economic 
level. Therefore, those structures conceal the fact that labour relations are in essence 
class relations and agents remain with the impression that they are isolated in the 
economic level which further leads to competition among them irrespective of class 
divisions202.  
In a parallel development, the State adopts a crucial role in the field of 
economic class struggle too203. As explained above, socio-economic relations appear 
in isolation from their political or ideological counterpart. This is translated into the 
economic class struggle, being part of those relations, appearing also isolated from 
the other class struggles. The State in this framework corresponds by adopting the 
role of a strictly political entity which unites the contradicting economic interests. It 
appears as the representative of the general interest or common welfare and by that it 
conceals its class nature. Therefore, in the structural level the State as an institution 
of the juridico-political superstructure consolidates the individualisation of the agents 
of production and in the level of practices it becomes their political unification which 
is the other side of the coin in concealing their isolation or competition under the 
ideation of common interest204.  
The distinction between individualisation and political union present 
respectively in the relations of production and in the political practice is most 
                                                 
201 See also N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 22, where he mentions that the State as well as ideology has 
always been organically present in the relations of production and their reproduction. The liberal 
“non-interference” of the State in the economy is not an absence but the specific way in which the 
visible State corresponds to the needs of capitalist production and reproduction. See also N. 
Poulantzas 1978, pp 31-32 and N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 100. 
202 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 131. 
203 This is not a superfluous repetition of the role of the State. The relationship between the State – an 
institutional power centre - and the relations of production on the one hand and the economic class 
struggle on the other although similar (the phenomenal neutrality of the State) constitutes a categorical 
difference due to the difference between structures and practices.    
204 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 49 and N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 133-134. There Poulantzas stresses that 
ideology is not the only means towards this result. State institutions also work towards this 
consequence by legitimizing the reproduction of relations of production.  
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noticeably witnessed in the bipolar system of public and private sphere. The nature 
of the State as exemplary of the public sphere represents exactly the unity of the 
individuals who would, in other circumstances, compete each other. Under this light, 
what Althusser holds, under the influence of Gramsci, is justified. He points that “the 
distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois 
law and valid in the subordinate domains in which bourgeois law exercises its 
authority”. But in reality “The domain of the State escapes it because the latter is 
above the law: the State which is the State of the ruling class is neither public nor 
private; on the contrary it is the precondition for any distinction between public and 
private”205. 
This set of crucial but not direct roles of the State in the level of relations of 
production and economic class struggle, justifies the designation of the State as 
relatively autonomous from the economy. This peculiar relationship cut across the 
history of capitalism. Both in the previous stage (also known as antagonistic or 
liberal capitalism) and in its imperialistic stage (also known as monopoly capitalism) 
the State remains present in the relations of production and their reproduction but not 
in an immediately visible way206. It could be suggested then that one of the criteria of 
the evolution of the Capitalist Mode of Production between stages might be the way 
in which the State appears in relation to the economical level both as relations of 





It could be concluded at this point, that, although the State has a distinctive 
class character in the sense that political decisions usually favour some classes in the 
expense of others207, it represents phenomenally the unity of the agents of production 
in their fragmented environment. The contradiction between the two functions is 
mediated through the very “phenomenality” of the unity. Poulantzas specifies the 
latter through the concept of ‘Hegemony’ which is practically a set of strategies. 
Hegemony was first coined by Antonio Gramsci with a slightly different meaning 
                                                 
205 L. Althusser 1999, p. 84. See also N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 145.  
206 N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 25. 
207 Ibidem p. 58. 
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since he attached the concept also to the State itself as its feature. Poulantzas in 
contrast, reserves Hegemony only for the political practices of the dominant classes 
which leads in understanding the State solely as an institution with “hegemonic class 
leadership”208. He, furthermore, attaches to it two readings.  
In a first level, Hegemony indicates how the political interests of the 
dominant classes appear as the very representatives of the general interest. In other 
words, the primary function of the State - nurturing the long-term economic interests 
of the dominant classes - and the secondary - namely counterbalancing the 
contradictions in the productive relations by presenting the State as the unification of 
all individuals - are both consolidated in the dominant classes209. This is feasible 
because of a peculiar characteristic of the capitalist State. The political domination is 
separated from political class struggle. In fact, the latter is nowhere mentioned, it 
does not ‘exist’210. Since, on the one hand, the economic competition is between 
individuals and not between classes and on the other hand the individuals come 
together as citizens of the same polity, there seems to be no space, no raison d'être 
for political class struggle211. In a second level, the dominating classes, fractions or 
categories in the political class struggle, may compose a ‘power bloc’. Their interests 
have common direction but not common content. Within this bloc one of the 
constituting parties holds a particularly dominant role which is the hegemonic one. 
Therefore, Hegemony allows both the convergence of the dominant social groups in 
                                                 
208 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 137. 
209 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 140. This is exactly the point where Poulantzas coincides with Gramsci. 
The latter mentions specifically that Hegemony is the moment when “corporate interests, in their 
present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can 
and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. This is the most purely political phase, 
and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures […] 
bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, 
posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, 
and thus creating the Hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups”. 
A. Gramsci in N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 140.  
210 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 188. 
211 This is a distinctive feature of the capitalist State. It should be reminded that generally the State 
because of its institutional character is a power centre and thus a contested field of the class struggle in 
every form. But in different class societies the interplay between the political and economical power 
had different consequences. For example in the feudal one, the economically dominant classes were 
overtly those ruling the State, as a matter of fact the King was the largest landlord; therefore, the 
economic class struggle was directly a political class struggle. One has just to see the illustrative 
examples of the emergence of the capitalist classes resulted to the ‘bourgeois revolutions’ in England 
and France in the 17th and 18th centuries.  
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one power bloc and its leadership by one of them212.  Those points require a closer 
examination in which we now turn. 
The aforementioned fragmentation of the levels of class struggle, and 
especially the separation between the political and the economic, results to a 
significant function of the State. The latter represents the political objectives of the 
dominant classes but not directly their economic interests. This allows some 
economic movements in favour of the dominated classes within some limits. Those 
are in the expense of the dominating classes but allow the establishment of the 
hegemonic leadership in the political level. Therefore, the consensus of the 
politically and economically dominated classes exceeds a mere ideological basis 
since it has specific political results213. The promotion of economic interests of the 
dominated classes should not be considered as withdrawal of the political power of 
dominating classes but exactly as its support. From another point of view, this retreat 
in the economic struggle leads to the political dislocation of the dominated classes. 
Thus, in every conjuncture there is a line demarcating the limit up to which economic 
concessions don’t question the political leadership but, instead, they support it. 
Exceeding this line may cause implications in the constitution of the power bloc of 
the dominant classes. It seems then, that the general interest as represented by the 
State is not downright a myth. It can serve the interests of dominated classes but only 
the economic and only to a limit set by the conjuncture, the ‘power’ of the classes in 
struggle and the specific type of the State. Thus, political power in the capitalist State 
is based upon an “unstable equilibrium of compromise”; ‘compromise’ because 
economic concessions can take place, ‘equilibrium’ because economic concessions 
cannot question the stability of the political power and ‘unstable’ because the whole 
system is dependent upon the conjuncture, the ‘power’ of the classes or the form of 
the State214.  
 
                                                 
212 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 141. Elsewhere (1984, p. 52) Poulantzas provides a methodological 
distinction of Hegemony corresponding to that of promoting the interests of the power bloc on the one 
hand and organizing the power bloc itself. More specifically, he presents the ‘political structures’ (in 
the sense of the objective institutions usually of the State) as the field of application of the first 
reading of Hegemony. Additionally, in the political practices Hegemony is applied in order to “retain 
or take over” the State. This requires the support by a complex form of ideology that would promote 
the homogenisation, self-consciousness and organisation of the dominant classes.  
213 J. Hirsch 1978, p. 103. 





As already mentioned the concept of Hegemony is a set of strategies within 
the institutional framework of the State that describe the phenomenal cancellation of 
contradictions between classes by referring to the common interest. The question 
arising is how this reference functions and why it is effective especially in the 
capitalist State. In those circumstances ideology, either as structure or practice, and 
its role comes as one of the main factors of interclass cohesion215. Poulantzas 
borrows from Gramsci the concept of dominant ideology but purified from historicist 
admixtures. The obvious risk run by a mechanistic use of dominant ideology is to 
connect it as a distinctive feature or “tool” of the dominant classes and thus fallback 
in voluntarism216. For example Lukács holds that “for a class to be ripe for hegemony 
means that its interests and consciousness enable it to organize the whole of society 
in accordance with those interests. The crucial question in every class struggle is this: 
which class possesses this capacity and this consciousness at the decisive 
moment”217. Generally, this approach connects directly ideology to the political 
organisation of a class. Apart from the problem of voluntarism, history shows that 
changes in the Mode of Production have not been always abrupt, something which 
allowed the coexistence of the previous dominant ideology and the domination of a 
new class, as in the case of Britain and the gradual political domination of the newly 
formed capitalists218.  
Poulantzas is based upon the definition on ideology given by Althusser. The 
latter holds that on the one hand, “ideology is a representation of the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” and on the other that 
“ideology has a material existence”219. These theses are approached by Poulantzas 
under the following explanation. In a world in which humans live their interpersonal 
                                                 
215 As shown above, there are also specific and pragmatic concessions that also hold the cohesion 
between the classes. The connection and the mutual fuelling of both factors is more than obvious. 
Concessions are given because of the ‘common interest’ and the ‘common interest’ is legitimized by 
the concessions. 
216 See for example the approach of ideology in economism/voluntarism ibidem p. 60. 
217 G. Lukács in N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 202. 
218 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 201-206. 
219 L. Althusser 1999, p. 100 and p. 102 respectively. In the same treatise, he explains in detail the 
reason for which we need ideology as mediation between the real conditions and their representation 
in our mind. In other words he justifies the meaning of “imaginary relationship” from his definition. 
See also N. Poulantzas 1984, pp 61-62. 
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relations as well as those with nature and society, ideologies represent the way that 
those relations are experienced. Ideology mingles and integrates with agents’ practice 
to that extent that it becomes indistinguishable from their actual experience. 
Therefore, this imaginary relation becomes both “real” and real. On the one hand it 
as “real” as the actual one because agents live this imaginary relation as if it was the 
concrete one and on the other hand it is real because it directs their actions to specific 
actions220. This allows the actual relations and the imaginary ones to connect in a 
single understanding of reality221. As a result, ideologies cannot be reduced to the 
problematic of the subject or the attached to it issues of alienation and false 
consciousness. Role of ideologies is not to provide a detailed image of the 
relationships in a Social Formation but to successfully integrate agents in the 
procedures that support the reproduction of those relationships. This happens because 
of the determination of the Social Formation by the ensemble of structures whose 
essence – including that of the ideology as such - remains hidden from agents. In 
other words, especially in class societies, the lack of transparency is determined by 
the relations of appropriation and property upon which ideology reflects the opacity 
under which social relations are covered. It could be safely assumed then, that 
ideologies by default, although they provide traces of real-concrete knowledge, they 
are necessarily false. In this framework, a special characteristic of any ideology is its 
intolerance to contradictions against the assumed reality. Their existence is generally 
denied since inconsistencies among their concepts or overt contradictions among the 
categories to which they refer would jeopardise the masking effect. The ideology, 
then, which becomes dominant, has an effectively cohesive role222 among the 
contradicting parts of the society223.   
The previous approach should be clarified, though, to avoid any historicist 
misconception. The application of the cohesive role upon humans may lead to 
understanding ideology as the consciousness – real or false – of the agents or classes. 
The unification role of ideology does not cause but presupposes the individualisation 
                                                 
220 This is the effect of the material existence of ideology. See in detail L. Althusser 1999, p. 104.  
221 This doesn’t mean that they coincide. This couldn’t happen anyway since ideologies refer to the 
representation of reality and relations are the very reality. Therefore, they are in a relationship of 
explicans and explicandum.   
222 Gramsci uses the exhibitive term “cement”. Ideology is the cement of a Social Formation. 
223 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 207. 
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of supports. More specifically, it presupposes their distance from the relations of 
property and appropriation. The reason is that ideology, being a constitutive part of 
the ensemble of levels in a Mode of Production and the respective Social Formation, 
is already overdetermined by the economic level. Therefore, what causes the class 
stratification in a society is also what determines at the last instance its dominant 
ideology. From this point of view, ideology is not acting as unifier because it actually 
brings together the contradicting classes but because it reproduces the social 
coherence in an imaginary level. The articulation of the levels of a Social Formation 
specifies its distinctive unity and ideology is its imaginary reproduction. If we further 
this strand of thought, it will become clearer that the peripheral structure of ideology 
cannot be directly connected to a specific class. If ideology mutually determines the 
other levels of the structure and it’s overdetermined at the last instance by economy, 
then ideology is only constituted by the ensemble of structures. Respectively, at the 
level of class struggle, it’s the unity of this level which determines and constitutes 
what the dominant ideology in a specific conjuncture is and not directly and in an 
unmediated way the dominant class. That means that the dominant ideology is 
constituted also by elements connected to non-dominant classes224.  
It must be stressed that ideology does not come as a fixed set of ideas (or 
better impressions). Ideology is divided into several sectors such as juridical, 
political, ethical, aesthetical, philosophical et al. Within this set, a sector dominates 
the others in the sense that they “borrow” concepts from the dominant. For example a 
domination of the philosophical sector may “dictate” what is aesthetically beautiful 
or not. As a matter of fact, one could see the interconnection of religion and art in 
Middle Ages where nudity, which was so common until the collapse of the Roman, 
Empire disappeared. The domination of one of the ideological sectors as well as the 
very coherence of ideological level is dependent on its ability to mask the always 
determinant economic level but also the each time dominant level. Additionally, the 
dominant ideological sector should hide the role of ideology per se225. For example 
                                                 
224 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 209-210. This explains also why a change of class domination does not 
entail a respective change of the dominant ideology.   
225 On that point Althusser (1999, pp 108-111) points that ideology has two functions, namely the 
“Recognition” and the “Misrecognition”. With the first one ideology imposes what is “self-
understood” which is then recognized by everybody as “obvious”. With the second one, ideology 
masks the fact that it influences our understanding of reality; it is the practical denegation of the 
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in the feudal Mode of Production the determinant level is the economic while the 
dominant is the ideological through religion. Nevertheless, the ruling class is also the 
strongest in economic terms which makes one assume the political level as the 
dominant one instead of the ideological. These contradicting facts are conciliated 
through the role of ideology which covers both the economic and the political levels 
and thus becomes the dominant. In parallel, religion through the medieval practices 
of mystification allowed exactly concealing the actual role of ideology in cancelling 
the class contradictions in the pertinent Mode of Production226. 
Poulantzas designates the juridico-political sector as the dominant in the 
ideological level of the Capitalist Mode of Production. In a Mode of Production 
where the determinant level coincides with the dominant one, ideology plays the 
unification role and at the same time hides away its role through the juridico-political 
ideological directives. The latter has already been discussed in connection to the 
establishment of individualisation as the main tool to support the relations of 
property and appropriation and its inscription in the more specific institutions of the 
State227. In purely ideological level, though, the juridico-political level causes a 
strange inversion. The dominant sector of ideology, which is supposed to unify the 
populace, in the first instance, separates them by promoting the idea of 
individualisation, which further denies the existence of classes228. This allows the 
competition among agents – an essential element of capitalist production - and the 
concealment of the role of the economic structure from agents. But in a second 
instance the same sector achieves the unification of individuals by infusing the idea 
that the State is the common denominator among individuals-citizens. Concepts like 
justice, egalitarianism, rights etc. which find their fundaments in the idea of 
individualism are attached to citizenship and the impression that they can only be 
incorporated by a State. It is the institution that unites all individuals through the free 
                                                                                                                                          
ideological character of ideology by ideology itself. The “accusation” of being “in ideology” only 
applies to others, never to oneself. Poulantzas implies the application of the second function of 
ideology as a criterion for the dominance of an ideological sector.   
226 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 211. 
227 One could also refer to historical facts like the main objectives of the bourgeois revolutions in 
France (liberté, égalité, fraternité) or in Britain (the struggle for more political power) to see how the 
juridico-political structure in a symbolic level affected even the beginnings of capitalism. 
228 In the pre-capitalist class societies the class division is obvious and “rationalized” in the 
ideological level; in slave-based modes of production because this division is something “natural” and 
in feudal Social Formations because it’s “sacred”.  
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and equal membership in the “national community”, since universal suffrage would 
express the public will. The transition from the juridico-political sector of ideology in 
the equivalent institutions of the State proves the crucial role of ideology in the 
formation of the modern representative democracy. The political scene of the State 
and especially the parliament is the very specific expression of the public will. 
Parties or politicians become representatives of the nonetheless fragmented People. 
This particular capacity of the juridico-political sector of ideology on the one hand to 
separate agents of production through individualism and on the other hand to unite 
them through the State should be sought in the relative autonomy that the peripheral 
structures in the Capitalist Mode of Production are privileged with229.  
Now, the specific way according to which the dominant sector of ideology, 
namely the juridico-political, obscures the delusion of unified individuals might be 
already clear. As a result of the universal suffrage, ‘public opinion’ and ‘consensus’ - 
become the “mantra” of the political system in a capitalist State. They manage to 
hide away the unification role of ideology through some distinctive characteristics. 
They are abstract but measurable concepts which can be “witnessed” by anyone just 
by observing opinion polls or electoral results. It could be said then that the juridico-
political sector of ideology is covered by an “objective” scientific mantle. It is 
“objective” because it points a subjective empirical reality which is nevertheless 
understood as universal. All individuals-citizens have their own understanding of 
public opinion or consensus under the ideation that it covers the whole of the society. 
More specifically, one can have concrete knowledge only of few opinions apart from 
his/her own. By projecting the empirical soundness with which those few opinions 
have been gathered upon the totality of an opinion poll or an election, the individual 
can be “sure” about the soundness of the results. But this is only a subjective 
assumption.  It could be assumed then that public opinion and consensus are 
subjective realities with objective consequences230. What these plausible assumptions 
imply is that whatever is not mentioned or witnessed lies in non-scientific fields. The 
absence of class struggle from the juridico-political sector of ideology and 
                                                 
229 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 211-218. See also N. Poulantzas 1984, pp 46-47. 
230 Poulantzas conceptualizes this rather schematic analysis under the idea that juridico-political 
ideology causes the “assimilation” of the individual to the society which is now presented as “his/her” 
society. N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 64.  
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consequently from the inscription in the respective State institutions makes it a 
utopia, although it is practically a linguistic absence. Hence, the juridico-political 
sector obscures the role of ideology not by mystification as in the feudal Mode of 
Production but by building a cognition system which denies the existence of 
whatever is not mentioned or witnessed and this is exactly what happens with class 
struggle. 
The function of the dominant ideology brings forward the issue of its index 
of success for a number of reasons; the most important being the need to investigate 
how successfully classes with profound contradicting interests can come together 
under the same goal, the “common will”, especially when this reflects the interests of 
the dominant class. In other words, how successfully the hegemonic class leadership 
can, through the State, impose the dominant ideology. Poulantzas uses ‘legitimacy’ 
as indication of that success. More specifically, he defines legitimacy as the 
representation of the political impact of the dominant ideology or else the way in 
which political structures are accepted by the agents of the structures. The State is 
formatted as institution in a Social Formation in which different modes of production 
overlap. This implies that agents of the relations of production could not be divided 
only in one bipolar system of classes (capitalists and proletariat). A first conclusion 
that could be drawn then is that several types of legitimacy could be spotted 
responding to several ideologies that survive along with the dominant under the same 
capitalist State231. However, this issue will be touched in detail in a following 
chapter. 
An issue related to the legitimacy of the political level is that of force of the 
capitalist State with the meaning of repression or violence. Force is approached by 
Poulantzas as covering “the function of certain institutions of organized physical 
repression, such as the army, the police, the penitentiary system etc. This repression 
is socially organized and is one characteristic of all power relations”. Force is also 
used by Gramsci under a rather vague explanation in the concept of ‘consent 
reinforced by coercion’ where consensus and coercion were in supplementary 
relationship. Hegemony is consent to State leadership and coercion or State force is 
its counterpart. Nevertheless, this implies that dominated classes consent to decisions 
                                                 
231 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 221-224. 
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of the State which requires a division between the State and Civil Society. In order to 
avoid this historicist problematic, a different view of the relationship between the 
State and force is needed. Since force is the organized physical repression, the State 
retains its monopoly232. The result is that force obtains a political character and its 
legitimacy is part of the legitimacy of the political level of the State. Force is 
presented as constitutionalized violence subjected to legal directives233.  
The “politicisation” of force has a very distinctive consequence in 
connection to its legitimisation. Poulantzas notes that “the exercise of physical 
repression is henceforth legitimized in that it is presented as corresponding to the 
general interest of the nation-people; here legitimacy is related exclusively to the 
State. The repressive organisation is deemed to be subject to the control of public 
opinion (see e.g. the institution of tribunals, juries, etc.)”. Therefore, force appears 
“naked”, according to Marx, from its non-political dimension which complies with 
the relative autonomy of the levels in a Capitalist Mode of Production234. The 
expression used, namely, that the capitalist State “has” the monopoly of organized 
violence, implies a possessive relationship. In reality, though, the State in the 
Capitalist Mode of Production is appointed with the monopoly of violence. The 
reason is related with the need to support the relative autonomy of the levels of the 
Mode of Production. More specifically, one can assume that had violence been not 
monopolized or implemented by an institution that is not legitimized by the common 
will as in the case of the State, the ideological masking of the relations of production 
under the dominant ideology would be impossible. The very individualisation effect 
would be then endangered235. Hence, force is legitimized in the same way as the 
                                                 
232 In contrast with other modes of production where other institutions had also this privilege, like 
Church. 
233 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 225-226.  
234 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 227 and N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 66-67. Elsewhere Poulantzas makes a 
contradiction between the position of violence in the capitalist and feudal modes of production by 
showing that violence was not “naked” but organically present in the relations of production in order 
to allow the extraction of the product from relations of production in favour of the owners of the 
means of production. He coins that concept as ‘legal violence’. N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 23 and N. 
Poulantzas 2001b, p. 41.  
235 Hirsch based on Pashukanis gives a more detailed approach of the State monopoly of violence as 
the other side of the coin in the need to present employees and employers as freely and equally 
participating in the labour relationship. The typical equality before the “laws of economy” and law 
itself require the absence of any straightforward form of violence implementation or coercion in the 
aforementioned relationship. Therefore, the State as an impartial factor is appointed with this task. J. 
Hirsh 1978, p. 100. 
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political level of the State, through the dominant ideology; in accordance with the 





As mentioned before, the second feature of Hegemony appears in the 
formation of the ‘power bloc’ among the dominating classes. It is the “particular 
configuration of the interrelations between the dominant classes which, when related 
to a State, they function within a specific political unity covered by the concept of 
the power bloc”. In more detail, the concept of power bloc indicates the contradictory 
unity of the politically dominant classes or fractions as related with a specific type of 
capitalist State. Before, we embark in the analysis of the definition, it would be good 
to see how Poulantzas explains the very emergence of the power bloc. As a special 
coalition between classes, it cannot be explained just by the overlapping of modes of 
production, and its effect which is the existence of several classes. Reasoning is 
rather multi-factorial. On a first level, the interplay between the State institutions 
allows the formation of a power bloc. For example, in a capitalist formation the 
relative autonomy of the State from the economic level and the subsequent need to 
be presented as the unification of the “individuals” lead to universal suffrage. The 
political interactions by this development created the basis for the formation of 
power blocs, which furthermore locates them at the field of political practices of the 
dominating classes. On a second level, the very multiplicity of modes of production 
in the same Social Formation dictates the co-existence of several dominant classes - 
each one being the dominant in the corresponding Mode of Production – which can 
be the constituting members of the power bloc. This, however, should not be 
interpreted in the sense that only ruling classes do participate in the power bloc. 
Finally, the bourgeoisie appears fragmented. This happens on the one hand because 
of the overlapping modes of production and on the other due to the various ways in 
which capital is constituted in the process of expanded reproduction. Therefore there 
could be a fraction of landowners’ class that becomes part of the bourgeoisie or a 
number of bourgeois fractions referring to the industrial, the financial or the 
merchandising capital. The political or economical reasons which separate them 
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cannot prevent them from forming power blocs236. Finally, the formation of a power 
bloc from the dominant classes becomes a requirement to capture power as it is 
concentrated in the State. Following that, a significant relationship is established 
between classes participating in the power bloc and the State since the structures of 
the latter are used to diffuse class interests as general interests of the populace. At the 
same time those State structures support the coherence of the highly fragmented 
power bloc as it would be shown237. 
As already mentioned, the power bloc is applied in the field of the political 
practices of the dominant classes. In there, one of the groups (either class or fraction) 
holds the hegemonic role. This happens because the constitution of unity in the 
power bloc corresponds to the unity created by the State. In other words, the 
particular interests within the power bloc are polarized but that of the hegemonical 
group are presented as the common political interests238. Usually, the domination of 
the power bloc and the domination of the political field of the Social Formation 
coincide in the same class or fraction239. This poses the question of the specific way 
according to which they manage to represent their interest as general in both cases. In 
the domination of the power bloc, Hegemony is constituted because of the position in 
the production relations reserved by the dominant group. For example in the final 
stage of capitalism, that of monopoly capitalism, the domination belongs to the 
financial capital because of the need to fund investments in industry, construction or 
land and on the other hand to secure the risks prone to those investments. Regarding 
the domination upon dominated classes, Hegemony is constituted through the 
                                                 
236 N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 229-234. 
237 N. Poulantzas 1984, pp 74-75. 
238 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 239. 
239 From the concept of the power bloc, alliances and supporting classes should be discerned. 
Alliances are looser blocs in which the unity appears in only one field of struggle. For example there 
might be mutual support in the economic field but fierce struggle in the political one. In the contrary, 
power blocs present united practices in all fields. This allows the formation of alliances between 
groups-members of the power bloc and classes or fraction belonging to the dominated social groups. 
Supporting classes are those groups that support the Hegemony of the power bloc without any 
sacrifice by the latter. Their support is based upon ideological illusions; so if there should be any 
sacrifice that would be a change in rhetoric to encompass critical issues for them. Poulantzas holds 
that, aside any ideological illusion, in some cases their support stems from their fear towards the 
power of working classes. Their contradicting interests with the proletariat lead them to take position 
and support the hegemonical class or fraction. It should be stressed that the support of those classes is 
principally directed through the State, in contrast with alliances or power blocs which also include 
non-institutional methodisations. Lenin coins this phenomenon as ‘power fetishism’ and is a proof of 
the ideological function of the State since it appears as the guardian of the status quo or the essential 
and impartial mediator in the class struggle. See also N. Poulantzas 1973, pp 240-245.  
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previously mentioned ideological function. As a matter of fact in the previous 
example of monopoly capitalism, the possibility of a collapse of the banking system 
due to a series of bankruptcies seems to be frightening for people dependent on them 
for investment funding as well as people that just have (or not even) a bank account. 
The coincidence of Hegemony in both the power bloc and the Social Formation in 
one class may have particular effects in different conjunctures as for example the 
dislocation, dissociation or displacement of these functions to different classes with 
particular effects also at the political level240. 
At this point an important distinction should be made. Power bloc should 
not be confused with concepts like class consciousness or class political organisation, 
which are related with the constitution of classes only under a historicist approach of 
Marxism241. Especially the class political organisation comprises what Marx calls the 
‘political scene’. The latter covers solely a particular space at the level of political 
class practices “which contains the struggle between forces organized in political 
parties”. The participation of a class in the political scene in the sense of its 
representation by a political party depends on the conjuncture. As a result the 
political scene is the field where the dislocations between classes’ political interests 
and practices on the one hand and their representation by political parties on the 
other is to be located242. 
Contrariwise, it’s the presence of pertinent effects that mark the existence of 
a social force. This is why dislocations between class interests, their practices and 
their representation from parties are not directly related to the relationship between 
the dominated classes and the power bloc or the constitution of the power bloc itself. 
Class relations cannot be reduced to party relations. In fact, what happens is the 
opposite. The power bloc in a specific conjuncture dictates the limits of the party 
relations because it corresponds to a specific type of State which further 
circumscribes the regime in which parties function. For example the Hegemony of 
the finance fraction in power bloc the current stage of monopoly capitalism 
corresponds to a form of State as we know it today. The party regime is then 
accordingly circumscribed through specific legal provisions regarding judicial 
                                                 
240 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 240. 
241 Ibidem, p. 81. 
242 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 247. 
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control of their bylaws, obligation to reveal their funding sources, prohibition of 
declarations against the current political system etc. This indirect relationship 
between power bloc and class representation could be seen in the case of absence of 
a class’ representation from the political scene and its presence in the power bloc. 
This phenomenon allows the conception of the distinction between the hegemonic 
class or a fraction and the ruling one which is the dominant in the political scene 
through its parties. It allows also the respective dislocation as in the case of a 
hegemonic group which is represented in the political scene by the party that is 
supposed to represent another class. The other side of the coin is that changes in the 
index of Hegemony, namely displacements in the power bloc, don’t require a change 
in the dominance of the political scene. More specifically, the change in the 
Hegemony of the power bloc could have no effects in the ruling class. A final 
distinction that should be taken into consideration is that between the hegemonic 
class, the ruling class and that which is “in charge of the State Apparatus”. The latter 
points solely the class from which the State Personnel are recruited. The hegemonic 
class, the ruling class or the ‘class in charge’ may coincide in one class or fraction or 
they can describe different social groups. Especially the last two categories may even 
refer to a class that doesn’t belong to the power bloc243.  
 
The distinctive combination of the two aspects of Hegemony allows the 
formation of an innovative approach of the State by Poulantzas. On the one hand the 
unstable equilibrium of compromise means that the dominated classes are taken into 
consideration in the structure of official State strategy. On the other hand the need for 
wider coalitions in the level of the power bloc which may include dominated classes 
means that they can participate even more vigorously in what appears as 
governmental policy. It seems then that both dominant and dominated classes 
contribute through their contradiction but more importantly because of their struggle 
in the formation of those specific relationships which are promoted by the State and 
because of that they are endemic in its institutional structure. The State therefore, 
could be fundamentally seen as a relationship and more precisely as the condensation 
                                                 
243 N. Poulantzas 1973, p 248-251. 
92   State and Structures 
 
of the articulation of the class struggle244. The latter forms the central point in this 
Thesis. Having established the structure of class relations within the Social 
Formation but most importantly the very essence of the State in which classes 
interact, the next chapter will develop how the embedded in the State class 
contradiction is manifested in its functions. 
                                                 











As already shown in the previous chapter, Poulantzas’ approach on State is 
significant among Marxist thinking not because he established a new theory from 
scratch but rather because he expanded the elements of theory hidden in the Marxist 
Classics to an intellectual level in which they acquired internal consistency. The 
difference, therefore, between the Classics and the following theoretical generation 
(Poulantzas, Miliband et al.) is that the latter gave operational definitions of the State 
instead of descriptions. In a similar way, the origins of a central concept in Structural 
Marxism - that of State Apparatuses - could already be found in Marx (The 18th 
Brumaire of Luis Napoleon or The Class struggles in France), in Lenin (Political 
report of the central committee of the 11th Congress of the RCP, Five years of 
Russian revolution – report to the 4th comintern congress, Better fewer, but better 
and State and revolution) and in Gramsci (Letters from prison); the centrality of their 
role, though, was first asserted in Althusser’s work. As a matter of fact, the two 
concepts, namely the State and the State Apparatuses, are intermingled in the 
Classics exactly because of the descriptive approach. As soon as in the Manifesto of 
the Communist Party Marx conceives the State as a repressive apparatus which 
allows the dominating classes to safeguard their domination. Therefore, the State is 
primarily an apparatus and more precisely its apparatus. In other words, it coincides 
with the State Apparatuses which have a repressive role245.  
Poulantzas’ reading of Lenin’s explorations starts a detailed presentation of 
State Apparatuses which is interpreted in a twofold way. The first refers to the 
placement of the State in the ensemble of the structures of a Social Formation. In 
other words, State Apparatuses refer to the way in which it realizes its economic, 
strictly-political or ideological functions. Secondly, State Apparatuses refer to the 
                                                 
245 L. Althusser 1999, p. 78.  
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State Personnel, the ranks of the administration, the bureaucracy etc.246. Both 
meanings are equally important as it will be seen in the course of this chapter. Their 
analysis is crucial before approaching more closely the issue of repression and of 





The most significant function of State Apparatuses is that they constitute 
the main method in which the each time articulation of the political, ideological and 
economical levels are transformed into specific strategies, policies or dictates. For 
example, Church in Middle Ages and currently schools, the Mass Media, the political 
parties, trade unions etc. are the communicators of the dominant ideology. The 
parliament is mainly the institution in which the interactions of the political level 
take place. The government in total and even more the ministry of finance plays a 
fundamental role in the relations of production. State Apparatuses, in other words, 
work towards the materialisation of the articulation of the levels247.  
Their actual role, though, differs from the each time allocated functions. 
State Apparatuses are needed to safeguard the consistence of a Social Formation by 
condensing the class struggle and establishing the domination of a class. This point 
needs to be further clarified. As it has been shown, class is the objective consequence 
of the articulation of levels in the field of the social division of labour248. The result, 
then, is that the determination of a class is also dependent upon the political and 
ideological relations, namely the struggle in the corresponding levels. State 
Apparatuses - being the incorporation of those levels – are put in the centre of the 
discussion over this determination. It is exactly the relationship between classes and 
Apparatuses that is critical for the placement of the former in the class struggle249. In 
other words, since classes only exist in their struggle and not in abstract, the 
relationship between class struggle and State Apparatuses is crucial for the existence 
of classes as such.   
                                                 
246 N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 116.  
247 See also N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 31 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 40 and 183. 
248 Ibidem p. 65. 
249 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 32. 
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It should be noted, though, that this constitutional role of the Apparatuses 
does not replace the first250 and fundamental role of the class struggle. Classes exist 
because of the class struggle and not because of their relationship with State 
Apparatuses. The latter as institutions are loci of power and not power holders 
themselves and this is how they are involved in the class struggle; they materialize 
and condense it. In that way, State Apparatuses are also discerned from the State 
power as such, which is the reflection of power relations among classes in the field 
of the State. It must be reminded at this point that the State is a relationship and more 
precisely the condensation of the articulation of class struggle251. At the same time 
the State presents a relative autonomy which enables it to function in favour of the 
dominant class in the long term. This definition might now be clarified. It is exactly 
the State Apparatuses in which classes project their interest. It’s those institutions to 
which the class struggle takes place (in relation to the State) and its vector forms the 
power equilibrium which later constitutes the public policy252. As a result the social 
contradictions run through the State via the State Apparatuses. On the other hand the 
ensemble of the applied power in each State Apparatus constitutes the State power253.  
The fact that the State incorporates those class contradictions specifically in 
its Apparatuses is the reason for which the State is also the organizer of the power 
bloc. The need of the dominant fractions to promote their long term interests bring 
them together under the hegemonic fraction in order to “fight” in unison the constant 
“battle” in the State Apparatuses. The other side of the coin is that the relative 
autonomy of the State is not its abstract genetic characteristic but exactly the 
outcome of the fact that in the course of the class struggle different classes or 
fractions manage to “take over” specific State Apparatuses and use them 
accordingly. Therefore the autonomy of the State is in essence the autonomy of some 
                                                 
250 The word “first” here should not be understood in a meaning of temporal sequence but rather in 
classification of importance. The relationship between the class struggle, State Apparatuses and 
classes themselves is not grounded on genetic reasons which would end up in a discussion similar to 
the question of what was made first the chicken or the egg. Class struggle has a fundamental role 
because one the one hand it’s the factor to which State Apparatuses correspond with their role and on 
the other hand the final criterion which decides whether the current articulation of State Apparatuses 
will change or not. It will be shown later that the input from the State Apparatuses in the class struggle 
is not insignificant but the importance remains with the class struggle.  
251 Ibidem p. 91. 
252 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 25. 
253 See also L. Althusser 1999, pp 81-82, N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 32 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 
182-191. 
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Apparatuses from the power bloc254. The domination of the power bloc – which is 
reflected in the “unity of the State” - is achieved because it managed to dominate in 
some preponderant Apparatuses from which it can influence other institutions or 
block their function255. The example of the contemporary centrality of the Ministry 
of Finance within the executive level in most European States is illustrative. Other 
ministries or State institutions in general have serious difficulties to apply 
independent policies without the consent of that ministry.  
What the previous analysis shows is exactly that the class struggle 
determines the role and function of State Apparatuses. They don’t have specific 
features by default but they depend upon the dynamicity of the class struggle. More 
specifically, State Apparatuses by organizing the power bloc achieve at the same 
time to disorganize the dominated classes since this is exactly the goal of getting 
together the power bloc at the first place. This development is significant exactly 
because the dominated classes appear in the struggle field of the State Apparatuses 
too. In this framework a State Apparatus becomes central or dominates others 
because it’s the one that can better organize the power bloc and at the same time can 
communicate the politico-ideological role of the State to the dominated classes. This 
is the case currently with the government or generally the executive sector. At the 
same time, Apparatuses’ roles in communicating the role of the State are dispersed 
according to the classes to which they refer as in the case of trade unions for labour 
classes or the educational system for the new petty-bourgeoisie. Finally, the 
emphasis on the each time role of an Apparatus may change according to the specific 
characteristics of the class struggle. An illustrative example is the role of the army in 
different countries or even in the same country but in different eras; it could serve the 
external defence, the internal security (dictatorships), the imperialistic views of the 
local capital (colonialism), the absorption of unemployment etc.256.  
What could be seen then is a circle relationship of constant feedback in 
which the class struggle determines the specific functions of the State Apparatuses 
and in the next movement, they determine the classes themselves by being the 
materialisation of the articulation of the political, ideological and economic 
                                                 
254 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 38. 
255 N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 192-196. 
256 See also N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 42 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 196.  
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instances. Later, the each time determined social entities, either classes or categories 
or fractions of classes, participate in the class struggle and thus, perpetuate the 
constant feedback. This is how the role of State Apparatuses as establishers of the 
domination of a class or a power block is grounded. From another point of view, 
however, this concept supports Marx’s proposition that the class struggle is the 
motive force of history because this circle relationship cannot be conceived without 
the perpetual movement257.  
The circle of constant feedback brings the discussion of State Apparatuses 
in the heart of the wider issue of the reproduction of class relations. No Mode of 
Production could be conceived without the corresponding reproduction of class 
relations. Assuming that a one-off settlement of the class relations would be enough, 
would equal to disregarding the class struggle; as if the society would run towards a 
prescribed destination using an autopilot. Poulantzas refers to this dynamic 
reproduction of class relations as extended reproduction of the social classes. State 
Apparatuses facilitate this process exactly by reproducing the political, ideological 
and economic conditions which determine classes in the first instance258. Given that 
classes do not exist outside their struggle, as stressed before, the determination of 
classes is essentially the determination of class relations, namely, the definition of 
power, domination and subordination among classes. Hence, this is the way in which 
State Apparatuses promote the domination of a class or of the power bloc, as 
mentioned in the beginning of this section. 
Moving deeper into the analysis of extended class reproduction, would shed 
some more light in the features and the role of State Apparatuses. The extended 
                                                 
257 See a similar approach in J. Delilez 1978, p. 154. The State has also a certain degree of materiality 
in its Apparatus (N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 154). Poulantzas leaves this argument unexplained. 
Nevertheless, he is using it in the context of whether the change of the equilibrium of power in the 
State Apparatuses would be enough in the course of Socialism. He concludes that a struggle only in 
and for the State would fall back in social-democracy and therefore a struggle in the base movements 
is also needed. If the materiality of the State is seen in this context along with the idea of the constant 
feedback then it could be understood as follows. The outcome of the class struggle is “frozen” for an 
instance (the temporal connotation here is exclusively relative) in a specific network of Apparatuses. 
This network is open to changes but until there is an occasion for change it presents material 
objectivity. Elsewhere Poulantzas (Poulantzas 2001a, p. 101-107) shows that the objective materiality 
of the State, namely the set up of the State Apparatuses in a specific instance, is what artificially 
creates the separation between the private and the public field. In other words, those fields do not 
correspond to two completely separate sectors but they are just another channel through which the 
power of the dominant classes pervades the dominant classes. The State Apparatuses in this 
framework indicating the transient positions of the public as opposed with the private.  
258 See the short analysis by Poulantzas in N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 34. 
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reproduction of social classes has two aspects that coexist. On the one hand, there is 
the reproduction of places occupied by social entities referring to the positions taken 
by classes because of the domination/subordination relations in the class struggle as 
dominating/subordinated correspondingly. On the other hand, there is the allocation 
of agents in those places. The primary role in those two aspects belongs to the first 
one because the allocation would have been meaningless outside the reproduction of 
class positions.  Indeed, what determines a class is not the characteristics of its 
members but the position they have (in unison) in the relations of production. In this 
framework, it should be highlighted that State Apparatuses do not have the same role 
regarding each aspect of the extended class reproduction.   
In reference to the reproduction of class positions, State Apparatuses 
interfere with the materialisation of the political and ideological components of class 
determination. At this point an already remarked point, namely that class 
determination is not the outcome of Apparatuses function, becomes more apparent. 
Poulantzas is using the example of the school. The main ideological apparatus of the 
State is not the cause of the division of the society in classes but it’s only a knot in a 
sequence of developments that start with the class struggle. The progress of 
capitalism triggered the need for at the minimum literate and moreover specialized 
workforce which is covered amongst else by the school. This development causes the 
division between the low specialized proletariats and the highly specialized 
workforce of the new petty-bourgeoisie which also results at the relevant class 
division. Therefore, those positions were not created by the school (or any other State 
Apparatus) itself but by the need for specialized workers which also created the 
school. Most importantly, though, the connection between the class struggle and the 
State Apparatuses means that all controversies, friction or alliances that occur in the 
class struggle are transferred in the field of State Apparatuses and through them the 
class struggle is “refuelled”259.  
The second aspect of class reproduction refers to the allocation of agents 
themselves. State Apparatuses in that framework have case-specific function rather 
than generic as in the previous one260. If the example of school should be used again, 
the allocation of agents in proletariat or in petty-bourgeoisie class positions becomes 
                                                 
259 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 35-37. 
260 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 41. 
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feasible through the process of specialisation. School doesn’t have, though, only 
vocational role but also promotes subordination which covers ideological and 
political relations. A whole system of rewards and punishment is set to help students 
understand the concept of hierarchy in general and ad hoc, namely the supremacy of 
the teacher in the classroom. The exam-system promotes the competition among 
students as well as the culture of constant evaluation. These constitute qualifications 
that the agent will carry in the labour market.  
Class reproduction in terms of allocation of agents also happens outside the 
Apparatuses as a direct consequence of class positions upon agents. As a matter of 
fact children of capitalists will become the future capitalists as will do most likely 
children of proletariats. The influence of the school or even of the family cannot be 
seen as decisive in that case; it’s rather a first allocation of agents because of the 
class positions themselves261. For example the fact that somebody inherits a firm 
automatically places him/her in the highest position in the hierarchy of power 
relations; therefore he/she becomes capitalist. In the same way, the fact that 
somebody has to work in order to survive because there was nothing to be inherited, 
automatically places him/her at a lower level of the power relations. A first account 
for this development would be the structure of the inheritance law which again in a 
deeper analysis is the outcome of the class struggle in the juridico-political level. 
An important issue which also shows that State Apparatuses are only 
facilitators instead of causes in the class reproduction is the role of the economic 
apparatuses. In the discussion of apparatuses, Althusser doesn’t refer to them at all, 
while Poulantzas only touches them allusively because they are much more 
important in the discussion over the relations of production. They are institutions 
where appropriation of nature takes place (the factory, the enterprise etc.) and they 
could belong in the private or the public sphere, if the bourgeois terminology could 
be used here262. Their importance in relevance to the current discussion is that they 
do promote class reproduction too. On the one hand inside a firm there is a specific 
division of labour that reinforces the relevant class positions. A sketchy example 
would be that the need for unskilled or semi-skilled labour creates the position of 
proletariat. The need for foremen, supervisors or clerk with domination relations with 
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262 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 31, 38 and 42. 
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the previous categories creates the position of petty-bourgeoisie. While the 
entrepreneur or the owner of the firm who dominates all the previous levels creates 
the position of the capitalist. Regarding the allocation of agents, training and 
subordination has always been part of the personal development in the workplace. 
Therefore, the unskilled labourer may become skilled inside the economic apparatus. 





As already mentioned the second interpretation of the concept of State 
Apparatuses refers to the State Personnel. By the latter, Lenin means the ranks of the 
administration, the bureaucracy of the central government as well as the ensemble of 
the personnel of those apparatuses. The whole discussion on that issue is placed by 
both Poulantzas and Lenin with the problem of ‘who is in charge of the State’ and 
how this group of agents are related to the core of the State263. At this point an 
important distinction should be reminded. The hegemonic class or fraction, namely 
the social entity which is the dominant in the power bloc, does not always coincide 
with the ruling class, namely the class whose “representative” party or parties 
dominates the political scene. In reality this is rare in the contemporary capitalism. 
Furthermore, the class or fraction which is “in charge of the State” may be different 
from the previous ones. The reason, as explained, lies with the fact that what 
determines the existence of a social force is the reflection of its position in the 
relations of production by pertinent effects in the ideological and political 
relationships. This on the one hand breaks the direct link between the very existence 
of a social force and its representation by a party and on the other hand allows 
dislocations between class interests and their practices264. This section, therefore, will 
deal with the personnel of the State Apparatuses who are exactly the group which is 
in charge of the State. 
The purposeful use of the word ‘group’ in the previous phrase indicates the 
difficulty to present the State Personnel as a single homogeneous class or fraction of 
a class. As it will be shown, State bureaucracy doesn’t fall into the concept of class 
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264 Ibidem p. 91 and N. Poulantzas 1973, p 248-251. 
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but rather on that of social category. It’s already mentioned that a social category is a 
social ensemble of various social forces which present an over-determining relation 
with a structure other than the economic one and more precisely it cuts vertically the 
social stratification by encompassing different social strata, fractions or classes265. 
Bureaucracy is exactly a social category whose over-determining relation lies with 
the juridico-political level, in other words the State. The reason is that it needs to 
balance on the one hand the reproduction of class positions which takes place in the 
State Apparatuses themselves and on the other hand the need to direct the work of all 
agents towards the same direction and achieve what is finally the State policy. In the 
analysis of this balancing attempt we now turn. 
State Apparatuses reproduce class positions both in the non-State field but 
also within themselves. The reason is that, as already shown, the State is a 
relationship which condenses class relations existing in the Social Formation. The 
very process of “condensing” (obviously this is an improper use of a metaphor), 
happens at the State Apparatuses. In other words, the State in reproducing the social 
division of labour - the extended class reproduction – concentrates in its Apparatuses 
what exactly reproduces, namely the social division of labour266. To conceptualize 
this, it’s imperative to refer to the idea of the circle of constant feedback between the 
State, the State Apparatuses and the class struggle as presented at the previous 
section. The result of this development is that there are class divisions within the 
ensemble of State Personnel.  
A potential side-effect of this could be the fact that, exactly because of the 
class separation in the State Apparatuses, the relevant contradictions may hinder the 
role and the function of the State267. Therefore, the other end of the balancing process 
is to mobilize the constituting forces of the social category in question towards the 
same direction. This is feasible through the function of the dominant ideology 
regarding the State. Its neutrality which exists for the common welfare and because 
                                                 
265 Ibidem p. 69 and N. Poulantzas 1973, p. 84. 
266 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 234.  
267 It has been mentioned before that what we see as final State policy is a chaotic ensemble of 
mutually contradicting decisions from various sources that hardly give the sense of homogeneity 
unless seen as the vector which is in favour of the hegemonic class or fraction. Therefore, prima facie, 
the potential hindering of the role and function of the State because of the class struggle among the 
State Personnel may seem self-contradicting. Nevertheless, the first description of State policy is 
pragmatic in contrast with the second one which describes the providences by the articulation of levels 
in the field of the State in securing continuity, irrespective of its success or failure.  
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of the common will is communicated through the State Apparatuses and more 
specifically through the persons who set this mechanism in motion, namely the State 
Personnel268. Therefore, they undergo themselves this reversion of reality and one 
can say even in greater degree than non-State Personnel exactly because of their 
position in the State Apparatuses. Thus, the dominant ideology acts as a cohesive 
factor not only in the Social Formation at large but also within the State Personnel 
preventing its dissolution in the constituting social forces.  
Having set the framework of the constitution of the State Personnel, it 
would be interesting to see which specific social forces participate. Before a detailed 
exploration, though, it must be reminded that for Poulantzas the criterion for the 
allocation of agents in classes is neither the class-origins nor the interpersonal 
relations or the actual income. What determines it, instead, is the position the agent 
occupies in the relations of production, exactly because the determinant of a class is 
the reflection of a social group’s presence in the relations of production upon the 
ideological and political levels by pertinent effects. This reiteration is significant 
because the discussion over the class allocation of the State Personnel has been the 
occasion for the infamous Poulantzas – Miliband debate. The latter by bringing 
forward the problematic of the subject suggested that the class character of the State 
is attributed to the inter-personal relations between the bourgeois class and the higher 
rank of bureaucracy. Although Miliband coincides with Poulantzas in the class 
affiliation of this group, they differ in the way they reach this conclusion which 
further determines the way they understand the relationship between the State and 
the Social Formation.  
The problem of class affiliation of the high rank bureaucracy is related with 
that of managers in the Capitalist Mode of Production. As already shown, relations of 
production are constituted by the relations of property and relations of appropriation; 
within them what really counts in the Capitalist Mode of Production is not the 
relations of property which are in every class society in favour of the dominating 
class but the relations of appropriation, which in capitalism point the fact that the 
labourer has not any actual control upon the means of production269. The other side 
of the coin, then, is that the agent who actually controls the means of production is 
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allocated in the class of the capitalists. The term ‘actual control’ should be discerned 
from any relevant legal right because what really count are the relations of power and 
subordination and not a doctrinal legal issue which doesn’t reflect reality270. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that the capital as articulation of relations is the 
determinant of the class position of the agents who perform the relevant functions. 
That means that powers related to the use of resources, management of the means of 
production or administration of the labour process are related to the relations of 
property and appropriation; thus, they frame the bourgeois class position. 
Furthermore, agents who perform the previous function are allocated to the 
bourgeois class irrespective of their legal relationship with the means of production 
in question. The reflections of their position in the relations of production upon the 
political level have to do with the very idea of hierarchy, the way they organize 
production within the workplace as well as the “know how” and the way it always 
stays hidden; from ideological point of view the rationalisation of production, the 
efficiency and the technocratic ideas that constitute the idea of managerialism in the 
wider society today271.  
Regarding the high rank officials of the State, their class position as well as 
allocation follows the same path. They belong to the bourgeois class exactly because 
they try to set the State in the service of the bourgeois class. This is not an empirical 
conclusion but it’s derived from a purely theoretical approach of the Social 
Formation. The existing division of labour in the Social Formation and the relevant 
power equilibrium in the class struggle is reflected in the State itself. Therefore, the 
class struggle transforms the administration of the State and the State Apparatuses to 
a specific class position which corresponds to the bourgeois class to allow 
accordingly the reproduction of the division of labour in the Social Formation. In 
other words they administer the subordination endemic in the division of labour 
within the State to promote on the one hand the culture of subordination and on the 
other hand to facilitate the class reproduction which are both necessary for the 
                                                 
270 The example of the legal status of land ownership in feudalism has already been presented. The 
total of the land belonged to the King but it was not him who subordinated the serfs but the lord. In a 
more contemporary example, an incorporated company as legal property is dispersed among a number 
of shareholders many of whom have no direct relationship with the company as such, especially when 
its shares are traded in a stock-market. In those cases, the subordination relations within the company 
are dominated by the managers. 
271 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 217-227. 
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capitalist relations of production. In that way they are placed among the bourgeois 
class. The reflections of this class affiliation upon the political level are related to a 
distinctive form of subordination powers related to the separation of responsibilities 
of decision and responsibilities of enforcement, while the reflection upon the 
ideological level is relevant to that of managerialism through the ideas of efficiency, 
rationalisation and other technocratic ideas272.   
The previous exposition regarding the higher rank State officials leaves 
open the question on who is subordinated by them in the power relations endemic in 
the State structure. The answer should be sought at the lower rank civil servants who 
belong according to Poulantzas to the new petty-bourgeois class. As in the previous 
case, a necessary deviation must be made regarding the nature of this class for a brief 
presentation of the traditional bourgeoisie. This class appears already in Marx and 
Engels because it refers to the simple merchandising Mode of Production which was 
a short lived dominant Mode of Production in the transition between feudalism and 
capitalism. The specific ways of production appearing due to this mode are the 
artisanship, the small scale industry and merchandising. Their distinctive 
characteristic is the fact that the owner of the company is also the owner of the 
means of production but he is the sole labourer himself if not helped by his family 
which doesn’t receive any salary. In other words the surplus value comes from 
merchandising the production and not by the exploitation of labour273.  
The new petty-bourgeoisie shares in common with the traditional one the 
fact that they belong to neither the proletariat nor the bourgeois class and they share 
the political and ideological reflections of their position at the relations of 
production. They differ though in the fact that the traditional one is destined to fade 
away due to the gradual abandonment of the Mode of Production in which it 
corresponds. They differ also in the fact that in many fractions of the new petty-
bourgeoisie there is endemic subordination as it will be seen. Turning now to 
specifically the new petty-bourgeoisie class it could be seen that in the current Social 
                                                 
272 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 44 and N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 227-235. An important remark though is 
the fact that the link between the bourgeois class and the higher rank bureaucrats is filtered through 
the distinctive cohesive factor of the State Personnel, namely, the idea that they serve the common 
good and they are there because of the common will. This will be analysed in detail below. 
273 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 354-355. The reflections of the level of production relations upon the 
political and ideological levels will be seen later in conjunction with the new petty-bourgeoisie since 
they have common characteristics. 
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Formation there are groups of agents that don’t have any property or appropriation 
powers on the production process and therefore they are not part of the bourgeois 
class. They are usually paid with salary for their work exactly as the labour class 
does. Illustrative examples are shop assistants, civil servants, freelance employees, 
clerks and other amanuensis jobs. Therefore the question is whether they should be 
considered as part of the working class or not. The issue of the salary cannot be the 
determinant for positioning them in the relations of production, because if every 
agent is stipendiary this doesn’t mean that he/she is also proletariat. As a matter of 
fact, the managers who belong to the bourgeois classes are also paid in the form of 
salary. In a deeper analysis, what actually lies at the core of this discussion is the 
delimitation of the labour class. In Capitalist Mode of Production, the actual 
determinant is the relation of the labourer with the means of production which 
characterizes a job as productive or not. A job which produces surplus value creates a 
proletariat class position while a non productive one could be either petty-bourgeois 
or bourgeois274.  
The productive character of a job is different from issues like its utility, its 
efficiency or other concepts of its nature. It should be seen, instead, within the 
specific social conditions in which it takes place, in other words, in the specific stage 
of the relevant Mode of Production. In this framework, productive is the labour 
which creates the dominant subordination/exploitation relationship relevant to the 
each time Mode of Production. In the Capitalist Mode of Production this is translated 
into the direct production of surplus value which on the one hand utilizes capital and 
on the other it’s exchanged with capital275. Therefore what capital tries to do in the 
first place is neither produce use-value for immediate personal consumption – a 
production relevant to feudalism - nor commodity destined to be transformed first to 
money and later to use-value - relevant to merchandising Mode of Production. The 
                                                 
274 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 259-260. 
275 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 261. Marx gives this basic definition in the fourth unfinished and therefore 
unsystematic volume of the Capital (published by Karl Kautsky as Theories of Surplus Value, 1863). 
Poulantzas contributes to that definition by specifying as productive labour that which produces 
surplus-value by reproducing directly the material objects which are used as base (substrate according 
to his terminology) for the exploitation relation. This is how productive labour interferes directly in 
the material production by producing use-values which increase wealth (N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 268). 
In this section, however, only the Marxian definition will be used as simpler and already sufficient to 
deal with the issue of State Personnel which is in question here. In any case, Poulantzas specifies the 
broad definition by Marx to tackle marginal cases of production relations laying between the 
proletariat and the petty-bourgeoisie classes. See J. Gillman 1965, pp 22-24 for a wider approach. 
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goal, instead, is to increase the value of capital by adding to it the surplus-value 
which is extracted by labour. This kind of labour is exactly the productive one. What 
is excluded then is any kind of labour that contributes in the circulation or liquidation 
of capital attached to the product like the case of bank employees or shop assistants, 
marketing or advertising employees276. At the same as non productive should be seen 
the provision of services that are directed for immediate “consumption” and are not 
compensated with capital but with salary as in the case of a hairdresser or a doctor. In 
this last group falls also the case of services provided by the State. Civil servants and 
generally the State Personnel do not produce directly any surplus value, irrespective 
of the fact that their labour is essential for the smooth function of the production 
relations. At the same time they are not different from the previous social groups 
since, on the one hand, they are stipendiaries themselves and on the other the final 
users of their services compensate them through taxes. Nevertheless, the labour 
provided in cases where the State appears as capitalist as for example in nationalised 
corporations is surely productive.  
The fact that in the previous cases employees do not provide productive 
labour doesn’t mean that they are not exploited since the latter is a different issue. 
Employees in circulation and liquidation contribute with their labour in decreasing 
the extraction costs of capital in those processes and the salary they receive does not 
correspond to their effort. Therefore, they are deprived from the value of their 
surplus-labour and thus exploited but not in the same way as productive labourers. 
Regarding the service providers things are rather complicated. For the freelancers, 
it’s better to see ad hoc each case to determine if they are exploited or not since they 
can be in a position where their salary corresponds to their labour and therefore there 
is no surplus-labour value deprivation as in the case of senior internal lawyers or they 
can be in the opposite situation in order to be competitive as in the case of junior 
ones277. It’s not the same, though, with the State Personnel where their labour is 
actually exploited. Since the role of State Apparatuses is the facilitation of the 
reproduction of classes, their function is essential for the smooth operation of 
relations of production. Therefore, in a capitalist society the most important 
                                                 
276 Labour directed in increasing the surplus value of the product like that of packing, preserving or 
storing is productive and should be discerned from that of circulation and liquidation. 
277 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 261-267. 
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“customer” of State services is Capital itself. Hence, it’s essential for its reproduction 
to decrease the cost not only at the field of capital liquidation as in the case of bank 
clerks, shop assistants etc. but also at the field of class reproduction where the 
exploitation of State Personnel’s labour fall.  
The previous analysis adopted a negative approach in the process of 
defining the relations of production pertinent to the petty-bourgeoisie. In other 
words, the differentiation between productive and non-productive labour it’s in 
essence an attempt to discern petty-bourgeoisie mainly from the labour classes. 
Therefore, defining the ideological and political reflections of the aforementioned 
relations becomes important not only as the necessary complement in the 
determination of the new petty-bourgeoisie but also as the necessary process to 
finally understand the blurred position of that class in the political conjuncture which 
sometimes results in surpassing it either as part of the proletariat or as part of the 
bourgeois classes. In order to understand those ideological and political relations, 
central role is played by the division between the manual and intellectual work. This 
is not only a technical fragmentation within the whole production procedure but 
constitutes, in a given Mode of Production, the condensed expression of the politico-
ideological relations in the specific way in which they articulate with the relations of 
production. In other words the division between manual and intellectual work shows 
the way in which the politico-ideological relations are present in the production and 
therefore in the Social Formation278.  
It should be stressed right from the beginning that the division in question 
does not coincide with the separation between the productive and not productive 
work. This is so because on the one hand they are concepts in different explanatory 
levels and on the other they intermingle in such way that they cannot be separated279. 
More specifically, the latter refers to the level of production while the former in the 
politico-ideological one. They don’t coincide, then, exactly because the relations of 
production concur and depend on the politico-ideological relations and the opposite. 
Furthermore, the intellectual labourers do not coincide with the intellectuals 
(scholars). Poulantzas follows Gramsci in understanding the latter as a special social 
category of agents whose role is essential in producing, reproducing and applying the 
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class related ideology either hegemonic or revolutionary. Therefore, it consists of as 
various groups as scholars themselves, teachers, various leaders (like party or trade 
union leaders) and even the State Personnel. Exactly because of their role in 
elaborating class ideology while being part of a class, Gramsci defines them as 
‘organic intellectuals’ a term which reserves also for himself280.    
In the framework of the Capitalist Mode of Production the intellectual 
labour is separated from the manual as a result of the distinctive relations of 
appropriation. The technological innovations have gradually made the production a 
more complex process than a simple elaboration of raw materials with the use of 
machinery which could be performed by a single labourer, since it now requires 
intellectual effort too. The relations of appropriation have always been using 
methods like the fragmentation of the overall production to secure or even intensify 
the separation between the labourer and the means of production. This fragmentation 
takes, amongst else, the form of distinction between manual and intellectual labour in 
contemporary capitalism. The technological innovation is only one aspect of the 
wider issue. A whole array of knowledge is related to the Capitalist Mode of 
Production from pure science and research to personnel and clientèle management, 
logistics etc. This knowledge becomes exactly the “know-how” in every field which 
in the course of fragmentation is hidden from the actual labourer. It could be said, 
then, that every specific form of labour which includes any kind of knowledge from 
which the actual labourer is excluded falls in the category of intellectual labour281. 
This hidden knowledge creates fragmentations among the intellectual labourers too, 
given that each group holds the “know-how” in a specific field. 
In several cases the “hidden knowledge” is not actual but rather cultural 
construction which reveals the consequences of the politico-ideological relations 
upon the relations of production ex post facto. For example, the use of sophisticated 
machinery in a factory requires intellectual interference from the side of the actual 
labourer like the understanding of basic or even advanced physics. Nevertheless, 
he/she is considered deprived from this knowledge - as manual worker - in contrast 
with his/her supervisor. Therefore, sometimes it seems that this knowledge is not an 
                                                 
280 Proceedings of the conference “Poulantzas today, 30 years after his death” in Athens 18-
19.12.2009. See also N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 312. 
281 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 290-295. 
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actual border between those who know and those who ignore but an “ideological 
invasion” in some knowledge protocols from which manual labourers are convinced 
that they don’t have282. On the other hand, the work of shop assistant is almost 
completely manual; he/she is not considered, though, manual worker. In those cases 
the manual labour is injected with some protocols, rituals, capabilities and cultural 
elements that discern it from other forms of manual labour. The specific use of oral 
and written language, the capability of marketing (in contrast with marketing as 
science) etc. are neither knowledge that falls in the wider field of science, nor hidden 
from manual labourers. Nevertheless, they have risen to a certain degree of cultural 
symbolisation that legitimises the difference of those who use them from those that 
don’t. The element of knowledge here is deemed as introduced by the process of 
apprenticeship either in the school or through experience283.  
The role of the educational system in the reproduction of the petty-
bourgeois class position is now more apparent. The main Ideological Apparatus of 
the State is placed in the centre of this distinction between manual and intellectual 
work as the provider of “knowledge”. Its role is in the first instance to reproduce 
class positions and in the second to allocate agents in those positions by promoting 
proficiency in both manual and intellectual labour284. It seems contradicting to write 
that although the school is the main provider of knowledge at the same time 
promotes proficiency in manual labour. Nevertheless, this will become clear by 
taking into consideration the fact that the educational system excludes any 
preparation on manual labour. Given that the school is the provider of knowledge 
whatever is not learned there falls in the field of manual labour. On the other hand 
the internal hierarchy of the petty-bourgeoisie which depends upon the level of 
knowledge one has, is also reflected upon the educational system with the various 
degrees that a student can get. As a matter of fact, the placement of an agent in the 
relations of production is directly connected with his/her degree. 
Closely connected to the ideological relations as exemplified in the “hidden 
knowledge” are the political relations of subordination. Firstly, some cases where 
fractions of the new petty-bourgeoisie are positioned in apparent relations of 
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imposition against the labour classes should be mentioned. Supervisors and other 
types of foremen are at the top end of an imposition relationship irrespective of the 
fact that they don’t exploit themselves labourers’ surplus work. It could be argued 
that this kind of relations in this case are not reflecting the social division of labour 
but an objective need created by the complexity of the contemporary production 
process. In other words, the need to supervise labour is attributed to the specificity of 
means of production like sophisticated machinery. Nevertheless, science is not 
sterilized and neutral from the each time Social Formation. Productive powers have 
absolutely no meaning without the relations of production. In other words means of 
production would have been neutral only if they didn’t need the interference of 
labourers to function. Therefore, since technological innovations (or science in 
general) are conceptualized with the prerequisite of relations of power that means 
that they are right from the beginning in the service of the dominant ideology. The 
relations of production are already there dressing the each time innovation with the 
mantle of exploitation285. The lower State Personnel falls also in those cases. They 
play a major role in materializing the political subordination relations since the 
hegemonic class dominates through the State286. The personnel of services like 
police, judiciary, prison system, tax collection have an obvious role in “passing” the 
subordination which they undergo upon other classes. On the other hand, other 
sections of the State Personnel have a more sublime but still apparent roles which 
materialize power like in the case of teachers, social workers or even clerks where 
the so called inflexible and unwieldy bureaucracy is a sign of imposition upon the 
everyday non-expert civil service user. 
The last case could become more understandable if seen in connection with 
the political relations in which the rest of the new petty-bourgeoisie participates. 
Those political relations - being a reflection of the social division of labour – have 
the distinctive characteristic to inductively internalize the main political relations of 
the capitalist Social Formation. It’s inductive because the agents themselves impose 
                                                 
285 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 292. This could become clearer through an example. The fact that a 
technological innovation requires, as soon as its conceptualisation, the existence of an actual labourer 
and of a supervisor means that it follows the existing power relations and thus cannot be seen as 
neutral.  
286 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 336-338. 
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upon them those political relations as the preponderant in the Social Formation287. 
This becomes clear through the concept of bureaucratisation which is different from 
bureaucracy as such because it refers to the tendency which materializes ideological 
influences upon the non productive labour. More specifically, the issue of the 
“hidden knowledge” in the framework of power devolution means that those agents 
although they are subordinated under the top rank of the each time hierarchy they 
reproduce these conditions in their intra-class relations. This is the essence of 
hierarchy, namely everybody is at the same time dominated and dominating. The 
legitimisation of this image comes exactly from the imaginary secret of knowledge, 
namely that each level in the hierarchy knows something that the subordinated levels 
don’t know and at the same time knows less than the levels which dominate it. The 
difference, though, with bureaucracy is exactly that what has been described is a 
tendency rather a specific system of organisation. Furthermore, the inductiveness 
appears exactly because there is no actual domination but only a mirage of it. This is 
why Poulantzas in those cases uses on purpose the term imposition instead of 
domination288. An important characteristic of bureaucratisation is that the agent can 
make a career. By “acquiring” the hidden knowledge he/she can ascend this 
hierarchy which means that more and more levels will be then subordinated. This can 
be used as an incentive towards providing more surplus-labour. At the same time it 
furthers the individualisation of the agents by enforcing competition among them. 
Most importantly, though, by “confirming” the effects of hidden knowledge it 
justifies the bureaucratisation system.  
The previous analysis revealed the structural determination of the new 
petty-bourgeoisie in the relations of production first and then at the politico-
ideological relations. This determination plays significant role as will be seen in the 
specific ideology and political position held by this class. It should be reminded that 
in the Capitalist Mode of Production and due to the specific relations of production 
the main classes are that of the proletariat on the one hand and of the capitalists on 
the other. That means that their ideologies are systematized and present internal 
                                                 
287 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 339. From this point of view the petty-bourgeoisie is a median class 
between the bourgeois and the proletariat not because it’s a middle point in the transfer of 
domination/subordination but because it’s the field where domination/subordination is successfully 
tested and thus legitimized.  
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consistency. The petty-bourgeois ideology doesn’t exist as such but rather as a fusion 
and therefore it’s always polarized between the previous two. The capitalist one 
being the dominant in the Social Formation also prevails in the class in question with 
the proletariat ideology playing also important role since the petty-bourgeoisie is a 
subordinated and exploited class as well. Those influences, however, do not exist as 
such but always filtered and intermingled with elements related solely to the new and 
traditional petty-bourgeoisie. This class then seems to be a field in which apart from 
its distinctive ideological elements capitalist and proletariat influences struggle also 
for leverage. On the other hand it should be mentioned that the petty-bourgeois 
ideological subtotal is not only a receiver of influences but can also influence the 
labour class289.  
The fact that the petty-bourgeoisie ideology is a field of struggle between 
the two main ideologies would become obvious if its specific elements were seen in 
detail290. Those elements refer to both the new and the traditional fractions; there will 
be though a focus on the new one due to its significance in relations with the State 
Personnel. Agents of this class have an anti-capitalist ideology because they are 
being exploited. Nevertheless, the distinctive way of their exploitation, namely by 
receiving less salary regarding their surplus-labour, along with the hidden forms of 
subordination direct their demands to salary increase. On the other hand, though, 
they insist in the stipendiary hierarchy and therefore the maintenance of the 
exploitation system. They tend to question the political relations in which they 
participate as subordinated by asking for higher level of contribution in the decision 
making process. The fact, though, that they don’t question the hierarchy reveals their 
desire to climb up the political relations climax rather than reversing the imposition 
relations. The latter, though, goes beyond their collective demands. As individuals 
they desire to ascend this hierarchy, to make career; in other words, they are trying to 
become agents of the bourgeois class. The main way to achieve that is exactly what 
discerns them from the proletariat or other fractions of the new petty-bourgeoisie, 
                                                 
289 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 358-360. 
290 It must be reminded here that the ideology is difficult to be seen in abstracto. The fact that it 
coexists with the relations of production means right away that ideology influences and is influenced 
at the same time. Therefore, the only way were we can conceptualize ideology is in class practices 
with the caveat, that ideological positions should be seen in relation with the conjuncture. See also N. 
Poulantzas 2001b, p. 359. 
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namely through knowledge. This is why these agents see education as a neutral 
apparatus which can be the stairway to their desired destination. Their demands 
therefore are for “democratisation” of the educational system in order to give 
opportunities to agents willing and capable to ascend291.  
The last ideological element, though, is not only related with the 
educational system. The new petty-bourgeoisie because of the fact that it’s a median 
class polarized between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in combination with its 
endemic individualisation, understands the State as a neutral power whose role is to 
be the referee between the contradicting classes. The exploitation and subordination 
which this class experiences from the upper classes usually through the State 
Apparatuses seem to be a deformation which can be cured through 
“democratisation”. Nevertheless, the relationship between the State and the new 
petty-bourgeoisie is much more complicated. It has been shown earlier that the main 
characteristic of the class in question has been the possession of a “hidden 
knowledge” which is then directly related with the distinction between manual and 
intellectual labour. The State itself is placed in the side of the intellectual labour 
either by reproducing this distinction in its Apparatuses like in the case of school or 
by reproducing this distinction in itself since the State is the exemplary case of 
bureaucratisation that has become an actual system of organisation, namely 
bureaucracy. The new petty-bourgeoisie acquires a possessive approach towards the 
State. The State “belongs” to that class as the institution which organizes as well as 
protects those agents292. The State cannot have under any circumstances class 
character which is seen as deviation. It should instead protect the common will but 
most of all the common interest. It is easily now understandable that the “common 
interest” for which the petty-bourgeoisie is struggling usually coincides with its very 
interest293.   
                                                 
291 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 360-362. 
292 Poulantzas refers to the State as being the party of the petty-bourgeoisie in the same way in which 
the labour party organizes and protects the labour class. In reality, though this class exactly because of 
its polarisation lacks any stable party representation. It moves between the two poles of the political 
scene according to the conjuncture. It can also interfere in an autonomous way depending exactly on 
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This ideological elements are even more apparent in the case of civil 
servants, namely of the State Personnel. As already shown, its lower levels in the 
hierarchy belong to the new petty-bourgeoisie. They need to embrace this ideology in 
order to be ready to execute their responsibilities. Their belief in the State as 
protector of the common interest is not just a characteristic derived from their class 
allocation but mainly because of their function in the State Apparatuses. Justice as 
beyond classes, police as guarantor of public order and civil rights, administration as 
the promoter of efficiency and welfare constitute this internal ideology of the State 
Apparatuses as incorporated in the minds and actions of the State Personnel. These 
ideological elements create their internal consistency and at the same time allow 
Apparatuses to reproduce the ideology of the neutral State in the wider Social 
Formation294. 
It has been shown, though, that the State Personnel is a social category 
which cuts vertically the Social Formation. It is constituted by bourgeois class in the 
upper levels of the hierarchy, petty-bourgeois class in the majority of the positions 
and labour class in some productive jobs295. The bonding element in this category is 
the aforementioned State ideology which they embrace and at the same time apply in 
their responsibilities. The other side of the coin, however, is the fact that they are not 
secluded from the rest of the Social Formation. From a horizontal point of view they 
remain agents of their class but they also have a vertical factor (the social category) 
which in combination with the previous determines their ideological and finally their 
political position. Therefore, the contradictions in the power bloc have effects among 
the heads of the State Personnel hierarchy. More interesting, though, is the case of 
the majority of the civil servants who belong to the new petty-bourgeoisie. As 
mentioned above, this class tends to be a struggle field between the dominant 
capitalist ideology and the counteracting proletariat one. As a result the class in 
question is polarized between the two both in the ideological as well as in the 
political level. As a result the labour class struggles influence the State Personnel in 
demands that are related to their particular position in the division of labour within 
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the State296. More specifically, the struggles of the labour class exert great influence 
upon the State Personnel through the alliances and coalitions of the petty-bourgeoisie 
with the proletariat. The contradictions then within the State Apparatuses are 
highlighted and especially between the lower and the higher rank of the State 
Personnel. The immediate result of this form of class struggle is that it reveals the 
class character of the State laying underneath the ideology of the State beyond 
classes. Nevertheless, the intra-State struggle takes specific forms that correspond to 
the cohesive factor among the social groups of the State Personnel, namely the 
ideology of the neutral State; this is why the demand for “democratisation” of the 
State appears. The State Personnel’s belief in the State beyond classes sees the 
existing situation as deformation of its true nature and even when the politicisation of 
the personnel has gone that far in order to organize a more generalized struggle, as 
for example in the case of general strike of the civil sector, there is a weakness in 
connecting their demands along with that of the labour class Additionally, the 
relative autonomy of the State gives specific forms in the struggle making it usually 
to appear as contradiction between Apparatuses or departments between the same 
Apparatus. Therefore, the State Personnel experiences its struggles within the limits 





Althusser divides the institutions in question in Repressive State 
Apparatuses - which are also the most apparent – and include indicatively the army, 
the police, the judiciary, the prison system etc. and in Ideological State Apparatuses 
consisting of the school, the mass media, the church, the family etc. Although traces 
of this approach could be seen in Gramsci’s Letters from the prison Luis Althusser 
was the one who systematized this concept298. Poulantzas has serious objections in 
this distinction to the analysis of which we now turn299.  
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The concepts of ‘repression’ and ‘ideology’ and specifically the relationship 
between them is neither simple nor easy. The first one should be understood as the 
organized physical violence, namely violence against bodies. Power relations are 
already dependent, for their establishment and maintenance, on the corporal 
repression as well as its threat. Nevertheless, the body is not just a biological entity 
but a political concept too300. The body as such as well as the management of it can 
be conformed or fit in specific dictates or expectations. The role of the State is 
equally supported both by the corporal repression and the way it manages bodies by 
moulding or “locking” them in institutions and apparatuses301. The core of the 
functions of State Apparatuses is to materialize the power relations endemic in the 
each time Social Formation by subordinating the body and the mind. It would be a 
mistake, though to crudely correlate Repressive or Ideological Apparatuses to the 
distinction between corporal obligation and mind dressage.  
The reason is that such a crude distinction between the two is highly 
questionable and valid only in a descriptive way. More specifically, had State 
Apparatuses been limited in repression and ideology would mean that the State in 
achieving subordination either obliges by corporal enforcement or influences by 
deception. The materialisation of the latter doesn’t change the delimitation of State’s 
practices in two functions in which the State’s interference in the Social Formation 
has a passive character; it only forbids or hides reality. What is really missing is 
State’s proactive role. It’s missing because it’s in economistic approaches that 
economy is a self-reproductive structure in which the State, and therefore class 
struggle, is not interfering; the State only safeguards economy’s smooth function 
from external threats. Nevertheless, the State also creates and transforms realities. 
The reason is that in the course of its attempt to establish the domination of a power 
bloc through social consensus acts in a field of unstable equilibrium of compromise. 
The State then takes a number of positive measures for the subordinated classes 
which have the form of concessions. In the relationship, therefore, between 
dominated classes and State there is also a material factor (different from the notion 
of materialisation of ideology or repression because of State’s Apparatuses). The 
other side of the coin would be that if State Apparatuses, namely the incorporation 
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(to discern it from the material character of the relationship between the State and the 
subordinated classes) of its functions, were solely the repressive and the ideological 
one, there would be some difficulties in explaining the fascist phenomenon. The 
wide support they faced could only be explained under the idea of people’s lust for 
repression or that they were simply misled. Generally, the bipolar system of 
repression-ideology leads inescapably to the subjectification of consensus 
disregarding the material reasons302. As a matter of fact fascist regimes took popular 
measures which contributed to the national support they had303. 
In parallel, the crude distinction between repression and ideology assumes 
that the State acts uniformly towards one direction either by repression or ideology. 
In reality, though, the need to compromise the organisational role for the dominating 
classes with the unifying role for the totality of the Social Formation complicates 
State’s actions. As shown above, there are as many directions of State policy as 
many State Apparatuses because each State Apparatuses has different class 
destination. For example trade unions refer to working classes while employers’ 
unions the dominating classes both of them though are State Apparatuses. This also 
explains why there is not always need for deception through ideology. Sometimes 
policies in favour of the dominating classes are openly acknowledged while some 
other times there is only silence because the final State policy is only the resultant of 
many contradicting tactics in the framework of State Apparatuses. This is what 
Poulantzas refers to as ‘bureaucratic silence’. Therefore, the index of ideologisation 
of State’s policies differs from case to case regarding to whom the State refers to304.  
Finally, insisting in the repression-ideology bipolar system results in 
disregarding the role of the State in the economic apparatus and more specifically the 
State Economic Apparatus by dispersing it between the repressive apparatuses. 
Furthermore, it has already been suggested by Althusser himself that the distinction 
between repressive and ideological apparatuses should not be understood in an 
excluding way305. That means that Ideological State Apparatuses have distinctive 
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repressive features or the other way around; for example schools have a special 
system of punishments while police and prisons have special symbolic meanings. 
Furthermore, there are some Apparatuses that fall equally in each category (even that 
of the Economic State Apparatus) like in the case of the army306. Therefore, the 
distinction is not valid even if we were using the criterion of “mainly ideological” or 
“mainly repressive” function307. The case described in a previous chapter308 
regarding the historic economic role of prison as neglected by Rusche, Kircheimer, 
Melossi and Pavarini explains exactly that. Prisons have always been loci of wealth 
accumulation, either directly as in the past or in a quasi way as appears from the 
major investments taking place for their operation or privatisation. This is even more 
important, as will be seen in the next chapters, in the course of an economic crisis 
where investment outlets are desperately needed. 
Michel Foucault provides a distinctive and interesting account for the 
previous distinction. The application of power in contemporary societies is based less 
on violence or other forms of repression and more on methods of discipline. There is 
a distinctive internalisation of repression which results to the consensus. The 
Repressive State Apparatuses then exist not as disciplinary mechanisms but rather as 
symbols of exactly the internalizing repression. Thus, power seems to function either 
through ideology or through repression. Furthermore, ideology and repression are in 
a zero-sum relationship in which every deterioration of repression equals to increase 
of internalisation of discipline. However, this is only a little different from the 
previous view since it results at the same counter-effects. More specifically, Foucault 
fails to ground the concept of “Resistances” to power. If the internalisation of 
discipline is enough for building a consensus and Repressive State Apparatuses have 
a symbolic role, then why there are social struggles? Foucault answers that by 
residing on the concept of “resistance” to power. Therefore, power itself is the cause 
of struggle. What could be concluded then is that consensus is just the product of 
“love” for the authority and this is why Foucault’s approach coincides with the 
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previous one. It misses the positive material reasons behind consensus, namely 
concessions or actual physical violence309.  
The existence of concessions and actual repression bring forward the need 
for a different understanding of the relationship between repression and ideology. 
Unlike the Foucauldian approach, power exists because of the class struggle and not 
the other way around. This explains why the modern State irrespective of its 
unquestionable monopoly of violence tends to reside often to that. One just has to see 
apart from the criminal procedure and punishment systems, dictatorships and wars 
too. In other words, the need for State violence resides in the contemporary society 
and it is the same need that pushes for the monopoly of violence by the State310. It is 
true, though, that violence doesn’t appear in the same frequency as it used to. The 
reason for that should be sought exactly at the monopoly which allows for multiple 
consensus building methods. To understand this, the schema where repression and 
ideology are supplementary concepts should be discarded. As a matter of fact, from 
the previous exposition of approaches, it doesn’t seem to appear any such 
relationship between the two. What Poulantzas suggests instead is that violence and 
ideology co-exist. The monopolized State violence exists permanently at the basis of 
consensus building; it belongs to the net of disciplinary and ideological Apparatuses 
and forms the materiality of the Social Formation even without direct violence. 
Given that power is practically class relations, the organisation of the former needs 
the organisation of violence as a guarantee of class reproduction. The vast network of 
ideological apparatuses requires the monopoly of violence by the State not only from 
a genealogical point of view but also from a developmental one. In other words, the 
existence of “violence-free” apparatuses requires the permanent assumption of 
repression by other institutions. Given that the State incorporates the concept of the 
“common will” the application of violence can take place in a legitimized field. 
Therefore, the class struggle from literal war between classes becomes political clash 
in the framework of the State, something which is a precondition for the smooth 
operation of capitalist exploitation. Thus, power and class struggles are mutually 
caused and determined311. This is not contradicting the phrase at the begging of the 
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paragraph, namely that power exists because of the class struggle. The reason is the 
primary importance of class struggle which sets initially in motion the cycle of action 





The peculiar intermingle between ideology and repression as shown in the 
previous section already implies the difficulties in differentiating the Ideological 
from the Repressive State Apparatuses. The visibility of the latter as well as the fact 
that it was the first kind of State Apparatus that has been mentioned already from 
Marx make their existence almost self-understandable. The side-effect, though, was 
that focus on those apparatuses has also been removed and this is why Poulantzas 
attempts to provide proper attention back to them312. In searching a definition that 
would set the criteria of distinction between the two Poulantzas takes a rather strange 
position. He deconstructs both the descriptive definitions as found in the Classics and 
the functional ones including the Foucauldian and the Althusserian approaches for 
the aforementioned reasons. He refrains, though, from clearly presenting a new 
definition. Few references, as in the case of The Social Classes in Contemporary 
Capitalism where he mentions that the main role of the Repressive State Apparatuses 
is exactly the repression apart from a secondary ideological role and the other way 
around for the Ideological one313, cannot and should not be understood as definitions 
because his aim is to describe their role in the reproduction of classes and not to 
distinguish them from the Ideological State Apparatuses. In any case the use of the 
word “main” does not contribute to a sound definition, something that he himself 
shows in the later book The State, power, socialism314. It seems then that he takes the 
distinction as self-understandable and this might be a theoretical drawback in the 
structure of his work. There is a point, though, that should be taken into 
                                                 
312 See for example Anderson’s remarks in P. Anderson 1976-1977. 
313 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 41. Althusser (L. Althusser 1999, p. 88) holds the same. Additionally, he 
points that the Repressive State Apparatuses is an organized total whose members are peripheral to the 
central leadership from the political representatives of the dominant classes which results to its 
uniformity; in contrast with the ideological apparatuses whose organisation is rather autonomous with 
internal contradictions. Nevertheless, those positions as far as they lack specific connection with the 
main theory of the State remain just a descriptive definition with functional elements.  
314 N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 47. 
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consideration.  He avoids an institution-based analysis throughout his work. His 
point is that a range of apparatuses, that use either methods, contribute to the social 
division of labour. He doesn’t need to show which apparatus uses which method and 
therefore a methodological separation like the one researched here would be 
superfluous.    
Indeed, a second view of the previous analyses would show that a general 
and diachronic definition would be impossible exactly because of the role of the class 
struggle. The specific dynamicity of the class struggle is the factor that determines 
the role, the position and the function of each apparatus and finally its very existence. 
The example of the church or of the army as previously explained are illustrative on 
how an apparatus may change roles throughout the years. Additionally, the example 
of the emergence of the organized police, as a relatively new development which 
replaced the army in the field of internal security, shows the contribution of the class 
struggle in the appearance and disappearance of apparatuses. Therefore, defining the 
distinction between Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses cannot be placed 
beyond the articulation of the relations between the State and the Social Formation in 
a given temporal instance. Additionally, an attempt to give the differentiating 
definition between the two kinds of apparatuses doesn’t need to go beyond the 
already mentioned approach, namely that Repressive apparatuses use mainly 
repression and secondarily ideology. The coexistence of the two concepts in class 
reproduction as shown in a previous section hinders a more specific differentiation 
between the apparatuses because they can also intermingle in the same institution. As 
already mentioned for example the prison system has apart from the repressive, a 
symbolic and therefore ideological role.  
The crucial detail, though, lies with the State monopoly of violence. 
Ideological State Apparatuses may physically repress the body in the course of 
communicating the dominant ideology. For example the system of punishments and 
awards in schools responds to the facilitation of communicating the ideological as 
well as subordination relations through the educational system. The monopoly of 
violence here doesn’t play any direct role. Of course schools (either public or 
private) are allowed to punish because they are legitimized as “impartial” institutions 
by the State itself. Nevertheless, they don’t exercise this power to subordinate the 
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agents but to make them understand that they are or they should be subordinated.  
The other side of the coin is those institutions that repress bodies or threaten to do so 
as a direct consequence of the State monopoly of power. Those apparatuses will 
mould and incapacitate bodies and/or minds because at some point those agents 
stopped understanding themselves as subordinated. Their ideological role is also 
related to the monopoly of violence. The symbolism of their existence - irrespective 
of their actual use - is depended on that specific feature of the State. In other words 
both their use and the threat of their use are directly legitimized by a neutral State 
which acquires the power of violence in order to transfer the struggle solely in the 
politico-ideological field. Hence, Repressive State Apparatuses are those institutions 
that physically repress the human body or threaten to do so as a direct consequence 
of the State monopoly of violence.  
The role of the Repressive Apparatuses of the State has already been 
touched allusively in the course of analysing the State Apparatuses in general. If seen 
in more detail, though, significant details will be revealed315. In the extended 
reproduction of the social classes they present an important contribution in a twofold 
way. Firstly they interfere pro-actively for the conservation of the direct exploitative 
conditions. This could be done with the civil or penal condemnation of strikes and 
other forms of insubordination in the workplace316. Additionally, they may preserve 
pro-actively the general conditions of the smooth operation of the relations of 
production, which includes either the suppression of an uprising or the protection of 
agents in both ends of the exploitation relation and thus allowing their reproduction. 
This already implies that the actual imposition of violence takes place at the last 
instance, namely when the subordination by the Ideological State Apparatuses has 
not been successful. Secondly, their very existence is enough for the threat of all the 
above interferences and thus, they can also passively conserve the relations of 
production. The last case is apparently the most usual one. This is attributed to the 
fact that labourers are deprived of any means of production apart from their own 
labour; therefore violence is not needed for the extraction of the production; in 
                                                 
315 N. Poulantzas 2001b, pp 40-41. 
316 See S. Spitzer et al. 1977 for a historical analysis of the role of police on the extension of capitalist 
control over the labour process and  J. Simon 2007, chapter 8 for a historical analysis of the proactive 
interference of Repressive State Apparatuses in “policing” the workplace in the USA. 
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contrast with feudalism, where the direct relationship between the labourer and the 
means of production, often required violence for the extraction in question.  
The total of all these domination/subordination relations are usually 
approached and communicated as “public order” from the State Apparatuses ranging 
from the legislature to the various executive institutions317. Public order is then 
correlated with “peace” or “justice” which further means that any attempt to reverse 
this order, namely the specific constitution of the current power relations as reflected 
in the relations of production, is a breach of peace and thus a wrongful or unjust 
act318. As a result violence is required - either the actual one by police and prison or 
the symbolic one by court hearing process – to deal with those acts. Violence, 
however, is legitimized only when it’s directed from the State, given its monopoly, 
and specifically dispersed among its institutions. Therefore, the role as well as the 
function of the Repressive State Apparatuses is to impose the “public order” on 
citizens and at the same time to promote its internalisation. 
Repressive State Apparatuses play also significant role in the allocation of 
agents. As mentioned above in this field of class reproduction the role of apparatuses 
is case-specific. This is apparent in some public bodies where hierarchy is their 
internal feature like in the case of the army or the police. The internal subordination 
in those cases reflects the wider one in the Social Formation319. The difference here 
is that its acceptance is “forced” by specific disciplinary provisions. Especially in 
States where the army service or any other temporary public service (in police, fire 
brigade etc.) is obligatory, the allocation of agents according to the internal hierarchy 
of the service is widespread and inescapable. Additionally, the right of officers to 
strike is widely debated. Finally, there are also some cases where the agent allocation 
                                                 
317 L. Althusser 1999, p. 89 and N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 91. 
318 In pro-actively maintaining the production conditions by the Repressive State Apparatuses, one can 
see how the insubordination of labourers was directly translated into breach of public order in the 
Victorian Acts or later (J. Simon 2007, p. 233). In pro-actively maintaining the general conditions of 
the smooth operation of production a very recent example is that of the 1754/2010 resolution of the 
European Parliament for combating the rise of extremism in Europe which mentions in paragraph 68. 
“The current financial crisis and its consequences on poverty and unemployment in Council of Europe 
member states might aggravate the present trend of resurgence of extremist movements. On the one 
hand, extremist groups reviewed in this memorandum will find more and more fertile ground for 
recruiting new members; on the other hand, other radical protest movements might become more 
virulent and better organised. I am thinking, in particular, of the anti-globalisation movement, some 
members of which have been condemned for vandalism due to their behaviour during demonstrations, 
or to the street protests and disorders which took place in Greece during several weeks in 2009”.  
319 N. Poulantzas 2001b, p. 43. 
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is related to class position itself within the Repressive State Apparatuses leading to 
the internal reproduction of their personnel. It is currently rare but formerly more 
usual to come across families who see careers in the army, the navy or the police as a 
family custom320. As a matter of fact, in Greece there are still laws in effect 
promoting the preferential enrolment of officers’ children in military academies (Act 
3648/2008 which updates law from 1982 and 1970). The same happens with soldiers 
after finishing long term army service (longer than the usual) which practically 
means that a temporary agent allocation is transformed into a permanent one.  
 
As an important continuation of the previous chapter, the current one 
specified the specific way in which the condensation of class struggle forms the State 
and the latter further forms the class struggle in a continuum. This constitutes the 
framework in which the hegemonic strategy takes place. Two crucial points need to 
be stressed before the following chapter. The State Personnel constitutes an 
important knot in the realisation of the aforementioned strategy. A separate social 
category in its own, needs to be separately handled to allow the smooth operation of 
the State Apparatuses. The other point is the Repressive State Apparatuses that have 
mainly a dual function. On the one hand, they facilitate subordination at the last 
instance by actual violence and on the other hand by their very presence, namely the 
threat of violence imposition. At the same time, as economic apparatuses, they are 
places of capital accumulation. 
                                                 
320 L. Althusser 1999, p. 89. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that in this case the influence of a 
different State Apparatus, namely of the family, is extended. Therefore, this phenomenon is not 









The previous chapters approached the State and more specifically the 
underpinned relationships in connection to the role of the Apparatuses by mapping 
the relationships on the one hand among the levels and on the other among the social 
forces. This is certainly not a static image but the dynamicity as described up to now 
reflects the normality321. In other words, what have been presented were the 
contradictions inherent in this network of relations and the way that they are eased 
through the function of the State Apparatuses and possibly the modification of the 
latter when they are not enough. The question then arising is what would happen if 
those relationships were taken to their extremes. More specifically, what would have 
been the reaction of the State – as a set of relations - in such a case? The importance 
of this analysis is that privatisation and prison out-sourcing as its part appeared in 
England and Wales during or right after a period in which social relations in Western 
Europe have been at their extremes. The British society constituted part of the wider 
image as it is suggested that it was facing a crisis period322. Therefore it is crucial to 
analyse this concept before the research embarks on a more detailed connection with 
prison privatisation. A proper analysis, however, would require approaching a 
specific Social Formation. Under this caveat, this chapter will focus on the concepts 






Delimiting crisis is a rather difficult enterprise since it refers to the social 
relations, namely the Social Formation as a ‘Whole’, and what appears as crisis is 
“distilled” in the economic, political and ideological levels. The economic crisis is
                                                 
321 “Normality” is used here as a synonym of “usual”, the non deviation from the average.   
322 See for example different approaches that nonetheless coincide in the presence of crisis in B. 
Jessop et al. 1988 and S. Hall et al. 1982. 
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the most prominent of the three and the most cited by a variety of theoretical 
traditions along with the Marxist one. The political and the ideological, though, 
constitute also significant appearances of the basic concept not as researched as the 
previous. Poulantzas, with his structuralist persistence in depicting the 
interconnection between the levels, provides valuable insights in the weave of the 
crises. Exactly this interrelation allows the differentiation between the cyclical and 
the structural crises with the first one referring to the economic level and the second 
to a combined appearance of crisis in all levels. 
 
- The economic crisis323  
In the economic level, the crisis is periodic. This could be seen from a 
combined approach of the two norms appearing in Marxian economics the most 
prominent of which is the falling tendency of the rate of profit. The basic idea is that 
the more constant capital is invested, namely infrastructure, less profitable becomes 
the investment. This phenomenon should be seen in conjunction with the norm of the 
secular tendency of capitalist accumulation. The essence of that theorem is again the 
falling rate of profit although for a different reason. In that case the capitalist 
production reaches an objective point beyond which the increase of the organic 
composition of capital, namely infrastructure and labourers, is not translated into a 
higher increase of the surplus value and therefore the rate or profit is decreasing. The 
inverted view is that, the pressure upon surplus value from the growing competition 
is not accompanied by higher cutbacks in the organic composition of capital.  
Against those two tendencies, some counteracting influences are employed. 
They range from austerity measures to keep the rate of wage increase low and 
subsidisations over the organic composition of capital, to intensification of labour by 
increasing the duration of the working day, the reduction of the unused periods of 
production (e.g. between shifts), the promotion of economies of scale, the promotion 
of socially combined labour and economisation in the conditions of labour in the 
expense of workers' safety. Most importantly, though, technological innovation is 
promoted either by supporting basic research or by facilitating the dissemination of 
technological achievements. 
                                                 
323 See analytically in the Appendix.  
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Technological innovation constitutes a counteracting influence against the 
secular tendency of capitalist accumulation not only because it increases productivity 
but also because it tends often to increase unemployment and therefore to reduce the 
variable capital, namely the amount for the compensation of employees. 
Nevertheless, the other side of the coin is that unemployment reduces the overall 
spending capability of labourers which runs counter the capitalist interests. Exactly 
because the capital produced remains unabsorbed by the market, under-consumption 
is the counterpart of capital over-production. Therefore, technological innovation 
tends to aggravate to accelerate the crisis in the long-term.  
Against the problematic reproduction of capital, the solution lies with 
capital purging. The removal of some of the invested constant capital from the 
production process would increase the market share for the rest. Moreover, the 
unused constant capital would also mean the reduction of the overall variable capital 
as well as the increased pressure upon salaries and wages for the still employed 
labourers because of the increased unemployment. This illustrates, however, the 
difficulties in driving the economy away from a capital over-accumulation crisis. The 
short-term solution, namely the reduction of the variable capital, is one of the factors 
that brought the economy in a state of crisis in the first place. It prohibits in the long-
term, therefore, a proper recuperation. If this ascertainment was taken further it 
would reveal why economic crises are periodic. It's the secular tendency of capitalist 
accumulation that leads inescapably almost every fifty years to a capitalist over-
accumulation crisis. The very same articulation of factors that structure the way that 
surplus is produced lies at the heart of the over-accumulation crisis as well as at the 
solution that needs to be delivered. That further means that economic crises are not a 
"black out" of the Capitalist Mode of Production. They are rather much needed 
opportunities to "reshuffle the playing cards" and reaffirm the relations of property 
and appropriation that are the crux of the capitalist class relations. 
 
- The political and the structural crisis  
The characteristics of political crisis should be sought at the role it performs 
in the articulation of levels in the Capitalist Mode of Production. More specifically, it 
appears to be appointed with the dominant role while, in reality, the latter coincides 
with the determinant level, namely economy. This is attributed to the function of the 
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dominant sector of the ideological level which is the juridico-political. The result is 
that the political level becomes the field where the appropriation of surplus value is 
related with legitimacy and “common will” of the People. Direct consequence of this 
is that class positioning and agent allocation are established as processes that reflect 
the reality of the political system. The same field is also the end point where all the 
tensions and contradictions of the Mode of Production are channelled and 
smoothened through the operation of representative Democracy. In this context, the 
much needed subordination to conform to the previous processes is categorized as 
peace, justice or public order. In short, the role of the political level is situated in the 
expanded reproduction of the social classes as an internal element of the continuation 
of the Capitalist Mode of Production. Therefore, the political crisis reveals a period 
in which the level in question is unable to perform those functions and consequently 
its supposedly dominant position in the articulation of structures is doubted.  
Following the analyses made in previous chapters it could be seen that the 
political crisis is the other side of the coin of an ideological crisis and closely related 
to a crisis of the State. Starting from the ideological level, the direct and crucial role 
in the delusion of the “common will” of the People, of the mandate to the 
government through elections and opinion polls but most importantly of the 
inversion between the promotion of individualisation and at the same time 
unification of citizens under the nationality or citizenship instead of class have 
already been discussed. Those processes allow exactly the phenomenal displacement 
of domination from the economic to the political level and by that they perform a 
fundamental role in the articulation of levels in the Capitalist Mode of Production 
with further consequences in the constitution of social forces324. The ideological 
crisis, being the decreased efficiency of the relevant structure in performing the 
aforementioned functions, along with the “misrecognition”, namely the ability to 
obscure its very delusive role, constitutes a sine qua non supplement of the political 
crisis. The State due to its role in the relationship between political and ideological 
crisis may be faced with crisis emerging in its own field. Nevertheless, because of its 
distinctive objective role in the expanded reproduction of classes, its own crisis will 
be analysed at a later section in this chapter. 
                                                 
324 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 28. 
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Up to this point, the economic and the political crises had been approached 
as separate phenomena. Earlier, though, the differentiation between cyclical 
(economic) and structural crisis has been underlined with the latter pointing a crisis 
that penetrates all levels of the Mode of Production. In an attempt to investigate the 
possibilities of a structural crisis, it’s essential to turn to the tenacious bond between 
the economic and political crisis, namely the class struggle. The latter has been 
conscientiously not mentioned in the previous analyses, despite being practically an 
active element in the crisis of each level, in order to present exactly the connection 
between the different crises. 
From the previous presentation of the economic crisis, one could conclude 
that economy is an autopoietic system with its own norms, cycles and methods of 
stabilisation. Nevertheless, this ascertainment would ignore the most significant 
factor interacting within economy, namely classes, their fractions and social 
categories. If, therefore, an economistic approach is to be avoided the class struggle 
should be taken into account325. It has already been shown how the division of labour 
reflects at the class formation. The determination of classes by structures, however, is 
not a single-dimensional relationship. The contradicting class interests and class 
power to capitalize gains or resist losses in their struggle transform the economic 
level itself. As a matter of fact, competition – a constant pressure on the rate of profit 
- is a sign of contradicting interests that transform the economic level; in another 
example, the struggle for higher wages occurring in the expansion of the business 
cycle and the resistance against firings, wage decrease and generally loss of labour 
rights occurring during the contraction are also signs of the conflicting class interests 
and powers that might trigger, accelerate or decelerate the crisis. Nevertheless, 
isolating the economic class struggle in a bipolar system of reciprocal effects only 
within the economic level would have been equally economistic. Given that both the 
political and the ideological levels are present along with the economic in the 
formation of classes (either at the stage of class positioning or in the allocation of 
agents) the effects of the class struggle cannot be isolated in only one level. In short, 
there is reciprocal influence between the articulation of structures as a Whole and the 
articulation of practices (the struggle in each level) as a Whole.  
                                                 
325 See for example N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 30. 
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This fact is translated, during the economic crisis, into alteration of the 
composition of classes as well as of the relationship between them. The over-
accumulation crisis leads consequentially to considerable pressure upon the variable 
capital, namely the wages, and to purging unprofitable constant capital which 
furthermore equals to increased unemployment. The loss of trade union power either 
from the diminished membership, due to unemployment or to the fact that they 
negotiate in an economically negative environment, proves collective bargaining 
ineffective. Labourers then may turn to alternative ways of securing their rights. 
Examples range from striking, rallying, picketing, squatting and “work-in” to 
extensive rioting. This radicalisation of the dominated classes brings them against the 
juridico-political system either directly in case that their actions breach the each time 
legal provisions or indirectly due to the ineffectiveness of their struggle - if they keep 
it within the given legal boundaries. As a result, the insubordination towards the 
continuance of the established class reproduction, either actual or intended, 
practically reveals the non-existence of the hegemonic “common interest” and doubts 
the juridico-political system as such.  
But it’s not only the proletariat or the petty-bourgeoisie affected by a crisis. 
The falling rate of profit and as a consequence the need to constitute some 
investments inoperative means that the initial competition between the capitalists 
leads to “casualties” which change the composition of the dominant classes but most 
importantly the power relations in the power bloc. It has already been shown that 
Hegemony within the power bloc is constituted by reserving the central position in 
the relations of production for a specific class (the hegemonic) among the dominant 
social forces. For example in monopoly capitalism the finance capital becomes the 
hegemonic group due to its central role in the liquidation and circulation of capital as 
well as in funding new investments and covering their risks. As a result, its interests 
appear to be if not common between the classes of the power bloc, then at least of 
major importance. Nevertheless, during the over-accumulation crisis it’s the 
productive capital that is primarily affected due to the combination of increased 
investments in the organic composition of capital and under-consumption which lead 
to the falling rate of profit. The finance capital is affected only in a second level and 
to a large degree indirectly because of the diminished rate of circulation and 
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liquidation capital since the productive sector of the economy is in recession; 
needless to mention that finance capital is much more transferable between sectors of 
economy as well as among Social Formations which allows the avoidance of its own 
recession. During the economic crisis, therefore, the variety of interests that formed 
the power bloc in the first place does not present a pressing need for collaboration 
any more at least and at most they might have even opposing directions. Thus, the 
Hegemony of the finance capital among the power bloc could be also questioned.  
Hegemony indicates how the interests of a specific class or fraction of class 
appear as representative of the general interests of the dominating classes. At the 
same time it allows the power bloc to present its interests as the common will of the 
populace. The concept in question, being practically a set of strategies in the political 
practice which consequently transforms the political level, shows the specific way 
according to which the economic crisis may become political. More specifically, the 
economic crisis, as shown before, changes the equilibrium of power in the power 
bloc and dismantles the phenomenal power relations – practically their absence – in 
reference to the dominated classes. It is exactly this rupture of the established social 
relations that may obstacle the political system from securing the dominance of a 
specific class, which is further the crux of the crisis of the political level. 
The previous analysis on the relationship between the economic and 
political crisis reveals a significant issue. The concept that triggers as well as 
aggravates the political crisis, namely the class struggle, is always present in the 
political practices irrespective of the occurrence of crisis326. Tensions and 
contradictions between classes, their fractions and social categories exist 
continuously on political issues. The fact that they are channelled and masked into 
the stricto sensu political system - what in other words Marx calls political scene - is 
exactly a verification of their existence. Of course the function of political parties 
does not always prove the existence of the social force that is supposed to be 
represented by them, since the operation and the very existence of a multi-party 
system is conditioned from the general function of the political level. Nevertheless, 
exactly the need for many parties that would operate within specific boundaries is a 
sign of the need to smooth social contradictions by their “representation” in the 
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“electoral struggle” instead of the class struggle. In a similar way, therefore, with the 
economic crisis, the components of political crisis are always present. Political crisis 
is nothing else but the specific condensation of those contradictions in a specific 
Social Formation. 
In another similarity with the economic crisis, the significant condensation 
of the ever-present elements of the political crisis should not be seen as a moment of 
unexpected rupture of the established relationships or as a “black out” of the 
otherwise normally functioning political level. Under specific conditions the political 
crisis may reveal the actual power of social forces and by that reaffirm the political 
domination of the hegemonic class. It may also purge the political system from 
parties that either obstacle the aforementioned domination or do not perform 
effectively the function of channelling the contradictions in a “safe” environment. 
Poulantzas even sees in political crises that subvert the whole political system 
leading to dictatorships the only way to establish the domination of the hegemonic 
class as in the case of the “emergency States” of Greece, Spain and Portugal 
dictatorships during the 1960s-1970s327.  
In contrast, however, with the economic level, no circularity of the political 
crisis could be observed. It should be reminded at this point that the peripheral 
structures in the Capitalist Mode of Production are privileged with relative autonomy 
exactly as a means to support the expanded reproduction of social classes and 
channel their contradictions away from the smooth operation of the economic 
processes. This is the reason for the consistent use of language pointing on 
‘possibility’ in the previous analysis regarding the transformation of an economic 
crisis to a political one; in contrast with the economic crisis whose emergence is 
cyclical and therefore predictable. As a matter of fact, an economic crisis may be 
never expressed as its political counterpart. On the other hand, a political crisis 
cannot be but the result of economic and political class struggle; nevertheless, it may 
be not related to a specific economic crisis. Finally, there is also the case of direct 
connection between an economic and a political crisis. This last case is exactly what 
                                                 
327 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 23 and further in N. Poulantzas 1976a. It must be noted that both the 
economic and the political crises may establish and reaffirm the previously hegemonic class 
domination under the prerequisite that they don’t lead to a completely different Mode of Production as 
in the case of socialist revolutions of the early 20th century.  
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structural crisis stands for. It must be stressed, though, that structural, as concept, in 
this case doesn’t imply any stability, as structures in the Whole do, but it rather 
means that it’s a crisis that permeates the totality of structures. If therefore, economic 
and political crises are periods of condensation and aggravation of the internal 
contradictions in the relevant levels, similarly the structural crisis is a period in 
which the social contradictions in their totality are condensed and aggravated in the 
context of a Social Formation328. A further consequence of the relative autonomy 
between the levels is their autonomous historicity. This means practically that on the 
one hand there is no temporal correlation between the political and economical crisis 
in their structural appearance and on the other each crisis has its own tempo. For 
example the great recession of 1929 was followed by political crises but in different 
time points and with different chronicity in separate Social Formations. In the United 
States both crises were almost parallel, while in Germany or France there was a 
significant time gap between the two in which the economic environment was almost 
reverted. The opposite order may also be witnessed. According to Poulantzas, May 
1968 in France and the political crisis which marked Allende’s presidency in Chile 
came prior to the economic crisis of the 1970s although they had been closely 
related. Especially for the latter example, it is asserted that political crisis as such 





The role of the State in the Capitalist Mode of Production has already been 
described in the previous chapters. Its importance could be summarized in the 
following arguments. Unlike the delusion of the ‘liberal’ State, the latter has always 
been present in the constitution and reproduction of the class relations in all Modes 
of Production. What has been changing is the specific relationship between the two 
concepts. In the Capitalist Mode of Production there is a relative separation between 
economy and the State which facilitates the individualisation of the agents, the 
extraction of surplus value and at the same time the unification of the populace under 
a concept unrelated with class separation (e.g. citizenship). This relationship has 
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329 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 26 and p. 27. 
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been changing according to the various stages of capitalism with the view of 
promoting always the expanded reproduction of classes and their relations. In 
monopoly capitalism the specific position adopted by the State in the economic level 
is characterised by continuous expansion330. Due to modifications in economic 
sectors like the relations of production and the extraction of surplus value (capital 
invested in circulation and liquidation), the labour division and the reproduction of 
classes (emergence of the new petty-bourgeoisie class or the need for technically 
specialised labour) the importance of a series of sectors that have been irrelevant or 
at least peripheral to the economy arose to such level during the 20th century that 
became part of the capital accumulation process. They range from some directly 
supportive sectors like education and specialisation of labour power and 
infrastructure development to more peripheral ones like health system and general 
welfare provision, mass transportations, urban planning and many others331. The fact 
that those sectors were covered from the State is not a random development. There 
was a pressing need after the Second World War to support the general conditions of 
capitalist reproduction by offering services at low prices or for free and it was only 
the State that could operate in low or no profit basis332. This is the context, therefore, 
in which the modifications of the State on the one hand and on the other the specific 
role of the latter during the economic crisis are determined. What is most important, 
though, is the fact that the peculiarity of the relationship between the State and the 
economy (continuous expansion but relative autonomy) indicates also the limits of 
the State’s intervention in the economy as well as the way that the economic crisis is 
transmitted in the field of the State333. 
                                                 
330 It must be stressed, though, that this “geographic” approach hides the danger of understanding the 
relationship between the State and the economy as one entailing moveable borders or limits. In reality 
both the State and the economy are coexisting and mutually influencing each other. Therefore, the use 
of wording like “expansion”, “intervention” etc. should not imply any externality between the two 
concepts. See further N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 238. 
331 See for example N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 239 and N. Poulantzas 1978, pp 32-33.  
332 S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004, p. 38 and pp 104-105. See also N. Poulantzas 2001a, p 260 et seq. 
where he points that the State intervenes in those sectors not just because they are not profitable for 
the private capital. In reality the State intervened also in highly profitable sectors as in the case of oil 
industry. The crucial criterion is the general and longitudinal interest of capitalists since the 
involvement of private capital in some sectors in a specific conjuncture would lead it to high rates of 
profit and abrupt decline of the same rate for other classes and fractions of the power bloc.  
333 See also N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 275. 
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Starting from the role of the State in the economic crisis an important 
feature of the latter should be reminded. The components of the crisis in the 
economic level are always present in its reproduction. It could be assumed then that 
the role of the State in the economic crisis during monopoly capitalism, given its 
expanded role, cannot be separated from the role of the State during its reproduction. 
If the counteracting influences for both the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and 
the secular capitalist accumulation were taken into close consideration it could be 
seen that the State is more than a passive factor. In reality it employs policies that 
focus either on the production process as such or on the liquidation and realisation of 
profits. On the first level one could mention generally the promotion of class 
subordination through State Apparatuses which is essential if the hierarchy in the site 
of work should be respected. Aside any abstract constructs, this is actualized in the 
image of the “conscientious” worker who doesn’t work recklessly as mentioned 
above. Most importantly, though, the State determines through legislation and 
implements through inspection agencies the standard conditions of labour which are 
directly related with the intensification of labour, the working hours and the cost of 
labour safety affecting accordingly the production of surplus value and the organic 
composition of capital334. On the second level, where the State focuses on the side of 
liquidation and realisation, one could mention the facilitation of profit extraction 
through a series of international actions ranging from bilateral and multilateral inter-
State treaties to agreements that form international organisation which often are 
accompanied by a relevant decrease of sovereignty (European Union, World Trade 
Organisation etc.). Additionally, the State fosters economies of scale through a range 
of measures that include low taxation for enterprises or even special urban planning 
to accommodate their needs. Regarding the most important counteracting influence, 
the technological innovations, again it’s the State amongst else which promotes 
research and development projects either through universities or with direct funding. 
What is more significant and illustrative of its role, though, in this field is that 
government funded research is usually directed towards basic research which 
although needed, it doesn’t have immediate turn out. Thus, it’s usually avoided by 
the private sector.  
                                                 
334 Obviously this analysis cannot take into consideration the case of intentionally or unintentionally 
deficient inspections. 
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In all the previous examples the role of the State in the capitalist production 
is also an indicator of its role in the economic crisis. More specifically, the occasion 
for the emergence of the crisis is the prolonged inability of capitalists to economize 
in constant capital investments. In other words the fraction of constant capital to the 
aggregate value of surplus and variable capital rises. The abovementioned 
counteracting influences show exactly the fields in which the State intervenes to 
reverse the economic environment either by enabling direct cut backs in constant 
capital investment for private companies or by raising the rate of profit indirectly 
through interventions outside the productive process as such. Nevertheless, given 
that the role of the State in capital reproduction is similar during the expansion as 
well as the contraction of economy, the very occurrence of the crisis implies that its 
involvement is finite. The need for more drastic State interventions during that period 
appears in the subsidies and nationalisation policies. As shown earlier integral 
element of the relative accumulation crisis is the under-consumption caused either by 
unemployment or decreased real wages. The investment, however, in variable capital 
by companies themselves, would lower significantly the rate of profit which is the 
very crux of the problem. The State, therefore, intervenes to subsidize wages in a 
number of ways ranging from diminished taxation, decreasing or removing the 
obligation of companies to pay national insurance for their employees to actual 
subsidisation partial or not of salaries for companies in financial difficulties335. 
Nationalisations constitute the most drastic among the proactive measures. The State 
intervenes and takes over companies that cannot handle their financial situation with 
any other relieving measure as for example decreased taxation336. The State may also 
establish close relationship with a company buying its services or products in prices 
higher than the market average, which, although legally not the same, the case still 
remains. The similarity lies exactly at the purpose of the State which is to allow 
companies operating, keeping job positions and ultimately restraining the tendency 
of unemployment to rise.  
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the peculiar relationship of 
continuous expansion and relative autonomy between the State and the economy 
                                                 
335 See for example N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 263. 
336 See also N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 255-256 where he adds nationalisations in the wider spectrum of 
measures for the invigoration of consumption.  
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indicates also the limits of the State intervention. In a context of extended decrease of 
the rate of profit the State involvement is finite337. Prima facie this is related with its 
limited capacity in subsidizing wages or nationalizing companies. The strains on the 
finances of a State that has a capitalist formation, it functions within a capitalist 
economic environment and employs itself capitalist policies are obvious338. It may 
provide much needed services at low rate or no profit at all but this is at odds with 
the ideology of functioning in an efficient and effective way. Nevertheless, given that 
the role of the State in Capitalist Mode of Production has always been that of 
supporting the reproduction of capital and the relevant class relations, it seems that 
the reason for the delimitation of State’s intervention lies somewhere else. What 
happens in reality is that on the one hand the involvement of the State prevents  
under-consumption by restraining the unemployment rates but on the other it also 
increases the competition pressure upon non-governmental investments by slowing 
the “capital purging” process which would increase in the long-term the rate of profit 
for the remaining invested capital. What happens, therefore, is that the role of the 
State during the crisis in the form of intervention is like a double edged sword since 
it can be a factor of deepening the crisis itself. 
The question then remains what would have been the role of the State in the 
economic stabilisation and subsequent expansion - given the cyclical character of the 
economic crisis - aside its continuous function in the counteracting influences. The 
extraction of a firm conclusion from an empirical point of view would have been 
difficult due to a number of factors. On the one hand, over-accumulation crises are 
more visible in the 50-year Kondratiev economic cycles because the latter include 
the highest peak as well as the deepest trough in a long period of time which mark 
exactly the start and endpoint of the cycle339. On the other hand, the latest phase of 
the current Mode of Production, that of monopoly capitalism became gradually 
dominant at least in Europe only after the First World War. As a result, there are not 
many examples of the role of the State in the deepest point of the contraction of the 
economy. As a matter of fact the few examples that can exemplify this are the great 
                                                 
337 See for example N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 33.  
338 N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 277. 
339 Shorter cycles include also growth and recession points that are part of the long-term economic 
movement marked by the 50-years cycles. In those cases the role of the State is efficiently described 
by the previous analyses. 
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recession at the end of the 1920s and the 1970s crisis marked by the 1973-1974 stock 
market crash and the oil crisis of the same years340. The same could be said for the 
2008 crisis, although with some caveats as its full extent is not seen yet.  
It is suggested that in the first case the crisis didn’t “fade away” but it came 
abruptly to an end because of the Second World War which combined the increased 
industrial demand and the absorption of unemployment in the armies341. Thus, the 
State had a particular role, although not the expected one in terms of direct economic 
intervention. The second crisis which is of particular interest in this research was 
reversed amongst else with the introduction of privatisation policies. During the 
1970s, in the looming of the crisis, State policies focused on nationalizing companies 
in financial difficulties to prevent the rise of unemployment and the consequent 
under-consumption as described before. Nevertheless, those policies were soon 
withdrawn as they didn’t offer the expected results342. Afterwards, the capitalist 
economy was left loose to purge the unprofitable capital with the State having a dual 
approach. On the one hand it created a framework to reduce the cost of variable 
capital. More specifically, there has been a consistent effort of inverting the 
traditional rights vested with labour as well as the protective net of social security 
regarding unemployment. The result was that the increase of unemployment 
increased also the pressure upon salaries343. On the other hand it not only stopped the 
direct interventions in the economy but also it started vigorously withdrawing from 
its previous economic investments and from fields that used to fall into its purview 
even before the short-termed first approach, namely nationalisations, in combating 
the crisis. Nonetheless, a solely empirical-historical approach on the facts that cover 
the period of the 1970s over-accumulation crisis would obscure the non-visible 
aspects of the economic upturn. In other words, it would leave unanswered the 
question why the State had to intervene in the purging process when this is an 
internal tendency of the economy based on competition. The answer is fairly simple. 
A purging process that would be up to economy itself would have possibly been 
                                                 
340  That the 1970s crisis has been a capital over-accumulation one is generally accepted. See 
indicatively R. Brenner 2006, B. Fine et al. 1987, S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004 and E. Ioakimoglou 
2000. 
341 J. Gillman 1957, chapter 9. 
342 S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004, p. 38 
343 See further in R. Brenner 2006, p. 146 et seq. 
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fierce resembling to the contradictions inherent in primary capitalist accumulation. 
The State, however, is able to promote a political “solution” which concentrates the 
advantages of centralized decision-making, of legitimisation of the monopoly of 
violence344 and the apparatuses needed to smooth any contradictions like the mass 
media for the propagation of the necessity and law enforcement for the subordination 
at the last instance345.  
Indicatively the new economic strategy was comprised by the following 
actions. The secession of the State from entrepreneurial fields, in which it was 
running under low or no profit rate to allow the smooth reproduction of capital, 
increased the rate of hoarding capital (money-capital in this case) which is in any 
case an internal capitalist tendency346. This caused unexpected demand for ready-
money which increased its cost and was partly covered by further bank lending. As a 
consequence, on the one hand the turnover of financial capital was increased and on 
the other companies were obliged to increase the rate of profit in order to repay their 
loans; something which boosted the overall purging process347. Additionally, large 
sectors of markets have been deregulated to decrease the non-productive costs of 
profitable investments and withdraw the protectionism from problematic capital with 
the view that the pressure of competition will purge the latter. Nevertheless, probably 
the most effective State intervention has been the selling out of State companies and 
services, what is otherwise called privatisation. This development provided outlets 
for profitable investments to increase the rate of profit during an over-accumulation 
crisis which indicates exactly the low or non profitability of the increase of the 
organic composition of capital. This has been coupled with the changing 
environment in which the remaining sectors of the State are functioning. The 
doctrines of capitalist economy - efficiency, effectiveness etc. - apply there as well. 
                                                 
344 Monopoly of violence is not a superfluous addition among those advantages in this case. Obviously 
violence turns against bodies. But when the threat of direct or indirect violence is central requirement 
for the application of an order the latter could also be coined as violence or repression. Expropriation 
or involuntary bankruptcy which could be used in the process of purging unprofitable capital for 
example are exactly cases of legalized violence since they are taking place under the provision of 
direct violence against the body of the subject who would not subordinate. 
345 See also N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 263. 
346 See further in the Appendix. In this capital restructuring period the increased rate of hoarding could 
be attributed not only to the need of tackling competition by increasing the organic composition of 
capital and consequently the productivity but also to the need for entrepreneurs to bid for the public 
companies under privatisation.  
347 S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004, pp 38-39.  
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The State, therefore, through the contraction of its economic role allowed the 
expansion of the economic cycle in the sense of the expanded reproduction of 
capital. Modifications in its form and more specifically at its apparatuses, correspond 
exactly to these developments. 
In the political crisis, the role of the State is much more clear-cut due to the 
fact that the latter is an internal element of the political level, although presenting a 
distinct objective reality. As in the case of the economic crisis, the basic element of 
the political one, namely the struggle between classes or their fractions is always 
present, which further implies that the role of the State doesn’t change between the 
periods of crisis and normality. More specifically, the State through its apparatuses 
seeks to smooth the contradictions between the various social forces and establish the 
Hegemony of one of them in the power bloc and furthermore the Hegemony of the 
latter upon the dominated classes. In other words, the role of the State in the political 
level during and aside any crisis is the successful realisation of the hegemonic 
strategy. Due to the fact that the State in terms of class relevance is nothing else but 
the focal point in which all class interests condense, its objective reality is in no way 
settled in a set of apparatuses with established functions but in practice it’s a 
continuously developing (or unfolding in Poulantzas’ terms) array of class interests 
and practices that contribute to its dynamicity. The consequences of this reality have 
been discussed in previous chapters and could be summarized in the fact that 
apparatuses change roles, positions, functions and powers according to the specific 
development of the class struggle. Therefore, it’s those modifications of the State 
Apparatuses that correspond to the need of overcoming the politically turbulent 
period. A detailed analysis would require the close examination of a specific Social 
Formation during political crisis. Nevertheless, the general direction of modifications 
in Europe during the 1970s political crisis would boil down to the centralisation of 
those bureaucratic apparatuses that correspond to the interests of the hegemonic 
group regarding the power bloc and to the intensification of expanded class 
reproduction through ideology but mainly repression regarding the dominated 
classes. What should be stressed, though, is the fact that the special architecture of 
the capitalist State is generally able to absorb the political crises and smooth the 
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contradictions. A more detailed approach will follow after the next section regarding 





The transmission of the crisis in the field of the State has been mentioned 
earlier as closely connected to the political crisis. Nevertheless, as the last part of the 
previous paragraph implies, a political crisis is not necessarily interpreted into State 
crisis. The State is only an element, although central one to the political level348. So 
for example a crisis of the political scene, namely a deteriorated representation of 
class interests by parties may not cause a crisis of the State much more so that the 
latter has the ability to smooth the problem by promoting its unifying role. What lies, 
instead, at the heart of the crisis of the State is the decreased ability or even inability 
for its apparatuses to establish and protect the unstable equilibrium of compromises 
needed to continue the expanded class reproduction and consequently the long-term 
profit accumulation. Although, a crisis of the State as part of the political crisis may 
occur independently from an economic, it’s the case of structural crisis and 
especially its emergence during monopoly capitalism which brings the crisis of the 
State at its extremes and thus makes it easier to analyse. Additionally, the emergence 
of such a crisis as related to a structural one is particularly important in this research 
due to the implications of the 1970s over-accumulation crisis in Europe. 
More specifically, that period was marked by the uneasy relationships 
between the various State reactions in combating the economic and political crises. 
As shown earlier the central point were the State interventions merge and interact 
with each other is the same point which connects the economic and political crises, 
namely the class struggle. The falling rate of profit during that particular crisis 
increased the contradictions between classes and fractions comprising the power bloc 
which would possibly lead, depending on the specific expression of the crisis in each 
Social Formation, to doubting the Hegemony of the leading social force. On the other 
hand the increasing unemployment or the deteriorating labour rights from the side of 
the dominated classes doubted the Hegemony of the power bloc in total. The 
                                                 
348 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 27. 
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“arsenal” of the State in monopoly economies at this point included, in the economic 
field, the counteracting influences which – when they became insufficient – were 
replaced by subsidies and nationalisations of companies in financial difficulties in the 
first instance or privatisation policies in the second. In the political field the 
expanded class reproduction was intensified. Different governments followed 
different commixtures of the previous options which led to variations in the 
consequences. There were cases, therefore, that the combination of some of the 
above modifications came in conflict and subverted the aforementioned unstable 
equilibrium of compromise as the politico-economic upheaval during the 1970s not 
only in Europe shows. More specifically one could assume that had a State followed 
the subsidies and nationalisation policies in order to protect job positions and 
therefore the long-term profitability of the capital it would break irreversibly the 
specific form of alliance in the power bloc due to the adulteration of the competition 
caused by companies running in low or no profit. On the other hand, had a State 
followed privatisation policies then the widespread and boosted purging of capital 
would increase unemployment in such degree that the smooth class reproduction of 
dominated classes would be endangered. Practically then, subordination and 
consensus would depend on the function of Ideological and Repressive Apparatuses 
in a context in which the economic role of the State would be largely revealed.  
An attempt to bring the aforementioned general schema under the light of 
specific consequences would entail the analysis of the crisis of the State in relation to 
the power bloc, to the dominated classes and the State Personnel in order to identify 
the relevant modifications. Starting with the first case, the political crisis could be 
summarized in the general questioning of the ability of the State to organize the very 
power bloc, namely the consonance of the capitalist interests under those of the 
hegemonic class or fraction. Given that State Apparatuses are loci of power in which 
some classes – usually likely exactly those which participate in the dominating 
alliance - dominate upon others, the contradictions in the power bloc are expressed in 
the form of conflicts between the State Apparatuses or between the centres of typical 
power and centres of real power in each apparatus. Apart from overt conflicts 
between sectors of the State administration, covert movements like overlapping 
competence or unwillingness to deal with an issue may also occur. The most 
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significant modification, however, is a general displacement of the functions of the 
apparatuses. On the one hand, apparatuses themselves may change role or emphasize 
on their ideological or repressive function unlike the traditional one. On the other 
hand, a general displacement of the organizing functions of the State may occur - for 
both the power bloc and the dominated classes - from the expected apparatuses 
(parties, trade unions etc.) to other like stricto sensu administration, financial expert 
committees, the army etc. The essence of those modifications reveals a contradictory 
aggregate of State policies349 caused by the diminished organisation ability which is 
further caused by doubting the Hegemony of the leading social force in the power 
bloc350.  
The same modifications indicate the crisis of the State in relation to the 
dominated classes, although for a different line of causes. On the one hand the cracks 
in the power block have a direct consequence regarding the dominated class or 
fraction that participates as ally social force there - most frequently the petty 
bourgeoisie. The political autonomisation of the class in question may result to its 
emergence as considerable force in the political scene351. On the other hand, the 
ideological crisis as essential requirement of the political crisis endangers the 
consensus of the dominated classes which alters their relationship with State 
Apparatuses both as loci of class struggle and as promoters of the consensus in 
question. Especially with regard to the Repressive State Apparatuses the ideological 
crisis has further consequences upon the dominated classes because the monopoly of 
violence is directly related to its legitimisation352. Generally, therefore, the 
intensified political and class organisation of dominated classes, as in the case of 
movements that surpass the political parties, result to those abovementioned 
modifications that reveal a State crisis. It must be noted, though, that the dominated 
classes have also an indirect role in the emergence of the crisis of the State. It’s the 
intervention of the State in the first instance to prevent the economic crisis which 
brings forward the contradictions in the power bloc. In other words, the very 
existence of the wage-demand factor, originating in the dominated classes assertive 
                                                 
349 The aggregate considered here as the vector of the different policies employed in the various loci of 
power, namely State Apparatuses, by the dominating in each one class.   
350 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 40. 
351 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 43. 
352 See also N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 29. 
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movement, in the discussion over the State approach shows the contribution of the 
dominated classes in breaking the power bloc.   
The previous analyses over the State modifications as well as the role of the 
State Apparatuses reveal already the connection between the crisis of the State and 
the State Personnel. Most importantly, though, the crisis of the State recycles and 
multiplies because of its personnel involvement. As shown in the previous chapter 
the State Personnel is a social category which, however, corresponds to the social 
stratification of the Social Formation. Therefore, the upper levels are part of the 
dominating classes, while the lower levels are related with the petty bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat. It was shown as well that the class struggle reflects in the struggle 
among the levels of the State Personnel. The case of the crisis of the State illustrates 
the exact way according to which this happens. In a direct way, the modifications of 
the State and consequently the alterations of functions between State Apparatuses 
reflect to the first recipients of those policies, namely the State Personnel. Their 
reaction is derived by a number of changes including transfer of personnel, different 
requirements or new functions for the service they have to perform, reduced salaries 
as well as a complete change of labour status if the privatisation policy is followed. 
In an indirect way the fact that their position in the social category corresponds to a 
position in the wider social classes, means that the struggle between the latter reflect 
in them. Contradictions between the leaders of the State administration reflect the 
contradictions in the power bloc, while the break of the petty bourgeoisie from the 
ideological bonds of the power bloc reflects to the civil servants. Finally, a distinct 
reference should be made for the personnel of the ideological apparatuses since they 
are affected immediately by the ideological crisis. Exactly because the State 
Personnel are the communicators of the dominant ideology and of the supposed role 
of the State, the politico-ideological crisis unmasks subordination and brings them in 
a situation of questioning their role353. If this is an ongoing process caused by the 
social struggle, during the crisis it gets at its extremes. The already mentioned lack of 
legitimisation regarding the application of violence affects additionally and foremost 
the relevant State Personnel. The ideological role of the State and the expanded 
reproduction of classes, therefore, are endangered by its promoters.  
                                                 
353 See also N. Poulantzas 1978, pp 28-29. 
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The crisis of the State is expressed among its personnel in a distinctive way. 
The contradictions between the upper levels have already been pointed. In addition to 
that, one should mention the contradictions between the different administrative 
sectors. Exactly because the State Apparatuses constitute loci of power dominated by 
different classes, the contradictions in the power bloc are translated into friction and 
problems among personnel from different apparatuses. The modifications resulting to 
function overlapping between different administrative sectors in an effort to establish 
the dominance of a class or fraction bring the very contradiction among the personnel 
per se. One should also not dismiss the power of the assertive movement of the State 
Personnel. The economic crisis rarely leaves untouched the real wages of the civil 
servants either because of the increase of the cost of life or more directly because of 
the changes in salaries due to the modifications they are going through. As a result 
the State Personnel increases their struggles during a structural crisis in which the 
crisis of the State plays an important role. Nevertheless, all the previous expressions 
of the crisis of the State regarding its personnel converge to the major consequence 
which is the fracture of its cohesion; a unity which is built through - and because of - 
the ideological role of the State. Adding to that the specific consequences of the 
ideological crisis upon civil servants, it would become clear that the crisis of the 
State, although caused externally by a structural crisis, is internally amplified and 





The previous analysis over the crisis of the State as an internal factor of the 
structural one, which aims to solve it in the first instance but ending in multiplying it, 
is combined with Poulantzas’ concept of Authoritarian Statism. The context in which 
it applies is already described; the involvement of the State in numerous sectors of 
the economy before the eruption of the economic crisis politicizes the economic class 
struggle in a much stronger way which further increases the possibilities of the 
economic crisis turning to a State one. Poulantzas then endorses the concept of 
Authoritarian Statism as the chosen solution by the hegemonic class or fraction for 
                                                 
354 N. Poulantzas 1978, pp 44-46. 
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the reinstatement of its dominance in the political level. This notion refers to a new 
form of State which is descriptive of the general trend of the developments in 
question; in other words the State tends to monopolize several sectors within the 
economic and social life. Nevertheless, the counterpart is that those movements are 
articulated with the decadence of political democracy and limitation of freedoms. 
Authoritarian Statism constituted in the 1970s the answer of the State in 
monopolistic economies towards the political crisis and furthermore their own 
institutional crisis. Aim of this set of modifications has been the restitution of 
subordination and smooth reproduction of capital at the last instance by using 
repressive functions of the State. The latter reveals that Authoritarian Statism has 
been practically only one aspect in the general fluctuation of State’s power which on 
the one hand was diminished by its crisis and on the other strengthened through this 
distinctive authoritarianism. It must be stressed, though, that Authoritarian Statism is 
not caused by the structural crisis as such but rather because of the permanent 
presence of its elements in the expanded reproduction in the economic and political 
levels. Therefore, crisis is only triggering the emergence of the concept in question 
rather than causing it. This also shows why Authoritarian Statism should be 
distinguished from fascist regimes or dictatorships since those cases designate a 
rupture with democracy while Authoritarian Statism actually represents the specific 
version of democracy that monopolistic economies of the last quarter of the 20th 
century were prone to355. 
The latter shows the reason of this concept’s importance in this research. 
Given the permanent character of Authoritarian Statism in the political level and of 
the phase of monopoly capitalism in the economic one, State modifications attributed 
to them could be distinguished from those related with the respective crises under the 
idea that the former present an embedded reality. On the contrary, State 
modifications that appeared due to economic, political or State crises depend on the 
extremity of the class struggle development in a given conjuncture. Therefore they 
have transient character356. In designating the State modifications, in relation to the 
reason of emergence, Poulantzas is not really helpful. It seems that Authoritarian 
Statism was an idea in the making since he repeatedly states, in his contribution at 
                                                 
355 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 27 and N. Poulantzas 2001a, pp 294-302.  
356 See N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 52.   
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the book The crisis of the State357 and in his last work State, power, socialism358, that 
he is writing about a general framework without entering in details. Leaving aside 
this contextual issue, Poulantzas deals with those State modifications appearing 
during the 1970s with a descriptive approach as he did with the definition of 
Authoritarian Statism.  
In The crisis of the State Poulantzas explicitly mentions that due to the 
general level of the discussion it’s not feasible to show those modifications attributed 
to the structural and State crisis and those representing a stable transformation of the 
State359. As a matter of fact they largely coincide with the analysis he made 
previously regarding the crisis of the State. Therefore, he points some State 
developments that fall in large into three groups without any distinction regarding the 
cause. In the most abstract level the first group of modifications deals with the 
general polity. More specifically, powers are concentrated to the executive in the 
expense of the representative function of the State which, however, is not limited in 
the parliament. Aim of this modification is to cover decision-making from 
democratic scrutiny. As a consequence, the phenomenal distinction of powers in 
bourgeois democracy is unmasked.  
On a different group of modifications, the increasing curtailment of 
freedoms triggers a redefinition of the division between public and private sphere. 
State’s repression is intensified; a development which is combined with the gradual 
transfer of the ideological role for the consensus building from the pertinent 
apparatuses to the repressive ones. In addition to the previous, the repressive 
mechanisms are expanded through a network of multiple-linked services (police, 
prison system, psychiatric clinics, social work services etc.) which identify and 
dislocate the “abnormals-deviants-dangerous” in Poulantzas’ words. The expansion 
of this network generalizes suspicion against the entirety of society. This further 
relates guilt to the ante factum estimation of criminal intention which is exactly the 
reason for the redefinition of public/private spheres. Consequently, this causes a 
whole disturbance of the related traditional legal theory regarding the rule of law. 
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Additionally, a number of administrative changes are inscribed in the whole 
array of State modifications. The common hierarchy in State Apparatuses is 
informally disturbed with the creation of covert nexuses between those mechanisms 
and central administration, aside the formal-typical ones. What is most significant, 
however, is that implementation of actual power is gradually transferred to the new 
connections. The latter gives rise to new State networks, either formal or not, aiming 
to organize the application of power between central decision-making and knots of 
governance, typical or not, within the apparatuses. This multiplicity of typical and 
actual centres of power along with the variety of nexuses between them contributes 
to the lack of general social planning. In a parallel development, political parties 
gradually lose their organisational role in the Social Formation, which is moreover 
diverted to the administrative mechanisms. This development politicizes further the 
role of State Personnel.  
In State, power, socialism Poulantzas analysed only specific State 
modifications that are explicitly attributed to Authoritarian Statism rather than the 
crisis of the State in the 1970s360. The decadence of the parliament, the strengthening 
of the executive and the politicisation of the public administration reflect to a large 
degree the exposition of the previous book. What is added in his last book is firstly 
the rise of a dominating mass party in the framework of the political scene. In an 
environment of general lack of “representativeness” between political parties and 
social classes, which is further coupled with loss of intervention power of 
representatives in the central administration mechanism as well as an epiphenomenal 
autonomy of the latter from the executive which obscures exactly the opposite, a 
mass party, or as Poulantzas states a State party, dominates the political scene. The 
rotation of ruling parties in a bipartisan political system doesn’t change at all this 
image. This development should also be seen under the light of the transfer of the 
role of organizing the classes and generally the society from the parties to the central 
administration. The mass party presents a strict hierarchical structure, is run by de 
facto or de jure rules and is separated in fractions depending on the intra-party 
division of labour just like the State mechanisms. This party then becomes an 
extension of the State which performs ideologically the same functions, namely 
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agent allocation in classes, consensus building etc., in a much more flexible way than 
State Apparatuses. The other side of the coin is that exactly because it’s an extension 
of the State it provides its apparatuses with personnel. This allows the realisation of 
the new knots and the new networks in the administration weave and extents the 
politicisation of the State Personnel not only because to a degree they are themselves 
members of the party in question but also because the administrative networks reflect 
the party organisation and ideology and thus they polarize towards them practitioners 
of the day-to-day application of the dominant ideology361.  
 In the same book Poulantzas adds the role of Authoritarian Statism in the 
Janus-faced State which seems to strengthen and de-strengthen at the same time362. 
For example, the planning and performance of policies from the administrative 
mechanism as coupled with the loss of organizing role from the side of political 
parties transfers the contradictions of the power bloc among and within State 
Apparatuses. Leaving aside the fact that the ponderous public administration is not 
the ideal place for the organisation in question, this modification by upgrading the 
role of the State, at the same time makes administration more chaotic and unable to 
perform its functions. The contradictions among State mechanisms filter the initial 
decisions in multiple levels and finally transform their intended field or scope of 
application etc. This is of course a general characteristic of the capitalist State 
especially during the dominance of monopoly economy. Authoritarian Statism, 
however, tends to extend it.  
Politicisation of public administration is not limited in the relations among 
State Apparatuses. Its consequences are expanded among the State Personnel with 
much more important implications. The osmosis between the mass State party and 
the administrative mechanism which establishes the new informal networks of power 
has detrimental effect upon the higher levels of the State Personnel. They experience 
Authoritarian Statism as diminishing their actual powers upon the administrative 
mechanisms which are replaced or mediated from new knots in the pertinent 
network. Formal or informal – but still embedded – rules of conduct, hierarchy as 
well as more trivial issues just as promotions or salary increase are overturned either 
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because of a new typical administrative formation or because of informal 
interpersonal relations.  
In the lower levels of State Personnel, however, the implications from the 
politicisation of public administration are much more complicated. The assimilation 
of Hegemony organisation by the stricto sensu State obscures the boundaries 
between political decisions and administrative acts. Nevertheless, State Apparatuses 
retain their core ideological function regarding the protection and promotion of the 
general interest. To a degree this comes in contrast with the new ideology of 
efficiency, effectiveness and rationalisation of function363. Apart from actual 
operational problems caused, it’s questioned whether efficiency can act as unifying 
element for the function of the State Personnel which is the first part of the society to 
be confronted with this change of principles.  
Additionally, it must be reminded that civil servants - part of the petty-
bourgeoisie themselves – are also dominated in the distinctive hierarchy of the public 
sector. The exploitation of their work takes unprecedented levels due to both the 
financial crisis and the new operational approach of public administration. This 
raises the assertive movement among State Personnel which, however, should be 
seen in conjunction with the wider class struggle and the demands of the petty-
bourgeoisie. The break of the power bloc, in which this class plays an important role 
as allied social force and as promoter of the social consensus to the rest of the Social 
Formation, influences the lower level of the State Personnel364. This is far from just 
an ideological construct. The centralisation and strengthening of the State brings it 
exactly in the core of the class struggle which is practically directed towards the 
State Apparatuses and its practitioners365. Therefore, they find themselves in the 
position of having to promote or defend administrative actions that cover political 
decisions when the particular tenacious bond of their social category, namely the 
                                                 
363 Parenthetically it could be argued that in this phase of monopoly capitalism the economic role of 
the State is not just diluted in the ideological and repressive functions  as in previous phases of the 
same Mode of Production but it becomes an objective reality whose dictates should be met by the 
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distinctive role of the State in the monopolistic phase of capitalist economy (continuous expansion 
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364 See also ibidem p. 101 et seq.  
365 It must be reminded that for Leninist revolutionary theory the State is the object of the political 
struggle (ibidem p. 70). Authoritarian Statism, however, makes the State and its apparatuses central in 
the totality of the class struggle by revealing their connection to the capitalist reproduction.  
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general interest, is itself questioned. If legitimisation of the practice of State 
Apparatuses has always been questioned in the contour of the class struggle, 
Authoritarian Statism brings that problem in the heart of the State.  
 
- Authoritarian Statism and privatisation 
Poulantzas never had the opportunity to analyse further the concept of 
Authoritarian Statism nay the emergence of privatisation policies since they appeared 
after his death. The question then arising is whether privatisation constitutes a 
derivation from the previously described situation, especially since it seems to 
represent abatement rather than strengthening of the State unlike Authoritarian 
Statism which increases the number of roles attached to the State. Resolving this 
prima facie contradictory relationship is crucial for this research because both 
privatisations and Authoritarian Statism indicate State modifications that became 
endemic in monopoly capitalism after the 1970s.  
It could be argued that Authoritarian Statism, being a political concept, 
describes either the reaction of the State to the political crisis or the transformation of 
the State during the corresponding phase of monopoly capitalism. In contrast with 
that privatisation policies indicate the economic role of the State; As a result their 
coexistence doesn’t pose any problem. This is, however, not a sufficient approach 
since the political role of the State is directly rather than indirectly related to 
economy especially during its monopoly phase as the previous analyses show. 
Following this understanding of the economic and political level would annul the 
relationship between the levels of the Mode of Production and moreover the 
connection between the economic and political struggles. Neither the wider dualistic 
nature of State modifications (strengthening/de-strengthening) could prove to be a 
satisfactory explanation. Specific alterations in the weave of State Apparatuses mark 
an enforcement of its array of roles as well as devotion of increased resources for that 
reason. De-strengthening and generally the inability to perform the functions with 
which the State is charged appear at the end and as a consequence of that process. 
Privatisation, however, follows the opposite order of developments and is not related 
with functions that the State cannot perform.  
The last argument, however, should be further examined because it takes 
for granted the fact that privatisation points a de-strengthening process of the State 
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which abandons civil services. What happens in reality is that privatisation removes 
only the visible aspect of the State; it leaves, however, intact the actual governmental 
management366. For example privatisation of services reaffirms that their provision 
“belongs” to the public sector which has the “right” to contract it out. Other 
examples show that privatisation was in reality a further expansion of the State. In 
the case of public corporation selling-out, of de-regulating markets as well as in the 
previous case of contracting out of services the State confirmed and to a degree 
expanded its role by the parallel introduction of controlling mechanisms. Aside any 
particular example, it should be reminded that the State per se is beyond any 
boundaries between public and private sphere. The latter take as prerequisite and are 
therefore constructed by the delimitation of the stricto sensu State, namely of the 
public administration. This explains why institutions like the family, the Church or 
the mass media are considered by Althusser and Poulantzas as Ideological 
Apparatuses of the State367. Therefore, the State in an effort to open outlets for 
profitable investments, promoted privatisation policies regarding the domain of 
public administration without, however, affecting its general characteristic in terms 
of intervening in the economy in favour of the continuation of the expanded capitalist 
reproduction and of the long term capitalist interests. Thus, privatisation instead of 
being contradictory to Authoritarian Statism, it constitutes a substantive element in 
its application. 
 
Following the depiction of class relations in the previous chapters, this part 
of the Thesis presented the dynamicity of the class struggle in the extremity of a 
structural crisis. What is especially important is the very creation of the structural 
crisis namely its transmission from the economic to the political level in which case 
the economic counter-acting measures of the State are not enough. The crisis of the 
State has especially important manifestations in the inability of the State Personnel to 
function as knot of transmitting subordination from the State Apparatuses to the 
dominated classes. Hegemonic strategy in that case is realised in State 
transformations that assure exactly the continuation of class domination. The 
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The State in the Crisis and the Crisis of the State   153 
 
European political history of the last quarter of the 20th century presents a distinctive 
set of State modifications which formed what is coined as Authoritarian Statism. 
This is in essence the form of State that corresponds to the economic crisis of the 
period. Substantial part of those transformations is the privatisation policies that 








































In the previous chapters a series of acknowledgements and conclusions 
have been established. The Social Formation, the Mode of Production and the class 
struggle constitute forms of a Whole in which different levels interact among each 
other. In each form of Whole the matrix of their relationship is determined at the last 
instance by the economic level without the latter being at the same time the 
dominant. The constitution of classes is determined by their position in the relations 
of production. In monopoly capitalism exactly due to the new articulation of the 
relations in the production process a new class emerges in between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat, that of the new petty bourgeoisie. The State Personnel falls 
exactly into this class and constitutes at the same time a social category, namely a 
social force with its own bonding element apart from the common position in the 
relations of production. The role of the State in this context is multiple. It has to 
unify the contradicting classes with its self-presentation as an all-inclusive institution 
beyond classes. The monopoly of violence reflects this supposed reality. 
Additionally it has to promote the domination of the social forces that constitute the 
power bloc upon the dominated classes and preserve their long term interests. The 
organisation of the cohesion of the power bloc and at the same disorganisation of the 
dominated classes, for the exploitation to be continued, is feasible through the 
hegemonic strategy. The latter takes the form of the centralisation of the interests of 
the hegemonic class or fraction regarding the power bloc and the supposed 
promotion of the general interest regarding the dominated classes.  
These roles are realized in the State Apparatuses from the State Personnel 
which, therefore, becomes a crucial knot in the transmission of subordination from 
the power bloc to the exploited classes. Especially the Repressive State Apparatuses 
are institutions with a dual function. They are set to safeguard the general or specific 
operation of the extended class reproduction in Capitalist Mode of Production 
passively, namely just by their presence and the mere threat of violence, and actively, 
that is when the Ideological State Apparatuses have been unsuccessful in promoting
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class subordination, at the last instance. Nevertheless, Repressive and Ideological 
State Apparatuses do not constitute just a tool in the hand of the power bloc. They 
are rather loci for the application of class power which means that the dominance in 
those institutions is not ascribed to a specific class but rather contested between the 
contradicting social forces. In mapping these relationships, the State Personnel 
represents a distinctive factor loosely connected with the rest of the social forces and 
more coherent internally exactly because its existence as social category. Practically, 
that means that they are the first recipients of the dominant ideology and at the same 
time the practitioners of its dictates. As a result, the wider class struggle is translated 
into separate demands from that of the other subordinated classes and within the 
framework of their specific status.  
These set of relations do not represent a fixed image. The constant pressure 
towards the direction of each class interest is vested with victories and losses. The 
dominance of the power bloc or its questioning from the side of the dominated 
classes unfolds constantly the hegemonic strategy which is reflected in the 
modification taking place in the very “battle field” of the political level, namely the 
State. The chaotic ensemble of governmental policies that seem self-contradicting 
from a wider spectrum reflects exactly the constantly changing form of the class 
struggle. Authoritarian Statism as a set of policies related with monopoly capitalism 
incorporates exactly the contemporary hegemonic strategy which is further translated 
into a number of State modifications. The eruption of crisis, however, designates the 
emergence of newly arisen and extreme conditions that previous modification didn’t 
manage to prevent. If the economic crisis is predictable and manageable, then the 
political crisis and the crisis of the State set new challenges. The new policies set to 
deal with those new conditions, either economic or political, are again transmitted in 
the organisational corpus of the State as modifications. The difference in this case is 
that the temporary character of the crises implies also the passing character of the 
pertinent State modifications. In contrast with that, modifications attributed to the 
contemporary phase of capitalism demarcate a permanent change in the State’s 
structure of policies and apparatuses.    
This last argument, however, needs to be thoroughly examined because the 
interrelation between the transient character of the crisis and of the relevant State 
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modifications is not self-understandable. In other words, it would have been too 
simplistic to assume that modifications that appeared due to a crisis would wither 
away automatically when the crisis is absorbed. Poulantzas368 deals with that issue 
only peripherally regarding the connection between the political crisis and 
Authoritarian Statism. He states that modifications appearing due to the former may 
not be removed after the end of the crisis because they correspond also to 
Authoritarian Statism. But again, this doesn’t give the right to assume the opposite, 
namely that if a modification doesn’t correspond to Authoritarian Statism would be 
withdrawn automatically. The core of the problem rather lies at the “automatic” 
reversion of the modification because it would presume that the political level 
operates according to some internal norms which are therefore unaffected by class 
struggle as in the case of economism regarding the economic level.  
What happens in reality is that every modification in State Apparatuses 
represents a strategic movement in the hegemonic policy which was further the result 
of the victory of a class and the loss of another in the framework of the struggle 
within the specific apparatus or in the general vector of the class struggle. It must be 
reminded that apparatuses neither are tools in the hand of a class, nor a class has 
established a stable dominance in them. The struggle for dominance is constant. 
Under this light, a modification means that a class’ “lost ground” becomes part of its 
interests (in the class struggle sense) to which it directs its powers369. In the case of 
modifications resulting from crises, the end of the extremity of conjuncture’s social 
relations implies that the “ground taken” from the dominating class in the apparatus 
in question is not any more of central importance. From this point of view the 
dominating classes in the course of the unstable equilibrium of compromises would 
prefer to strategically withdraw from the ground taken to secure their position in 
more crucial parts of the “battlefield”. But movements like this are not the result of 
unilateral power relations. In other words, the concessions by the dominating classes 
are not the result of their magnanimity. They take place exactly because the 
dominated classes pressed for those concessions. To bring a concrete example, 
censorship which is common characteristic of dictatorships – exemplar of 
modifications due to a State crisis – is withdrawn by the time the regime in question 
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is overthrown, namely by the end of the political crisis. The curtailment of human 
rights is not of crucial importance any more since the hegemonic strategy is able 
again to establish the dominance of a class and at the same time the dominated 
classes demand the repossession of their rights.   
In an attempt to bring the asynchronies of privatisation and specifically that 
between the introduction of the general privatisation and prison privatisation policies 
under the light of the previous approach would reveal an interesting inversion of the 
previous schema. It has already been shown that privatisation was the chosen State 
policy to invert the economic environment after the 1970s economic crisis by 
opening outlets for profitable investments in fields that used to be in “State’s 
purview”. Moreover, privatisation does not signify a withdrawal of the State but a 
reaffirmation of its involvement in the economy. Thus, it’s compatible with 
Authoritarian Statism in the political level. The general privatisation policies, 
therefore, reveal State modifications that are related with the phase of monopoly 
capitalism during the last quarter of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. As 
a matter of fact, the wave of privatisations has not been reverted; on the contrary it’s 
still being promoted which shows exactly that it’s a permanent characteristic of the 
current phase of monopoly capitalism.  
The issue of structural relevance between general and prison privatisation 
policies has been touched earlier370. The essence of that approach had been that there 
is such a close relationship between the two which allows understanding the absence 
of one of them as exceptional condition. Nevertheless, a step deeper in the analysis 
of this relationship is necessary since the presentation of only the common 
characteristics or even the intended goals of the two categora shows at best an 
affinity and at worst a coincidence between them. What really matters, however, if 
an inductive reasoning is to be avoided, is to present the inescapability between the 
two. The latter cannot but be grounded on the concept of internal consistency, 
namely the need to privatize the prison system exactly because the privatisation 
policies have been introduced. On the one hand, it must be clarified that the pursuit 
for internal consistency in politics from a macroscopic point of view is necessary to 
avoid any relativistic approach which would dilute any attempt to explain facts into 
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agnosticism. In other words, finding the internal consistency in politics is crucial to 
avoid cancelling political science as such. On the other hand, because of the 
structural-Marxist stance adopted in this research, the concept of internal consistency 
should be discerned from abstract idealistic approaches. More specifically, there is a 
danger that the concept in question might sound close to an Aristotelian telos or a 
Hegelian werden of the phenomenon since it implies that prison privatisation is a 
stage in the course of general privatisation. The up to now analysis, however, shows 
exactly the concrete reality to which privatisation policies including the prison one 
corresponds. It’s the need to create an economic environment for profitable 
investments which dictates “rolling back the frontiers of the State” without any 
obvious reason for exceptions371, preferences or delays. 
The previous discussion over the modifications can now take a new 
significance. If economic, political and ideological consistency is to be retained, the 
introduction of general privatisation makes prison privatisation a sine qua non and 
therefore the need for consistency allows understanding the delay of the latter as a 
modification too. In this case it’s not a modification of what was there, namely of the 
State as formed in modernity, but a modification of what was supposed to be there, 
namely of the State under Authoritarian Statism. Explaining this modification 
requires referring to two basic arguments previously mentioned. The basic role of the 
Repressive State Apparatuses, is to secure the smooth operation of the Mode of 
Production by violence or its threat at the last instance, namely when the Ideological 
Apparatuses have failed. On the other hand privatisation policies appeared as a 
solution towards the over-accumulation crisis of the 1970s which turned to (or 
threatened to turn in reference to different Social Formations) a structural crisis. 
Putting those arguments in the political context of the pertinent period would reveal 
that in a process in which capital purging and privatisation as such target amongst 
else wages or labour rights and increase unemployment, social upheaval could easily 
be forecasted. Even if the economic crisis is not transmitted to the political level, the 
intensification of economic class struggle is highly possible. Exactly because the 
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preservation of the unstable equilibrium of compromise by concessions becomes 
more and more difficult, the hegemonic policy has to focus on subordination caused 
by the ideological and repressive apparatuses. Hence, the key importance of 
Repressive State Apparatuses is apparent in protecting the general capitalist 
reproduction. From a wider point of view the importance of the repressive 
mechanisms is present not only during the transformations’ period or the crisis but 
also during Authoritarian Statism with a more permanent character. More 
specifically, Poulantzas notes that the form of State in question is expected to build a 
whole preventive institutional framework to deal with the rise of social struggle and 
the consequent dangers of Hegemony. As in the previous period this framework is 
not at the front line of measures but thoroughly covered as a reserve ready to be set 
in motion372. The importance of the repressive mechanisms, however, is still not 
enough to explain the peculiar unfolding of privatisation since it doesn't explain why 
their outsourcing would obstacle in any way their role in the conjuncture. 
To answer the last question one should turn to the analyses over the State 
Personnel. Under the previously described conditions, the power bloc cannot risk 
losing the support of civil servants, which are exactly the practitioners who realize 
the hegemonic policies. This becomes even more important in reference to those 
employees that are active in the Repressive State Apparatuses as the “last line of 
defence”. The previous question then should be restructured. Would privatisation of 
those mechanisms affect the performance of their personnel? It should be reminded 
that the lower levels of civil servants from a class point of view, which also 
constitute the vast majority of the total number of the State Personnel, belong to the 
petty-bourgeoisie. This class due to the general lack of representative party in the 
political scene tends to rely on the State for the protection and promotion of its 
interests. This is why usually their political demands for transparency, justice and 
meritocracy are interpreted in the promotion of their own class interests. If this is a 
political peculiarity of the petty-bourgeoisie in general, it is more apparent in the 
State Personnel due to its position. The general interest – being the State's dominant 
ideology - is their tenacious bond both because of their status in the mechanisms of 
the State since they are supposed to promote and protect the general interest and 
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because as practitioners of this ideology they are its first and more affected 
recipients. Privatisation, however, marks a radical change in the dominant ideology 
posing dangers in several fronts.  
From one side, the State Personnel would be practising policies that clearly 
differ from the previous conception of the general interest ideology. The public 
ownership of enterprises like coal mining or steel industries was promoted due to 
their centrality in economy while in the provision of services like electricity, water 
supply, transportations etc. the State intervention was grounded on the fact that 
private capital could not afford the cost of building such networks. Later, other 
industries were nationalised to reduce or halt the rise of unemployment. The common 
denominator in public ownership of enterprises as well as public provision of 
services has been the social welfare. This has been the specific interpretation of the 
general interest. Towards the end of the 1970s that particular approach of general 
interest was replaced with the mantra of economic efficiency of the State. 
Considerations on cost existed of course in the previous period as well but they 
referred to the cost of service or product for their user and not the State as if the latter 
had been the final consumer. This change could directly or indirectly affect the State 
Personnel by changing what used to be their distinctive characteristic as social 
category. It must be stressed, though, that what is under discussion here is not 
whether public ownership of enterprises corresponds to social welfare or if 
privatisations really constitute the State more efficient. It’s the change of dominant 
ideology, instead, with which the State Personnel is vested, that really matters. From 
the other side – and this is the most crucial one - the State would have been turning 
against State Personnel’s direct interests by changing their labour status. It should be 
reminded that privatisations do not happen in abstracto but in conditions of wide 
capital purging which further means that labour powers remain unused. Even more, 
privatisations are exactly part of the wider purging process; therefore, under the idea 
of efficiency, job places and conditions of labour are not secured even in the public 
sector. In other words due to privatisations the State Personnel were risking at best 
their conditions of labour and at worst their work places as such. 
It could be assumed, then that the promotion of the wider privatisation 
policies would require a hegemonic strategy in which the interests of the personnel of 
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the Repressive State Apparatuses would be protected in order to avoid undermining 
the subordination by repression in the Social Formation. That means that the crux of 
the asynchrony between the introduction of general privatisation and prison 
privatisation policies lies at the possibility of demoralisation of the personnel of 
police, prison system etc. The alterations of the unifying element of their social 
category, the promotion of the general interest that is, exactly because they are 
questioned from the other dominated social forces leads to their entrenchment from 
the wider socio-economic developments.  
This approach, however, seems to leave open some other questions. One 
should understand for example why prison privatisation appeared at the end of the 
day. Although, there seems to be no reason for exceptions, preferences or delays in 
the privatisation process according to its guiding principles, there are some strategic 
reasons. The entrenchment and protection of the State Personnel’s interests that is 
occupied in the Repressive State Apparatuses is crucial as long as there is a threat of 
social upheaval, namely as long as the social struggle in the economic and political 
levels is increased. The eventual decrease of strikes, conflicts, insubordination and 
maybe trade union membership designates the time point after which the 
privatisation of Repressive State Apparatuses may begin.  
Moreover, a country’s prison system was never totally privatized not even 
in the case of the State of Victoria in Australia with the highest number of prisoners 
held in private prisons in the advanced capitalist world. This should not be seen as a 
drawback of the previous approach since the actual target of prison privatisation has 
already been accomplished by partially out-sourcing the prison system. The aim of 
privatisations, namely opening up outlets for profitable investments by the private 
capital is not only fulfilled by outsourcing services as such; the same happens 
through a series of measures that as a matter of fact followed prison privatisation. 
Most notable examples are the organisation of prison service as such which usually 
takes the form and the status of a private company, procurement process which is 
liable to various market-testing schemes in search of the greatest efficiency and 
employees’ salary whose increase depends on the achievement of set goals etc. 
Nevertheless, the exemplar of profitable investment in the carceral system without 
the stricto sensu privatisation of services is the underpaid prison labour which is not 
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as rare as widely believed373. Therefore, prison privatisation in the sense of profitable 
investments is multilevelled in contrast with other narrow outsourcing approaches.  
Another question arises from the fact that the prison system is only part of 
the total Repressive State Apparatuses. Privatisation in those mechanisms then 
should follow a similar course with the most notable example being that of police 
due to its importance in the repressive system and its size in terms of budget and 
personnel. Unlike the prison system, the private involvement in policing never 
ceased to exist. Private guards, alarm systems or private detectives played a 
peripheral role but they were never effaced. Policing privatisation therefore was 
essentially privatisation of security rather than of police as such. In other words, 
instead of outsourcing the public sector’s policing services a combination of 
developments transformed the relationship between the public and private policing. 
During the 1980s the expansion of space (either in the public or in the private sphere) 
that was deemed to be in need of protection was coupled either by contraction of the 
State policing services or by their expansion at a slower pace in comparison with the 
private sector. Nevertheless, this “subtle” ‘rolling back of the frontiers of the State’ is 
not enough to firmly establish conclusions for the wider transformations in the 
Repressive Apparatuses of the State. 
Contrariwise, what is more important is the deliberate suggestions for the 
contraction of State policing services that came more or less in the same period and 
under the same circumstances at least in Britain with prison privatisation. For 
example the Sheehy Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards which came 
out in 1993 recommended fixed-term contracts, performance-related pay and a 
general connection between police salaries and the private sector. This report might 
                                                 
373 See further information in http://www.prisonlabour.org.uk/index.htm. Of course prison labour (and 
not penal servitude) existed in prisons throughout the 20th century and irrespective of any privatisation 
scheme. In the British context, however, is important to note that the white paper Custody Care and 
Justice published by the Home Office in 1991 as a response to the Woolf Report notes explicitly that 
prison governors should increase the involvement of private employers in the prison workshops in 
contrast with the Woolf Report which suggested private involvement as a possibility. As a matter of 
fact in the Prison Service annual report for 1993 describing the new developments it’s announced that 
pilot schemes involving private firms employ directly inmates; something that the aforementioned 
data prove to have remained the existing practice until now (see further in F. Simon 1999, pp 14-15 
and 17). One could bring forward the counterargument that the linkage of prison labour with private 
employers may ease the process of finding a job after the release. Nevertheless, the basic point 
remains, namely that it was only in 1991 that in-prison employment recommendations focused 
amongst else in private involvement in prison labour. 
164   A Structural Marxist Account on the Asynchronies of Privatisation 
 
not inquire the private involvement in policing as such but it’s certainly a sign of a 
new understanding of policing under the ideas of efficiency. More specific has been 
the Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks which was published by the Home 
Office in 1995 and intended to ‘examine the services provided by the police, to make 
recommendations about the most cost-effective way of delivering core police 
services and to assess the scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks’. According to Jones 
and Newburn, the review as such was a sign that the Treasury was pressing for a 
large-scale abandoning in favour of the private sector of police functions374. Going 
back to the initial issue, it must be reminded that privatisation of the prison service 
was introduced in Britain by the 1991 Criminal Justice Act and was first 
implemented in 1992 namely around the same period in which police privatisation 





Before closing the theoretical part of this Thesis, this section will review 
objections against structural Marxism and different approaches on the issues touched. 
The first theory to be reviewed is that by Antonio Gramsci which forms Poulantzas' 
intellectual basis. Gramsci's most interesting work was not a consistent piece of 
research but a collection of notes written during imprisonment and under censorship. 
His writings, therefore, are a “canvas” upon which different theories and political 
practices are projected375. In this case, Gramsci will be approached through Perry 
Anderson's article The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci376 which is critical towards 
both Gramsci and Poulantzas. Anderson identifies three Gramscian positions 
regarding the relationship between the State, namely the Political Society, and the 
Civil Society; one in which the State contrasts the Civil Society; another in which the 
State encompasses the Civil Society and one in which the State merges with the Civil 
Society377. 
For Anderson, the Gramscian idea of Hegemony, which is implemented on 
Civil Society, is the proletariat's effective leadership upon dominated classes; not as 
                                                 
374 See further in N. South 1988 and T. Jones et al. 1998 especially chapter 4. 
375 See for example P. Anderson 1976-1977 or M. Thomas 2012 and T. Kampagiannis 2011, p. 99. 
376 P. Anderson 1976-1977. 
377 P. Anderson 1976-1977, p. 12. 
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a materialistic compromise of interests but as consent through cultural ascendancy of 
the former. Simultaneously it's the dictatorship against the bourgeoisie. The 
compilation of those predicates leads to three scenarios regarding the Gramscian 
State. In the first one, as long as Civil Society is preponderant against the State, the 
“cultural ascendancy” of a dominant class is enough for the continuation of its rule 
by consent. Civil Society exists in equilibrium with the State, in the second scenario, 
therefore, Hegemony is distributed between the State and the Civil Society both of 
which function by coercion and consent. In the third one the Civil Society and the 
State merge into a single unity. Anderson takes the opportunity here to criticise 
structural Marxist State theory by holding that extending this argument would 
constitute different forms of State unimportant378.  
What is missing from all three scenarios, is the importance of the material 
nature of consent, beyond any ideological or coercive source of subordination. 
Specifically for the second scenario Anderson falls in a petitio principii taking as 
given the State's monopoly of violence. But apart from this sociologically 
uninformed thesis379, perceiving the State as separate from, although in equilibrium 
with, the society resolves to voluntaristic views on the former, since it appears as 
“custom-made”, rather than structural construct, in order to balance coercion and 
consent. Anderson's criticism against the third scenario is as limited as the analytical 
capacity of the metaphor between base and superstructure380; the Civil Society is 
considered to be an array of superstructural institutions. Nevertheless, “merging” 
retains the categorical difference between the two concepts. For Poulantzas, 
however, the State is a relationship congenital with the society; the public aspect of 
class relationship. But the diffusion of State and society doesn't mean that the 
materiality of a particular condensation of the State is unimportant. Poulantzas 
avoids a general theory of the State, exactly because it needs to be seen within each 
conjuncture. The same misunderstanding reflects in Ernesto Laclau's commentary. 
He asserts that identifying the State with institutions promoting social cohesion and 
private interests would lead the State Personnel in schizophrenic condition381. He 
                                                 
378 P. Anderson 1976-1977, pp 18 et seq. 
379 See indicatively J. Simon 2008, chapter 8, E. Wilson et al. 2009, D. Ganser 2005, S. Wright 2002 
and T. Newburn 2003. 
380 N. Poulantzas 2001a, p. 20. 
381 E. Laclau 1977, pp 67-69. 
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neglects, however, the importance of ideological identification between general 
welfare and specific private interest. Moreover, for Poulantzas, the material 
condensation of the State doesn't coincide with the power dynamics which are 
employed in the apparatuses the domination in which is contested. Therefore, class 
contradictions are inherent and this is how the chaotic ensemble of policies is 
created.   
In contrast with Poulantzas, Ralph Miliband holds that the State could be 
theorised and this is what he is doing in his book The State in Capitalist Society382. 
He identifies the existence of a ruling class whose cohesiveness is materialised in a 
recruitment process open to specific class origin383. This class controls the State 
which is the aggregate of particular number of institutions including the 
administrative, military, judiciary, local administrative and party/parliamentarian 
elements. Among them, 'State power' resides in administration and the army. The 
permeability between State and specific classes is explained by the skimming role of 
higher education that is available only to higher incomes. The State Personnel is 
characterised by general conservativism regarding the protection of the particular 
class hierarchy. The consequence is that no government threatens the capitalist 
economy while it functions in favour of the direct or indirect interests of 
corporations384. The proletariat cannot apply effectively any political leverage, since 
it's fractured and has a more difficult task than capitalists. The reason lies with 
Hegemony which is a pervasive effort deliberately conducted for a national supra-
party consensus. In the process of political socialisation, ideas are “skimmed” and 
then internalised, disappearing by that every different “subversive” concept. It takes 
place in the Civil Society and specifically from the conservative parties, the Church, 
nationalism, businesses, mass media and education. Most importantly, however, 
capitalism is “mentally reproduced” by capitalist production itself. Aside cultural 
Hegemony the expansion of capitalist is its own legitimation and the reason for 
labour self-subordination385. 
                                                 
382 R. Miliband 1969, pp 7 et seq. 
383 R. Miliband 1969, pp 23-47. 
384 R. Miliband 1969, pp 55 et seq. 
385 R. Miliband 1969, pp 182-264. 
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The main issue in Miliband's work is methodology which, in a constant 
deduction from actual facts, refutes bourgeois political theory and then structures a 
new one. Although it's not mistaken to assess theories in their own premises, the 
same tools are not usable in structuring a new theory, since concepts are not 
“innocent” of implicit ideas386. This undermines the consistency of the theory and, as 
a matter of fact, his work is vulnerable to exceptions. He constantly brings forward 
the possibility of a different development without, however, explaining the reason 
behind that. It seems that he is committing the classic 'is/ought fallacy' as in the case 
of the numerus clausus of State elements without further explication. In general he 
seems to be presenting as social theory a sociological research that has not been 
grounded on a previous social theory. The second point to be raised is voluntarism 
that leads to a conspiratorial perception of history. If the decisions in the elements of 
the State depend on particular individuals or a self-conscious class, then the whole 
theoretical construct collapses under its own randomness; especially since Hegemony 
is considered as deliberate effort. 
 Poulantzas appears also indirectly in the debate between Stuart Hall et al. 
and B. Jessop et al. which was triggered after the publication of Policing the Crisis387 
by the former. By analysing the criminal phenomenon of mugging, they ended up in 
a social theory encompassing social subordination, State and crisis. They identify a 
working class “common sense”, formed by the British empiricism388 and defined 
antithetically. This dominant ideology is negotiated through contextualised 
judgements leaving the former intact389. The Gramscian view by Hall et al. differs 
from the Poulantzasian in that the State is not a relationship, neither its apparatuses 
loci of power. It expands within the society without losing its categorical difference 
and administers Hegemony as consent and coercion in a zero-sum relationship. 
Therefore, the crisis of the State is reciprocal to the crisis of the Hegemony and 
interconnected to the economic crisis, since the State intervenes in that field. During 
crisis, class domination is exercised by a tilt of the index of Hegemony from consent 
to coercion; not in the sense of coercion into consent but consent around coercion390. 
                                                 
386 N. Poulantzas 1969, pp 69-70. 
387 S. Hall et al. 1982. 
388 See Perry Anderson and Bentham in S. Hall et al. 1982, p. 151 and N. Poulantzas 1976b, p. 65 
389 S. Hall et al. 1982, pp 154-156. 
390 S. Hall et al. 1982, pp 208-217. 
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A critical approach to Hall et al. would identify an over-ideologisation. 
Acknowledging the British proletariat as a self-conscious class is incompatible with 
identifying its ideology since the mystifying function of the latter would be self-
cancelled. The antinomy caused by historicism becomes obvious in the fact that Hall 
et al. reserve hegemonic ideology only to the dominated classes391 implying that it's a 
conscious lie from the side of the dominant classes. As a consequence, just like 
Anderson's third scenario, voluntarism becomes a necessary resort392, in order to 
accommodate the lack of structural exegesis that an economic analysis would have 
provided, especially if implemented in the perception of Hegemony.  
Further to Policing the Crisis, Hall and Jacques published an analysis of the 
Thatcher governments which triggered a debate with Jessop393 on crisis and the new 
form of State394. The new hegemonic project, Authoritarian Populism, mobilized 
popular support for a rightwing solution to the economic and political crises around 
authoritarian solutions. For Hall et al. Authoritarian Statism is incompatible with 
privatisations and weak in explaining the ways that power bloc mobilizes popular 
consent395. Although this is not the case as already shown, the descriptive approach 
by Poulantzas gives indeed rise to those allegations. But descriptive is also Hall's 
approach in addition to the lack of structural underpinnings in support of 
Authoritarian Populism. It's merely a discoursive analysis that ignores the reception 
of “message” of the government. Hall argues that this is not a general theory; 
nevertheless, a Marxist political analysis cannot be but total, since all levels coexist 
in class reproduction. Therefore, Hall seems to transform the relative autonomy of 
the levels to complete autonomy. It is exactly this fractured analysis of the Whole 
that leads Hall in factual problems since he is obliged to take the Thatcherite rhetoric 
for granted. As an alternative to Authoritarian Populism, Jessop suggests the Two 
Nations theory according to which Thatcherite rhetoric separates Britain in the 
productive and unproductive nations, the first of which is rewarded by the market 
and the second punished. Repressive Apparatuses' personnel is not productive but is 
                                                 
391 S. Hall et al. 1982, pp 153-154. 
392 See for example S. Hall et al. 1982, pp 214 and 215 et seq. 
393 B. Jessop et al. 1987. 
394 S. Hall et al. 1983. 
395 S. Hall in B. Jessop et al. 1987. 
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protected due to their role in the unobstructed capital reproduction396. Jessop's 
approach, although less, remains discoursive and institutional. This is why the 
supposedly protected prison officers finally lost their job status. The most worrying 
issue, however, is the way that Margaret Thatcher appears as key role player; an 
autonomous factor397. 
The de-construction of the critique against Poulantzas' work doesn't mean 
that his work is complete. Although analytically significant and responsive to 
adaptations, is far from perfect. The first issue is the problematic definition of the 
conjuncture. It could have a topical, temporal or any other meaning but appears as a 
generic phrase depicting the specific condensation of the class struggle. This might 
be a theoretical gap, but it has only a “programmatic” revolutionary relevance. It 
leaves, however, the analysis of history unaffected. The same applies to the second 
issue. By rejecting class consciousness altogether, Poulantzas rejects the capability of 
a revolutionary party to reveal the role of ideology in covering the existence of 
classes. Class consciousness, instead, does exist in the individual level; nevertheless 
purged from Lukacsian mystifications. 
                                                 
396 B. Jessop et al. 1987, pp 71 et seq. 












































































The previous theoretical part, following a progressively deepening analysis 
of the structural Marxist theory of the State, presented a pertinent approach to the 
time gap between the introduction of general privatisation and prison privatisation 
policies. The detection of the particular components of this approach in the concrete 
reality of the British Social Formation requires a relevant progressive analysis. The 
first step in this process is to determine whether prison privatisation constitutes a 
transformation of a State Apparatus or not. That would allow bringing the discussion 
over Authoritarian Statism in the field of criminal justice system. More specifically it 
allows associating the discontinuity of the governmental role in imprisonment, 
represented in the emergence of prison privatisation, with the discontinuity of the 
form of the liberal State, represented in the emergence of Authoritarian Statism. This 
discussion has been touched earlier under the issue of breakthrough or re-emergence 
of prison privatisation but it’s only now that obtains a substantial position in the 
framework of this research instead of a mere intellectual exercise.   
Although such a research enterprise would require the examination of the 
existing practices some years before the introduction of prison privatisation and their 
comparison with the changes brought forward with the Criminal Justice Act 1991, a 
further retrospection would particularize some important conclusions from the 
previous chapters ranging from the relationship between the private and the public 
sphere to the nature and origins of the State itself. Therefore, this chapter will review 
the State’s role in imprisonment as early as the medieval times. An important issue 
should be noted right from the beginning. The periodical notions (medieval ages, 
early modernity and modernity) that are used pose more problems than they solve 
since they have multiple readings and none of them remains unquestioned. They 
could – to name the most common - have chronological meanings; for example the 
period from the transfer of the Roman capital from Rome to Constantinople for 
medieval times or from renaissance to mid-20th century for modernity. They could 
also have intellectual reading; for example the period of mystical philosophy instead
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of systematic thinking for middle ages or the period in which rationality has 
definitional and aetiological role for modernity. Even under those approaches, the 
actual time limits could not be strictly defined. On the other hand, that problem 
doesn’t seem to affect the coherence of any argument in this chapter, since the 
intention is not to strictly correlate specific developments at specific time points but 
rather to locate deeper and wider changes in imprisonment as opposed to the current 
reality.     
This chapter following the analytical framework as explained in the 
previous part of the research will employ a tripartite analysis. In an attempt to 
account for the actual role of the State in imprisonment in each era, its description 
will be followed by an analysis of the cognate socio-political, ideological and finally 
economic developments that dictate the relevant transformations in imprisonment. In 
terms of the retrospection a brief mentioning to the medieval times will be followed 
by early modernity. Modernity as such will follow up to year 1877 and the important 
changes taking place at that time point. Finally, there will be a brief description of 
the changes brought in prison system by the Criminal Justice Act 1991. The focus 
will be on Britain but with some substantial parallelisms with developments in the 
rest of Europe. It should be noted, though, that the purpose of this chapter is not to 
provide a detailed historical analysis which means that the juxtaposition of facts and 
linkages between them refer to the average image of the punitive field in each period 
according to the available sources. Hence, it’s understandable that there will be some 





The aforementioned problem of defining eras in chronological limits puts in 
this case possibly biggest constraints. Conventionally, medieval times in Britain 
usually refer to the period between the Anglo-Saxon conquest and the reformation 
parliament in 1529398. Practically, however, continuous written documentation of 
British criminal justice exists since the 12th century. Aside this issue, in this period, 
it’s perceived that imprisonment was not punitive since this kind of incarceration is 
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rather an invention of modernity. Although admittedly present in criminal justice 
systems as early as the Roman ages, it is believed that imprisonment had mostly a 
pre-trial detention purpose for suspected offenders to secure their presence in trial399. 
Different bibliographical sources, though, without reversing this image, reveal that 
punitive imprisonment was more frequent than assumed400. For example, in England 
and Wales pre-trial detention was not fixed and could last for several years. As a 
result, irrespective of guilt or innocence of the suspected offender, the years spent 
waiting for a trial could be decided as sufficient punishment401. On the other hand the 
Saxon tradition of compensation regarding offences of lower significance (Wergeld 
in German or Wergild in old English) was present and widespread at least in early 
medieval ages402. When the corporal punishment gained ground at the expense of 
compensation later in the same period, punitive imprisonment was suggested for 
juvenile thieves, abuse of legal process, or breach of oath. Additionally, 
imprisonment is suggested as the appropriate punishment for new statutory offences 
such as wrongful taking of goods from wrecked ships, spreading seditious slanders, 
suspected felony, for felonious clergymen or for civil debtors403. On the other hand, 
corporal punishment remains for crimes with the status of felony. Hence, it seems 
that punitive imprisonment was not uncommon in medieval ages. 
It would have been apparently difficult to retrieve specific figures for the 
number of carceral institutions or the number of their inmates irrespective of how 
much the scope of such research is restricted. A classification of those institutions 
could be demonstrated, instead. General instructions issued between 1165 and 1166 
stipulated that gaols should be built in every county; it should not be assumed, 
though, that county gaols didn’t exist before that ordinance404. County gaols were 
under the control of local sheriffs who were appointed by the King. The actual 
administration of prisons was in the hands of gaolers. They were either tenants in 
sergeanty or common gaolers. In the first case they were noblemen who had also 
                                                 
399 See for example D. Melossi 2008, p. 20, L. Fox and C. Dobb in S. McConville 1981, p. 2, S. & B. 
Webb 1963, p. 4 and D. Howard 1960, p. 4. 
400 R. Purgh 1968 pp 2-47 for a detailed analysis and especially pp 16-17. Purgh mentions that the 
assertion of King Edward I (1272) marks a substantial increase of punitive imprisonment.  
401 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 6 and B. Hanawalt at the same.   
402 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 7 and D. Melossi 2008, p. 22. 
403 C. Harding et al. 1985, pp 7-10. 
404 R. Purgh 1968, p. 58 and G. Ives 1914, p. 10. 
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hereditary rights on the custodial powers of the specific prison. In the second case, 
common gaolers were appointed initially by the sheriff. Nevertheless, the sheriff 
soon lost this right due to gradual concentration of powers to the central (royal) 
administration. Thus, the appointment of gaolership since mid-13th century was made 
by the Crown by breaching statutes stating explicitly that sheriffs should not be 
deprived from this right. In those cases gaolers used to be former (low rank) royal 
officials or civil servants405.    
A different case was that of franchisal prisons. Some jurisdictional powers 
have been delegated to local landowners by the King. They included the 
apprehension of the offender, the arrangement of trial, sentencing and execution of 
the punishment. Therefore, the appointment of the gaoler was in that case in their 
hands. It should be mentioned, though, that franchisal prisons were not considered as 
outside of the royal justice system. This institution gradually deteriorated because of 
the increasing uniformity of criminal justice administration. Franchisal prisons seem 
to be the development of a similar institution, namely the jurisdictional powers of 
feudal lordship, across Europe. The lord had the right amongst else to imprison serfs 
who breached rules of the manor. Although the latter disappeared because of the 
abolition of serfdom, few franchisal prisons remained as late as the 19th century. 
Finally carceral institutions were also administered by local bishops. They were 
holding non felonious clergymen responsible for either secular or ecclesiastical 
wrongdoing. Monasteries also reserved rooms to immure errant monks406.   
In terms of financing, the Crown had the burden of constructing and 
repairing the gaols either directly or through the sheriffs. The same applies to 
franchisees for the relevant prisons. Gaolers were usually paid directly from the 
prisoners for their release or the provision of basic catering and other services. On 
some occasions, though, the gaoler received a fee from the Crown407. In return they 
were responsible for safekeeping the inmates. If the convicted person didn’t have 
                                                 
405 C. Harding et al. 1985, pp 17-20 and R. Purgh 1968, pp 140-152. Their rights were sometimes 
inheritable and transferable. See for example S. McConville 1981, p. 12. 
406 C. Harding et al. 1985, pp 17-20. R. Purgh 1968 adds the municipal prisons administered by 
sheriffs (or the mayors in some occasions).   
407 S. McConville, 1981, p. 10 and R. Purgh 1968, p. 140. In the cases where the gaoler was tenant in 
sergeanty the fee was in the form of land. 
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personal assets, he/she was supported by relatives. In this framework, charities 
played also a crucial role408.   
The identification of the role of the State in this context is illustrated prima 
facie in its absence. The basic feature of the abovementioned administrative 
framework is the delegation of powers to actors that today would be described as 
privateers. Only Sheriffs seem to be connected somehow with the central 
administration. Gaolers, landowners, lords and bishops are closer to what today 
would be part of the private sector. At the same time, however, the central 
administration gradually concentrates the previously delegated powers. This takes 
the form either of central appointment of gaolers or of circumscription of the specific 
rights and obligations regarding the interfering actors409. 
It should be noted, though, that the use of the notions “privateers” or 
“private sector” as mentioned above is problematic. They both require an existing 
separation between Civil Society and central administration. In those times, however, 
the division between State and Civil Society, namely between the public and the 
private sphere, was not clear; there was significant overlapping, instead. More 
specifically, the division of labour – what structures the internal and external limits 
of the Civil Society - was based on relationships of “natural” character; something 
which was giving them a substantial public status410. The social status (for example 
kingship, gentry or serfdom) was hereditary instead of acquirable as in the case of the 
modern years. Especially the status of administrative elites required either land 
ownership (hence hereditary too) or higher education. The latter was rather 
expensive, since even achieving simple literacy required spending substantial amount 
of money. Given that the dominant Mode of Production of the era - feudalism – was 
based on land as means of production, the primary source of wealth was again land 
ownership. Higher education, therefore, doesn’t seem to occur in abstracto but being 
exactly the result of the Mode of Production. The division of labour in the medieval 
society as a result is firmly circumscribed in advance; something which mantles 
social relationships with public status. Not only the reproduction of classes but also – 
                                                 
408 C. Harding et al. 1985, pp 26-30. 
409 For example since Henry’s III middle years the delivery of franchisal gaols had been hold by the 
same way county gaols were delivered. His successor Edward I further restraint the powers of 
franchisal prisons. R. Purgh 1968 p. 93. 
410 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 48. 
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and more importantly in this research – class practices are expected to function in a 
specific and well known way. This is exactly why what is understood today as 
private sphere is actually part of the public one. In the ideological field, personal, 
political and economic relationships in order to accommodate their “natural” 
character, they are presented as forming a “sacred hierarchy”.  
Following the previous analyses, the political level in the feudal society is 
not vested with autonomy as in the case of capitalist Social Formations because a 
person’s existence in the community coincides with its function in an economic total 
(royal family, gentry or serfs). The person is not the individual of the Capitalist 
Mode of Production who “deliberately sells” his/her labour power for a wage but 
somebody who is obliged to function in a specific way according to the position 
he/she inherited in the “sacred hierarchy”. Accordingly, the Royal family and the 
totals of gentry or the serfs apart from constituting classes, they also form political 
casts which prevent any movement between them. Consequently, the State – as 
incorporation of the public sphere – is associated with the specific structure of the 
Social Formation by validating the social hierarchy “as it is”. In the sense of public 
power, the State reproduces and protects exactly this specific inflexible class 
separation411. Thus, it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to conclude that the totality of 
social relations are included in the limits of the State and the opposite, namely that 
the totality of social relations constitutes what is the State in medieval ages.  
By bringing the specific features of imprisonment under the light of the 
previous understanding of the Social Formation, it could be seen that the State is not 
at all absent but rather the most important actor in imprisonment. The delegation of 
the power to imprison in privateers is a misnomer since the private sphere is absent. 
The State by embodying the public sphere is omnipresent in the social relations. In 
practical terms, that means that the “privateers” have the power to imprison because 
                                                 
411 N. Poulantzas 1984, p. 48 et seq. The previous analyses over the organically present violence in the 
relations of production in the framework of the feudal Mode of Production might be helpful at this 
point. Violence constitutes substantial part of those relations in order to allow the extraction of the 
product in favour of the owners of the means of production (see ibidem footnote 234). The fact that 
violence is not “naked” from its non-political dimension but directly linked to it doesn’t obscure the 
argument brought forward here but completes it. Violence is able to be directed and applied in a 
hierarchically descending line of social classes exactly because class separation has public status and 
the State has a direct and organic role in both class reproduction and violence application. In other 
words, the fact that violence is not directed from a State deemed as beyond class (as in the case of 




their personal status, which also reflects their economic, political and de facto 
powers, is associated with the public status of their position in the labour division. In 
other words they constitute the medieval analogy of the contemporary State 
Personnel as every person in that society did. In the ideological level, given that 
those power relations are pronounced and established through the “sacred hierarchy” 
of social stratification, there is no specific theory behind the interference of the State 
in imprisonment, other than the general that runs through the Mode of Production; in 
other words the idea that there is a natural inequality embedded in the human nature. 
The role of the State, however, is further illuminated in the way that gaols were 
financed. The profits from the provision of catering reproduced the reason for which 
the gaoler was appointed in the first place. In other words, the profits from the 
custodial services reproduced the economic as well as the socio-political status of 
their holder; the same public status that allowed him to be appointed with the 
gaolership. In this framework, the role of the State in imprisonment should be seen as 
part of its role in class reproduction. 
The second feature of the State’s interference in imprisonment, namely the 
gradual concentration of powers to the upper levels of the administration, reveals the 
slow passage to modernity. The political significance of the centralisation of powers 
and the correlated economical developments will be approached in detail in the next 





Before, the analysis of the early modern period, a special reference should 
be made for the period comprised by the Elizabethan (1558-1603), Jacobean (1603-
1625) and Caroline reigns (1625 – 1642) up to the end of the civil war and the 
subsequent restoration (1660). According to the previous arbitrary periodisation they 
constitute part of the early modern period; there is, however, a significant 
penological experimental breakthrough which lasted more than a century between 
1553 and 1660412. The establishment of Bridewell in London and of Houses of 
correction round the same period in other cities marks not only a different 
                                                 
412 S. McConville 1981, p. 39. 
180   A Retrospection of the Role of the State in Imprisonment 
 
penological ideology but also a different method of administration. It’s, however, the 
discontinuance of the scheme which makes it distinctive for the period in question 
and requires a separate observation.  
The increase of citizen mobility due to the decline of feudalism, the 
increase of population and the introduction of new agricultural techniques created a 
new class of landless labour vulnerable to job availability and wage rates. As a 
consequence, vagrancy and beggary increased significantly413.  Various methods to 
deal with this phenomenon having failed414, the Royal Palace at Bridewell was 
provided by Edward VI to house an institution for the treatment of vagrants. The 
nature of the treatment was both punitive and welfarist. Thus, children and younger 
inmates were receiving some education while older offenders were sent to work (e.g. 
beating hemp). Soon after Bridewell, other cities followed suit even before the 
establishment of houses of corrections be suggested in every county by an act of 
1575415. Their character, though, started being modified by 1609 and definitely after 
1630. An act of that year ordered the establishment of houses of correction next to 
gaols. The result was practically their administrative unification416. After the end of 
the civil war they served as cheap custodial punishment for minor offenders417.   
One of the fundamental principles of houses of correction was the end of 
the profit-based custodial system418. Therefore, it was initially planned that the 
scheme would be financed by the inmates’ labour. In practice, however, this source 
of income was only a part of the overall revenues. The rest were coming from the 
local authorities which levied special taxation on local inhabitants419. This allowed 
the staff to be salaried from external sources instead of the inmates. A minimum 
amount of fees were actually taken from inmates but keepers didn’t rely on them for 
their livelihood. In any case, the financial situation of the inmates didn’t allow for 
wider extortions420.  
                                                 
413 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 66 and C. Hill 1940, p. 13. 
414 For example alms giving, licensing beggars etc. C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 68. 
415 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 69. Houses of correction became compulsory for every county in 1609. 
416 S. McConville 1981, p. 45 and C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 72. 
417 S. McConville 1981, pp 44 and 47. 
418 S. McConville 1981, p. 33. 
419 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 68. 
420 S. McConville 1981, pp 37 and 43 and C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 69. 
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In terms of administration the City Council of London was appointing a 
corporation of 66 governors comprised by aldermen and “grave commoners”. They 
were drawn after elections for biennial inspectorship. In each appointment only half 
of the governors’ body was changed to allow continuity in their service. The 
governors had under their inspection not only the Bridewell but also the four 
hospitals of London city. Apart from some pure functional roles (president, treasurer 
etc.) the rest of the governors had departmental responsibilities related to their 
interests and expertise; for example, the nail-house of the Bridewell was run by an 
ironmonger. Audits and inspections were undertaken by the governors to ensure staff 
compliance and prevention of corruption. The real administrative breakthrough, 
however, lies with the fact that governors were collectively responsible for payments 
and accounts. They checked and rechecked each other and according to the 
regulations every payment should be done under the consent of at least six governors 
two of which should be aldermen. The honorary character of this position was 
underlined by the fact that interested citizens, in their nomination for the City 
Council, should prove that they didn’t have any economical interest but their 
application was solely on altruistic grounds. It seems, however, that in the pursuit of 
such a position the applicants had actually personal interests but other than financial 
since almost all lord mayors of London and the majority of high rank public officials 
had been governors at some point. Outside London, houses of correction didn’t have 
the same complex structure. Hence, the governors were substitute by a keeper 
(Bailie) who had general administrative duties and was salaried by the City 
Council421.  
As shown from the previous description, in contrast with gaols, the 
interference of the State was unquestionable. Both in terms of their establishment and 
of their function, the State either through the municipal authorities or through the 
Sheriffs and Justices of the Peace was the main regulator. What should be more 
thoroughly analysed then is the exact nature of that interference. In addition to that, it 
must be stressed that not only the emergence of the new penological experiment but 
also its transience poses some important questions. Therefore, the role of the State 
                                                 
421 S. McConville 1981, pp 33-42 for a detailed presentation.  
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should be seen not only regarding the establishment of the houses of correction but 
also in reference to their practical disappearance.  
From a political point of view houses of correction was an invention of the 
Elizabethan era (although Bridewell was introduced by Edward VI, few years before 
he dies). Elizabethan social policy was essentially conservative emphasizing stability 
and integration422; on the other hand Stuart social policy encompassed the same aims 
although partly influenced by puritan Protestantism423. Houses of correction worked 
towards the integration end and against the will of the emerging middle classes 
which adopted more puritan understanding of poverty424. In this framework, Privy 
Council became a crucial instrument of governance. It established an administrative 
hierarchy by which effectively controlled Sheriffs and Justices of Peace towards 
obedience to the letter and the spirit of legislation425. The “vigilant” Privy Council 
was also one of the reasons for the civil war; this is why the end of it (1660) marks 
not only the end of a specific administrative architecture but also the end of a specific 
social policy426.   
From an ideological point of view it has been already mentioned that 
Elizabethan social policy used houses of correction as a means of integrative reaction 
towards the rising numbers of vagrants and beggars. One can assume that the 
existing experience with the appointment of gaolers from public local authorities 
(Sheriffs, City Councils etc.), highly connected with extortion, would not serve the 
aim of conservative integration. Therefore, the penological breakthrough presents a 
distinctive perceptional differentiation with the previous experiences427. More 
specifically, the sound auditing methods of houses of correction and the transparency 
                                                 
422 S. McConville 1981, p. 23 “Bridewell and the other houses of correction arose from and were an 
integral part of broader Tudor social policy; and this policy was conservative. The enemies of the 
Privy Council were disorder and the restless appetites which since they led to encroachment of class 
on class, were thought to provoke it…their aim was to crystallize existing class relationships by 
submitting them to the pressure, at once restrictive and protective of a paternal government, vigilant to 
detect all movements which menaced the established order, and alert to suppress them. This search for 
stability engendered wide-ranging social and economic legislation extending from the regulation of 
prices and labour to the relief of distress and the suppression and reform of the idle and dissolute. This 
was a corporatist society: there was little social anonymity; everyone had a place and a duty to which, 
for the common good, the powers – secular and sacred – strove to keep them”. 
423 S. McConville 1981, p. 45 and C. Hill 1940, p. 28. 
424 See for example Baxter in C. Hill 1940, p. 10. 
425 S. McConville 1981, p. 44 and C. Hill 1940, p. 31. 
426 S. McConville 1981, p. 47. 
427 S. McConville 1981, p. 34. 
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in their function served the ideological legitimisation of integrative social policy in a 
period in which the puritan approaches of social policy by the emerging middle 
classes would view poverty as a crime to be punished rather to be sympathised428. 
Houses of correction, however, should not be seen outside the wider socio-political 
environment of the era. The need to legitimize the interference of the central 
government echoes also the need to legitimize the conservative monarchy against the 
progressivist gentry and the rich middle class that demanded further political 
powers429. From an institutional point of view again, the ideological prevalence of 
those classes could also be the background for the abolition of the reformative 
character of houses of correction. The prevalence of Puritanism during the Jacobean 
and Carolinian reigns leaned towards viewing crime as moral failing instead of 
misfortune. Especially the able-bodied poor should be punished as criminals430.   
In economic terms, the role of the State in establishing and maintaining the 
houses of corrections is obvious. As described above, the extensive support from the 
City Council in the case of Bridewell, the imposition of a special taxation, the fixed 
salaries of the personnel are illustrative of governmental interference. The economic 
reasons, however, that explain the decline of this penological innovation should be 
looked in the causes of the civil war. The conflict among the emerging middle 
classes and the King prevented the constitution of the parliament which was 
comprised by exactly those higher classes. Given that the parliament was only an 
advisory body with no decisive character, the middle classes along with progressivist 
gentry claimed further political power than what were given by the outmoded 
medieval administrative system431. The State depending on the parliament for tax 
collection, the public revenues suffered wide diminution. Hence, one of the first 
“victims” of this situation was social policy itself432. This development is the reverse 
illustration of the strong dependency of houses of correction from State interference.  
                                                 
428 That the London City leaders had not fully adopted the reformatory perception on poverty as the 
middle classes had is seen in McConville. They were moving between medieval and modern social 
thought. They sought to relieve the poor but by means which would at the same time discipline and 
coerce them (S. McConville 1981, p. 27). 
429 C. Hill 1940, pp 14-15. 
430 S. McConville 1981, pp 45-46. 
431 C. Hill 1940, p. 13 et seq. 
432 S. McConville 1981, p. 47. 
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The role of the State in the penological experiment of Bridewells goes 
beyond an institutional perspective. Their establishment could be attributed to a 
change of approach towards poor relief, but also – and more importantly – to the 
struggle of the emerging capitalist classes against the conservative monarchy for 
more political powers433. The newly arisen and gradually dominating Capitalist 
Mode of Production allows the use of pertinent terminology as well as understanding 
the breakthrough and consequent abandonment of the houses of correction in social 
struggle terms. In other words, houses of correction as State Apparatus became a 
locus of power and moreover a point in which the class struggle was concentrated. 
The specific development of the capitalist production of the period determined the 
interests at stake from both sides of the conflict. More specifically wealth 
accumulation is not based yet upon production process as exemplified by the 
Marxian manufacture capitalism but on merchandise434. Therefore, the emerging 
classes do not depend upon numbers of labourers for the production of value neither 
upon their disciplined work in a factory environment. The persecution of vagrancy 
and beggary is attributed to their interest in wider societal peace to allow 
unobstructed merchandising. This further explains their intention to punish in the 
sense of deterrence this social nuisance without any integrationist view for the future 
of those people. The Privy Council and the aristocracy, on the other side, in their 
struggle to retain their powers they are also obliged to preserve the relevant class 
reproduction and to deal with the consequences of the new Mode of Production in 
the field of human resources, namely the landless and unemployed beggars and 
vagrants. Houses of correction are directed towards this specific goal, namely, 
integrating the new underclass in the old set of relatively inflexible social 
relationships. Accordingly, the institutional unification of houses of correction and 
gaols as well as the loss of reformative character after the end of the civil war435 
prove not only the class struggle character in the conflict over this penological 




                                                 
433 C. Hill 1940, p. 6. 
434 See also ibidem p. 104. 





Following the previous arbitrary periodisation, early modernity could be 
delimited round 1500 and 1750. The reason is that the notions of rationality, State 
constitution and criminal justice theories that flourished during the 17th century 
became influential enough to turn to particular policies after 1764436. Therefore, the 
mid-18th century marks a point where modernity ceases to be merely an ideological 
trend but is also actively promoted as official State policy. This schema already 
implies the basic characteristic of early modernity. It should not be seen as an era 
with clearly defined policies or dominant ideologies in criminal justice. It is rather a 
prolonged period during which the social and ideological fermentation prepares the 
breakthrough of modernity.    
The same case could be seen in a general overview of the use of 
imprisonment. The lack of apparent developments in comparison with medieval ages 
in the organisational structure of gaols –the visible part of punishment that is - covers 
significant changes of State interference in ideological and financial levels – the non-
visible part. Before anything else, however, the frequency and role of imprisonment 
should be addressed. It again serves mainly custodial and coercive goals (for 
example for civil debtors). After 1660 in Britain capitally punishable offences 
substantially increase, the actual executions, however, decrease. This seems to reflect 
a wider European tendency for more punitive legislations. Additionally, military 
service and transportation appear as alternatives to imprisonment. Nevertheless, as in 
the medieval times, punitive punishment was not unknown nay less frequent. The 
same reasons as in the previous period apply here as well; in addition to them, the 
abuse of clergyable offences, imprisonment for political and religious causes and the 
general unwillingness of the jury to impose death sentence should be mentioned437.  
The categorisation of prison institutions remains unchanged from the 
medieval times. County gaols, municipal, franchise and ecclesiastical prisons 
constitute the possible destinations where an imprisonment sentence could be served. 
Starting from the two last variations, it should be noted that living conditions were 
                                                 
436 As a matter of fact, Hobbes published “Leviathan” in 1651and Locke published the “Two treatises 
of government” in 1689. On the other hand the policy-wise influential Dei delitti e delle pene was 
published by Beccaria in 1764 or the Panopticon by Bentham in 1787. 
437 C. Harding et al. 1985, pp 57-60 and 76-83. 
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worse than the average county gaol. Inspections were not frequent and, as suggested, 
that corresponds to the general need of protecting the interests of the individuals who 
controlled them. As a matter of fact many new statutes regarding the organisation of 
gaols expressly excluded franchise gaols from their scope438. One can assume that 
their presence reflects the survival of feudal lordship and of the de facto power of 
church as in the medieval ages and this is illustrative of the aforementioned character 
of early modernity as a mezzanine period which follows to a degree the medieval 
mindset. Hence, the public status of gentry and the political consequences of it (e.g. 
franchise gaols) remain unchanged. This might be an acceptable explanation but it 
would have been over-simplistic to fully rely on it given the political context of the 
era. It is true that the emerging middle classes along with part of the progressivist 
gentry invested their wealth to land ownership and to new ways of agricultural 
production (e.g. leasing the use of land)439. Their covert or overt (in the case of the 
Civil War) confrontation with the Crown created in the political level landowners of 
“two speeds”. Given that franchise gaols had the status of privilege granted by the 
King440, it would be rather strange for the Crown to further diminish the State’s 
central administration in favour of hostile parts of the society. At the same time the 
fact that franchise prisons were exactly seen as concessions brings them under the 
light of hegemonic strategy which practically means that they were a means of 
building a supportive power bloc around the Crown. Nevertheless, those concessions 
do not come alone but they are vested with the concept of social relationship 
incorporating the public status as described before. The same could be written in an 
analogy for ecclesiastical prisons441. Regarding municipal gaols, most towns and 
                                                 
438 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 84. 
439 C. Hill 1940, chapter 2.  
440 R. Purgh 1968, p. 89. 
441 In an interesting passage Hill mentions that “Bishops and priests were far more like civil servants, 
part of the government’s administrative machine, than they are at present; and the first to recognise 
this fact were the ecclesiastics themselves […] Church, then, defended the existing order, and it was 
important for the Government to maintain its control over this publicity and propaganda agency. For 
the same reason, those who wanted to overthrow the feudal State had to attack and seize control of the 
Church. That is why political theories tended to get wrapped up in religious language” (C. Hill 1940, 
pp 8-9). It could be assumed then that the status of Ideological Apparatus of the State for the Church 
was much more overt by that time in comparison with the more subtle character of the later years. At 
the same time the status of the civil servant for the ecclesiastical administration illustrates the status of 




boroughs had a gaol or a lock-up442. Unlike franchise and ecclesiastical gaols, the 
public character of their administration is unquestionable. In the framework of a 
weak State, city councils had the role of local governments with powers to shape in a 
way the criminal justice system. Their varying degree of autonomy from the central 
government doesn’t seem to play any substantial role since the former were the 
alternative images of the latter; they both represented views of the State. 
County gaols constitute probably the most interesting variation of carceral 
institutions in the framework of this section, since they were subject to the direct 
control of central administration. As previously mentioned, initially the general 
responsibility for their erection, maintenance and gaoler appointment was in the 
hands of the Sheriff. Nevertheless, this gradually changed during early modernity 
since their powers were diminishing in favour of the Justices of Peace. At the same 
time the Crown was effectively manipulating the ad hoc developments whenever that 
was needed443.  
In all of the previous cases the interference of the State is apparent444. The 
most important aspect of it is that gaols were – in theory - subject to rudimentary 
control by the State or local authorities445. A question, however, remains on whether 
the State could claim not just administrative interference but absolute competence in 
those prisons. Before any conclusion the issue of gaolership should be reviewed. As 
in the medieval times, the actual administration of gaols was in the hands of gaolers 
(or keepers). Their appointment was dependent on the person or the public body that 
had the responsibility for the prison in question; in other words the sheriff, the City 
Council, the Bishop or the franchisee. There were, however, significant exemptions 
where in larger gaols the appointment of the gaoler was subject to royal patronage. 
The post of the gaoler was also subject to transactions and hereditary succession. In 
                                                 
442 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 84. 
443 S. McConville 1981, p. 6 and C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 84. 
444 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 101 notes that “there was at this time only a limited function for the State 
and interference with gaolers’ activities was seen as being wrong in principle and expensive in 
practice”. That would be partly true as far as the State coincides with central government. The 
question arising, however, is to what extent could the local authorities or the publicly established 
social stratification between gentry and ‘common gravers’ be exempted when they equally influenced 
developments in the public sphere. The issue in question is the perfect example of a process which 
produces results firmly attached to the public sphere (imprisonment) and in which local governance 
(for municipal prisons) and noble landowners (for franchise prisons), namely public actors other than 
the Crown (central government), had decisive role.   
445 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 86 et seq. 
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most of the cases, not even the gaoler had actual role within the facility. He was 
supposed to live there but the day-to-day routine was in the hands of turnkeys and 
porters. Gaols were self-financed in the sense that gaolers and their subordinates 
were paid by inmates for the provision of basic catering or through extortions (e.g. 
relieving from fetters). If the administrative role of the State in county, municipal, 
franchise and ecclesiastical gaols is apparent, the question arising is if the day-to-day 
administration of the institution itself and more specifically the issue of fee-taking 
could reverse this image. In other words, irrespective of the higher and middle level 
public administration, could the gaolers’ functions bring into consideration a 
potential concept of privatisation? Should gaolers be seen as entrepreneurs?  
As with the analysis of the prison system in medieval ages, imprisonment 
should not be seen outside the contemporary socio-economic context. In early 
modernity, the argument of the lack of private sphere is not fully valid. Capitalist 
Mode of Production has already appeared in Britain especially in the second half of 
the 16th century446. Thus, in the relevant power relations the existence of private 
sphere could not be denied. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to project current 
phenomena to the past; the connection between fee-taking and relations or 
transactions of the private sphere is a modern association. The weak State of the 
medieval and early modern era had to rely on petty officials who retrieved their 
salary from fees (e.g. constables, coroners etc.). The State didn’t have the means to 
pay for service provision. Imprisonment could not stand out of this “rule”447. At the 
same time perceiving a whole array of services as privately provided or corrupted448 
because of fee-taking would be equally mistaken449. Specifically on the 
                                                 
446 See for example C. Hill 1940, chapter 2. 
447 S. McConville 1981, p. 10, pp 68-69 and p. 72. See also an analogy with prison space in R. Purgh 
1968, p. 97. 
448 See for example S. McConville 1981, p. 8. He asserts that prisons should not be perceived as more 
corrupted than other services of the period. This is also a questionable view since it generalizes the 
image of corruption. Those notions are defined through their contrast to the socially accepted idea of 
transparency. By that time, however, fee-taking was both accepted and predictable as the ratification 
by Justices reveals.  
449 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 101 when referring to reform attempts during the 18th century quotes that  
“as the House of Lords commented when refusing to pass a bill to reduce overcrowding in the King’s 
Bench prison any diminution in the number of inmates would lead to a situation where the profits 
thereby accruing will not be a proportional recompense to the officers to attend the courts so that the 
King’s four courts at Westminster will be without prisoners and without officers to assist them”. It 
could be assumed then that self-financing was substantial to the existence of the whole criminal 
justice system. By extending, however, the association between fee-taking and privatisation would 
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reimbursement of gaolership, although fees varied from gaol to gaol, the specific 
amount rested on local custom which was ratified by Justices of Peace450. This is 
exactly an indication of the official character of charging inmates. 
From the previous analysis, it seems that the State either as central 
government, as local authorities or as publicly established social stratification (in the 
case of franchise and ecclesiastical prisons) not only interferes in the process of 
imprisonment but is the only actor in it. In this era the notable development lies with 
the dispersal of powers to multiple governmental actors451. Therefore, a deeper 
analysis of State’s interference in imprisonment should primarily deal with that issue. 
The political significance of the dispersal of powers should be sought in the 
emergence of the new Mode of Production and consequently in the corresponding 
classes. The alteration of the previous societal equilibrium is overturned but not 
without the resistance of the feudal structure of the society. The developments in the 
criminal justice of the period show exactly that case. As a matter of fact, although the 
general tendency since Henry III’s reign had been to incorporate jurisdictional 
powers to the central administration, some poles in the public sphere retained their 
rights452. Therefore, the slow and painful process of “the old that is dying and the 
new one that cannot yet be born”, as the case of the Civil War showed, is the catalyst 
according to which the diversification between the parties that are granted with the 
power to hold a gaol should be seen. Before anything else, a central issue should be 
noted. Punishment of crime – either harsh or not – was viewed as prerequisite for 
social order. The weaknesses of policing and therefore the speculation of no 
apprehension by criminals provided no other choice to criminal justice policy but 
focus on general deterrence453. Imprisonment, therefore, played a crucial and central 
role in the criminal justice of a very turbulent period.  
What lies at the heart of an attempt to explore the dispersal in question is 
the already mentioned hegemonic strategy of the Crown. Starting from the Church, it 
                                                                                                                                          
lead to the rather exaggerating argument that the totality of judicial processes had been under private 
control.      
450 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 88 and S. McConville 1981, p. 18 where states that the Crown sought to 
control the fees in national prisons. 
451 Trevelyan in S. McConville 1981, p. 63 regards for example Justices and municipalities as actively 
autonomous and the actual policy makers due to the notorious weakness of the Executive government.  
452 See for example R. Purgh 1968, p. 93. 
453 C. Harding et al. 1985, pp 60-63. 
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should be mentioned that it exemplifies the connection between support to the Crown 
and concessions directed from it. Bishops retained many privileges and among them 
the administration of ecclesiastical prisons because during the turmoil of the later 
Tudor and early Stuart State, the established hierarchy of the Church had been 
strongly supporting the conservative policies454. It should be reminded that Church 
being an Ideological State Apparatus – possibly the strongest of that period – it 
became itself a locus of conflict between the rivalling parties. The clash between 
Puritans and the Church of England condenses in the ideological level the class 
struggle that was taking place in the wider society. The case of franchise gaols 
should be seen under the same terms. Land ownership itself was not enough anymore 
from the entitlement of privileges exactly because the emerging middle classes and 
competitive towards the royal prerogative tended to invest their profits in land. The 
symbolic concession of franchise prisons which offers patronage and prestige455 has 
been restricted to the royalists; something that turned them essentially to part of the 
State administration as explained before. City Councils turned to be another field of 
conflict. The emerging middle classes managed to contribute extensively in the 
direction of their policies especially after the Civil War. Their organisational 
structure, however, secured throughout the largest part of the period into 
consideration that conservative policies at important topics would be followed at the 
last instance since the council of Aldermen (consisted by gentry) was playing the 
major role456. Thus, the distribution of imprisoning rights among the different 
competitors of political power is a paradigm of the hegemonic strategy of the Crown. 
Concession of principles had been possible under the prerequisite of accepting the 
policies represented by the royal domination in contrast with the actors who 
questioned it. In cases that the class struggle had constituted such fractionist policy 
impossible, as in the case of City Councils, where the Crown had to compromise 
with the emerging classes, a royalist control at the last instance had been established.   
The ideological role of the dispersal of imprisoning powers among poles of 
the public sphere could already be drawn from the previous conclusion. The 
                                                 
454 C. Hill 1940, pp 4 and 7-9. 
455 R. Purgh 1968, p. 97. 
456 See for example the right of “negative voice” in cases of dispute between the Court of Aldermen 
and the Court of Common Council in P. Withington 2005, pp 192-193.  
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administration of a gaol by a party other than the central government was not only 
based upon the acceptance of the de facto political power of the Crown but on the 
ideological as well. Understanding that every prison “belongs to the King”457 and 
therefore viewing any other kind of administration as concession, requires the 
acceptance of the symbolic supremacy of royal governance. Thus, the royal 
administration could reaffirm its dominant role in a period in which it was disputed - 
before the Civil War - and gradually depleted – after 1660. The slow passage to 
Capitalist Mode of Production makes the need for an all-encompassing ideology 
apparent. In an over-simplistic but still helpful comparison, one could assume that 
the modern ‘general interest’ is the early modern loyalty to the King not as a person 
but as a concept. Nevertheless, all these complex organisational structures would be 
superfluous if the central government actually possessed the administration of gaols. 
As had already been mentioned, though, the State lacked the financial ability to 
control the carceral institutions458. In a society that slowly moves away from feudal 
organisation, with no sophisticated monetaristic structure459, widespread poverty and 
problematic tax collection system as mentioned above and often wars or 
skirmishes460, judicial or social policy wouldn’t be the main concerns. This is exactly 





As previously mentioned, the middle years of the 18th century remark a 
change in penology since the developments in theory became influential in actual 
policies. The “pick” of this process could be found in 1877 and the wholesale 
transfer of the prison system from peripheral poles to the central government. It 
should not be assumed, though, that the transfer in question was an automatic process 
triggered by an Act. The depletion of imprisoning powers of peripheral 
administrative poles in favour of the central government was rather the general 
                                                 
457 S. McConville 1981, p. 11.  
458 See also C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 97. 
459 See for example C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 79. 
460 See for example the Anglo-Spanish war (1585-1604), the 30years war (1618-1648), the Civil War 
(1642-1660), Anglo-Dutch wars (1650-1674), nine years war (1688-1697), war of the Spanish 
succession (1701-1714) etc.   
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characteristic of that period461. The other trend was the increased punitiveness 
especially after the 1770s. For various reasons the number of indictments 
substantially rose exerting pressure to the criminal justice system. The result was a 
change of mindset regarding the role of central administration. On the one hand, the 
criminal law ceased to be a rare intervention in the normal proceedings of social life 
and became a regular means of social control. On the other hand, central government 
took over the responsibility of it from other actors of the public sphere (employers, 
socially superior classes or simply victims). The practical consequence of this 
process was the reformation of the criminal justice system with new prisons, modern 
police and more effective proceedings462. 
A building program for new prisons during the period in question was 
accompanied by legislative activity. It started with the Discharged Prisoners’ Act and 
the Health of Prisoners’ Act both in 1774. The first one promoted the payment of 
acquitted prisoners’ fees in order to be released463 and the second included some 
provisions on ventilation, cleaning, sick rooms, baths and regular surgeon visit. 
Without directly transferring any powers, those acts revealed the intention of the 
government to regulate prison life. Later the Penitentiary Act of 1779 promoted a 
regime system following the tradition of Houses of Corrections regarding the need 
for reformation and the transparency of administration464. After several unsuccessful 
attempts it was only implemented in 1816 in the case of Millbank Penitentiary. The 
government’s decision to build Millbank was a clear sign that central government 
had accepted a permanent rather than occasional role in prison administration which 
further required developing the relevant bureaucracy as well as national policy465. 
Further later, the Gaol Fees Abolition Act in 1815 sought to change what has been 
viewed as the major concern of reformers since the previous century466.  
                                                 
461 See also S. McConville 1981, p. 88 according to whom the extreme autonomy and decentralisation 
of the early Hanoverian period had waned already from the last quarter of the 18th century.  
462 C. Harding et al. 1985, pp 120-122. 
463 This Act terminated the medieval policy according to which the gaoler should receive fees even for 
releasing the prisoner.   
464 For example officers should be salaried and specific provisions of diet, uniforms etc. protected the 
inmates from any transaction with officers. 
465 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 134 and S. McConville 1981, p. 131. 
466 See for example John Howard, Elizabeth Fry, Sydney Smith et al. Fees were substituted by salaries 
or compensation for lost fees by the Quarter Session Judges. Apart from the abolition of a source of 
abuse, this development had several other consequences. It indirectly forced Judges to interfere with 
prisons, even if it was to ensure that money were well spent. In this framework, Justices begun to 
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Most importantly, though, the Gaol Act 1823 was the first comprehensive 
statement of principle from central government to be applied to local prisons467. It 
promoted developments, already taking place in Millbank penitentiary, throughout 
the country. It included both specific provisions for issues like labour, healthy 
conditions of confinement, inspections etc. and general policy statements like the 
aims and purposes of imprisonment. On the other hand, it also provided fiscal 
assistance by the central government for the application of those reformations. The 
same Act required – in terms of local prisons – the visiting Judges to report to 
Quarter Sessions and to the Secretary of the State. Therefore, central government 
sought to extend its powers not only to the newly built prisons but also to the existing 
structures. Leaving aside the actual implementation of the legislation, the Gaol Act 
1823 was surely a precedent towards extending those powers468.  
During the 1830s select committees urged the need for greater uniformity in 
issues like prison discipline469. Some of their suggestions were incorporated in the 
Gaol Act 1835, the most crucial one being the establishment of a board of inspectors 
who in addition to the visiting justices would refer directly to the secretary of the 
State. The pursuit of uniformity was furthered by the Prison Act 1839 dealing with 
issues on prison discipline470. In 1850 the directorate of convict prisons was 
established to oversee the administration of the increasing governmental involvement 
in prisons. The Directorate as a coherent body of experts with decision making 
powers, helped to consolidate and orientate the general governmental policy, 
amongst else, towards further centralisation of the prison system471. The year 1857 
marked the end of confinement in hulks. Although they comprised prisons, directly 
                                                                                                                                          
firmly establish their powers in gaolership appointment and definitely not based on hereditary rights 
(S. McConville 1981, p. 67). Additionally, it removed any impression of entrepreneurship from prison 
administration in regard to the gaolers; they could now be fully regarded as civil servants. Finally, it 
removed any possible source of institutional independence. Gaol management had to follow the rules 
of the funding body. Of course, fee taking remained as a custom for a period of time, but in this case it 
was a sure sign of corruption and not of policy as in the previous era (S. McConville 1981, p. 224).     
467 D. Howard 1960, p. 53 and C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 143. 
468 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 144 et seq. 
469 S. McConville 1981, p. 170 and D. Howard 1960, p. 59. See for example the 1833 select 
committee on agriculture and the 1835 House of Lords committee. 
470 It should be noted that up to that point, the Gaol Acts extended governmental powers in reference 
to local prisons based on persuasion rather than obligation. Their effectiveness was mixed since some 
of the inspectors’ instructions were consistently rejected. C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 165 and S. 
McConville 1981, pp 250 and 254. Nevertheless, the crucial point is the fact of the gradual depletion 
of imprisoning powers in favour of the central government through institutional means. 
471 See also S. McConville 1981, p. 215.  
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managed by the State, they will not be considered here because they had constantly a 
temporary character; that is, until the issue of transportation was finally settled. On 
the other hand transportation was not imprisonment as such472. In 1863 the 
suggestions by Carnarvon Committee became legislation under Prison Act 1865. 
More specifically, the closure of small local prisons was suggested as well as the 
withdrawal of Treasury funding from local prisons which failed to implement Home 
Office rules. In this row of legislation which furthered the powers of the State in the 
expense of local authorities, the final Act came in 1877 with the wholesale 
nationalisation of the prison system.    
Once again the term used for the 1877 Act might be a misnomer. 
Nationalisation could nowadays imply that previously imprisonment has been out-
sourced. Nevertheless, as with the previous period, the interference of the State in 
imprisonment seems to be unquestionable473. Either through the local authorities 
(municipalities and Quarter Sessions) or through the central government institutions 
(Convict Service and Board of Inspectors), the State has been present in managing 
confinement long before the official centralisation of powers474. The question then 
that needs to be answered is what the leading forces towards this development are. 
Starting again from the political underpinnings in the tripartite analysis, a general 
movement of powers from the local authorities to the centre could be observed. A 
whole array of powers previously appointed to local governance was gradually 
transferred to national institutions, including amongst else the various powers of a 
criminal justice system (policing, imprisoning etc.). The political explanation given 
was that the problems were more complicated than before, exceeding the 
administrative competence of a single authority475. At the same time the problems in 
question exceeded the material capacities of small carceral institutions. This, in 
                                                 
472 See further in S. McConville 1981, pp 105-109 
473 See for example D. Howard 1960, p. 62. 
474 In 1877 there existed a particular administrative duality in the prison system. Next to the local 
prisons under the actual management of Quarter Sessions but with the increasing involvement of 
central government in their regulation, the prison institutions under the Convict Service 
(penitentiaries, new prisons, hulks etc.) were increasing.  
475 See for example in C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 122 and p. 162 the case of the mobility of poor 
classes in connection to social policy and the need for general and uniformed changes of discipline 
respectively. In D. Howard 1960, p. 99 the case of the mobility of criminals. 
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connection to the conservative government’s devotion in cutting rates, lead to a 
reformed prison system that could only apply uniform rules and be efficient476.  
It’s needless to point, that the way this gradual transfer of powers from the 
one administrative pole to the other reveals a change that came through wider 
structural transformations rather than a conscious decision by some officials. It lasted 
more than 150 years which means that a number of governments or high rank 
officials were involved in decision making throughout those years. Most importantly, 
though, the transfer of powers took a specific shape in which; firstly the central 
government created obligations to institutions (general living conditions, special 
provisions, specific type of discipline). Next, the same administrative pole took over 
the obligation of funding the new requirements477, so that finally centralizing the 
whole administration would seem either as a relief from an administrative burden of 
local authorities or as a stage in the normal development of things in public 
administration478. The “commonsensical” character of the previous opinion could be 
seen in an incident of 1854. A case of a prisoner committing suicide because of 
bodily and mental exhaustion as an effect of the separation disciplinary system 
(known as ‘the Birmingham scandal’), aroused the public interest in the prison 
reform discourse and especially in favour of the centralisation of prison 
management479. Nevertheless, the maltreatment of inmates has been a constant and 
conscious custom since the introduction of imprisonment as punishment in the 
criminal justice system480. 
Uniformity in practice is not only politically important but plays a crucial 
ideological role as well. It helped to create a common impression across Britain on 
criminality. More specifically, it helped in creating the popular image of the criminal 
                                                 
476 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 161, S. McConville 1981, p. 473 and D. Howard 1960, p. 101. 
477 S. McConville 1981, p. 256. “The payment by central government of a substantial subsidy towards 
local prison expenses which began simply as a part of more general fiscal reform in the 1830s became 
an increasingly important means of ensuring local compliance with statutory obligations and 
ministerial directions”.  
478 For example by the end of 1830s an increasing number of municipalities waived their rights for 
keeping a prison and preferred using the county gaol or house of correction. In the case of franchise 
prisons the abolition of fee-taking made their economic survival hazardous. Their “official end”, 
however, came earlier than 1877. The Liberties Act of 1850 prohibited the keeping of franchise 
prisons. S. McConville 1981, pp 232-233 and D. Howard 1960, p. 98. 
479 D. Howard 1960, p. 93. 
480 Few years before, in 1838, a case of prisoners’ breakdown in Millbank caused a heated discussion 
in the House of Lords. The public, however, remained rather apathetic. G. Ives 1914, pp 179-180. 
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and his/her origins. The special treatment taking place in penitentiaries, the discourse 
on discipline, the advanced role of inspectors and chaplains and many other features 
of the British prison system promoted a focus on the crime committing person itself. 
In the beginning of the period criminals were associated with radicalised labour 
class. Later on, though, it became clear that not all the members of the labour class 
commit crimes. Therefore, it was associated with a distinctive ‘criminal class’ with 
the subsequent stigmatizing effect481. It can be safely assumed that in a dispersed 
criminal justice system it would be difficult for a general concept on crime and 
criminality to emerge due to the secluded character of institutional practices.  
The consequence of the concept of ‘criminal class’ and its stigmatizing 
effect should be seen in connection with the wider legislative developments of the 
era. The Factory Acts, the legitimisation of trade unions and the widening of 
franchise worked as concessions to the strengthened labour class482. At the same time 
they were a clear sign of the need to smoothly incorporate this class in the system of 
production and avoiding any radicalisation483. In other words concessions worked as 
the carrot in contrast with the stick of criminal justice system. In symbolic terms, the 
incorporated part of the working class was earning the status of the deserving, hard 
working, law-abiding class; while its alienated part was the outcasts, the 
lumpenproletariats, the ‘criminal class’484.  
The economic part in the tripartite analysis has already been implied. The 
main driving force in the centralisation of the prison system (which should be seen as 
part of the development of a modern criminal justice system) was the need for 
smooth operation of the capitalistic Mode of Production. The requirements for 
intervention into social control exceeded the capacities of both local authorities and 
                                                 
481 D. Howard 1960, p. 99. “Miserable distorted blockheads, the generality: ape-faces, imp-faces, 
angry dog-faces, heavy sullen ox-faces; degraded underfoot perverse creatures, sons of indocility, 
greedy mutinous darkness, and in one word, of stupidity, which is the general mother of such” 
Thomas Carlyle in C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 178. 
482 It is suggested that towards the end of the 18th century and because of labour class pessimism due 
to the outcomes of the French revolution, workers became class conscious and more radical. C. 
Harding et al. 1985, p. 124. 
483 At a later point, the prohibition of placing goods manufactured in Prisons at the open market could 
also be considered as conciliation to trade unions and their strictly political demands. D. Howard 
1960, p. 99. 
484 See also C. Harding et al. 1985, p 177-179. 
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private actors485. Furthermore, the way that the production was organized required 
extended mobility towards big cities and between them. That meant that only a 
centralized criminal justice system could accommodate the smooth operation of this 
kind of production, since criminality exceeded the administrative borders of local 
authorities486. The need to integrate the labour classes by differentiating them from 
the criminals also fits in this image since this process was increasing the efficiency of 
production.  
The need to accommodate financial interests within the capitalistic Mode of 
Production could be also seen through the philanthropic movement which acted as a 
prod to the State to take over initiatives in terms of social control. John Howard and 
other reformers were members of those wealthy classes who saw their acts as a 
reaction towards a social malaise. But philanthropy is also a deeply political act since 
– in the case of crime – deals with a phenomenon of the public sphere but at the same 
time it involves a criticism against competent authorities to tackle problems487. From 
another point of view, philanthropy is also an act of authority that creates a 
relationship of dependency between the providers and receivers488. What could be 
suggested then is that philanthropists symbolically paved the way for the State to 
replace them (or simply to materialise their recommendations) and at the same time 
to replace them in the relationship of dependency. In other words, they legitimized 
the centralisation of criminal justice system which as a development was acting in 
favour of the long-term interests of their class.   
The case of the centralisation of imprisoning powers works at the same time 
as exemplar of a process described in previous chapters. The advancement of the 
Capitalist Mode of Production in its ‘manufacture’ period not only needs a State that 
can provide disciplined labour ready to work in the timescale of a factory or offer 
rationality and uniformity in the field of social control. Most importantly it needs a 
State that seems to go beyond classes in order to be able to apply violence “naked” 
from class connotations. The individualisation of the labourer – a process required 
                                                 
485 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 122. S. McConville 1981, p. 226 on municipal prisons. The interference 
of the State to facilitate the way of production in sections were the private capital would be unable or 
unwilling to accommodate is explicitly mentioned in C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 161. See also S. 
Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004, pp 70-71 for a general discussion on that issue.    
486 See D. Howard 1960, p. 99 for the criminal mobility. 
487 C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 112. 
488 Ignatieff in C. Harding et al. 1985, p. 112. 
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for his/her alienation from both the product of his labour as well as the means of 
production – requires a bonding element in order to avoid the collapse of the 
otherwise fragmented society. In this framework, the legalisation of violence, either 
applied or threatened, is inescapably associated with its monopoly by an institution 
which mantles the actual and ongoing class struggle; in contrast with the overt class 
violence which was anyway needed for the extraction of the labour product in the 





The aim of the previous sections has been to show that the legislation set in 
1877 is not an actual but a symbolic milestone. The State not only interfered but was 
the only factor participating in imprisonment during the periods under discussion. In 
the same way, the legislation set in 1991 is not an actual but rather a symbolic 
milestone, since to a large extent the previous image doesn’t change fundamentally 
after the Criminal Justice Act of that year. In reality, what is needed is a wider view 
of the changes of that period in order to determine the emergence of a State 
Apparatus transformation.  
In 1991 the Criminal Justice Act states under article 84§1 that:  
“the Secretary of State may enter into a contract with another 
person for the running by him of any prison which (a) is 
established after the commencement of this section; and (b) is for 
the confinement of remand prisoners, that is to say, persons 
charged with offences who are remanded in or committed to 
custody pending their trial, or persons committed to custody on 
their conviction who have not been sentenced for their offences; 
and while such a contract is in force, the prison to which it relates 
shall be run subject to and in accordance with sections 85 and 86 
below, the 1952 Act (as modified by section 87 below) and prison 
rules”489.  
 
The second paragraph of the same article interprets the previous terms as follows. “In 
this Part ‘contracted out prison’ means a prison as respects which such a contract is 
for the time being in force; ‘the contractor’, in relation to such a prison, means the 
person who has contracted to run it”. The rest of the articles in the same section refer 
                                                 
489 The third paragraph of the same article practically allows the government to contract out any prison 
and not only those established after the commencement of the Act or only remand prisons something 
which caused wide frustration in the parliamentary debates. 
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to the appointment of officers and their duties in the contracted out prisons as well as 
the power of the Secretary of the State to intervene in case “that the director has lost, 
or is likely to lose, effective control of the prison or any part of it” and “in the 
interests of preserving the safety of any person, or of preventing serious damage to 
any property”. Aside the specific provisions for the contracted out prisons, the same 
Act enables in other sections either the Secretary of the State or other administrative 
bodies to contract out prisoners’ escorts and court security.  
A secluded from wider changes analysis of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
would conclude that any transformation in the prison system refers exclusively in the 
actual management of specific prisons. In other words, what changes is the 
interference of privateers in the basic units of the prison system. In contrast with that, 
the middle level administration, namely the HM Prison Service, remains in the public 
sector as well as the higher level administration located in the Home Office. In 
addition to that, one could argue that the State somehow reinforced its decreased 
presence through the imposition of a Crown-servant controller in every contracted 
out prison, the specially approved by the Secretary of the State director of the prison 
in question and of any officer with custodial duties and finally the provision for 
intervention in cases of emergency as noted above. Nevertheless, the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 is only part of the picture. In the same year the White Paper 
Competing for quality: Buying better public services introduced a series of principles 
and guidelines to be followed in the view of more efficient administration. The most 
notable point in this paper was the first question that should be answered regarding 
each public body. The “prior options exercise”, sought the reasons why the service in 
question should not be abolished or privatized. This development opened the way of 
contracting out, apart from institution management as such, particular services like 
catering, education, cleaning etc. in prisons run under public administration. This 
peculiar question in the market testing scheme reveals that the underlying principle 
has been the priority of the transfer to the private sector. The presumption had been 
against the public ownership of services.  
In addition to the previous developments, and following the 
recommendations of the Ibb's Report which became governmental policy under the 
White Paper Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps in February 
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1988, HM Prison Service became an executive agency in 1991. General goal of 
turning administrative departments into executive agencies has been to develop 
corporate culture within the administration. More specifically, the changes set to 
correspond to the intended business-like environment would be focusing on 
recruitment, internal promotion and management on the higher echelons in the 
administration of each executive agency. For example promotions in those positions 
would be seen either as reward after presenting “reformist” managerial abilities 
elsewhere or as test to present those abilities before being transferred to another high 
position. This practice resembles exactly corporate management practices. At the 
same time chief executives could be hired from the private sector as it did happen in 
several cases490. Especially the agency status of the Prison Service intended to evolve 
clear lines of responsibility, improve management and accountability, give more 
delegated powers from ministers to operational managers, enhance corporate 
identity, and secure better performance in the overall service. Those general 
principles were specified in the responsibilities of the chief executive of the agency 
who would be personally responsible for the day-to-day management. The Home 
Secretary would allocate the resources as well as key performance indicators as 
quantifiable targets in the wider fields of keeping prisoners in custody, produce them 
to the courts as required, maintaining order, control and discipline, providing decent 
conditions for prisoners and meeting their needs in positive regimes, assisting 
prisoners to prepare for their eventual return to the community and delivering all 
those services using the resources provided by Parliament with maximum efficiency. 
In a parallel development the agency status of the Prison Service allowed it to 
participate in privatisation processes and compete in the open market against other 
bidders to run establishment or provide services491.  
From a formalist point of view, it could be argued that transforming prison 
service into an executive agency is merely an internal administrative change in the 
public sector since the “owner” and final responsible for the provision of the 
respective service is still the State. Nevertheless, if changes were closely examined, it 
would be seen that prison service is not just transformed into a corporate-like 
institution but in an actual corporation owned by the State. The budgetary 
                                                 
490 See for example M. Ryan 2003, p. 93 for the Prison Service which is of interest here. 
491 J. Black 1993, pp 28-30. 
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independence, the goals to be met, the quantifiable efficiency indicators, the hiring 
and promoting based on good references even if they don’t come from a relevant 
working culture but most of all the wide administrative independence that made the 
chief executive liable only to the Home Office in the same way that a CEO is liable 
only to the shareholders of a company made Prison Service and the rest of the 
executive agencies “private islands in a public sea”. Even if privatisation in the form 
of contracting out services and management was not implemented at the medium 
level of prison administration, the private ethos did emerge. The significance of what 
is otherwise called corporatisation without privatisation could be seen through a 
comparison with the previously State-owned enterprises. The latter were usually 
described amongst else as large scale organisations with highly centralized 
management. This allowed on the one hand bureaucracy to make functioning rigid 
and unable to respond to changing technology or consumer demands. On the other 
hand, in the field of industrial relations centralized management enhanced unions' 
power by giving them “undue political influence”492. It is those attributes that 
corporatisation in the medium level of prison administration tried to confront by 
breaking the centralized hierarchy into smaller groups, setting goals and incentives, 
bringing forward efficiency as principle and generally by treating the Prison Service 
as a corporation with a single shareholder, the State.  
What could be seen is that in the period between 1991 and 1993 a series of 
developments affect both the lower and medium levels of the administration of the 
prison system. On the one hand privatisation in the form of contracting out appears 
referring to the whole management of prison institutions or to particular services 
within the prison system. On the other, the administration of the latter is not 
privatized as such but takes the peculiar form of a hybrid between a public and 
private corporation. The transformation of prison service, therefore, is reaching 
depths further than the initially assumed from a shallow analysis of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991. Bringing into consideration the concept of Authoritarian Statism 
would significantly facilitate the connection and understanding of those 
developments. As a matter of fact many aspects of the aforementioned 
transformations have been described by Poulantzas in his approach of the form of the 
                                                 
492 See indicatively T. Colling 1991, p. 117. 
202   A Retrospection of the Role of the State in Imprisonment 
 
State that befits monopoly capitalism in the last quarter of the 20th century. Starting 
from the main innovation of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, it has been shown that 
privatisation as such exemplifies the economic developments adopted to combat the 
1970s over-accumulation crisis. Contracting out, however, is not incompatible with 
Authoritarian Statism since it’s only the visible “frontiers of the State that are rolled 
back”493. The other side of the coin had been that the State expanded its controlling 
mechanisms to ensure compliance of the private providers with the contract 
provisions. The intervention of the Secretary of the State in cases of emergency 
according to article 88, the special approval of the appointment of the director of the 
prison as well as of any officer performing custodial duties but most of all the 
permanent presence of a civil servant controller in the prison institution shows 
exactly that.  
More revealing, however, is the situation in next level of administration, 
namely the Prison Service. The decentralisation of this service through its 
establishment as executive agency is a sign of disturbance in the official hierarchy of 
public administration; the appointment of Chief Executive of the agency by the 
Home Office especially in the case that he or she comes from the private sector is an 
indication of a new set of nexuses between the apparatus in question and the central 
administration. Most importantly, though, the creation of a two tier Prison Service, 
namely publicly run and private one, with different salary levels, different 
administrative organisation, different characteristics as in the case of prison regimes, 
different functional principles to be followed and different functional guarantees (see 
for example the “no-overcrowding” guarantee of private prisons)494 in combination 
with the expansion of this image, namely the furtherance of prison privatisation, 
reveals that the implementation of actual power in this State Apparatus is gradually 
transferred to the connections embedded in the new setting of prison administration. 
As a result of the latter, the corporatisation but not privatisation of the Prison Service 
is exactly an indication of the need for the establishment of a new network of power 
within the State in order to comply with and be able to control the new knots of 
governance, namely the contracted out prisons495.  
                                                 
493 See further ibidem pp 151-152. 
494 J. Black 1993, pp 27-30. 
495 Ibidem p. 149. 
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It seems then that privatisation in the field of corrections either as prison 
and services contracting out or as modifications in the upper levels of prison system 
administration reveals some transformations that correspond to the wider State 
movements related to Authoritarian Statism. Nevertheless, the history of those 
developments doesn’t start with prison privatisation. In the economic level, as 
already mentioned, privatisations were introduced, at least as coherent governmental 
policy, in 1979 with the partial selling of British Petroleum. In the administrative 
level, however, changes have begun as early as 1981 with the abolition of Civil 
Service department and transfer of its powers to the Prime Minister’s and Cabinet 
Office. At the same period particular ministries have been experimenting with 
corporate and business planning as in the case of the Department of the Environment 
and Ministry of Defence. The first comprehensive strategy, however, was not set out 
before 1982. The Financial Management Initiative set for the public administration 
similar principles as those explained before. Efficiency, corporate planning and 
targets to be met served again as guidelines for wider transformations in the civil 
service. In 1984 the principle of comparable salaries between private and public 
sector was abandoned to be replaced with performance-related payment. 1988 
brought the completion of the aforementioned Ibb’s Report under the title Improving 
Management in Government: The Next Steps which initialized the policy of 
executive agencies, while market testing scheme was introduced in 1991 with the 
White Paper Competing for quality: Buying better public services. The guiding 
principle in all those cases has been the achievement of efficiency by using 
managerial expertise from the private sector, setting targets, allowing budgetary 
autonomy and decentralizing functions from the main administrative mechanism. 
Especially in the case of Prison Service agency its “hiving off” from the Home 
Office meant a distinctive preoccupation with efficiency since individual prison 
boards were working under the threat of competition and market discipline. As a 
consequence, corporate and business plans along with ‘Key Performance Indicators’ 
were regularly published outlining objectives related to improving quality of services 
and increasing value for money496. The effect of “corporatisation without 
privatisation”, therefore, was significantly similar to privatisation as such. The reason 
                                                 
496 D. Evans et al. 2009, pp 178 and 184. 
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behind that is that both developments present indicators of Authoritarian Statism. 
Therefore, the theoretical conclusion of the previous chapter that the time gap 
between the introduction of general privatisation and prison privatisation policies is a 
transformation by absence, namely a transformation of what was supposed to be 









The previous chapter pointed the emergence of prison privatisation as a 
State transformation by absence. As already stressed, transformations should be 
explained with reference to the peculiarities of the class struggle. In order to direct 
the discourse towards that direction and before reaching the specific analysis of the 
class contradictions in reference to the prison system, a general overview of the class 
struggle in the conjuncture is much needed. The particular characteristic of the period 
at the last quarter of the 20th century has been the manifestations of another economic 
crisis. It is generally accepted by the international bibliography, at least the part 
following heterodox economics and especially the Marxian ones that in that period 
capitalist economy were going through a capital over-accumulation crisis497. The 
British economy could not form any exemption498. In an attempt to identify the 
characteristics of the class struggle, what is especially important is to connect the 
State responses to the economic crisis with an account of the society's reaction. This 
would allow understanding whether the cyclical economic crisis has turned to a 
structural one; a necessary process before accounting for any State transformation. 
From an international point of view, it has been suggested that the counteracting 
influences of that period differ between the early stages of the crisis and the later 
ones499. This chapter therefore, will examine the possible emergence of purging and 
anti-purging policies in the British context but most importantly the reason behind 
their interplay. Special focus will be placed on the detection of any political crisis as 
well as the gradual introduction of privatisation. 
                                                 
497 See indicatively R. Brenner 2006, B. Fine et al. 1987, S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004, E. 
Ioakimoglou 2000.  
498 For a particular analysis regarding the emergence and manifestations of the capital over-
accumulation crisis in the British economy see the Appendix.   
499 R. Brenner 2006, p. 157 et seq., E. Ioakimoglou 1987, p. 150 et seq. and S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 
2004, p. 38. 
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- The second half of the 1960s 
1958 constitutes the turning point in which the rate of gross value added to 
the value of constant capital invested became negative and this is an index of the 
wholly decreasing productivity. In addition to that, other indexes were implying that 
after 1959 economy was turning from “go” to “stop”. They were comprised by the 
increasing deficit at the balance of payments, the inflationary pressures and the rising 
tendency of unemployment. It’s significant to mention that, regarding the first factor, 
within a year the surplus of £132 million in 1959 gave way to £273 million deficit in 
1960. The combination of pressures on sterling and increasing inflation were 
attributed according to the Bank of International Settlements and the OEEC (the later 
OECD) to the constantly rising wages. More specifically, it was argued that wages 
exceeded the productivity gains with immediate consequences on the cost of 
production and the prices. The gradually deteriorating role of the UK in the polarized 
from the cold war international affairs prevented an economic boost through military 
expansion, while the decolonisation was decreasing the markets with preferential 
relationships500. Therefore, the 1961 budget and an emergency package that followed 
three months later employed deflationary policy with a balanced mixture of 
increasing bank rates and a pay-pause at the public sector with the view of being 
extended at the private one501. Those policies, coupled with a later reflationary tax 
cuts in 1963 created a short bust-boom cycle (otherwise called the ‘Maudling Boom’ 
from the Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald Maudling) that retained the GDP at a 
fairly satisfactory level of 3.1%502. The third among the previous factors remained, 
however, relatively uninfluenced by those policies. Unemployment – largely 
concentrated in Scotland and Wales – reached 573.000 or 2.6% of the total working 
population in 1963. Such numbers may seem negligible at current standards but they 
represented a break with the mid-20th century conditions with unemployment being 
close to 1%503. Only towards the end of the short expansion cycle in 1964 
unemployment fell temporarily to 1.7%. 
                                                 
500 D. Porter 1993, p. 21 et seq. and N. Woodward 1993, p. 76. See for example the case of the Skybolt 
missiles, the Suez crisis or the French veto at Britain’s entry negotiations at the EEC.  
501 D. Porter 1993, p. 18. 
502 N. Woodward 1993, p. 73. 
503 D. Porter 1993, p. 12. 
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In the second half of the 1960s, however, indexes present a more difficult 
image. The Maudling boom increased the deficit to £373 million in 1964 by rising 
the imports and diverting the production to the internal market. This furthered the 
sterling crises of the 1950’s and 1960’s. The interpretation given was that rapid 
growth could not be sustained as balance of payment problems were arising in the 
way explained before. To tackle this situation, deflationary measures employed 
undermined investment, new techniques and scale economies. This development 
aggravated further the overall problematic competitiveness. To avoid this vicious 
cycle the State-led modernisation of the production was suggested which was 
understood as support for exporters, encouragement of industrial investment, 
restructuring of the existing industry or creation of new sectors directly by the State 
and investment in education and training504. By late 1964, however, the deficit in the 
balance of payments reached £800 million and given that there was no devaluation 
until November 1967 a hard incomes policy was implemented with the intention to 
manipulate demand as well as inflation. The same policies were followed after the 
devaluation and the eventual balancing of external payments. At the same time two 
more deflationary packages aiming to reduce the demand were employed. Inflation, 
however, remained high retaining its increasing tendency reaching 6.3% in 1970 and 
9.4% in 1971. 
The prominence of the balance of payments problem did not prevent in the 
second half of the 1960s decade the implementation of the abovementioned plan for 
the modernisation of production that in any case fell short of the targets in production 
output505. The technology policy that came under the umbrella of the new Ministry of 
Technology (Mintech) promoted indeed the reorganisation of machinery by 
subsidizing their replacement to support new technological developments, provided 
services to promote R&D and the dissemination among industry of the new 
technological practices. Active support was also directed to high-tech industries with 
direct governmental investments. Along with the Mintech, the Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) was established to reorganize industry by acting 
                                                 
504 H. Wilson’s Swansea speech on January 1964, in N. Woodward 1993, p. 79. 
505 N. Woodward 1993, p. 86. 
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as merger broker506. The Selective Employment Tax (SET) taxed employment in 
service sector while subsidizing employment in the productive sector in an attempt to 
reorganize apart from industry the division of labour as well. Furthermore, the profit 
tax was replaced by corporation tax with the view to encourage retaining the profits 
and reinvesting them. At the same time subsidies for investment were extended507.  
Irrespective of those counteracting influences the total output of the 
economy in the second half of the 1960s remained lower than the expected and 
planned one. The active intervention of the State was not enough moreover to reverse 
the falling tendency of efficiency. In an abundance of potential explanations ranging 
from the external factors in international trade, the pressure upon sterling, the 
inflation and the measures to tackle it or the rising tendency of wages, there is an 
indication that although mentioned is constantly ignored. The problem of the British 
economy has not been one of lack of investments in comparison with other 
economies but one of their relative inefficiency which should be seen in conjunction 
with the falling industrial capacity’s utilisation508. From this point of view, the 
inactivity of capital and the decreasing growth of output as well as the consequential 
inflation in relation to which the increasing - in face value - wages should be seen, 
suggest a different explanation of the economic conundrum, that of over-
accumulation crisis. The apparent result has been the rising unemployment as such as 
well as of the rate of its average duration509. Against this crisis, however, the overall 
State intervention aimed towards decelerating the capital purging process.  
The emergence of the first signs of the economic crisis, by bringing the 
social forces’ relationships gradually in opposition, presents a distinctive opportunity 
                                                 
506 See more analytically in R. Coopey 1993b, p. 105. It should be noted that IRC was comprised by 
industrialists rather than civil servants who managed a budget of £150 million to promote the 
promotion of scale economies. 
507 N. Woodward 1993, pp 85-89 and R. Coopey 1993b, pp 113 and 118. See also in D. Horner 1993, 
pp 65-68 the whole industrial modernisation program that was not fully implemented due to the 
financial constraints. It’s crucial to mention that the particular measures exemplify the counteracting 
influences to the falling tendency of profit by the State as analysed in the appendix; most notably the 
expansion of higher education to support industry with scientific manpower, the establishment of a 
ministry of technology to ensure rationalized deployment of resources and State promotion of R&D.  
508 N. Woodward 1993, p. 85 and p. 89. 
509 N. Woodward 1993, p. 93 identifies the rising unemployment in the weak demand of labour in 
combination with the industrial reorganisation. The weak demand is caused by the falling profitability 
due to the closing gap between productivity and labour’s compensation. His analysis comes from a 
different analytical framework; nevertheless, the data provided seem to support the existence of signs 
of over-accumulation.  
Crisis, Privatisation and Political Strategy   209 
 
to examine the composition of the power bloc on the one hand and of the other the 
hegemonic strategies employed during the 1960s. The relationship of the power bloc 
with the working classes was influenced by the ideological dominance of Keynesian 
economics. The particular set of policies connected to this was identified as the post-
war consensus. The minimum standard for Labour and Tory governments has been a 
commitment to full employment, the welfare State and mixed economy510. The 
consequence has been two politically related socio-demographic changes. On the one 
hand, the consensus politics and most specifically the full employment mantra had 
created a class fraction of economic affluent labourers that were gradually obtaining 
a petty-bourgeois mentality511. At the same time the technical orientation of the 
production added considerable numbers of skilled labour, engineers and scientific 
professionals to the dynamicity of that class. Its significance and most importantly its 
political power came to light already after the pay-pause at the public sector of the 
deflationary package of 1961. Disillusionment among “dons, schoolmasters, school-
teachers, civil servants, clerks, nurses, public utility workers, railwaymen and all the 
rest” was not only attributed to the expected pay rises that were not delivered but also 
“middle-class professionals and other white collar workers saw their differentials 
eroded; they felt that they are relatively ill-paid compared to the high wages which 
they heard about coming in the ordinary artisan’s house-hold”512. The second change 
has been the particular strengthening of the labour movement. The industrialised 
economy in combination with full employment produced a large number of workers 
for whom the threat was inflation rather than unemployment. The 1960s has been a 
period of labour militancy as seen not only in the strike activity but also in trade 
union density. This was particularly apparent among public sector workers513. 
In understanding the relations of the power bloc with the labour classes514, 
the full employment and welfare policies and generally the concessions in the form 
of wage increases should be seen under the light of the unstable equilibrium of 
                                                 
510 D. Porter 1993, p. 12.  
511 S. Fielding 1993, p. 31.  
512 H. MacMillan’s view after Orpington defeat in D. Porter 1993, p. 18.  
513 N. Woodward 1993, pp 82 and 94. This also explains why despite the rising unemployment, wages 
were also increasing. It should not be forgotten that the assertive movement is a crucial part of the 
over-accumulation crisis. 
514 A complete analysis of the Social Formation should also include the composition of the power bloc 
and the contradictions within the dominating classes. This is, however, a peripheral issue here. The 
following sections, therefore, will omit the relevant analysis.    
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compromise strategy. The concessions in question, however, could not be extended 
beyond a certain point given the falling profitability of capital investments. The 
uneasy industrial relations constituted result of this inflexibility and at the same time 
it worked as catalyst for more assertive struggles. In this field the State presented a 
mixture of responses. In the first half of the 1960s decade it didn’t intervene in the 
collective bargaining taking place in the private sector. It did, however, implement a 
pay freeze in the public one. At the second half the aggravation of the crisis resulted 
to a change in policy. The deflationary packages were coupled by a harsh incomes 
policy aiming to stop the acceleration of inflation. An interesting example has been 
the way that seamen’s strike was tackled in 1966. Although the employers were 
willing to settle to the pay claim raised by the strike, the proposed settlement was 
exceeding the percentage suggested - but not statutorily imposed – by the income 
policy. MI5 penetrated and surveyed the strike leadership. The strike was then 
alleged by the government as influenced by communists, something which had 
detrimental effects on its continuance in the cold war climate of the period515. More 
generally, the failure to devalue and consequently the only deflationary mechanism 
left, incomes policy that is, brought the power bloc and the working class against 
each other516.   
Given the increasingly difficult relations with the trade unions and generally 
with the labourers, a new strategy was initiated, which would be constantly 
implemented in the following years. The aforementioned socio-demographic change 
that resulted in the increasing numbers of white-collar workers and freelance 
scientists gave the opportunity to the mass party to establish a new alliance between 
that dynamic social force and the power bloc517. Having in mind the economic 
constraints because of the looming crisis, this new alliance would serve as an outlet 
to support the dominant position of the power bloc. New advertising techniques were 
used by both parties with the view of influencing exactly this group of affluent 
workers and scientific professionals. The industry modernisation rhetoric was 
                                                 
515 R. Ramsay 1993, p. 153. The effects of Authoritarian Statism in this case are more than obvious.  
516 See for example T. Crossland’s quotation in N. Woodward 1993, p. 84: “The failure to devalue 
constrained public expenditure. It antagonised the trade unions and alienated large groups of 
workers”.  
517 This doesn’t mean of course that the power bloc-petty bourgeoisie alliance is something new. What 




particularly embracing those social groups. At the same time the classic petty-
bourgeois ideations about the State-centred egalitarianism and prospects through an 
all-inclusive education were deployed even from the Labour party that used to focus 
until that time on the manual workers. This change was particularly visible in the 
traditional labour class newspapers518. Aside any rhetoric, the most striking example 
of the hegemonic strategy change has been that of devaluation. Although suggested 
early enough, the government devalued sterling only in 1967 preferring instead to 
address the crisis by manipulating income. The official explanation was that reducing 
the living standards should be avoided519. Taking into consideration all the literature 
regarding the affluent workers it’s easily comprehensible that the ones protected 
were exactly this allied fraction with the power bloc. Devaluation wouldn’t have 
detrimental effects upon the less affluent workers in contrast with the petty 
bourgeoisie which should direct their consuming habits to non imported products520. 
The industrial capital would had definitely profits out of this policy by making their 
products more competitive, increasing their exports and job vacancies. The financial 
capital would initially sustain losses (a fact which may imply the dominant fraction 
in the power bloc) but in the second instance would minimize them through the 
profits of the industrial capital.  
The looming economic crisis along with the changes and frictions in the 
power bloc created problems in the political level but definitely not a political crisis. 
The first sign of political unrest came in the field of the mass party. Labour’s 
commitment to nationalisations (Clause IV in the Labour party's constitution) 
attracted much of the intra-party conflict during the 1960s. The party was separated 
after the 1959 electoral defeat between the traditionalists, mainly the left wing, who 
insisted on the preservation of the clause and the revisionists, the majority among the 
party, supporting its deletion. The importance of the Clause IV conflict is not a 
doctrinal one but should be seen in conjunction to the later strategic change in the 
                                                 
518 S. Fielding 1993, pp 35, 38 and 40 and R. Coopey 1993b, pp 111-112. The results of this strategy 
could be seen in the gradual change of support towards the Labour party in the second half of the 
1960s in S. Fielding 1993, p. 43.  
519 N. Woodward 1993, p. 82.  
520 The consuming habits affected by the devaluation are mentioned in profiling exactly those new 
fractions of the petty-bourgeoisie allied to the power bloc which also constitute the target group of the 
changing Labour party affiliated press: “It explicitly appealed to those who went on holiday abroad, 
were under 35 and to married women who worked; people who ate steaks and had come into recent 
possession of cars, houses, refrigerators and washing machines” in S. Fielding 1993, p. 41. 
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power bloc. Most significantly, though, is related to the privatisation policy that 
would emerge 20 years later. The non commitment to the nationalisations might not 
be an affirmation to privatisations as such but it’s definitely a “stepping stone”. 
Although divided, the party remained united through a tactical appeasement under 
the idea that a change of a constitutional clause would be futile, irrelevant or 
unrealistic political “theology”521. This shows that at least for the dominant wing in 
the party, the socialist goal of State ownership became nothing more than a 
symbolism. The internal conflict, however, continued fuelled by the opposition to 
devaluation, the deflationary packages, the incomes policy and the way that seamen’s 
strike was handled522. The intra-labour contradictions culminated with the May Day 
Manifesto accusing the leadership of the party that succumbed to the needs of the 
monopoly capital abandoning its initial premises523.   
Taking into consideration the way that the conservative version of the mass 
party lost office it seems that the political level was facing problems in reproducing 
its legitimacy and moreover the domination of the power bloc. Irrespective of the 
economic and political (not to mention the scandals and shortcomings) hitting the 
Tories, the Labour Party didn’t manage to achieve a large majority in parliamentary 
seats (only four) leading Harold Wilson to new elections after 18 months. 
Notwithstanding the first-pass-the-post electoral system in the United Kingdom 
which allows for large majorities, this could be a sign that the economic crisis was 
gradually turning to political resentment seen also in the fact that until the end of the 
1970s no government managed to be re-elected for a second full term in office (apart 
from elections close to each other in order for the government to secure a better 
majority). It should be noted, however, that the eventual formulation of governments 
throughout the period in question nay by the left and right wings of the mass party 
constitute eventual affirmations of the reproduction of the political system. Therefore 
a political crisis could not be spotted in the 1960s. 
With the view of initiating the purging process of the British economy, the 
first steps towards that direction took place in that very period, in the 1960s. 
Especially towards the end of the decade both major parties took initiatives to 
                                                 
521 S. Fielding 1993, p. 34.  
522 R. Ramsay 1993, p. 153 and R. Coopey et al. 1993a, p. 3.  
523 See analytically in N. Tiratsoo 1993, pp 164-165.  
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prepare for the gradual withdrawal of the State from the market to allow for 
investment space for the private capital. As soon as 1965 the governing Labour party 
commissioned the preparation of a report that came out in 1968. The Fulton Report 
suggested the introduction of “accountable management principles” which meant the 
objective measurement of the performance of individuals or units. At the same time 
it recommended the identification of cost centres in order to quantify the 
performance of the civil service as a total and in the level of units and individuals. 
The working status within the civil service might have not been changed, possibly 
due to the need to strengthen the alliance with the petty bourgeoisie of the white-
collar civil servants; the recommendations of the report, however, were accepted by 
the Labour government. The significance of this report lies with the fact that its 
quantification of management objectives became the basis for the development of a 
policy some years later that culminated in the ‘Next Steps’ policy from the 1980s. 
The civil service should be separated in semi-autonomous agencies baring specific 
budget, business plan and accountability to the central government. What has been 
implemented immediately, though, has been the Civil Service Department aiming to 
provide personnel management within the Civil Service. Irrespective of the fact that 
it has been established to rationalise the civil administration according to the 
previous recommendations, it ended up being a protecting shield for the status of the 
civil servants until its abolition in 1981524. This development reveals that the purging 
initiatives form the side of the State are constantly subject to the vector of the class 
struggle within the State Apparatuses.  
From the other side, the Conservative Party commissioned a committee 
under Nicholas Ridley to produce a report on nationalised industries that came out in 
1968. The report was more focused on the proposed relationship between 
nationalized and private companies it included, however, many suggestions related to 
privatisations, public-private partnerships and re-organisation of the civil service. For 
example, the government was expected to set a specific framework of operation for 
each industry with specified policy, pricing, purchasing and financial targets that 
would change every 5 years, something that resembles a contemporary business plan. 
That also meant that some of the business activities should be diversified as in the 
                                                 
524 K. Theakston et al. 2004, p. 211-212. 
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case of the National Coal Board which should abstain from North Sea gas 
exploration activities or in the case of British rail which should pull out from 
shipping and hovercraft activities. Postal services and telecommunications should 
split and the corresponding markets de-monopolized. Apart from the restructuring, 
privatizing State industries as such were also suggested ranging from steel and 
shipping to airlines and aviation authority or docks. Interestingly enough, the 
recommendations were also touching public utilities and services such as coal 
mining, buses, British Rail, electricity, gas, telephone service, Cable and Wireless. 
The receptiveness of the report was mixed among the members of the Conservative 
Party. It ranged from modest to sincere enthusiasm but there were objections raised 
regarding the way that such a project should be brought forward. Their common 
ground has been strikingly similar with the reason that the labour project was also 
not implemented. The extent of the problems in economy as well as the industrial 
contradictions in both the private and the public sector were prohibitive in the view 
of another set of reforms525. Nevertheless, Ridley’s recommendation made their way 
to the next Tory manifesto elaborately covered under vague wording. “We will 
progressively reduce the involvement of the State in the nationalised industries (e.g. 
Steel) to improve their competitiveness. An increasing use of capital will help to 
reduce the burden on the taxpayer, get better investment decisions and ensure more 
effective use of total resources”526.  
 
                                                 
525 Indicatively B. Sewill mentions that “the paper is at the moment written starting from the 
assumption that denationalisation is right in principle. While all Conservatives naturally agree with 
this Ι feel that the next Conservative Government is going to be faced with so many urgent problems 
in the economic sphere that there will be a natural desire not to upset more apple carts than strictly 
necessary” in L. Johnman 1993, p. 194. Ramsden’s view that Heath vetoed Ridley’s Report because 
he wasn’t prepared to consider it (J. Ramsden 1996, p. 22) doesn’t seem to be supported by Heath 
himself who warned in June 1969 that “the Conservatives should be careful in future in proposing to 
introduce changes in the structure of everything in which the government was now involved. There 
would be a number of high priority matters and we would need all our time. We would get no thanks 
from the public for bogging ourselves down in massive structural changes in our early years in office” 
(in R. Taylor 1996a, p. 145, see also p. 147 in the same). What mattered for Heath, therefore, was not 
his supposed disliking of the privatisation idea but the political strategy towards it. Nicholas Ridley 
himself in a second report of the same committee in 1969 stated that “the politics of the matter appear 
to suggest we should denationalize some industries but avoid using that word”. Elsewhere he 
acknowledges the importance of political strategy by stating that “political considerations would make 
denationalisation of coal an unrealistic proposition at least in the foreseeable future” while he 
recognises that it would be “impracticable to denationalise most of State industry but thought many 
public corporations might be at some stage after being put on a sounder basis and covered by suitable 
regulatory machinery” (in R. Taylor 1996a, pp 144 and 145).  




The next decade is characterized by the subsequent U-turns between 
intended and finally implemented policies. In the beginning of the first half of the 
1970s the major problem of the previous period seemed to be finally settled. The 
devaluation of sterling in 1967 turned the balance of payments deficit to surplus. The 
inflation was decelerating at about 5% and unemployment was stabilizing. 
Irrespective of the positive signs in the economy, the new government was aware of 
the difficulties lurking in the days to come. The economic policy directions were 
clear and “purging” in their underpinning philosophy. Less intervention in industry, 
reduction in “red tape” to create a more efficient administrative machine, tax reform 
aiming at their decrease, legislative reduction of the trade union power, improvement 
in industrial relations with the view of reducing strikes and finally faster economic 
growth. The “purging” element in the State policy as seen in the 1971 budget resided 
with the intention to create a framework in which the free enterprise would flourish. 
That meant that there would be no active pursuit of government planning or direct 
investments on the one hand and on the other the State would not interfere statutorily 
in incomes policy and wage settlements in the private sector527. Overall, the primary 
policy direction was towards a mild passive rather than energetic purging in the 
economy. In other words, the State would not interfere in the protection of the “lame 
ducks”528 with subsidies or wage settlements but at the same time would not extent 
its policy in privatisations in the public sector.  
The reality, however, proved to be much more complex than expected. In 
the beginning of the 1970s The GDP was growing modestly at around 1.5% and 
unemployment was increased at around 3%. Interestingly enough, the wage rise was 
not affected by unemployment. Between 1970 and 1971 wages increased at 14.5% 
while the same rate in the next year was 13% and even faster between 1972 and 
1973. This increase prevented the government from a wide reflationary policy that 
would increase the GDP growth and reduce unemployment. What was preferred 
instead was some tax cuts that didn’t bring any positive change in the previous 
figures. In contrast with the estimations, by 1972 GDP was stuck at 2% and 
                                                 
527 A. Cairncross 1996, pp 109-110, R. Taylor 1996a, p. 139 and A. Roth 1972, pp 5 and 16.  
528 It’s not a coincidence that this phrase was introduced in British politics by the government of that 
period. 
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unemployment rising at 4%. Apart from the discrepancy between increasing 
unemployment and rising wages, another interesting figure is that of the value of 
investments that were falling in those years. Especially, stockpiling seems to have 
taken a nosedive529. This situation led government to a change of target. The 
intention since 1972 became the containment of unemployment rather than the GDP 
growth.  
The new direction took the shape of a U-turn in comparison with the 
previous approach. The non-intervention stance was abandoned and replaced with 
active encouragement of investments in manufacturing industry especially in areas 
with high unemployment530. Apart from further extensive tax cuts531, the new policy 
included direct State investments as in the case of £100 million over some years as 
part of a public works programme. As a consequence, the GDP started rising 
reaching 3.5% in 1972 and 9.6% in the first half of 1973. Unemployment fell 
significantly to 2.1% by the end of 1973. Whether the economy was overheating or 
not is disputed. What stands out, however, is that the expansionary measures brought 
with them shortages in materials, components, plant capacity but most importantly 
labour and especially skilled labour which posed exceptional pressure upon wage 
increase and consequently inflation. This situation didn’t leave unaffected the third 
part of the economic problem that seemed resolved few years ago. Partly attributed 
to the increased import needs due to the expansion of the economy and partly to the 
world commodity boom just before the oil crisis which further deteriorated the 
situation, the balance of payments was again in deficit reaching £1600 million by the 
end of 1973. It even climbed up to £3359 million in 1974532. The full deployment of 
the economic crisis in the occasion of the oil crisis expanded the breadth of the 
measures in several sectors of the economy. The restrictions like those imposed to 
space heating, floodlighting, supplies of petroleum, speed limit and the three-day 
week were extended in the financial sector. The minimum lending rate was raised to 
                                                 
529 A. Cairncross 1996, pp 111-115. 
530 The labour MP Edmund Dell summarized this movement: “our pragmatic prime minister, having 
marched his troops up the hill to laissez-faire and disengagement, is marching them down to selective 
intervention on a massive scale” in A. Roth 1972 p. 234. 
531 Analytically in A. Cairncross 1996, p. 116 et seq. Apart from the total tax concessions that 
amounted to £1800 million per year, there were implemented special allowances regarding 
depreciation and investments in plant and machinery either new or second hand.  
532 A. Cairncross 1996, p. 118 et seq.  
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13% and restrictions on the growth of bank deposits were implemented (fixed rate of 
8%); what has been coined as the “corset”. The latter reversed a previous change of 
policy by the Bank of England from 1971 which eased the inter-banking system 
market increasing cash liquidity. That increased the stock of money available and 
further asserted as an accelerating factor of inflation533. This change could be also 
recorded among the U-turns of the first half of the 1970s since it moved from a 
“purging” tactic to protectionism – although this time in favour of the whole 
economy. On a different field of action, in an attempt to counter the debt created by 
the State-led expansionary intervention in the economy the previous tax cuts were 
reversed and public expenditure were reduced by £1200 million534. 
The other side of the U-turn and directly connected with the previous one 
has been the rise of employment and consequently of wage and prices inflation. The 
government was obliged to embrace what had abandoned before the U-turn, namely 
the statutory income policy. Between 1970 and 1971 the government stayed adamant 
in the initial decision to avoid interference in wage settlements in the private sector. 
It followed, however, the tested and failed idea from the 1960s that settlements in the 
public sector would affect the private one as well. Therefore in the wage claims 
raised in that period, it implemented the “n minus one” policy (namely offer one 
percent lower than the claimed increase) and managed indeed to decrease the 
acceleration of wages in the public sector without affecting, however, the private 
one. The other part of the “equation” was a settlement with the Confederation of 
British Industry to limit price increases for one year to 5%. Nevertheless, both the 
wages and production costs were rising uncontrollably. The wage increase between 
1970 and 1972 were fluctuating between 13.8% and 12.5%. In the meantime even in 
the public sector the government was sustaining the first losses from the initial policy 
when settled an agreement with coal miners at 20% increase. When the settlement 
with CBI was about to expire, the government initiated tripartite negotiations 
including the CBI and the TUC. The negotiations’ impasse led to statutory control of 
                                                 
533 See analytically in A. Cairncross 1996, pp 124-128. The policy of greater availability of cash in the 
inter-banking system loans is deemed to be the first monetary step in the British economy.    
534 Public expenditure reduction at the amount of £600 million has already been planned for 1973 and 
the following years. The reason, however, was different. In order to boost the expansion of the 
economy planned State investments, as in the case of road expenditure, local government, industrial 
subsidies etc. were withdrawn with the view that they would be replaced by private ones. 
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incomes policy in three stages. At first there has been a freeze in pay prices, rents 
and dividends. In the second instance a Pay Board and Prices Commission 
implemented and controlled wage and prices guidelines. Finally, a 7% pay increase 
was allowed which was increased 40p for every 1% increase of inflation. Although 
those measures had the potential for a successful intervention between the winter of 
1972 and the winter of 1973, the oil shock along with the aforementioned 
international commodity price rise had their impact on wage rises which were 
assisted by the later stage of the incomes policy as well as by the trade unions’ 
claims. Overall, the wage rise culminated at the winter months of 1973-1974535. 
The synchronized increase of unemployment, wages and inflation, in 
contrast with the established knowledge of the Philips curve, and later on the 
decrease of unemployment and consequently further increase of wages but most 
importantly the nosedive of investments in the productive sector of the economy 
constitute aspects of both absolute and relative over-accumulation. It was, therefore, 
the full deployment of the crisis that begun to exert significant pressure on 
profitability pushing the opposed classes gradually to extreme contradiction. In 
response to that, the State once again employed the classic Keynesian counteracting 
influences - in complete un-accordance with the initial commitments - like tax cuts, 
subsidies or direct investments. The most prominent breaks with the initial liberal 
economic logic have been the Rolls Royce536 and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders bailing 
out both in 1971. The next year the Industry Act 1972 was passed with the view of 
containing the soaring unemployment. Regional development grants up to £250 
million were made available aside the sweeping powers of the Secretary of the State 
to provide any form of financial assistance to industry with some abstract criteria 
related to the national interest. Parliamentary approval would be needed only if the 
funds were exceeding £5 million537. 
In an attempt to explain the governmental U-turns, one has inescapably to 
turn to the relationship with the dominated classes. The non interventionist policy for 
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536 Rolls Royce was already under State management but running under private economy criteria.  
537 R. Taylor 1996a, p. 153 and A. Roth 1972, pp 16 and 223-224. It should be mentioned that a major 
field in which State capital was injected in the economy was in investments (R. Taylor 1996a, p. 155). 
The importance of this lies exactly with the fact that the counter-acting influences were directed 




the “lame-ducks” soon became State investments and nationalisations. The hands-off 
policy towards the trade-unions soon became the industrial act 1972 and attempted 
consensual reduction of wages. Finally the sound public accountancy became 
significant increase of public expenses538. The commitment to full employment could 
not easily account for the change of policy direction since the initial intention to 
purge the economy from the stagnant capital could not come without relevant 
changes in unemployment. As a matter of fact, the government was alarmed about 
unemployment only by 1972 when it has reached unprecedented levels; up to that 
point it tolerated the rising figures. What, on the other hand, can account for the 
policy change, was rather the labour militancy especially in the public sector and the 
subsequent social upheaval539. It’s not by coincidence that as early as the Tory 
manifesto was issued in 1966, it recognized the powers of trade unions as one of the 
problems to be addressed. The excessive use of the ‘state of emergency legislation’ 
and the high number of working days lost due to industrial actions are exactly signs 
of this development540. Illustrating examples are the cases of the infamous bail outs 
of Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. In the first case the government was 
threatened with a possible loss of about 80.000 job places. The assumed civil 
disorder that would follow became much more apparent in the second case. The 
initial refuse of the government to bail out the ship yards triggered massive reaction 
in west central Scotland during summer and autumn 1971. A demonstration in 
Glasgow was attended by around 80.000 marchers. The concern over the danger of 
widespread civil disorder led the local chief constable to ask for 15000 police 
officers to uphold the rule of law. As Margaret Thatcher recalled “there was tangible 
unease” and John Campbell, Heath’s biographer wrote that “the government frankly 
gave in to the threat of violence…UCS was saved purely to preserve jobs”541. 
An interesting detail that worth mentioning is the distance between the open 
policies and what was privately admitted. On the one hand industrial relation policy 
planning was deemed to be consensual. On the other hand it was admitted that the 
                                                 
538 A. Seldon 1996, p. 7. 
539 R. Taylor 1996b, pp 176-177. Taylor at this passage attributes the possibility of social upheaval to 
the rising unemployment rather than to labour militancy. Although this is a slightly different view 
from the one deployed here, the result is exactly the same. 
540 See for example R. Taylor 1996b, p. 161. The first strike for the Tory government was held by 
dock workers less than a fortnight in office. 
541 R. Taylor 1996a, pp 150-152. 
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government’s industrial relations strategy was motivated, at least partially, by an 
attempt to weaken union powers. That was the impression created before the U-turn 
of the Industrial Relations Act, that, when passed, a party memorandum had to be 
circulated in order to explain why the legislation did not “bash” the trade unions. The 
law in question was symbolically consensual but in reality repressive. Trade unions 
were supposed to register in order to enjoy legal protections, secure tax advantages 
and avoid financial damages from the National Industrial Relations Court. The other 
side of the coin had been that this court would rule out strikes that don’t fit in the 
criteria settled by the enabling legislation. Furthermore workers would be jailed if 
found in contempt of court decision in the proceedings of their industrial actions. As 
stated by the aforementioned party memorandum “legal proceedings and 
enforcement are provided only as a fall-back when the voluntary system has 
failed”542. Amidst the deteriorating industrial relations and financial situation a 
voluntary system that is subsequently followed by repression doesn’t seem to include 
much consensus. 
Unemployment, usually a factor that affects the trade union power, seemed 
in this case to feed their militancy rather than reduce their assertiveness. The 
governmental U-turns are not the only signs showing that the State succumbed to 
trade unionism; it was also their appeasement strategy as such employed by those 
policy changes that failed too543. It was early 1972 when the government failed to 
adhere to its “n minus one” policy regarding the coal miners of the public sector after 
a six-week-long strike544 and two years later it was electric workers and coal miners 
that demanded their exemption from the third stage of the new incomes policy. Their 
strike was not successful in securing their claims but managed to bring down the 
government in January 1974. The labour movement’s victorious mood developed 
after the successful settlement of the wage claim of the coal miners in 1972 is 
illustrated in Arthur Scargill’s words in an article. “Here was the living proof that the 
                                                 
542 R. Taylor 1996b, p. 168-173. 
543 See for example J. Ramsden 1996, p. 42 where he mentions that “it was only the entirely 
unanticipated ferocity of the battles over the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and the 1972 miners’ strike 
that created the impression of a government bent on confrontation. As soon as the miners were back at 
work, Heath determined that ‘we must find a more sensible way of settling our differences’. From that 
point on, Heath was as a Prime Minister a tireless advocate of a partnership or corporatist approach to 
running the economy, again a stance that derived from his experiences in office before 1964”.  
544 See analytically in A. Roth 1972, pp 230-232. 
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working class had only to flex its muscles and it could bring governments, employers 
and society to a standstill”545.  
 The difficult relationship between the power bloc and the proletariat was 
repeated to a degree between the dominating classes and the petty-bourgeoisie. 
Especially in what regards the State Personnel, the ideological inertia towards the 
changes brought by the initial policies of the Tory government started making their 
appearance visible. For example, David Howell holds that “the reforming and anti-
government zeal that had informed Conservative thinking on the civil service prior to 
1970 was sabotaged by senior civil servants, infected deeply with a Keynesian 
‘dirigiste’ mentality”546. The same was held by several other members of the cabinet 
like Keith Joseph who was concerned that “ministers planning to cut back functions 
and staff would have to work against inertia – and worse” or Nicholas Ridley who 
depicted Whitehall as an organized conspiracy against consensus that made free 
market policies hard to carry out. Douglas Hurd was convinced that the civil service 
was not a natural ally of the conservative party especially if they were trying to cut 
back the public sector. But more generally than the allegations of the Tories against 
the civil service, Douglas Hurd states that ‘the truth is that a party which believes in 
reducing the power of the State will always face serious problems with civil servants 
at all levels547. But even if the State Personnel was resisting the change of the 
dominant ideology in practice, they cannot be attributed with the increase of the 
public sector with 400.000 more employees548. The latter, apart from being a 
proactive policy to reduce unemployment, could also be seen as an appeasement 
strategy which, however, would increase in the medium-term the power of the 
assertive movement within the civil service. As a matter of fact reports as early as 
1971 were pointing to the anger among civil servants over pay, the growing 
militancy and the possible industrial action which finally occurred in 1973. The 
                                                 
545 A. Scargill 1975 and R. Taylor 1996b, p. 177. Poulantzas’ view that class interests are determined 
by class power and the acquis is illustrated in exactly this passage. 
546 In A. Seldon 1996, p. 8.  
547 K. Theakston 1996, pp 81 and 83. 
548 A. Seldon 1996, p. 8. 
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immediate result was that the commitment to re-organize the civil service by cuts in 
the numbers of the personnel was “quietly buried”549. 
In this environment the reproduction of the political level was faced with 
acute problems. The emergence of political unease could be easily diagnosed first 
and foremost by the very U-turns. The reasons behind those changes in policy as 
explained above imply already that the economic crisis was contaminating the 
political level. On the one hand the economic struggle within the public sector is 
immediately understood as confrontation with the political leadership of the State 
which appears as the employer. This is even more apparent in the struggles of the 
State Personnel in which what was at stake was not only an economic claim, but also 
a gradual change in the dominant ideology from Keynesian welfarism to monetary 
practices. On the other hand, in the private sector, the State intervention to bail out 
corporations or even its (initial) refusal to subsidize them connects inescapably the 
economic claims to the political ones. The State reactions to the crisis, especially 
after the collapse of a consensual solution, tended to further politicize the crisis. The 
statutory incomes policy or the ‘corset’ in what regards the power bloc constituted 
signs of both the political dimension of the economic crisis as well as of authoritarian 
State transformations. The most infamous, however, reaction towards the labour 
class militancy has been the excessive use of the “state of emergency legislation” in 
four occasions, one of them taking place in the very first strike of the period in 
question less than fifteen days after the conservative government took office550. The 
eventual call for elections in January 1974 took place under the pressure of another 
coal miners’ strike and in conditions of extreme reductions in energy consumption. 
The catchphrase that dominated the election campaign had been the question of “who 
governs” which was linking itself the industrial relations to the political 
developments.  
The political U-turns became source of disenchantment in the conservative 
wig of the mass party. Although a marked crack in the unity was not easily visible, 
                                                 
549 K. Theakston 1996, p. 99. A reduction that may appear in some statistics could be attributed to the 
hiving-off of some departments rather than to actual redundancies. In the same passage Theakston 
argues that the government was not antagonistic towards the civil service and he supports this by 
reference to a number of policy initiatives. Those initiatives, however, remained at the planning level 
apart from legislation to give civil servants index-linked pensions. Given that intentions do not 
compensate for reality, the government ended up being antagonistic. 
550 See for example A. Seldon 1996, p. 8 and R. Taylor 1996b, p. 161. 
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the party organisation had to fight to preserve unity among the ministers (as in the 
case of Nicholas Ridley551), MPs and supporters of the party especially from the 
middle classes – the main electoral pool of the Tories552. The implications from the 
political unease affected also the political scene in the electoral level of 1974. In 
February 1974 the general elections resulted to the first hung parliament since 1929. 
Conservatives, although they had the majority of votes, had less parliamentary seats. 
In any case, no party managed to take enough seats to form government. The lack of 
consensus between the Labour, Conservatives and Liberals on the formation of 
government led to new general elections in October 1974 in which the Labour 
managed to form government with a majority of only 3 seats553.  
The political implications of the economic crisis, however, were not 
restricted in the field of policy making, the parties or the electoral results. The 
contradiction within the trade unions constitute also signs of this non smooth 
reproduction of the political level. It should be reminded of course that trade 
unionism itself is a State Apparatus which condenses the different class interests. 
Although TUC was united in the opposition against the new Industrial Relations Act, 
they were not unanimous on how to confront the legislation effectively, especially in 
what regards the new registry for the trade unions. The left wing within the TUC, 
although secured almost half of the votes, didn’t manage initially to push the 
decision towards boycotting the new registry. But by July 1972 the condemnation of 
five strikers, instead of their trade union, found liable by a court for the declaration of 
a strike overturned the image554. More generally, though, what is generally held is 
that during the 1970s trade union leaders had lost their legitimacy. There was a clear 
separation between the trade union and labour movement. The first was acting as a 
containment mechanism in line with its State Apparatus nature, following different 
direction from the latter. The aforementioned condemnation by the court was 
implying exactly that the trade union as an organisation was irresponsible for the 
                                                 
551 “I could stand it no more. Ted Heath sent for me in April 1972 when he had a reshuffle […] I was 
very glad to have had nothing to do with the government of 1972-4 and I used my freedom to the 
maximum advantage” in N. Ridley 1991, p. 4. 
552 S. Ball 1996, pp 315-350 and J. Ramsden 1996, pp 44-46. 
553 See for example D. Kavanagh 1996, pp 365-370. The fact that the previous hung parliament was 
formed in 1929 namely at the outbreak of the previous capital over-accumulation crisis is a much 
telling case.  
554 R. Taylor 1996b, pp 172-173. 
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shop stewards’ actions. Dennis Kavanagh states that a government could neither 
govern with the consent of trade unions or without it largely because of the lack of 
union leaders’ effective control over their members555. The Conservative government 
has been aware of this; they thought that the Industrial Relations Act would restore 
the union leaders’ lost authority over the workplace by enabling them to discipline 
dissident shop stewards556. Vernon Bogdanor provides an interesting overall image 
of the political implications; “the February 1974 general election thus revealed a 
deep-seated frustration with both of the major parties, and with the elites that had led 
them since the war. Not only were trade unionists more militant than they had been 
in the past, but workers on the shop floor were refusing any longer to follow the 
advice of trade union leaders, while voters were refusing to follow the advice of their 
political leaders”557. Are those shortcomings in leadership enough to diagnose a 
political crisis? Although tempting, it’s difficult to assert this. On the one hand, in the 
political scene the electorate turned to the Liberals while in the subsequent elections 
gave a mandate to the Labour side of the mass party. On the other hand, the labour 
movement did not overpass the economistic claims to produce a political claim. 
Therefore, the reproduction of the political level seems to have gone through strains 
but survived during the first half of the 1970s.  
The need to purge the economy from the stagnant capital has been raised 
already in the previous period. As already seen the Ridley Report has been rejected 
by the Conservative government; not on the grounds of ideological or economic 
disagreement but rather on planning issues558. It was estimated, in other words, that a 
rapport should be established first with the trade unions before any radical economic 
movement. A different approach holds that the full employment and other Keynesian 
theories were deeply embedded in the Tory government which is further considered 
as the last one following the post war consensus559. This means that the Heath 
government was not fully committed to privatisation but concerned also with the 
                                                 
555 D. Kavanagh 1996, p. 367. 
556 R. Taylor 1996b, p. 166. 
557 V. Bogdanor 1996, p. 382. 
558 Robert Taylor states that “Ridley’s Report may have gone further in their proposals than Heath and 
his colleagues believed to be politically sensible, but their approach was more in tune with the leader’s 
thinking in 1970 than many on either side of the party were later prepared to admit” (R. Taylor 1996a, 
p. 147). 
559 A. Cairncross 1996, p. 137 where he mentions that Heath government in contrast with the Thatcher 
one had specific employment policy. Similarly V. Bogdanor 1996, pp 377-378. 
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employment conditions. The data available, however, do not confirm this approach. 
The basic premises of the Ridley Report have been included and covered within the 
Tory manifesto560. In Ridley’s words “all seemed set to embark on the privatisation 
programme and the dismantling of the socialist state”561. Nevertheless, the 
deliberately purging policies of the first period of governance were inescapably 
resulting to the increasing unemployment and that could have been easily estimated 
in advance. The commitment to full employment instead of privatisation, therefore, 
seems rather non-grounded unless one accepts that there has been a change of 
ideological premises or political sensitivities among the Tories in the middle of their 
period in office. Another approach moves away from both the privatisation and 
employment considerations. The Conservative government’s primary concern has 
been the modernisation of the British industry. When the laissez-faire policies failed 
to mobilize the private sector to respond, what changed were the instrumental means 
towards the same goal, namely the State turned to a government-led growth strategy 
with a strong emphasis on public investment562. This approach tells the story 
analysed here in different words. Modernisation doesn’t happen for the sake of 
modernisation. It’s rather directed towards profitability. When the purging policies 
fail, what is left is the State’s counteracting influences. In accounting for the failure 
of the purging strategies, in other words in accounting for the U-turns in order to 
decrease unemployment, one has to turn to the militancy of the labour movement 
which as mentioned above was not contained anymore from the leadership of the 
trade unions563. The initial passive purging policy, by no intervention in the 
economy, proves exactly this approach. Additionally, it’s not by coincidence that 
privatisation strategies in non sensitive areas passed with no problems. For example, 
government departments were “hived off” as in the case of the Civil Aviation 
                                                 
560 N. Ridley 1991, p. 4 and R. Taylor 1996a, p. 147. The fact that the conservative manifesto didn’t 
mention anything explicitly is not a major issue since even the next conservative government did not 
win office in 1979 on a clearly expressed programme to privatise the nationalised industries (R. 
Taylor 1996a, p. 157). 
561 N. Ridley 1991, p. 4. 
562 R. Taylor 1996a, pp 141-142. 
563 R. Taylor 1996a, p. 140. A similar explanation may be assumed that is developed by D. Kavanagh 
1996 p. 367 who states that Heath having started out on a proto-Thatcherite agenda had to change 
policy due to pragmatist concerns. What would have been those concerns if not the labour militancy? 
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Authority, in a movement resembling to the previously mentioned ‘marketisation 
without privatisation’564.     
 
- The second half of the 1970s 
The political U-turns continued in the second half of the 1970s under the 
Labour government. Already from opposition, there were negotiations between the 
party leadership and the TUC over a much closer mutual understanding. The 
negotiations resolved to the February 1973 agreement which was later coined as the 
social contract. It committed the next labour government to a system of price 
controls, especially on food, a new approach to housing and rent with intensive 
involvement of the State in its provision, the strengthening of public transport, large 
scale redistribution of income and wealth through tax system, immediate rise in 
pensions, the extension of industrial democracy by opening the scope of collective 
bargaining. Finally, the social contract insisted in the “expansion of investment and 
the control of capital by further public ownership, by the extension of State 
supervision of private investment and by new measures of control to prevent 
excessive investments overseas”. The social contract was part of a wider 
conceptualisation of the economic problems of the British society in which inflation 
and unemployment were the major ones to be tackled. To the disproportionate power 
of a number of large companies, the Labour programme was proposing the extension 
of public ownership, the setting up of planning agreement with major companies and 
a new Industry Act. The first proposition was echoing the clause IV of the Labour 
constitution but was not as extended as to entail the nationalisation of the twenty-five 
largest companies as it used to be in previous years. The radicalism of the 
programme and the close connection with the trade unions were, however, mitigated 
by a number of factors. Initially Hugh Scanlon leader of the AUEW (Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers), one of the most powerful unions among the TUC, 
insisted that there would be no trade union support for any “social contract” unless 
there is an assurance that it would involve no incomes policy or free collective 
bargaining. On the one hand, the social contract remained silent in what regards an 
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incomes policy. On the other hand, James Callaghan, shadow secretary of foreign 
affairs and future prime minister, was stating that the social contract is a basis for 
beginning talks with the TUC on a voluntary incomes policy. Later the Labour 
manifesto was opening the backdoor for changes under the idea that the severity of 
the problems faced by the future government may modify the programme565. Another 
sign of the fluidity of the programme has been the credits given from Wilson, the 
opposition leader, to Heath the prime minister, by January 1972 for having halved 
the wage settlements down to 8-7% from 15-14%566.    
In contrast with the previous government, the one in office during the 
second half of the 1970s was aware of the extremity of the economic problems. The 
profit squeeze since the 1960s continued reaching a real profit crisis567. In line with 
the OECD estimations, the balance of payment deficit in 1974 reached £3323 
million. Wages rates and inflation were ranging in the same year between 15 to 20% 
more than the previous year. Unemployment on the other hand had been constantly 
rising crossing the one million mark by October 1975. Both the productivity and the 
GDP fell. Especially, the latter presented a steep downturn between the second half 
of 1974 and the first half of 1975 at 2.5% following the same direction since 1972. 
The State’s strategy, according to the budget for 1975, to cope with this was a 
mixture of immediate responses to “buy time” and more structural reforms. On the 
one hand it resolved to international borrowing to finance the balance of payments 
deficit and gain some moving space. This policy was chosen instead of an abrupt 
deflation which would hit predominantly the working classes and so was in line with 
the redistributive programme of the Labour government. The structural reforms 
would be directed to stop the acceleration of wages and inflation. The important part 
of the policy, however, was that the pension increase, food subsidies, and rent price 
control would come from a redistributive shift of tax levying. Therefore, lower taxes 
for the lower incomes would be replaced by wealth and gift taxes for the richer. 
Nevertheless, at the same time the trade unions were expected to accept a voluntary 
wage restraint. This would not only decelerate the wage inflation but estimated that 
would encourage industrialists to further investments too. Thus, it was expected to 
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decrease unemployment and outbalance of the external payments deficit irrespective 
of the fact that they were also burdened with heavier corporation tax, higher national 
insurance contributions, increased prices of procurement from the nationalised 
industries and tougher price controls568.    
The budget, however, fall short in giving a solution to the problems 
plaguing the British economy, possibly because it identified their source as limited 
productive investment which was only a node in the chain of causes and results. As a 
consequence, a number of paradoxes emerged leading to an impasse of the 
implemented policy. Servicing the external debt attracted the focus of the State’s 
intervention. It became a growing part of government spending and brought tight 
externally dictated limits on public sector borrowing and therefore to the social wage. 
The medium-term result was that the foreign loans raised to prevent immediate cuts 
caused the very severity of the cuts in social expenditure that had to be imposed. In 
parallel, the balance of payments deficit and the accompanying high rate of inflation 
weakened confidence in pound sterling. The exchange value declined severely. In 
contrast with the expected, however, this devaluation didn’t stimulate exports but 
rather increased imports and internal inflation. One reason has been that, although 
exports were profitable indeed, the export capacity was fading away because of the 
inflation created by the sterling devaluation. The second interrelated reason was that 
the capital over-accumulation crisis itself constituted investments unprofitable as 
already shown in the previous sections. At points Bank of England was intervening 
to balance the devaluation while at the same time providing pound holders in 
FOREX market a great opportunity to sell off their holdings. That was creating a 
vicious cycle that constantly aggravated the situation. The Labour government saw 
the only solution to the revival of the world trade in which however had limited 
leverage, leaving aside the fact that there was a world recession. What attempted to 
do was to strengthen the British competitiveness in the international markets which 
required major industrial investments. The problem was that this strategy was more 
or less the common among the developed economies. But even if it was not, its 
realisation required the reversal of the long-standing low investment rate in the sense 
that increased productivity would lower the price of British products making them 
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more competitive and in the long run increasing the rate of return. Nevertheless, the 
low investment rate was undermining the future competitiveness which was on its 
turn putting obstacles in the present investment. What was most illustrating, though, 
that the government was not aware of the emergence of an over-accumulation crisis 
has been the underpinning logic behind the increased tax burden on the industrial 
capital. It aimed to mobilize industrialists towards an expansionist direction both 
internally and externally in order to override the tax burden. What was miscalculated, 
though, was that the decrease in demand caused by the inflation had exactly the 
opposite effect. Industrialists, in order to tackle taxation, economised in both stock 
levels and variable capital569. The situation was one in which the State finances were 
“trapped between a weak currency and an internal inflation that could only hope to 
be removed by economic growth, and an economic growth that it could not be 
created because of inflation and weak currency”. The same impasse was taking place 
at the other side of the governmental policy. Growth and inflation taming required 
the easing of interest rates and price controls which would, however, threaten the 
wage settlements which were used to slow down inflation570. 
 The high interest rates issue needs to be fleshed out because it covers a 
wider one related to the social contract of the Labour government. They were kept 
high and thus prevented industrial borrowing to protect the reserves and slow down 
the money circulation and consequently inflation. This was not only an intentional 
governmental policy but also the result of the extended public spending which was 
competing the private investments. Public spending on the other hand as materialised 
in the higher social wage, in pensions, social insurance etc. was crucial part of the 
social contract which planned to increase productivity through the creation of a 
climate of social justice. The economy, however, trapped in the abovementioned 
paradoxes could not deliver the much expected growth. The result therefore was that 
the government had to withdraw resources from an overall static GDP to fund the 
shift of wealth, the interventions in industry and the increasing social benefits to the 
increasing unemployed population. Since productivity – the creation of wealth – was 
                                                 
569 It worth mentioning, though, that in 1975 the cabinet was aware of the major consequence of the 
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limited, the taxation to materialise those policies were on the one hand contributing 
to the recession and on the other hand increasing inflation. Hence, the crux of the 
vicious cycle described by the previous paradoxes and therefore the solution to the 
problem became the dilemma between cutting expenditure programmes or continue 
borrowing heavily. The consequence of the first scenario was the further increase of 
unemployment which would hit the private sector as well and the problem was the 
increased labour militancy. The consequence of the second scenario was already 
present and visible, namely the further increase of money supply, inflation and 
devaluation of sterling. The problem on the other hand was that this situation 
couldn’t be continued for ever571.  
This dilemma and its eventual answer in favour of the first scenario were 
depicted in the various policies and budgets drafted by the Labour government. In 
line with the social contract the minority government until October 1974 settled with 
miners, returned to a five days week, imposed an immediate freeze on rents until the 
end of the year, started the process to bring land required for State-led development 
into public ownership, introduced tougher price controls and food subsidies. 
Pensions were calibrated according to the general level of earnings in the economy. 
An annual wealth tax was levied on assets over £100,000 and a capital transfer tax on 
gifts over £15,000. On the other hand negotiations started with TUC for wage 
restraints on voluntary basis572. The reflationary budget for the period between 
February and October was replaced by a milder one for the remainder of 1974 which 
increased the purchasing capacity of the people by cuts in VAT, further food 
subsidies and more tax relief; while it resolved to extensive international borrowing 
from bilateral agreements573.   
The aforementioned limitations of the previous economic policy had 
already become apparent by the time the new Labour government took office in 
October 1974. The subsequent policies, therefore, constitute the U-turn record of 
Labours during the 1970s. It was November 1974 when the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced four preoccupations, namely, to improve the balance of 
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payments, avoid unemployment, shift resources towards exports and investment, cut 
inflation by avoiding any excess in money supply and restrict wage increases 
according to what was agreed with the TUC. Those pillars constituted what almost 
every government was trying to achieve since the Second World War. What changed 
in this occasion, or in reality what didn’t change, were the specific measures 
implemented towards this direction. The government retreated from subsidies, price 
controls in markets and discipline over the private sector. It changed the corporation 
tax, urged banks to give priority in lending the manufacture sector and reduced 
subsidies to public sector industries. Those measures released around £1500 million 
in the market. The public sector borrowing requirement continued growing 
nonetheless. The Labour government was well aware that a reduction of public 
spending would result in a large increase of unemployment, however, the State 
phased out subsidies on public sector prices particularly in energy industries; coal, 
gas and electricity prices, therefore, increased significantly. At the same time local 
authorities were obliged to restrict their expenditure something which decreased the 
total amount of the social wage. Lastly, but more importantly, the government 
committed itself towards the containment of the wage increases which became the 
infamous £6 pay policy of July 1975574.  
This economic policy could be described as “purging”, although it wouldn’t 
make justice towards its real characteristics. The reason is that what was purged was 
the State’s role in the economy and not at all the private capital’s one575. Therefore, 
State protectionism for public enterprises was withdrawn in contrast with 
interventions in favour of the private capital which was intensified. The reason has 
been the government’s belief that any increase in employment required a thriving 
private sector. In a Janus-faced understanding of reality, however, the very same 
members of the cabinet were admitting that an increase in unemployment was 
                                                 
574 D. Coates 1980, pp 28-30. The incomes policy in this case was coined as voluntary. An overview 
of the propositions would reveal that the only difference between the voluntary and the statutory 
policies was that in the first case there were tax related sanctions or withdrawal of subsidies and aid, 
while in the second case there were criminal sanctions (B. Donoughue 1987, pp 62-71). One wonders 
of course, how voluntary is a policy that imposes sanctions even if they are just tax related.  
575 An interesting feature of this selective “purging” has been the new industrial strategy that came to 
light in November 1974. Essentially, the State from an active intervention stance was falling back to 
the liberal policy of creating merely the conditions for profitable investments. This plan, however, was 
never implemented; hence, the selective “purging”. See further in D. Coates 1980, p. 35. 
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expected and tolerated even if it crossed the one million mark576. Later those 
announcements would be publicly reversed and so on and so forth. As a matter of 
fact in January 1975 unemployed workers were 678,000 while in twelve months 
would reach 1,129,000 and continue rise in the subsequent years. Even with that high 
unemployment, though, inflation continued rising from 15% to 30% in almost one 
year until May 1975 and stabilising thereafter with slight increasing tendency close 
to 20%. In wage inflation, on the other hand, the government had mixed results. 
Between July 1974 and July 1975 wages and salaries were increasing faster than 
price inflation. After that point and for a year they decelerated to start increasing 
again until the end of 1978. Industrial output on the other hand didn’t present any 
significant rise until 1978577.  
 The April 1975 budget furthered the U-turn already set previously. Apart 
from the tax relief, deregulation of prices, direct public funding (£100 million) were 
made available to assist private corporations to begin capital projects578. On the other 
hand, £900 million were cut from the public expenditure which was translated into 
the loss of 20,000 jobs which neither affected the rising inflation or the unstable 
exchange rate of pound. In July 1975 an agreement between the government and the 
TUC concluded to a £6 maximum wage rise per week for a year. In return the 
government would reduce its planned cuts in food and house subsidies. The 
voluntary incomes policy was extended in the following years with 4.5% pay rise, 
which was later risen when the government faced a wave of strikes. Those policies, 
however, did few to tackle the problems of the British economy. The speculation 
against pound led the Bank of England to raise the minimum lending rate at 11% 
which, however, had counter effects on the growth strategy of the government. In 
summer 1975 30,000 labourers were being laid off every month. In an immediate 
reaction the government released £175 million to be injected into job saving schemes 
in an attempt to decelerate the rise of unemployment with no short term results579.  
                                                 
576 It worth mentioning Wilson’s statement that in accounting for the causes of Britain’s abnormally 
high rates of inflation among the lack of investment and endemic problems of industrial relations, it 
was also the chronic overmanning in essential industries. See further in D. Coates 1980, p. 33. 
577 D. Coates 1980, pp 30-32. 
578 T. Tomlinson 2004, p. 59. 
579 D. Coates 1980, pp 32-37, B. Donoughue 1987, p. 62 and T. Tomlinson 2004, p. 59. 
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Following the budgets of November 1974 and April 1975 which gave 
priority to the support of private investments in the expense mainly of public 
spending and local authorities, the February 1976 White Paper on public expenditure 
further reduced those cuts even in the agreed with TUC food subsidies. These cuts 
were to a degree the result of the IMF directions given in return for a loan to which 
the Labour government resolved in December 1975. Apparently, the investments to 
the public sector and servicing the sovereign debt resulted to an overall increasing 
deficit irrespective of the cuts. Despite the funds injected by the Bank of England to 
keep sterling stabilised, the external value of pound fell dramatically and increased 
the value of imported raw materials. Throughout the first half of 1976 the Bank of 
England kept the same strategy in vain. In July of that year, therefore, the 
government announced another set of public expenditure cuts this time even from the 
private investment support and employment stimulation schemes. The inability of 
any recovery brought in September of the same year a new IMF loan and even more 
cuts. The same story was repeated in December 1976 with cuts in the usual areas 
affecting the social contract and the social wage. The only beneficiary was the 
National Enterprises Board which was the main administrative tool in the hands of 
the government to support the private manufacturing sector580.  
In 1977 the image of British economy changed. Partly because of the arrival 
of the North Sea oil and partly because of the relative containment of the trade 
unions’ militancy the previous months, the balance of payments started getting better 
and speculative runs on sterling stopped. Actually, the situation reversed so 
dramatically that turned to a problem again. The appreciated sterling made British 
products more expensive and deteriorated their competitiveness. Additionally the 
easing of incomes policy by 1978 increased the production costs for the 
manufacturing enterprises. As a result unemployment remained relatively stable at 
much more than the 1 million mark, the index of industrial production remained low 
and the overall rate of return continued falling. In March 1977 budget, as well as in 
particular economic measure packages until April 1978, a relative reflation was 
initiated with tax cuts, child benefits, tax allowances, pension increases and £400 
million aid to construction industry and small businesses. The other side of the coin 
                                                 
580 D. Coates 1980, pp 38-41. See also B. Donoughue 1987, p. 91 for the July 1976 measures.  
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has been a new voluntary incomes policy, eased though, at 10%. The living standards 
were increased as well as the price inflation. The industry revival, however, was only 
slight and managed to decrease unemployment only at 90.000 (in comparison with 
1.32 million unemployed workers). The incompetence of investments in the 
industrial sector to produce profits led the government to raise the minimum lending 
rate in November 1978 to discourage further investments and make industrialists to 
economize in capital. The short-termed economic growth stopped abruptly as the 
balance of payments turned again to deficit by the end of 1978. The short lived 1979 
budget of the Labour government had once again to deal with the aforementioned 
deficit, high inflation, unemployment and intensified labour militancy especially in 
the public sector581.  
A retrospection of the Labour government economic policy reveals 
something more than a single U-turn. It could be rather characterised as a sequence 
of changes of the immediately previous policy. As a matter of fact, it has not been 
just the November 1974 economic measures that pointed a fundamental change with 
what was planned in the social contract, in the manifesto and what was to a degree 
implemented between February and October 1974. The previously mentioned 
measures between 1977 and 1978 mark also a change with the previous hard 
monetaristic economic policy, closer to what has been planned in the years in 
opposition. Finally once again, the 1979 budget, although not implemented, was 
reversing to exactly those austerity policies. In accounting for those changes one 
could refer to the external factor of international recession or of the aftershock of the 
oil crisis. It should be born in mind, however, that this factor was merely setting the 
conditions or more specifically the pressure upon the British economy. The particular 
way that this pressure has been dealt with, including the domestic capital over-
accumulation crisis, should be approached through the class struggle analysis within 
the State to which we now turn. 
The State intervened actively throughout the period between October 1974 
and early 1977 in the profitability of the dominating classes either through weighing 
the price controls or through direct financial aid. In this context, the bailing out of 
Chrysler UK in December 1975 for £184 million as such and the ruthless extortion 
                                                 
581 D. Coates 1980, pp 43-49. 
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by its owners regarding the unemployment cost caused by a potential shutdown of 
the industry serve as an exemplary of the role of the power bloc in the formation of 
State policy582. It had been however, the relationship between the power bloc and the 
dominated classes that affected mostly the formation of policy. Starting from the 
labour class, the increasing militancy from the previous years continued throughout 
the Labour governance from 1974 to 1979. Having in mind the experience from the 
previous government, Labours were preparing a different approach towards the trade 
unions, the culmination of which has been the Social Contract. As a matter of fact the 
few months of the hung parliament saw a relative rise of the actual and the social 
wage which, however, were bound to be reversed after November 1974. It’s difficult, 
in explaining this change, to ignore the role of the organized labour and focus solely 
to the economic environment and more specifically on the capital over-accumulation 
crisis as if the latter is not determined by labour’s share of output. It’s equally 
difficult to ascribe a full commitment of the Labour government in a pro-proletariat 
policy since the final version of the social contract as such and its interpretations 
were at least dubious583. From November 1974 onwards the attempted repayment of 
the public deficit as well as the revival of the British industry took place in the 
expense of the labourers. On the one hand, the actual incomes policy, voluntary or 
not, in combination with the increasing inflation reduced the take-home wages and 
salaries and on the other hand the public expenditure cuts were reducing the social 
wage584. The reduction in the size of the public sector along with the purging of the 
private one, which was taking place indeed irrespective of its attempted deceleration 
                                                 
582 B. Donoughue 1987, p. 53.  
583 B. Donoughue 1987. pp 52 and 60. In the first case for example Donoughue mentions that 
“Labour's problem was that its general commitment to industrial investment and maintaining full 
employment, as well as its close ties with the trade unions, made it politically difficult to cut out the 
bad parts of British industry, even though that was essential for its long-term efficiency and survival”. 
The contradiction with the real tolerance towards unemployment as expressed by the Prime Minister 
and Ministers themselves and mentioned before, questions the plausibility of this argument. In 
addition to that, one should also take into consideration Callaghan’s expressed anxiety, already since 
1969, about the power of the trade unions; “they are still much too powerful. This is our problem”. In 
V. Bogdanor 2004, p. 13.  
584 The distinction between the actual and the social wage reveals a particular aspect of the hegemonic 
strategy. The fact that the public expenditure cuts were economizing from fixed rather than current 
expenditure (redundancies or salary cuts) was affecting the social wage. This should be seen from a 
hegemonic strategy point of view as a form of damage management since they were affecting 
indirectly the life of beneficiaries rather than directly as it would happen if the majority of cuts were 
imposed on current expenditure.  
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through the State’s aid, resulted in the aforementioned exceptional increase of 
unemployment.  
The easing of the incomes policy as well as the benefits and allowances 
could prima facie been explained by the stabilisation in the value of pound sterling 
and the inflow of the North Sea oil. Taking into consideration, however, that the 
productivity of the industrial sector increased only slightly, while the profitability 
affected by the “expensive” pound, they seem to be two rather unconnected 
developments. The answer should be sought in the end of the containment of the 
labour movement by the trade unions in the way it was taking place the previous 
years. The collaboration with the trade unions during the years in opposition and the 
agreement of the social contract, established indeed a rapport between the two. 
Between 1975 and the mid-1977 the Labour government managed to convince the 
trade union leaders to accept the voluntary incomes policy – something that was in 
any case crossing the red line set by Hugh Scanlon585. As a matter of fact, stoppages 
and days lost were significantly reduced in comparison with the record of the 
previous years586. A different, non voluntaristic, understanding of these 
developments would be related with the nature of trade unions as State Apparatuses. 
What happened in reality was the result of the Heath industrial policy which 
extended the limits of the State by including the trade unions in a particular 
corporatism. This is not to say that trade unions as such do not constitute in any case 
mainly Ideological State Apparatuses587. It’s rather the fact that from a partisan and 
peripheral organisation which was affecting policy making by reflection588 they 
gradually became central players in the political level. They were not just bargaining 
but negotiating policies. What happened in 1977 onwards, therefore, has been the 
extension of the consequence of the corporatist policy that emerged already from the 
previous conservative governance. The union leaders by gaining rapport with the 
government, they were losing rapport with their members. The labour movement was 
                                                 
585 See for example B. Donoughue 1987, p. 75 conclusion that “without the support of the TUC the 
Labour government would have foundered – as indeed happened when it lost trade union support in 
1978-9”. 
586 See also D. Coates 1980, p. 25. 
587 R. Taylor 2004, p. 84 et seq. presents an illustrative example of the struggle taking place within 
trade unions in the period in question proving exactly their State Apparatus nature. 
588 Without of course the case of Civil Service trade unions which affect policy making directly. 
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well separated from its trade union leadership589. A factor that should be brought into 
consideration is also the fact that because of the social contract industrial democracy 
has been extended within the trade union movement enabling powers otherwise 
suppressed590. The centralisation of trade unions in the aggregate of State 
Apparatuses made the already intensified class struggle within them more 
influencing. If this conclusion were brought in the previous analysis, it would mean 
that the reflationary budgets of 1977 and 1978 were in reality concessions in order to 
retain the hegemonic strategy of the unstable equilibrium of power.    
The July 1976 package of austerity measures marked the turning point of 
the relationship between the power bloc and the labour movement591. As a matter of 
fact the number of stoppages after a one year and a half period of relative labour 
peace between July 1975 and December 1976 started rising again in the same levels 
as with the last period of the previous conservative government. The stabilisation of 
the balance of payments didn’t have any substantial influence in labour militancy 
which remained high in the next years and culminated in what is established in the 
popular memory as “winter of discontent”, namely the winter of 1978-79. It must be 
mentioned, that not even the expected call for elections in early autumn 1978 
managed to reduce the number of stoppages and working days lost. After a futile 
attempt to impose a new payment policy with TUC in October 1978, a massive wave 
of strikes begun in key sectors as in the case of oil-tanker drivers, road haulage 
drivers, local authority manual workers, water and sewage workers etc. As Bernard 
Donoughue puts it “there was a curious, feverish madness infecting industrial 
relations and in some cases unions actually went on strike before their pay claims 
                                                 
589 The same was taking place in the different levels of trade unionism. For example in October 1978 
the government attempted to forge a new pay policy with TUC in order to prepossess individual trade 
unions which would have to come at odds with TUC in case they were disagreeing. While the 
economic committee of TUC agreed on the basis of the new policy, it accidentally didn’t pass from 
the General Council for just one vote while some key members in favour of the policy were absent. In 
B. Donoughue 1987, pp 169-170. 
590 See for example R. Taylor 2004, p. 83 and V. Bogdanor 2004, p. 11. The same author, however, 
observes in the trade unions of the period the emergence of individualism which led to the anarchic 
industrial relations of the 1970s (more or less the same line is followed by R. Taylor 2004, pp 99-
100). Nevertheless, one wonders how the “upsurge of individualism” managed to lead to collective 
bargaining or common struggle. Instead of this, focus should be placed on the State Apparatus nature 
of trade unions. Being loci of struggle themselves means that the powers demanding more than a 
compromise with the government were “gaining space” in the vector of the class struggle. 
Furthermore, the demand for industrial democracy could be also seen as an achievement of the 
struggle “from below”. 
591 D. Coates 1980, p. 39. 
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had been submitted”592. In mid-January 1979 the shortages in products in the 
markets, raw materials in industries and of water in some areas became apparent. The 
railwaymen soon followed suit along with local authority manual workers and the 
total of public service workers closing hospitals, schools and local authorities. By 
March, nurses, teachers and civil service itself went on strike. A significant issue has 
been that the capitulation of the government to a wage claim didn’t mean that the 
same sector wouldn’t go again on strike. At the same time, the labour militancy 
didn’t just mean a work stoppage. The images of rioting, violent picketing and lack 
of sensitivity with patient admission refusal in hospitals or corpses left unburied were 
prevalent. As B. Donoughue admits “More daunting was the fact that ahead of us lay 
the massed ranks of the miners and the electricity supply workers. If we capitulated 
to filing clerks, what prospects did we have of fighting battalions with real clout?”593. 
What has been most significant, though, had been the complete inability of the union 
leaders and more specifically of the TUC to control the individual unions. In mid-
February 1979 the government was struggling to settle an agreement with trade 
unions on restraining the wage claims as well as the control of secondary picketing 
and no-strike agreements in essential services. The agreement failed clearly because 
TUC leaders could not deliver the cooperation of their members594.  
As already seen, the rising class contradictions did not affect only the 
relationship between the proletariat and the power bloc but also between the latter 
and the petty-bourgeoisie. In the pick of the crisis, the, already built from the 
previous governments, alliance between the power bloc and the class fractions in 
question was facing difficulties. Under this light we should interpret the expressed 
concern by Harold Wilson himself regarding the falling living standards in the fight 
against inflation595. The “living standards” affected by inflation were referring to the 
petty-bourgeoisie and the working aristocracy rather than the always precarious jobs 
of the working classes. The most important part of this contradiction, however, was 
taking place in the field of the civil service, in other words between the power bloc 
                                                 
592 B. Donoughue 1987, p. 171. 
593 B. Donoughue 1987, pp 171-183. 
594 It worth mentioning what one of the TUC representatives stated: “We all agree with what you say, 
Jim [Callaghan], but there is nothing that we can do about it”. In B. Donoughue 1987, p. 179. See also 
T. Tomlinson 2004, p. 57. 
595 D. Coates 1980, p. 42. 
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and the State Personnel. A particular characteristic of this social category should be 
reminded. Civil servants due to their exposure to the dominant ideology participate in 
the class struggle in a distinct way. Therefore, although the militancy of civil 
servants continued throughout the 1970s, the specific ways that this was being 
expressed was particularized mainly in a “war of attrition” rather than a fully fledged 
clash. There is a wide bibliography and collection of statements on the role and the 
inertia of the Civil Service in implementing non favoured policies while promoting 
preferable ones596. One of the most notables has been the conclusion of a Labour 
Party Report on the Machinery of Government which stated already in 1976-78 that 
the civil service had an “inbuilt anti-socialist bias” while its supposed impartiality 
was “a constitutional myth which acts to the positive detriment of a Labour 
government”597. This relative autonomy in withstanding the implementation of 
policies was also appearing from the opposite side, namely as direct promotion of 
individual interests. A notable example is the way in which the fees and increments 
had been excluded by the pay policy in 1975 through a direct intervention by civil 
servants in drafting the white paper598. A similar case was recorded in March 1979 
when the Civil Service Pay Research Unit – a committee manned by civil servants – 
asked for a wage increased ranging from 26% to 48% which further triggered the 
strike in civil service sector with relevant wage claims. What is significant in this 
case is that the employees who were themselves responsible for the implementation 
of a strict pay policy were asking their exemption but most importantly the 
committee circumvented the cost in the budget of this claim as well as specific 
channels of communication that would “prejudice” negatively the final political 
decision. Similar behaviour has been witnessed with failed attempts to devolve 
departments of the civil service and impose cuts on the civil service budget599. In 
parallel, the Civil Service Department established in 1968 under the 
recommendations of the Fulton Report gradually became a protective shield of the 
civil servants, rather than a tool for the rationalisation of their performance600. These 
cases are illustrative examples of the nature of the State as a compilation of 
                                                 
596 See a collection in K. Theakston et al. 2004. 
597 In K. Theakston et al. 2004, p. 208. 
598 B. Donoughue 1987, p. 71 and R. Taylor 2004, p. 83. 
599 B. Donoughue 1987, pp 181-182. 
600 K. Theakston et al. 2004, p. 212. 
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apparatuses in which the vector of the class struggle exerts pressure towards specific 
direction. At the same time they constitute example of the hegemonic strategy since 
ministers decided finally to capitulate in the wage claim in order to avoid losing the 
support of the main “tool” of administration, namely the civil service. It’s not a 
coincidence, further, that unemployment which rose extensively throughout the 
period in question was deliberately kept out of the public sector, inflicting wholly the 
private one601. Another, however, aspect of the hegemonic strategy has been the 
attempt to short-circuit the outcome of the class struggle. Bernard Donoughue’s book 
about the history of the Downing Street Policy Unit constitutes an excellent example 
of the isolation of policy-makers from the established information diffusion channel 
of the civil service. As already implied, however, the class struggle within the stricto 
sensu State didn’t remain at the level of “war of attrition” but moved, although 
delayed in comparison with the rest of the working classes, to actual striking602. It’s 
this militancy among the civil service employees which explains the fact that the 
Fulton Report603 regarding the corporatisation without privatisation was never 
implemented after being halted by the end of 1972, although it has been 
commissioned by the previous Labour government. More or less the same course 
was followed by the Programme Analysis and Review technique of management by 
objectives and the Central Policy Review Staff which petered-out during the latter 
half of the 1970s. The reason was that “the Labour government had no stomach for 
another round of administrative reform”604.  
The previously described conditions bring forward again the question of 
political crisis. Apart from the already mentioned policy U-turns, the extended 
unease in the industrial relations and the continuing inability of the trade unions to 
control the labour movement, one has to add some further factors. The winter of 
discontent is not just the compilation of some events in industrial relations. It rather 
created its own dynamic since the assertive spirit in the Social Formation was to a 
degree self-fuelled, bringing more and more productive sectors on strike. Although a 
state of emergency was never called, the available data from the cabinet meetings, 
                                                 
601 B. Donoughue 1987, p. 188. This of course refers to both the productive and the service sectors 
under public ownership or competence. 
602 See for example K. Theakston et al. 2004, pp 212-213. 
603 Ibidem p. 213. 
604 K. Theakston et al. 2004, p. 211. 
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from the suggestions made to the Prime Minister as well as from the latter’s second 
thoughts as expressed some years later, prove that it was a very strong possibility605. 
It’s difficult to speculate the outcome of a different decision. What is an objective 
reality, instead, is that this government was obliged to call for elections under the 
same circumstances as the previous one; namely under the pressure of an immense 
strike wave. This issue along with a series of others, the most prominent being the 
policy U-turn and the pay policy, were creating serious cracks in the labour wing of 
the mass party606. This doesn’t only refer to the distance between the government and 
the party but also in cracks within the cohesion of the Labour MPs607 and the 
Cabinet. The question that arises again is if those factors are enough to “diagnose” a 
discontinuity in the political support of the Capitalist Mode of Production, namely a 
political crisis. Again, however, the answer would have been negative. The threat of 
a political crisis was apparent but it did not transform into a reality. In the labour 
movement the non economistic claims never became dominant, leaving the 
prevalence to the wage claims. In the political scene, the small majority achieved in 
1974 faded away through by-elections and defections already since 1977. A Liberal-
Labour pact as well as the Ulster unionists, the Scottish and Welsh nationalists, 
however, supported the minority government until its final collapse. Therefore, the 
political system took care of its own reproduction even if it was against the “will of 
the people”. Furthermore, in the conservative wing of the mass party, the change of 
leadership may not be understood as sign of crisis but definitely it marked a change 
of rhetoric which exerted more pressure in the whole situation.  
Turning to the purging of the economy, although privatisation as such 
didn’t appear as policy, the government appeared to be rather ambivalent towards it. 
In the first period, the heavy taxation was accelerating the destruction of capital in 
the private sector. After the U-turn, however, the government embarked in a 
                                                 
605 B. Donoughue 1987, p. 175. 
606 The new understanding of the economic reality was announced in the Labour party Conference in 
1976 by James Callaghan who commented that “, it was no longer possible for the Government 
simply to put its foot on the economic accelerator and spend its way out of unemployment” triggering 
mixed responses. The IV clause dispute continued to liquidate cohesion in the Labour party since, 
although not deleted, it was practically abandoned with few exemptions. See further in B. Donoughue 
1987, pp 145 and 148.  
607 When for example in December 1978 the British Leyland trade unions claimed a wage increase up 
to 37%, much higher than the voluntary directive of 5%, the sanctions accompanying the pay policy 
were defeated on a motion in the Commons when five Labour MPs deliberately abstained. See further 
in B. Donoughue 1987, p. 172. 
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distinctive mixture of policy combining on the one hand protectionism and 
intervention in the private industry and on the other cuts in public expenditure608. 
The latter increased the dependence of people on market provision of services and 
therefore to their profitability and contributed extensively in the rise of 
unemployment. This Janus-faced approach leaves the official argument in favour of 
this policy, namely that the main concern was unemployment which would be 
reduced by a “thriving industry”, unsupported since at the same time the public 
expenditure cuts were doing the opposite. The fact that this was a recurrent image in 
the budget from November 1974 onwards practically reveals – in combination with 
the self-contradicting statements - the actual intention which was the destruction of 
labour powers609. This would allow implementing more effectively a lower income 
policy by minimising the losses in the already invested capital. Indeed, it’s wrong to 
perceive the IMF role as the catalyst which triggered the monetarist policies since 
they’ve already been implemented since 1974610. Therefore, it has been an absolutely 
purging economic policy directly in the expense of labour.   
It must be clarified at this point that what really matters in this kind of 
analysis is not the intentions but the actual results of the policies. The reason is that 
the capitalist State itself is calibrated towards specific directions which are 
determined by the vector of the struggle in its apparatuses. The aforementioned 
examples of civil service inertia towards any change of their salaries and status or the 
role of the Downing Street Policy Unit are illustrative611. Another example has been 
the role of the Treasury in the administration of the crisis generally612 and especially 
                                                 
608 See in R. Taylor 2004, p. 78 a number of subsidies, bailed out and aided corporations.  
609 An interesting example of those intentions is revealed in the passage referred previously at footnote 
510. What stands out is the fact that an advisory unit created by and referring directly to the Prime 
Minister approaches the relationship between the Labour party and the trade unions or its assumed 
commitment to full employment as a problem. It moreover suggests to “cut out the bad parts of British 
industry” to secure its long term efficiency and survival – a clearly purging policy – in a section in 
which the writer discusses the reorganisation of the public sector industries. In a volte-face the same 
person leading this Unit thinks on the other hand that the rising unemployment was unacceptable (B. 
Donoughue 1987, p 144-145).   
610 T. Tomlinson 2004, pp 61-62 where he also mentions that Labours have never been a fully 
Keynesian party. Proto-monetarist approaches already existed at the right of the party during the 
period in question. 
611 See for example the Unit’s approach towards the nature of cuts in the public expenditure that 
should have been imposed or towards full employment and trade unions in B. Donoughue 1987, pp 62 
and 52 respectively.   
612 See for example the Treasury’s insistence in a statutory payment policy in contrast with the Prime 
Minister’s directions using the “bounce” political strategy (in B. Donoughue 1987, p. 66) or its 
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in the IMF intervention in 1976613. For example the centrality of the Treasury on the 
one hand in the formation of almost every single policy and its institutionalised focus 
on certain aspects of the economy and not on others as in the case of 
unemployment614 makes its employees generally susceptible to certain ideas and 
solution. It’s not by coincidence for example that several writers identify the 
emergence of monetarist ideas among the Treasury officials at around that period615. 
Their keenness to implement them brought the Chancellor of the Exchequer to 
repeatedly bring forward the IMF solution long before the British economy resolves 
to its loans. The Treasury is even accused for inflating the borrowing figures and 
manipulating political strategies to achieve the monetarist goals either through non-
transparent negotiations with IMF or more often through the “bouncing” strategy in 
which officials wait until a financial index reaches alarming levels before they 
announce their concern and present their preferable solution. Especially in the period 
in question, the Treasury intervened against the will of the Cabinet and the Prime 
Minister in order to arrange higher public expenditure cuts in return of the IMF 
loan616. Obviously the dominated classes’ militancy was also contributing in the final 
formation of policy and ultimately at the final form of the State. Aside the 
abovementioned strikes’ wave, the resistance of the labourers either threatened or 
                                                                                                                                          
suggestion as soon as late 1975 to further “squeeze” the economy in order to create was they called “a 
hole for expansion” (in B. Donoughue 1987, p. 84) in other words they were clearly and openly 
suggesting the furtherance of the purging policies.  
613 In an interesting passage from his book, B. Donoughue (1987, p. 94) provides a firsthand 
experience of the particular calibration of the State Apparatuses. “Interestingly, in view of later 
developments after the Conservatives returned to power in 1979, the ΙMF crisis provided a first 
opportunity for some (although not all) people in the Treasury and in the Bank of England to take the 
opportunity to try to change the whole economic stance which had characterised all British 
governments since the Second World War. The first major push took place during the crisis to secure 
a massive switch of resources from the public to the private sector. The broad policies which are now 
characterised as “Thatcherism”, together with the now “familiar language” were in fact launched in 
primitive form at Mr Callaghan in 1976 from the Treasury, from the Bank, and above all from the 
ΙMF and sections of the US Treasury. Had the Prime Minister accepted the original ΙMF- proposals, 
there would not have been much more for Mrs Thatcher to do on the public Sector front”. He might be 
pointing on persons rather than on structures but aside the caveat of personal conditionality he 
provides an illustrative example of the way that State Apparatuses and more specifically, the vector of 
the class struggle taking place there transforms the State itself.   
614 B. Donoughue 1987, p. 147. 
615 See for example K. Hickson 2004, pp 34-51, where he defines those ideas as neo-Keynesian rather 
than monetarist. Irrespective of the definition, the results remain similar. B. Donoughue 1987, pp 100-
101 where he also states how fast the existing procedures and Whitehall narrative adjusted to the new 
monetarist ideas, concepts and procedures.  
616 K. Theakston et al. 2004, p. 210 and B. Donoughue 1987, pp 79-102. See also T. Tomlinson 2004, 
p. 62 about the general intellectual weight of the Treasury’s perceptions. 
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actual had more direct effects in such degree that was leading to political decision 
which were coming at odds with the general governmental policy. For example the 
nationalisation of Chrysler UK was exceeding the general policy of industrial aid as 
well as coming against the purging direction of the public sector. What led there, 
however, was not just the fear of the cost of unemployment but the threat of 
widespread civil disorder much like the case of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders some 
years earlier. Especially the Scottish Ministers were predicting riots at Chrysler’s 
Glasgow Linwood plant617. 
 
- The crisis debated 
Before moving to the analysis of the 1980s and the government by 
Margaret Thatcher an alternative perception of crisis should be discussed. As already 
seen Hall et al. published the thought provoking book Policing the Crisis focusing 
mostly on the Tory “interregnum” between 1970 and 1974 and their thesis is that 
there was indeed a State crisis in Britain. They analyse more or less the same facts as 
those presented here. By focusing, however, solely on the ideological level they 
identify a crisis of Hegemony, or State crisis, in four points618. The first one is a 
passing reference to the crisis of “British capitalism” without any further analysis on 
the cause and manifestations of the crisis that would elucidate the particular political 
agenda. The second point lies at the crisis of the political class struggle which is 
experienced as a crisis of the “Party”. It has already been shown, however, that, 
irrespective of contradictions, the domination of the Mass Party remained intact. 
Hegemony was directing votes to Labour and Conservative parties, preventing any 
radicalisation. The third point of crisis refers to the crisis of the State. In a brief 
passage, Hall et al. seem to conceive transformations of the State as its crisis. To this 
extent, the analyses on Authoritarian Populism are cancelled, since they refer to an 
“emergency State” rather than a new type of class condensation. The final point of 
crisis is located in the tilt of the index of Hegemony towards coercion. They neglect 
the fact, however, that coercion is always present and necessary in Hegemony but not 
in a supplementary form.  
                                                 
617 B. Donoughue 1987, p. 53. 
618 S. Hall et al. 1982, pp 317-319. 
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In accounting for Heath government policies, Hall et al. proceed to a logical 
gap. They understand the U-turns as a sign of crisis619 but in reality they were 
attempts to safeguard consensus. Signs of crisis cannot be both the protection of 
consensus and administration of coercion. As a matter of fact, the same working 
classes that were active in the Saltley Coke and during the 'winter of discontent' had 
been voting interchangeably for the Labour and Conservative parties throughout the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s decades that are into question here.  
 
- The 1980s: reorganisation and tactics 
Before turning to a brief exposition of the economic policies during the 
1980s, special focus should be dedicated to a previous development. In 1974 short 
after the defeat of the Conservative government in the general elections, a 
“nationalised industry policy group” was established in the Tory party, chaired by 
Nicholas Ridley, to examine once again the possibilities of a privatisation policy. 
According to Ridley his second report which was finalised in 1977 was identical to 
the first one from 1968 with the necessary updates620. It forms a substantially purging 
economic environment for the public sector that fits neatly in a monetarist/supply 
side approach to the economy. What is more important, though, is the political 
strategy planned to be employed in multiple levels of administration621.  
The first part of the report refers to the way that nationalised industries, 
utilities and services should run. After a short exposition of the public sector 
inefficiencies regarding the lack of motivation (either bankruptcy or higher 
dividends) and the lack of information on operation costs, it moves to the 
relationship with the private sector in terms of competition and the cost of raising 
capital which is much lower for the public sector. In order to compensate for that a 
series of actions should be taken. A flat rate of return should be set for all industries. 
To calculate this rate, the employed capital, given that public industries did not 
update the value of their assets, should be arbitrarily estimated. Based on this 
estimation and in the view of achieving that rate of return, any capital advancements 
would cost to industry a little more than it costs for the exchequer so that after few 
                                                 
619 S. Hall et al. 1982, pp 261 and 304. 
620 N. Ridley 1991, p. 15. 
621 For the following presentation of the Ridley Report see more analytically in Economic 
Reconstruction Group 1977. 
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years borrowing between the public and the private sector would be outbalanced. If 
the rate of return is not achieved, “effective action” must be taken which practically 
means uneconomic plants closed down, businesses sold off or liquidated and 
consequently workers laid off622. The rate of return will moreover be the basis on 
calculating the price per unit for each State industry. Faithful to a supply-side 
approach, therefore, the report stresses that price controls should be avoided at all 
costs. The case of undertaking uneconomic activities is a revealing one. If an activity 
proves to be uneconomic, the industry in question may ask for governmental subsidy. 
If the claim is rejected, it would be up to the management of the industry to decide 
whether it would keep it running or not. If the respective State department decides 
that the uneconomic activity is needed, the subsidy will be incurred by the allotted 
budget to the State department. The allocation, therefore, of responsibility does not 
only touch industries themselves but ministerial politics as well. The importance of 
this development is that this is an attempt to insulate economy from the political 
influence and retain the opposite direction given that in a generally strict monetaristic 
policy direction, both the nationalised industries and their political superintendents 
were bound in a lose-lose relationship. This is further supported by the only power 
left to the political administration which is the control of investment in those 
industries. The civil service and consequently the sponsoring department will acquire 
a vigilant role through the publication of a detailed five-year corporate plan in which 
the commitment of the government will always be decreasing. The purpose of this 
control would be to restrict nationalised industries in their main-line activity and 
avoid damaging the private sector. Although the more specific policies of investment 
control would be imposed from the each time competent ministry, the flat rate of 
return would be determined by the ministry of finance which takes a central position 
in both the circumscription and allocation of funds; a central role in the purging 
policy therefore. 
Along the same lines, the wage policy in relation to the nationalised 
industries reveals the full political strategy of the report. It acknowledges that wage 
                                                 
622 As the report tellingly stresses “it must eventually be taken for granted that in order to meet the 
obligation plants must be closed and people must be sacked”. In a later point, the report is aware of 
the fact that making industries more efficient – meaning closing down uneconomic activities - would 
deprive whole cities of their sole income resource. 
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claims would be difficult to resist since trade unions “have the nation by the jugular 
vein”. More specifically, it differentiates indicatively between the ‘category I’ 
industries, utilities and services like sewerage and water, electricity, NHS and Gas 
where no week of strike can be tolerated. ‘Category II’ strikes in Railways, coal, 
docks and dustmen could be tolerated for some weeks; while ‘category III’ strike in 
buses and tubes, posts and telephones, education, civil service and tax, air transport 
and steel may continue for a long time. Moreover, it discusses the restrictions on 
striking which in the United Kingdom cover only the police, the armed forces and 
gas, electricity and postal workers under certain circumstances. The report adopts a 
series of recommendations regarding the pay policy in the public sector. It finds it 
non-recommended but in case that it cannot be avoided, the government should reject 
the horizontal expansion of wage increases. Therefore, an increase of 26% in a sector 
doesn’t legitimize a similar increase in another sector. Wages increases should, 
instead, be related to the labour market, namely the shortage or surplus of manpower 
in the industry concerned and the vulnerability to a strike. In order to accommodate 
the increase of wages, the need to maintain specific percentage in the rate of return 
and continue the purging policies, the report suggests that the wage claims or 
excessive overmanning would be counterbalanced either by increased prices for the 
consumer, increased productivity or cutting inefficient units. In short time, that 
would increase the unpopularity of trade unions. The report continues estimating the 
opposition from the trade unions towards this policy. It rejects though extending the 
legal restrictions to strike as well as the formation of strikebreaking corps since both 
solutions wouldn’t secure the major issue which is the continuing operation of the 
industries, services and utilities in question. Intervention in tax refunds and 
unemployment pay for strikes would deliver, instead, a much needed calibration of 
the system.  
Equally revealing is the planning on the management of the nationalised 
industries. The not just underpinning but verbatim declared purpose is to insulate 
their functioning from the political or civil service inputs. The fragmentation of the 
industries into independent units is coupled through a strategy that enables managers 
to develop business plans in order to achieve the prescribed goals. Therefore, the 
decentralisation of management in subsidiaries units, the deliberate self-restrain from 
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ministers in interfering with administration and the transformation of nationalised 
industry boards into ‘supervisory boards’ would give the maximum possible freedom 
to their operation and at the same time protect them from political intervention. As a 
matter of fact, the report presents as advantage of this proposal the lack of 
democratic accountability, since there is no need for specific legislation for those 
changes. Otherwise, a bill would “stir up an unnecessary hornet’s nest”. The 
commercially-minded bankers and holding company chairmen who would undertake 
the responsibility to manage the nationalised industries, exactly due to their freedom 
of act, are expected to receive the major wave of discontent.  
The second part of the report refers to the suggested strategy for the 
denationalisations. Firstly, a relevant legislation would end the monopolies wherever 
there is a State monopoly. The report lists indicatively coal pits, electricity, post 
office, steel and buses. The methods devised range from permitting private 
generators to sell electricity to the Grid to more complicated procedures including 
the transfer of licensing for private mines to the ministers instead of the National 
Coal Board and splitting the letter post from telecommunication functions of the Post 
Office. The latter overlaps with the second strategy, which is the fragmentation of 
industries into smaller units. In cases where this would have been feasible, given that 
there are some practical considerations, it would allow reducing the public sector 
trade unions, purge the inefficient units, decentralise management responsibility but 
the cardinal reason is the facilitation of denationalisations. The expected reaction 
from the trade unions and the civil service could be circumvented because the 
fragmentation and the decentralised management could increase productivity. Given 
that wage claims would only be delivered under increased productivity, the 
possibility of increases in earnings would possibly disrupt the trade union militancy. 
Denationalisation, therefore, would be both more attractive and more difficult to be 
reversed.   
Finally, a number of denationalisation methods are discussed. The 
motivation as explicitly pointed is not to raise funding from selling State assets but 
specifically to transfer them in the private sector to protect them from the “evils of 
the State-run industry”. For each company, service and utility (or groups of them) 
different solutions are suggested. Utilities and especially those that require a network 
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like gas, water, railways are not recommended for privatisation before a solution 
with the needed regulation is found. A different group of companies, however, that 
are mainly factory-based manufacturing industries could be sold directly or by 
floating their shares to the market. Companies with multiple service points like ports, 
airports and the National Coal Board with its several coal pits should first be 
fragmented to the basic units and then give or sell shares to their workers. 
Furthermore, for other companies an ad hoc solution is recommended ranging from 
direct selling to more complicated processes.   
Throughout the report, the group is concerned about the reactions of the 
trade unions and the civil service. What is then suggested is not a frontal attack but a 
general strategy of returning the industries, services and utilities in the private sector 
by stealth. This is further analysed in the confidential annex at the end of the report. 
Based possibly on the previous experience of the Heath government, the report 
estimates that a casus belli will appear few months after taking office most likely in 
the grounds of a wage claim on a vulnerable – category I – industry. The strategy 
employed is based on the idea of choosing the “battle ground” on more suitable area 
and conditions. Therefore, in order to avoid confrontation in the vulnerable industries 
a more lax rate of return shall be established to allow scope for giving in to a wage 
claim. The policy, however, should remain intact in category II industries where 
trade unions could be provoked and won. A victory there, would discourage an attack 
on a more vulnerable ground. The report, however, warns that the risk of losing the 
battle in those industries is major since transmitting the assertiveness in the 
vulnerable industries like electricity or gas would have detrimental effects. In 
specifying this idea, the group suggest docks as the most suitable one to provoke and 
win the labour movement. Nevertheless, the most likely area of confrontation is the 
coal industry. In tackling this, government should make preparations in advance like 
stockpiling of coal at power stations, installation of oil firing systems and hiring 
strike-breaking lorry drivers – in contrast with the declaration at the non confidential 
part of the report. The greatest deterrent, however, for any strike would have been to 
reduce their wages by means of withdrawing benefits and tax refunds. For this reason 
legislation should be set early enough before industrial actions start. The final 
strategy requires special mentioning since it arose major criticism when the 
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confidential annex leaked in 1978. The future Tory government should be prepared 
to deal with violent picketing that, along the lines of the previous policy, surpasses 
the changes in the nationalised industries and is more far-reaching. In other words, 
what is needed is a strategy to repress the tangible threat and not just deter the 
industrial actions. For this reason it suggests the formation of a large mobile squad of 
police, specially trained and equipped to stop civil disobedience. In parallel private 
haulage companies should recruit non-union drivers willing to cross picket lines in 
order to leave the supplying of industries and docks unaffected623.  
The importance of the Ridley Report consists of two revealing facts. On the 
one hand, it’s a fully fledged purging policy of the State capital directed towards the 
increase of the private profitability. What is clearly the underpinning logic, is not 
raising capital to ease the public sector borrowing requirement but removing public 
capital from the market to increase the market share obtained by the private sector. 
For example in preparing for the denationalisation, the report suggests the 
fragmentation of industries and increasing profitability by connecting productivity 
and increased wages. One wonders of course, why a profitable public industry should 
be sold at the first place if not for triggering profitability at the private sector. The 
fact that reversing the falling rate of profit had been the goal is also obvious in the 
confidential annex where reactive policies are expanded beyond the field of public 
interest. Strike-breaking strategies, industrial action policing and reduction of 
strikers’ incomes go beyond the scope of nationalised industries, services and 
utilities which anyway fall into the State’s competence as employer and reach the 
handling of labour movement militancy in the private sector as well. On the other 
hand, and most importantly, this is a very detailed strategy. Purging policies have 
been followed since the mid-1960s. What really distinguishes this plan is that it’s 
practically a stratagem to contain the expected insurrection. Furthermore, what really 
stands out in the Thatcher policy is that it actually followed this detailed plan unlike 
                                                 
623 “We must be prepared to deal with the problem of violent picketing. This again is a matter going 
beyond policy for nationalised industries. But it is also vital to our policy that on a future occasion we 
defeat violence in breach of the law on picketing. The only way to do this is to have large, mobile 
squad of police who are equipped and prepared to uphold the law against the likes of the Saltley Coke-
works mob.  
 It also seems a wise precaution to try and get some haulage companies to recruit some good 
non-union drivers who will be prepared to cross picket lines, with police protection. They could 
always be used in the crunch situation which usually determines the result of any such contest” in 
Economic Reconstruction Group 1977, pp 25-26.  
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the previously commissioned by the Heath government and moved even further624. A 
mixture of appeasement in the first instance as the government buys time to prepare 
legislation, stockpiling and public opinion with full confrontation at a later point. 
The policies recorded in the Ridley Report reflect to a large degree the 
economic policies followed in the 1980s. Purpose of this section is not to present the 
macroeconomics of the Thatcher government in detail since there is already an 
abundance of analyses625. Purpose, instead, is to find the relationship between the 
economic policies of the 1980s and of the previous decades. The monetarist 
understanding of the economy, that became apparent in the British economy after 
1976 and the IMF loan, was further intensified but at the same time “devalued”. 
Therefore, the preoccupation with controlling the money supply and the availability 
of credit were seen as great tools for controlling inflation but nothing more than that. 
In other words, macroeconomics focused away from promoting prosperity on just 
controlling inflation. Fiscal policies were ruled out and replaced from an aspiration 
of the balanced budgets. On the other hand, distinctive focus was placed on the 
microeconomics and especially on the supply-side measures of the economy such as 
tax reform, privatisations and restriction of trade-union power626. 
As early as 1979 the Medium Term Financial Strategy constituted the basis 
of the macroeconomic policy. It outlined specific targets of public spending and 
borrowing with the view of restricting inflation. As a matter of fact, inflation fell 
dramatically from 18% in 1980 to 3% in 1986. Nevertheless, the strict financial 
policy went that far that caused recession in 1981. The other side of the economic 
problem during the previous decade, namely unemployment, rose steadily close to 3 
million in 1986. The later part of the 1980s saw a fluctuation with initially a small 
decline due to a short reflation of the economy and a later increase reaching 1.8 
million in 1990. In the third part of the economic issue, public expenditure fell 
remarkably from 44% of the GDP in 1979 to 40% by 1990. The fiscal dividend that 
appeared from the combination of diminished spending and economic growth 
                                                 
624 N. Ridley 1991, p. 15. 
625 See for example a detailed analysis by C. Johnson 1991. 
626 A. Seldon et al. 2000.   
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allowed the government to reduce direct taxation and further increase the potential 
for increased productivity627. 
Throughout the 1980s much like the previous years the government 
implemented a positive environment for businesses but at the same time helped the 
increase of competition among them. Therefore, on the one hand it reduced capital 
tax and tax on small companies. The financial market, namely banks, building 
societies and the City were largely deregulated. Exchange controls were abolished 
and sterling was freely convertible allowing companies to accumulate assets abroad, 
which was translated into a sharp increase of investments abroad. The other side of 
the coin was that industrial and regional subsidies were halted. The easing of the 
business environment meant increased potential for profits but also no help for the 
“lame ducks”. Therefore, the purging of the British economy was accelerated. The 
most important supply side measure, however, has been the privatisation policy.  By 
1990 50 big companies had either been sold or were for sale. That figure constituted 
two thirds of State’s industrial assets in 1979. Private share holders rose within a 
decade from 3 to 9 million substantiating the vision of popular capitalism. There 
were also some shortcomings since network based utilities such as gas and 
telecommunications as already estimated by Ridley could not easily be fragmented. 
They were sold, therefore, as such marking the transfer of public monopolies to 
private hands. When later some competition was introduced, regulation had also to 
be introduced which altered the basic premises of the privatisation ideology628.  
Turning now to the class analysis, the previously presented macroeconomic 
policy had substantial consequences in the composition of the dominated classes. 
The deregulation of the financial market and the ease of capital flow was a profitable 
development for banks, building societies and the stock market; while, the 
withdrawal of subsidies and industrial policies was in the expense of the industrial 
capital which, however, was given the opportunity to flee abroad because of the 
deregulation of exchange controls. The result has been a change of the general 
direction of British economy from industrial production to service provision.  
 
 
                                                 
627 A. Seldon et al. 2000, pp 65-67. 





Source: Office for National Statistics. The blue colour depicts the productive sector while the red one 
the service sector. Capital services is used in this occasion instead of net capital stock due to the 
nature of service provision that doesn’t require extensive investments in constant capital. 
 
Given that the service sector includes labour intensive activities, in contrast 
with the industrial one which is capital intensive, the relations with the dominating 
classes became more and more important. Indeed the increased rate of return didn’t 
rely on productivity growth as such but on the diminished variable capital. As 
already mentioned, the supply-side understanding of economy required also trade 
union reforms. For the supply-side economists viewing labour as market meant that 
its provision should be freed too. In the long run, that would decrease wage and 
salaries and as a result increase profitability. The previous governments’ experience, 
however, have shown that purging policies alone are not enough. In other words, the 
increase of unemployment did not cause the decrease of employees’ compensation. 
What prevented this expected development was the labour movement militancy. The 
Ridley Report gives a glimpse of how the trade unions were handled during the 
1980s. A mixture of appeasement while preparing for better conditions and 
confrontation when they are set summarizes the strategy. Unlike the common 
understanding, however, this has not been a fully fledged contradiction but rather a 
war of attrition. It started as soon as the winter of discontent where the role of some 
media – an Ideological State Apparatus - had been detrimental in creating 
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unpopularity for the “overpowerful and insufficiently accountable”629 trade unions. 
From the side of the open political actions, the Thatcher governments gradually 
diminished the power of trade unions firstly through the purging policies themselves. 
The recession of the early 1980s reduced the number of their members from twelve 
millions to just under ten. More active policies had been on the other hand the 1980 
Employment Act which following the Ridley recommendations outlawed secondary 
picketing and restricted the operation of ‘closed shops’. The 1982 Employment Act 
made unions liable for damages in case of unlawful industrial while narrowing the 
definition of the lawful strikes and strengthening individual worker’s rights against 
closed shops. The 1984 Trade Union Act implemented secret ballots in decision 
making and made strikes decided without secret ballots unlawful. The 1988 
Employment act extended the powers of individual labourers regarding their trade 
unions. War of attrition, however, was not the only method used. The government 
resisted giving into labour disputes irrespective of the degree of confrontation. By the 
means explained earlier in the Ridley Report, the united front of the labour 
movement was broken by fragmentation of industries and by selective capitulation to 
wage claims. Therefore, when the resistance to the changes was inescapably 
culminated it took place in the coal industry where the government had considerable 
advantage. An initial strike in 1981 obliged the government to withdraw its plans for 
pit closures but three years later with adverse legislation and no solidarity from other 
unions, after almost a year of industrial action the National Union of Minerworkers 
voted for return to work630. After 1987 the government launched a full attack against 
trade unions in order to undermine collective bargaining and promote an even more 
flexible labour market631.  
The contradiction with the proletariat increased the dependency of the 
power bloc on the usual allied social force, namely the petty bourgeoisie. Its 
importance has been considerably increasing since the 1960s as already seen but 
became even more significant after 1981 when the service sector thrived over the 
production one. The Thatcher governments made several attempts to foster this 
                                                 
629A. Seldon et al. 2000, p. 69. 
630 It must be noted, though, that the role of the strategy was not related only to that described above. 
During and after the strike the miners’ leadership was framed by MI5 and falsely accused for 
corruption. See further in S. Milne 2004. 
631 For the data presented here see further in A. Seldon et al. 2000, pp 68-70. 
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alliance by directing intervention in selected areas even at the expense of wider 
financial goals. Apart from lowering direct taxation that availed everybody, with the 
view of cultivating the conservative electoral base and supporting what was called 
“popular capitalism” through the distribution of public industries’ shares632 
concessions in the social wage were mainly referring to populations in a marginal 
position. Wealthier labourers and pensioners were benefiting with the purpose of 
creating a petty bourgeois mentality even if they were not elevated to a petty 
bourgeois class position according to a Marxist understanding. Therefore tax relief 
on private health insurance for those over the age of 60 had multiple goals, namely to 
reduce the burden on the NHS, instigate the private health sector, add more freelance 
doctors among the self-employed petty bourgeoisie and create a largely false feeling 
of class elevation to the pensioners. In the same way the ‘assisted places scheme’ 
gave the opportunity to able pupils to attend private schools; while parents were 
given the opportunity to select the preferred public school over another. The most 
important policy, however, had been the ‘right to buy’ according to which the 
council house tenants were given the opportunity to buy the house they used to live 
for discounted prices that could reach up to 70%. On the other hand cutting public 
expenditure, which practically meant cutting the social wage, did not affect the more 
affluent petty bourgeois classes but rather the proletariat. The progressively 
tightening eligibility rules for unemployment benefits, the introduction of means-
testing in many areas of the welfare State and the withdrawal of child benefit reduced 
the social wage for those mostly depending on them rather than the middle classes633.   
Purging policies after 1979 were expressed mainly in the form of 
privatisations. Nevertheless, different approaches played a significant role as well. 
They were mainly directed in the central administrative apparatus of the State. As 
already mentioned the Civil Service Department was abolished in 1981 and the 
Central Policy Review Staff in 1983. These developments removed some of the 
protective shields of the State Employees many of whom Margaret Thatcher 
personally disliked as ‘cryptosocialists’634. As a matter of fact civil service numbers 
                                                 
632 A. Seldon et al. 2000, p. 67. 
633 For the data presented here see further in A. Seldon et al. 2000, pp 70-72. 
634 See further in A. Seldon et al. 2000, p. 75. One wonders of course, if Labour governments thought 
of the civil service as Tory Trojan horse and Tories as cryptosocialists, what else is there for Civil 
Servants to be characterised of.  
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fell from 730,000 in 1979 to 562,000 in 1990 removing mainly workers from the 
privatized industries but not solely. The creation of the intra-State quasi markets 
meant also a quasi fragmentation of the NHS leaving individual hospitals competing 
for patients. At the same time, the health system and later the local governments 
were forced to contract out some of their services. More far-reaching had been the 
need to improve and “prove” efficiency according to which all the range of central 
administration, from NHS units, local governments and even academic staff, became 
accountable for the budget allocated. This policy was consolidated in the previously 
explained ‘Next Steps’ initiative of 1988635. Here needs only to be reminded that 
fragmentation of functions and hiving off in the form of independent agencies or 
privatized service providers was an already existing reality in the civil service even 
before 1988. The ‘Next Steps’ policy just made ‘marketisation (or corporatisation in 
some cases) without privatisation’ the new, openly declared, direction of public 
administration. Authoritarian Statism came in the foreground under the extended 
State supervision of those agencies, the prescription of specific policy requirements 
and sound budget audit. The effects of authoritarianism became more apparent in the 
area of local government which through the delimitation of budget lost a degree of its 
independence.  
The question arising, as with the previous government, is if the 1980s 
demarcate a political crisis period. The answer is outright negative. In the political 
scene the Conservatives achieved a comfortable majority in the 1979 elections of 43 
seats that was multiplied in the 1983 elections with 144 seats. In 1987 the majority in 
seats fell to a degree but still gave a lax domination of 102 seats over the Labours 
and the Liberals. If there was a crisis, it generally resided with the Labour party that 
after 1980 was led by Michael Foot and pointed towards a general turn to the left. 
This led senior members of the party and ministers of the Wilson/Callaghan 
governments like Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Bill Rodgers and Shirley Williams to 
leave the party and form the Social Democratic Party that further formed along with 
the Liberals the “Alliance”. Falklands’ war of course contributed in changing the tide 
in favour of Margaret Thatcher but the aforementioned concessions and the gradually 
changing socio-economic nature of Britain should also be taken into consideration. 
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The consolidation of the economic policy along with the reflationary budgets for 
1987 and 1988 helped Tories to secure their victory in 1987 and on the other hand 
Labour and the Alliance under new leaderships to fall into a new cycle of 
introversion. Overall, the political system seemed capable to return to its normality 
for the British standards with no hung parliaments and change of governments every 
four years as in the case of the 1970s.  
Outside the political scene, however, the picture is much more mixed. The 
first Thatcher government inherited a long standing labour militancy that was 
touching also the civil service as such, namely the core of the State Employees. At 
the same time, after several victories upon consecutive governments, the confidence 
and assertiveness of trade unions have also been high. A retrospection of the 1980s 
history leaves of course no doubts that the labour movement didn’t transform into a 
new political claim and finally didn’t manage to achieve even its economic claims. 
Nevertheless, the clash between the power bloc, spearheaded by the State, and the 
dominated classes has been apparently phenomenal. It’s not the number of strikes 
and working days lost as such that posed a threat to the reproduction of the political 
domination. Industrial actions have been in any case limited after May 1979 and 
gradually vanished in early 1990s. It’s rather the civil disobedience that posed a 
threat. The claims were not consistent among each other, but this is not a reason to 
disregard the tangible obstacles posed in the anxious attempt to revive the falling rate 
of profit. Irrespective of the existence or not of class consciousness and political 
objectives among the rioters, they were actively disrupting the reproduction of the 
capitalist relations of production. Brixton, Toxteth and Broadwater Farm riots in 
April 1981 as a response against police discretion, the miners’ strike between 1984 
and 1985 with the widespread riots that culminated in the Orgreave battle in June 
1984 and the poll tax mass disturbances with the significant London riots in March 
1990 constitute notable examples of the threat of civil disobedience636. The 
importance of this threat and especially of the miners’ strike is also evident from the 
attempts by MI5 to infiltrate it and make the movement collapse from within637. A 
different case but in the same direction has been the ending of trade union rights at 
                                                 
636 See further in I. Hernon 2006. 
637 S. Milne 2004. The case of MI5 and Special Branch in the infamous seamen strike during the first 
premiership of Harold Wilson must also be reminded.  
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the Government’s Communication Headquarters in 1984638. It could be concluded, 
therefore, that as in the previous decade, although a political crisis as such never 





The previous part of this chapter set out to identify the State responses in 
the capital over-accumulation crisis after 1965. The initial argument, namely that the 
tactic against the crisis has changed in the course of the 1970s seems to be confirmed 
in the concrete example of United Kingdom. The Keynesian counteracting influences 
against the falling rate of profit appeared from the late 1960s to 1976 after which a 
monetarist purging policy has been followed. Aside this, however, some really 
important conclusions could be also fleshed out. The limitations of Keynesian 
responses to the falling rate of profit have already been acknowledged in the late 
1960s. It’s not by coincidence that both parties took initiatives to research the 
possibilities of purging policies; the governing Labour one with the Fulton Report 
and the opposing Conservative one with the first Ridley Report. The implementation 
of those ideas was postponed until the first half of the 1970s in which the overall 
economic policy of the Heath government had been a pro-purging one until the first 
U-turn. The second half of the same decade saw the opposite direction, namely a 
Keynesian policy that very soon turned to a monetarist one. In what Thatcher 
administration seems to differ is the lack of any U-turns. The State economic policy 
was fully and steadily pro-privatisation and hence pro-purging. It could be seen, 
therefore, that purging policies appear irrespective of the governing party. On the 
other hand, this confirms Poulantzas’ ascertainment that political parties are not 
connected directly to class power or class interests. The former being conditioned in 
the relatively autonomous political level rather try to condition the latter. The 
political scene is, to a large degree, an attempt to channel class contradictions.   
If this argumentation was pushed a little further what else could be seen is 
that the purging policies incorporated in monetarism and privatisation do not 
constitute primarily the result of ideological persuasion but a creation of the 
                                                 
638 A. Seldon et al. 2000, p. 77. 
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economic circumstances. Indeed, liberal economic ideas appeared much earlier than 
the 1950s639. One wonders, therefore, what made them attractive thirty years later to 
both Conservative and Labour party. A possible explanation could be as simple as 
the fact that some policy makers have been convinced at this time point. To a degree 
this reflects reality. Margaret Thatcher has not always been proponent of monetarist 
ideas. During her duties as Minister of Education in the Heath government, has been 
amongst the highest spending ministers. The same applies with Keith Joseph who 
greatly supported her in the consecutive conservative governments640. The first 
turned to monetarism while in opposition after the 1974 defeat, while along with the 
second they set up a think tank – The Centre for Policy Studies – in June 1974641. At 
the other side of the political spectrum, however, Labour politicians never seemed to 
be convinced about the monetarist solutions; they were rather obliged to react so due 
to stagflation, namely the specific way that capital over-accumulation crisis had been 
expressed. Moreover, the concept of purging policies had been more or less well 
received in the Heath government but faced great difficulties in execution. Therefore, 
resolving in the persuasion of persons in key positions presents considerable 
shortcomings. Indeed, ideas are not good or bad by default. It’s rather the 
circumstances that make them plausible or not. This doesn’t mean that people do not 
have ideas, or that they could not be convinced about something. It rather targets the 
conditionality of ideas upon the economic developments. In other words, the way 
that some ideas become at a specific point commonsensical or plausible is 
conditioned on the circumstances that make them “ideal”. Additionally, the “key 
person” persuasion thesis ignores the actual articulation of power in the State; in 
other words ignores the class interests and the class power. Otherwise the analysis 
would be obliged to acknowledge a person or a group of persons as omnipotent. 
The discussion over the circumstances brings forward a factor which is 
external from the political and the ideological level, although mutually influenced; 
it’s the specific development of the Capitalist Mode of Production. In the capital 
over-accumulation crisis of the 1970s the specific articulation of the power bloc was 
                                                 
639 Assuming that Friedrich von Hayek is a central writer in that field, he published his Road to 
Serfdom in 1943. More or less the same applies to Milton Friedman. 
640 R. Lowe 1996, p. 214. 
641 N. Ridley 1991, p. 7. 
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leaving no other road apart from the purging policies. The crisis had slowed down 
the economy and more specifically the industrial sector. The financial sector was also 
hit by the crisis but in the second instance and due to its dependency upon the 
productive sector of the economy. Increasing the industrial rate of return, however, 
could not take place in the expense of financial capital if the intra-power bloc 
contradictions were to be avoided. Therefore, State interventions to fund industrial 
renovation soon had to be abandoned because they were reducing the profitability of 
private financial institutions642 and at the same time increasing the State’s borrowing 
requirement. The last concern is a confirmation on its own that the State 
Apparatuses, in that case the Treasury, are calibrated to reproducing a specific 
articulation of the power bloc. On the other hand, purging the economy from 
uneconomic constant industrial capital as well as from labour powers managed to 
increase the rate of return for the investors remaining in the market as well as lower 
the employees’ compensation in such a degree that allowed for the expansion of 
capital in the labour intensive services sector. Easing the exchange controls and 
consequently allowing the industrial capital to flee abroad was a strategic movement 
in order to keep the consistency of the power bloc intact. It wouldn’t have been 
groundless, therefore, to argue that purging policies had been inescapable. In fact the 
specific way that the crisis occurred and the solutions available reflect the previous 
formation of the State Apparatuses. Decades of Keynesian economics made the State 
one of the major players in the economy. The solution therefore was passing 
unavoidably through the purging of the State capital643.  
Some more issues arise at that point. If purging policies had been 
inescapable, why did the U-turns appear? An explanation brought forward really 
often is that up to the second Wilson administration both Tories and Labour 
governments have been committed to the Keynesian full employment. On the other 
hand, the Callaghan premiership signals the end of this commitment. During the 
1980s the conservatives governed in the absence of the post-war consensus which 
gave the opportunity to accelerate purging and consequently raise the unemployment 
                                                 
642 Since they were removing “clients” from the private financial market. 
643 See also an account of the unavoidable privatisation scheme (on different grounds) in case that 




rate in unprecedented levels. Nevertheless, a closer look at the record of the 1970s 
policies would create a completely different image. The purging policies, followed 
similarly by both the Heath and the Wilson/Callaghan governments, led inescapably 
to the rise of unemployment. It would have been naïve to assume that carefully 
planned policies removing State intervention and increasing competition between 
private industries did not take any account of the unemployment increase. It seems, 
therefore, that the so called post-war consensus was abandoned long before the 
Thatcher administration.  
The question, however, still remains as to how the U-turns could be 
explained. To a degree unemployment seemed indeed to be a concern for the 1970s’ 
governments but not for the sake of full employment. It was rather its other 
consequences that were leading their decisions. In the case of the Conservative 
administration for example, the fear of civil disobedience, strike and riots as such 
were reasons to capitulate to the miners’ strike in 1973, to bail-out Rolls Royce and 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. This provided a valuable experience for the Labour 
government. The social contract and the attempt to contain the reactions of the trade 
unions is a manifestation of exactly that. The U-turn in that case had the opposite 
direction. It’s true that the social contract managed to restrain trade unions for a 
period but the massive turn of economic policy rightwards initiated a wave of strikes 
culminating to the winter of discontent. The problem, however, was the 
government’s impression that by negotiating with TUC they were by default 
negotiating with the ‘shop steward’644; in other words they were mixing the trade 
unions with the labour movement. Winter of discontent as such is exactly a foretaste 
of the extremity of the situation in case that this threat was materialised, namely in 
case that the employment status was changing further following a purging policy. On 
the other hand a notable exemption, namely the nationalisation of Chrysler UK, 
confirms also that conclusion. The bail out occurred under the threat of massive 
unemployment and riots in Scotland.  
                                                 
644 An excerpt from B. Donoughue account on the winter of discontent is revealing. “Mr Callaghan’s 
decision not to go to the country in October 1978 may have been momentous. Had he fought and won 
it is possible, having presided over the Conservatives during their third successive electoral defeat, 
that Mrs Thatcher might have been pushed out from British politics (although it is difficult to believe 
that the tide of disenchantment with collectivism, the trade unions and the public sector which she 
reflected would so easily have been pushed aside)”. B. Donoughue 1987, p. 166. 
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Once again the previous experience proved invaluable for the next 
government. What the Wilson/Callaghan administration has offered was the 
innovation of tactics in restraining labourers’ discontent. The difference in that case 
was in the actual strategy used. The appeasement and negotiation was replaced by 
preparation, selection of the preferential field of the battle and repression. What is 
also significant is, that, on the one hand this stratagem was confidential and on the 
other it took place in stages rather than wholesale. As a result the relevant legislation 
started changing gradually in order to restrain trade union powers. The fragmentation 
and pressure over each industrial sector to achieve a rate of return was removing the 
solidarity between trade unions. The result was that through confrontation with a 
trade union at a time, the government managed to seclude it from much needed 
support. The miners’ strike for example was initially supported by the seamen’s 
union while the engineer’s union was not accepting coal from pits operated by strike 
breakers. Steel industry, however, the major recipient of coal, did not support the 
struggle due to its own fight to achieve the rate of return. Gradually, though, even the 
scarce external support was withdrawn under the exerted pressure645. It is exactly this 
tactics that confirms the existence of the previous concept of “transformation by 
absence”. In a general direction towards privatisation, the fact that some industries, 
services or utilities remain immune while others are privatized shows exactly that 
they constitute a transformation of “what was supposed to be there”; until of course 
their turn comes. What could be seen therefore as a final conclusion is that at the 
heart of this analysis is the class struggle. What led to State intervention after the 
Second World War had been the need for reconstruction and containment of the pre 
war labour militancy. What led to the transformation of the 1970s had been again the 
contradiction within the power bloc and between the latter and the labour powers. 
What proved to be a successful strategy was exactly that which restricted the labour 
militancy and reduced labour’s share of output. 
                                                 










































































The previous chapter, after examining the capital over-accumulation crisis 
of the 1970s and the British State’s responses, brought forward some conclusions. 
The purging policies, mainly through the monetarist perception of the economy are 
beyond party differences. They are rather the outcome of the specific way in which 
the crisis made its appearance. Furthermore, the solution given, namely the pressure 
upon incomes, depend on the particular articulation of the class struggle in Britain in 
the conjuncture of the 1970s. What made Thatcher government more successful in 
this solution in comparison with the previous governments had been its hegemonic 
strategy. The research now obtained enough analytical tools to move to the 
explanation of the temporal asynchrony between the introduction of general and 
prison privatisation policies.  
The first question that needs to be addressed is if there is any relation of 
inescapability between general privatisation and prison contracting out. Although an 
explicit reference did not appear in the echelons of governance earlier than 1986, 
several signs were confirming that prison privatisation was a possibility indeed. In 
the soft end of the prison system, namely the detainment of undocumented 
immigrants waiting deportation, privatisation had already occurred since the Heath 
government. In 1970 the Harmondsworth detainment centre in London was awarded 
to Securicor646. At the same time, the blueprint of the privatisation strategy, namely 
the second Ridley Report, has been “consistently abstract” referring to the public 
industries, utilities and services but without specific mentioning of the services. 
There is a point, however, that a strange reference to the civil service doesn’t just 
echo the preoccupation of the report with the nationalized industries or the 
persistently abstract reference to the State services. It’s in the confidential annex  
                                                 
646 Home Office 1988, p. 8 and L. Windlesham 1993, p. 302. 
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where the Civil Service is mentioned for the first time as a non-vulnerable field in 
which a victory would discourage confrontation in more vulnerable ground647. That 
leaves one wondering, if privatisation would touch not just the productive part of the 
public sector but the administrative as well, within which the Prison Service 
operates. 
The answer to that question came around the same period by the ‘May 
Report’. In November 1978, in response to a growing wave of unrest in the prison 
system from officers and prisoners, the Home Office commissioned a report to a 
group chaired by Justice John May. The recommendations touch a big number of 
issues of which the organisational ones are of major importance here. In the fifth 
chapter, the report straight away states that prison service should remain accountable 
to the Ministerial control and the latter accountable to the parliament for the running 
of the prison service. This recommendation is significant exactly because it is 
mentioned. It’s an indication that a relevant issue has been posed. The issue in 
question is not a purely administrative one since administrative changes are 
discussed at the next paragraph where “there was less agreement on the form that 
Ministerial accountability should take”648. As a matter of fact, while both the Prison 
Officer’s Association (POA) and the Institution of Professional Civil Servants 
(IPCS) were proposing increased autonomy of the prison service that would, in any 
case, keep the prison service directly administered by and accountable to the Home 
Office649, the Home Office presented a set of preferences and the report finally 
recommended a significantly different structure. Two of the ministerial scenarios 
included the complete separation of the Prison Service with substantial responsibility 
for finance. In essence, what was proposed by the government department resembles 
the agency status that finally mantled the Prison Service in 1991. Indicatively, the 
Home Office suggested the creation of a separate organisation regarding the prison 
system within the Ministry that would have advisory role. This informal competition 
between the two organisations illustrates exactly the efficiency issue which was 
                                                 
647 Economic Reconstruction Group 1977, p. 24.  
648 Home Office 1979, pp 74-75. 
649 See analytically in Home Office 1979, pp 75-80. 
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accelerated by the quasi governmental services (quangos) of the 'Next Steps' 
initiative650.  
What is more significant, though, is the fact that both the final agency status 
of the prison service and the suggested autonomy by the Home Office and the May 
Report resemble the fragmentation policy of the Ridley Report. It’s not just the 
autonomisation of the Prison Service, or the suggested informal competition between 
organisations it’s also the delegation of financial accountability with fixed budgets to 
the units, namely the prison branches that point this resemblance. The Society of 
Civil and Public Servants (SCPS) suggested the imposition of financial limits in the 
day-to-day administration of regional offices and branches. The administration then 
would have the responsibility and the discretion regarding the use of the amount. The 
commission adopted this suggestion and furthered it by recommending the 
delegation of accountability to the managers of institutions. Apart from the financial 
control, the report suggested the delegation of powers regarding the personnel 
administration at the level of local management. As a result governors would have 
administrative powers over financial as well as industrial relations’ issues. 
Additionally, although a separate escort service was not recommended, effective 
transformation would occur from a renewed organisation of this combined function 
between police and prison service and from the deduction of funds on “an agency 
basis” with encouragement for manpower economies651. Therefore, the report, 
following the views of the intervening actors but mainly of the Home Office, ended 
up suggesting a new organisation structure that would keep prison service within the 
Home Office but it will give it also “a greater corporate sense and enable those in 
charge to be more directly responsible for all aspects of its organisation than is 
currently the case”652; in other words a fully fledged fragmentation of the prison 
service few months after Ridley Report was published. 
                                                 
650 Home Office 1979, pp 81-83. 
651 Home Office 1979, p. 280. A much more radical proposition was carried on by Lord Windlesham 
(1993, pp 272 et seq.) at a later stage. Apart from the recommendations, however, the fragmentation 
of escort service, its agency status and the very privatisation was confirmed at the 1982 Prison Officer 
Association conference which condemned any attempt to hand escort services to Securicor (D. Evans 
et al. 2009, p. 118).  
652 Home Office 1979, pp 84-87 and 278. See also in the same (p. 87) “the affairs of Her Majesty’s 
Prison Service in England and Wales should continue to be directed by a Prison Board. This is not and 
will not be a true corporate body but the collective name for the group of men or women who we 
recommend shall be generally responsible for the affairs of the service”. After the previous 
270   Prison Privatisation: Transformation by absence 
 
What is meant in the previous analysis is not to uncover any conspiratorial 
networks between the contributors of the Ridley and the May Reports. What is 
intended instead is to show that both approaches had a common starting point which 
was to increase efficiency in a period (Winter of Discontent) where the 
manifestations of the capital over-accumulation crisis were more than apparent. As a 
matter of fact the May Report was commissioned to make recommendations on eight 
issues the five of which are related with economy, efficiency, employee 
compensation and industrial relations. Given that the mandate by the Home Secretary 
required explicitly the commission to regard the “need to secure the efficient use of 
manpower and financial resources in the prison services”, one of the four criteria in 
doing recommendations for the prison service was right from the beginning the 
economisation in public expenditures653. As already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the birth of ideas should be separated from their emerging plausibility and 
their incorporation as policies since the latter are reduced to the circumstances654. 
Therefore, what is significant is not the fact that the May Report recommends 
practically the agency status of the prison service655, neither that this fits with the 
fragmentational purging policy of the Ridley Report, not even the fact that they 
coincide in time of publication, because it could be just this, namely a coincidence. 
What is significant instead is that they both commence from the same starting point, 
the need to reduce the State capital assets and consequently trigger the profitability of 
the private sector which would necessarily step in to cover the emerging needs656. 
Hence, prison privatisation would have been inescapable development as long as the 
State has embarked into purging policies.  
                                                                                                                                          
overbidding on the corporate sense in the service to avoid referring to a true corporate body makes 
one think of a “quasi” corporate one, as in the case of “quasi nongovernmental organisation”. 
653 Home Office 1979, p. iii. 
654 Ibidem pp 258 et seq. 
655 Assuming that the May Report is nothing but an opinion, then one could see the same in the Home 
Office views which were going much further. The May Report, however, is important as a yardstick 
which shows the equilibrium of the “special burden” of the criminal justice factors' opinions.  
656 A parallel development worth mentioning. Roy King and Rodney Morgan published in 1979 their 
own “recommendations” based on facts and data analysed in the May Report. Although they are in 
favour of the public and centralised character of the Prison Service (p. 124) their preoccupation with 
the “normalisation” (p. 94 et seq.) of the service seems to be a synonym of efficiency. And it’s this 
preoccupation that reflects the hegemonic ideology and echoes the circumstances surrounding prisons. 
This is more evident in the recommendations regarding service provision and will be analysed later. 
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After the May Report, a series of developments signify exactly the 
aforementioned will of the government, of the higher echelons of the Civil Service 
and of private security companies lobbies to lead criminal justice system into 
privatisation. Those developments have already been analytically presented by Lord 
Windlesham657 and Mick Ryan658. Instead of another reiteration what would have 
been more helpful is a timeline. The Adam Smith Institute, one of the intellectual 
spearheads of the purging policies in Britain, initiated the ‘Omega project’ in 1983 
which addressed amongst else the possibilities of prison privatisation with a 
publication in 1984. In 1986 the conservative members of the Home Affairs 
Committee visited contracted-out prisons in the United States and had been 
“profoundly impressed”. In 1987 they produced the fourth report for the session 
1986/1987 under the title Contract Provision of Prisons in which they suggested the 
experiment of privatising some remand prisons. The Minister of the State at the 
Home Office with responsibility for prisons reported very favourably after a visit on 
American privatised prison institutions in 1987. The same year Peter Young 
published the much-commented Prison Cell with the Adam Smith Institute. In 1988 
a lobbying meeting between security corporations, representatives of the Adam 
Smith Institute and the Centre of Policy Studies, Tory MPs, members of the cabinet 
and of the policy unit at 10 Downing Street and academic criminologists took place 
in Carlton Club. In the same year but earlier than the meeting, the response of the 
Home Office at the report of the Home Affairs Committee Private Sector 
Involvement in the Remand System came in 1988 and was generally in favour of 
private provision of custodial services659.  
At that point an issue should be clarified. It has been argued that although 
the Conservative Party has been in favour of prison privatisation, the government had 
been more reluctant. Mick Ryan for example identifies a volte face by Douglas Hurd 
                                                 
657 L. Windlesham 1993. 
658 M. Ryan 2003.  
659 What is significant about this Green Paper is that it leaves possibilities open for extension of prison 
privatisation away from the remand centres. “If the benefits of contracting out are to be realised it will 
be also important not to define in advance where and how private sector facilities should be provided. 
The framework within which proposals from the private sector were solicited would need to be 
flexible enough to allow novel solutions to be adopted, if workable” (Home Office 1988, p. 10). From 
this point of view, the intervention by the Tory MP Edward Gardner to amend the Bill before it 
becomes the Criminal Justice Act 1991 in order to include the privatisation of remand as well as 
closed establishments was pre-circumscribed by the Green Paper. 
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– the Home Secretary in his statement at the House of Commons on the 16th of July 
1987 that  
“few people would accept a case for auctioning or privatizing the 
prisons or handing over the business of keeping prisoners safe from 
anyone other than government servants”  
 
and a statement on the 1st of March 1989 that  
“the introduction of the private sector into the management of the 
prison system would certainly represent a bold departure. It offers 
the prospect of a new kind of partnership between the public and 
the private sector in this important aspect of our national life. We 
should not be scornful of new ideas which, if successful, will make 
an important contribution to the government’s programme of 
providing decent conditions for all prisoners at a reasonable cost”. 
 
The reasons for this opinion change are attributed to some key developments like the 
lobbying pressures already explained, the fact that some Tory MPs were keeping the 
issue alive at the parliament and the Minister’s of the State visit to the United 
States660. Nevertheless, this position is not supported by the available facts. Margaret 
Thatcher was founding member along with Keith Joseph of the Centre of Policy 
Studies which was promoting actively the privatisation thesis. Key recommendations 
of the May Report had already been in place. Already before 1986 standards and 
targets for improvement have been set in each establishment. Accountability has 
been delegated down to the level of each governor which amongst else included 
direct accountability for budgets to them to cover operating costs661. What by that 
time was called “civilianisation” of the Prison Service had gone that far and closer to 
privatisation to resemble the contracting-out of services in the central European form 
of privatisation. Starting from transferring prison functions to posts outside the 
Prison Officer grade, they moved to contracting-out prisoners’ canteen, officers’ 
messes, staff car park attending etc.662.  
                                                 
660 M. Ryan 2003, p. 88. 
661 Home Office 1987, p. 3. 
662 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 162. See also the recommendation by R. King et al 1979, pp 78 and 113. 
They mention that “the best way of ensuring that the level of provision within the prison is typical of 
that prevailing within the community is to integrate prison and community facilities. We suggest that 
where it is possible for local authority, statutory, voluntary or commercial agencies who normally 
provide a service in the community to offer it also within the prison that they should be encouraged to 
do so”. Given their position that is in favour of the public and centralised character of the prison 




Assuming that the pro-fragmentation and purging policy suggested by the 
Home Office to the May inquiry do not represent the plans of the government, the 
data used by Ryan to form his conclusion have also another reading. What Douglas 
Hurd mentions at his first statement is that “few people would accept…”. This 
doesn’t mean that he or the government he was representing at the parliament are 
against privatisation. Furthering this approach would bring forward the essence of 
this Thesis, namely that the Home Secretary identifies the need for a political 
strategy or the fact that one is already in operation to convince people. Ryan also 
refers to the letter by Margaret Thatcher to Lord Windlesham from the 12th August 
1987 regarding his suggestion to privatise remand establishments663. The full length 
of the letter, however, is revealing. There it’s explicitly stated that  
“the government is fully committed to making greater use of the 
private sector wherever this helps Departments like the Prison 
Department of the Home Office to get better value for money. […] 
But as you yourself say, there would clearly be many problems to 
resolve before we could contemplate similar developments in this 
country. There is the security problem to which you allude: I was 
interested in your solution to this, though of course be difficult to 
ensure that the courts would remand a sufficiently high number of 
prisoners to the privately run centre to make it viable. There would 
also be legal problems and problems to do with accountability, that 
have not yet been fully explored”664.  
 
On the one hand, what is clearly stated is government’s commitment in 
privatisation, including those regarding the prison system. On the other hand, the 
legal and accountability problems with hindsight didn’t seem to obstacle the 
government less than two years later. An interesting part of the letter, though, refers 
to the number of remand prisoners sent to the experimental establishment to make it 
viable665. This proves that the main concern as such is not the imposition of better 
conditions for prisoners but the creation of a win-win situation between the State and 
the private contractor. Therefore, the government never presented any volte face. It 
has always been in favour of prison privatisation. This is also confirmed by the 
decisiveness towards prison contracting-out when the pragmatic arguments were 
                                                 
663 M. Ryan 2003, p. 88. 
664 L. Windlesham 1993, pp 278-279. 
665 The remand population presented a small decline during those years. See for example L. 
Windlesham 1993, p. 292.  
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collapsing around 1990. It was not only the fact that remand prisoners’ number was 
falling, it was also that a detailed study of the Home Office was confirming that “no 
substantial savings in cost could be anticipated, and swayed by the falling prison 
population”. Thatcher’s intervention and persistence, however, was detrimental in 
the inclusion of prison privatisation in the forthcoming Criminal Justice Act 1991 





If prison contracting-out is inescapable and there have been strong interests 
and intention in pursuing this policy, the question arising is exactly the central one in 
this research, namely, why has there been such an asynchrony in the introduction of 
this policy? Where this transformation by absence could be attributed? Given that 
transformations are the result of the specific articulation of the class struggle and that 
the role of the Repressive State Apparatuses is to safeguard the reproduction of the 
Capitalist Mode of Production, the previous theoretical approach suggested that the 
asynchrony of prison privatisation depends on the need to entrench the prison 
officers from wide changes in order to keep prisons operating; a function much 
needed during a period of insubordination. Prison privatisation could emerge at a 
latter point when the reproduction of capitalist relations would have been smoother. 
In the empirical part, that schema is exemplified in the mixture of appeasement and 
confrontation appearing in the Ridley Report. In other words, the previously 
explained tactics of differential treatment between categories of labourers applies 
here as well.  
The fact that prison officers were playing a major role if not the central one 
could be seen in the main argument of the Adam Smith Institute campaign in favour 
of prison privatisation. Peter Young in the Prison Cell argues that  
“the prison system has been subject to a phenomenon that 
commonly afflicts public sector institutions – that of producer 
dominance. The assured income of a state monopoly service leads 
to complacency about existing practices and a failure to innovate. 
Political fears about strikes or unemployment lead to lax labour 
relations and overmanning. Political pressure from the employees 
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diverts resources to current spending (on wages) and away from 
needed capital improvements. Those who work in such a state 
monopoly service represent a concentrated and united interest 
group and so have much more power in the political process than 
do ordinary members of the taxpaying public. The prison system is 
just a case of a state service being run to benefit the producers of 
the service, the employees, rather than the inmates and the 
taxpaying public”667.  
 
Leaving aside the fact that this excerpt reconfirms the preoccupation with 
efficiency and the corporate understanding of a nonetheless very special “service 
provision”, what could be also deducted is that it centralises the problem on the 
employees, namely on the prison officers. They are a “concentrated and united 
interest group” whose political pressures divert resources under the fear of their 
reaction. What is apparent is that the hegemonic ideology reaches a turning point in 
which the concept of the “public interest” by connecting to the mantra of efficiency 
is necessarily separated by those who used to be the operators of the public interest, 
namely the State Employees and in this case the prison officers. The public 
interest/efficiency will not be delivered through their protection as impartial 
executors of the common will but by diminishing their powers. Therefore, achieving 
the efficiency of the public sector passes inescapably through prison privatisation and 
the creation of quasi competition. As will be seen later, this new understanding was 
soon perceived by the prison officers who made tactics a practical need. 
That the period during the 1970s and 1980s has been one of generally social 
insubordination and specifically uneasy industrial relations has already been covered 
in the previous chapter. What needs to be addressed here is the specific militancy of 
prison officers. Dealing with an institution at the periphery of the public attention, 
prison officers’ labour movement was equally neglected. Resulting from local 
disputes and disenchantment with salary levels since the 1880s,   the first 
underground trade union, Prison Officers’ Federation (POF) was formed along with 
the official one (National Union of Police and Prison Officers) in 1915. It was, 
however, acknowledged only in 1939 as a separate formation and trade union as such 
under the Prison Officers’ Association (POA) title. Difficult industrial relations 
existed throughout the 20th century but it was in the 1970s that they were expressed 
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in a much more militant way668. In 1972 a series of prisoners’ protest, including riots 
in few cases, transferred the unrest to the prison officers who demanded in 1973 
better staffing levels and ban of overtime work that exceeds the agreed level with the 
prison service669. Local action, however, was limited until 1975 in which a 
development marked a watershed. In that year local action started in London prison 
regarding the London weighting allowance without the support of the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) of the POA. Soon staff at Cardiff prison withdrew 
labour regarding a local management issue once again without the support of the 
NEC. Towards this growing wave of local actions, NEC decided that “forms of 
action to be pursued on local issues (including sympathetic actions) are matters 
within the discretion of the local branches concerned”670. This decision was 
substantial in what was going to follow in the next years. The purging policies 
largely due to the IMF loan in 1976 and more specifically the allocation of a budget 
of staff hours to each establishment (the regularisation of which was going to be 
recommended by the May Report) resulted in essential reduction of the average 
salary. The distribution of this budget was to be decided on a local level between 
officers and governors. The result of this situation was a significant increase of local 
industrial actions671. Disputes over quarters, weekend working, safe manning levels, 
ferry warrants for prisons based in islands reached the number of 26 in a single 
moment in May 1978. Those were at this period accompanied and culminated around 
retrospective payments and claims over breaks during shifts672.  
The threat of a national strike by POA in November 1978 in the eve of the 
‘winter of discontent’ led to setting up the May inquiry which didn’t as such ease the 
militancy. The May Report codified the reasons for the unrest as “the loss of 
confidence in the treatment objectives, the distancing of staff and inmates as a result 
of the changing nature of the prison population, increased emphasis on security and 
                                                 
668 Home Office 1979, p. 233 and D. Evans et al. 2009. 
669 See further in D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 82 et seq. It worth mentioning the differential treatment with 
which groups of strikers imprisoned by virtue of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 were faced by POA 
members during 1972 and 1973. It’s also significant in understanding the climate of the period, that 
prisoners had been “unionised” under the organisation of the Preservation of the Rights of the 
Prisoners (PROP).  
670 Home Office 1979, pp 233-234 and D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 87. It’s not a coincidence that between 
1975 and 1978 the industrial actions at the level of branch rose from 19 to 119. 
671 D. Evans et al. 2009, pp 86-90. 
672 See for example Home Office 1979, p. 286. 
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growing numbers of specialists in prisons, poor working environment, changes in 
staff background and experience, the effects of incomes policy, apparent changes in 
the general industrial relations climate and the effects of this on the comparatively 
isolated position of prison officers, the failure of management to take initiative in 
responding to industrial unrest and to support governors faced with disputes, the 
inadequacy of the Whitley Council machinery and the experience that the industrial 
action produces results”673. Up to that point the main types of action took three 
forms. Industrial action was directed towards the administration of justice with 
refusal to allow solicitors, police or probation officers enter prisons, refusal to 
produce inmates at courts and refusal to receive in custody those committed by 
courts. The second type of action was directed to prison administration with late 
unlocking, restrictions on the movement of vehicles, staff or supplies, no operation of 
parts of the establishments and withdrawal of labour. Thirdly action was also 
directed to prisoners with complete prevention of classes, exercise, visits and 
association and even locking up for 23 hours per day674.  
In the early 1980s the majority of the claims were concentrated in the 
payment and employment status issues. In October 1980 the refusal of the Prison 
Department to extend payment recommended by the May Report to all prison-related 
workers and specifically the refusal of the Home Secretary to allow for arbitration 
led the associations to national industrial action. In that case, action took the form of 
prevention of essential maintenance which necessarily led to the closure of prison 
workshops, refusal to carry out certain duties within prisons and most importantly 
refusal to receive prisoners sentenced or remanded by the courts675. Along with the 
prison officers, the Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) launched a campaign 
against the suspension of Civil Service Pay Agreement. The strike was continued 
with small interruption until May 1981 but it was shortly followed by a Civil 
Service-wide dispute over the abovementioned issue that lasted until August 1981. 
The local actions, however, continued even after the end of the national strikes 
mainly on issues of local management, overcrowding and understaffing during 1982 
and 1983. A short period of relative industrial peace in which, however, unresolved 
                                                 
673 Home Office 1979, pp 234-235, 238-240 and 286 and D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 81 et seq. 
674 Home Office 1979, p. 236. 
675 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 106. 
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problems both managerial and financial had been mounting led to renewed militancy 
in late 1985 and 1986 always at a local level. Only in 1986 the POA took over action 
at a national level in the form of an overtime ban. The ban itself lasting only 24 hours 
led to severe disturbances and riots mainly in Bristol, Northeye, Erlestoke, Lewes 
and Wymott.  Once again in 1988 national strike broke out in the view of non 
honoured promises under the ‘Fresh Start’ initiative and more specifically on the 
manpower, on the ongoing ‘civilianisation’ of the prison service and on the so-called 
interpretation of ‘Bulletin 8’ referring to the work rules under the Fresh Start 
proposals. Apart from the national claims, local actions resulted from managerial 
issues mainly on inadequate staffing in 1988 and 1989676.  
What could be seen from the previous brief exposition is that the prison 
officers’ labour movement was not less militant than the general one during the 
1970s and 1980s and to a large degree one reflects the other. The idea of reflection, 
however, should be handled with rather carefully. On the one hand, “reflection” does 
not imply that prison officers were mimicking other labourers and consequently they 
didn’t have their own claims and problems677. On the other hand, their militancy was 
necessarily contained within the objective and ideological constraints put upon them 
by their position in the State Apparatuses. This corresponds to what Poulantzas 
asserts about the assertiveness of the State Employees678 which is even more 
exacerbated regarding the Repressive State Apparatuses employees. This practically 
took the form of the previously described types of industrial action. Their 
possibilities were in any case constrained by humanity concerns; therefore complete 
withdrawal of labour was only an extremity and could not last for more than few 
hours. At the same time, this could be seen in their very claims in which the financial 
issues constituted only a minority among the total. An often recurrent demand 
concerned the levels of manpower which was affecting their quality of life. The 
previous conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that an adequately staffed 
establishment would also decrease the amount of overtime and finally the take-home 
payment. In parallel, overcrowding and security issues – directly connected to the 
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677 See for example S. Thomas account on the May Report in D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 100. 
678 Ibidem pp 144 et seq. 
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understaffing - are brought constantly forward especially in the framework of local 
actions679.  
What is most significant, though, is the ideological form of their actions in 
the course as well as outside industrial unease. The May Report for example praises 
“the substantial harmony and sense of duty that does still exist” among the officers. It 
finds impressive “the response of staff, in the course of industrial disputes, to the 
declaration by the governor of a state of emergency. When in the opinion of the 
governor the establishment has reached a serious state of crisis, staff have not 
hesitated to resume their normal duties”. The report concludes that “nothing must be 
allowed to jeopardise the underlying loyalty which that implies”680. A more concrete 
example had been the commitment of POA in smooth judicial function that comes 
even to the point of non solidarity to other unions when they were crossing picket 
lines outside courts during civil service industrial action681. Another example had 
been the political neutrality maintained until 2006 which was confirmed in a civil 
action against a Tory political broadcast in 1985 which gave the opportunity to the 
trade union to reaffirm its “non-partisan and neutral party political stance”682. These 
constitute manifestations of the exposure of State Employees to the hegemonic 
ideology of their State Apparatus as impartial applier of the ‘common will’. 
Nevertheless, the comparison between the general labour and prison 
officers’ movement would reveal common places too. The common period of 
eruption of the assertive movements has been previously mentioned. What needs to 
be shown here is that the State machinery – either the Home Office or the 
government – have been aware of this changing climate. The unionisation and 
militancy of workers was apparent inside and outside of the prison683. At the same 
time, the self-propelled dynamicity that was evident in the ‘winter of discontent’ by 
Bernard Donoughue684 was also confirmed by the May Report. Prison officers, 
governors and the Home Office, confirmed that “for whatever reason industrial 
                                                 
679 See indicatively D. Evans et al. 2009, pp 83-86, 117-120 and 122. 
680 Home Office 1979, pp 87 and 246. 
681 Home Office 1979, p. 237. 
682 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 106 and 210. 
683 Home Office 1979, p. 239 and D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 170 et seq. 
684 Ibidem pp 237-238. 
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action has been found to produce results, and that the practice of resorting to such 
action has developed a momentum of its own”685.  
A final commonality between the movements could be seen in the distance 
created between the members of POA and its administration, namely the NEC686. 
Especially after 1975 and the decision to delegate the call for action at the 
establishment level, the NEC resolved to a rather controversial behaviour. On the one 
hand, the very delegation of this power was a sign of succumbing to the ongoing 
fragmentation of the prison service since a fragmented reaction wouldn’t be as 
effective as a national one. The consequence is that during the 1980s only three 
national strikes were called in comparison with an abundance of local actions. In 
several cases the NEC had been openly unsympathetic to the local actions as in the 
case of Holloway and Wandsworth strikes in 1988 and 1989 respectively687. In 
several other occasions, the POA members were calling the NEC to take action with 
no apparent result688. The dissatisfaction was leading prison officers to dissociate 
themselves from the NEC. As an officer pointed regarding the Wandsworth support 
dispute, “you have to be careful when you talk about the POA; there's a tendency to 
say ‘the POA did, the POA didn't’, even when you're POA yourself . . .what they 
usually mean by that is the National Executive”. As a result, break away trade unions 
emerged, although with no success, in 1980 (Prison Force Federation) and in 1988 
(Prison Service Union)689. On the other hand, POA took also decisions that mitigated 
the previous developments. For example the 1975 decision regarding the delegation 
of power allowed a more flexible labour movement, although not far-reaching. 
Assertiveness could be rewarded in a local level but at the same time crashed more 
easily. POA established a ‘strike fund’ from which it was supporting with the 
substantial amount of £53000 the Wandsworth strikers whose strike was in any case 
not supporting690. Those controversial actions of the POA, as in the case of the other 
trade unions in the 1970s, constitute manifestations of their State Apparatus 
                                                 
685 Home Office 1979, p. 241. 
686 According to the May Report “there can now be no automatic assumption that agreements reached 
at national level will be honoured down the line” (Home Office 1979, p. 237). 
687 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 163 et seq.  
688 See for example some cases in Home Office 1979, p. 286 and D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 86 et seq. for 
1971, p. 88 for 1978, p. 103 for 1980, pp 108-110 for early 1980s and pp 135-136 for 1985. 
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690 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 168. 
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character. The fact that they were fields of class struggle subject to a changing vector 
of the equilibrium of power explains exactly those policies; on the one hand, 






The latter brings forward the very consequences of the industrial actions by 
the prison officers. The May Report, as early as 1979, warned its addressees, that the 
Prison Service cannot be seen outside a wider perspective of departments within the 
Home Office. The recommended re-organisation of the service in question is careful 
enough not to affect the Home Secretary’s ability to have a co-ordinated view of the 
criminal justice system. The reason is that “decisions taken in regard to other parts of 
the system – for example in regard to police manpower, the court building 
programme or the sentencing powers of the courts – may well significantly affect the 
demands placed upon prisons”691. If this is a self-understandable view of the criminal 
justice system, then it focuses only on the regular course within that system and takes 
prisons as its terminal point. For example, an offender is arrested, prosecuted, judged 
and then locked in a prison. The fact that this is the regular course means exactly that 
“irregularities” do exist and during crisis circumstances they become more apparent. 
Prison officer strikes constitute one of them.  
As already seen the most usual form of industrial action has been the refusal 
to receive convicted or sentenced prisoners and the most extreme one has been to 
complete withdraw labour. A usually local form of action had been to “work by the 
book” which in that case involved refusal to work more than the agreed overtime and 
the refusal to accept inmates more than the Certified Normal Accommodation 
(CNA). In both cases, the problem caused was substantial to the whole criminal 
justice system. Only indicatively it could be mentioned that during the 1980-1981 
national strike more than 3500 prisoners had to be kept in police cells according to 
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the government692. Nevertheless, this was only a modest estimation or at least one 
referring to the first month (October 1980) of the action. Towards the end of 
November and during December the drop was more far reaching compared to the 
seasonal reduction of inmates693. Taking into consideration the fact that the total face 
value number of prisoners was almost 2000 people more than the previous year, one 
could estimate that about 4000 prisoners had to be transferred to police cells694. The 
disruption to police functions is self-understandable – especially if the fact that 
Brixton riots which took place before the official end of the strike was taken into 
consideration - but much more evident in the case of the Wandsworth 1989 local 
strike. When prison officers decided to withdraw staff from particular sections to 
allow safe guarding of the rest of the establishment they were met with a 10 days 
management lock out. 120 prison officers were replaced by 600 police officers called 
to run the prison695. The 1986 national overtime ban caused disturbances, riots in 
more than 40 prisons along with 21 escapes696. What could be seen, therefore, is that 
apart from the actual cost of bringing the prison system in regular operation, there 
was extensive unquantifiable cost in terms of police function disruption and escapes 





A general overview of the situation would reveal that prison officers 
constituted a largely unionised and militant group of workers. Their actions were 
necessarily conditioned from their status and position in a Repressive State 
Apparatus. Nevertheless, when decided, their contradiction with the State machinery 
could prove to be detrimental not just for the operation of the prison system but for 
the whole criminal justice system in a period of extensive use in order to handle the 
                                                 
692 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 106. Of course there was a wider and long-standing phenomenon of 
prisoners being kept in police cells (see details in L. Windlesham 1993, p. 259) but the prison officers’ 
industrial action constituted an exceptional factor. 
693 Home Office 1981. 
694 The Home Secretary in his 1984 speech at the annual conference of the POA gave an even bigger 
number. “I will not deny that there have been times in the past when industrial relations have broken 
down. Many of you will recall the industrial action taken by Prison Officers in the winter of 1980 to 
81 when, at its peak, 5000 inmates had to be held in police cells ...”. 
695 D. Evans et al. 2009, pp 164-169.  
696 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 147. 
Prison Privatisation: Transformation by Absence   283 
 
widespread strikes and riots697. As a result, the containment of this labour movement 
was of major importance. This is even more evident if the attitude of the POA 
against privatisation was taken into consideration. Just the possibility of contracting-
out court escorts to Securicor, as soon as 1982, caused a fervid response by the 
otherwise conservative NEC. The chair of the POA stated at the annual conference 
“If the Prison Department is looking for massive confrontation, then it should 
continue looking at prisons and courts with a view to taking them from the Prison 
Service. If there is one area that the Service will go into battle about, it is escorts and 
courts. To the Home Office I offer this genuine piece of advice: leave it well alone, 
you are playing with fire”698. One wonders, then, if court-escorts could cause a major 
reaction by the POA, what the privatisation of prisons as such would cause. Evans 
and Cohen in their interesting account of the POA history approach the animosity of 
prison officers against privatisation under the understanding that court escorts 
constituted a large percentage of overtime and therefore a major contribution to their 
salary. What needs to be also addressed, however, is that the European Union 
directive regarding the protection of employment in the event of transfers and 
undertakings as integrated in the Transfer and Undertaking Protection of 
Employment legislation (TUPE) was interpreted by the British governments as not 
affecting privatisations. Despite the condemnation of this practice from the Court of 
the European Union, the relevant legislation did not change until 1997. Therefore, 
there was a substantial danger against the employment status of prison officers 
hiding in privatisation. 
Of course not all workers in the prison system constituted a unanimous 
body. Governors or chief officers were well separated from the general sentiment 
confirming the role of the upper petty bourgeoisie according to Poulantzas699. Some 
indicative examples go back to 1978-1979 where the governors’ branch invited the 
May committee to consider recommending restrictions at prison officers’ industrial 
actions700. In 1980 the PFF break away union argued that POA was not independent 
                                                 
697 An interesting information would be that only in the Orgreave incident of the 1980s miners’ strike 
4000 police officers had to be mobilised. Policing that strike had cost almost £240 million with 40 
million extra police hours worked including a special allowance (I. Hernon 2006, p. 234).  
698 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 118. 
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because of the inclusion of chief officers who constituted “part of the policy-making 
senior management team”. What is significant is that POA’s reply did not refute this 
accusation but argued that “chief officers comprise less than 2% of the membership 
and only one is a member of the NEC” which practically acknowledged their 
separate labour interests701. Sporadic incidents confirm this reality throughout the 
history of POA industrial struggle in the 1980s as in the case of their reaction in the 
Gloucester prison in 1986 and Wandsworth prison in 1989702. Lord Windlesham 
provides also interesting evidence. After publishing an article in Times in 1987 
proposing the privatisation of the remand system, he received a letter by the HM 
Chief Inspector of Prisons who agreed and congratulated the former703. Interestingly, 
it’s the same person (James Hennessy) who led an inquiry at the aftermath of the 
1986 riots after the overtime ban by the POA. 
A retrospection on the uneasy industrial relations of the 1970s and 1980s 
would reveal that the exposure of prison officers to the hegemonic ideology or the 
internal separation with the more conservative governors and chief officers were not 
enough to contain militancy and the consequent disturbance in the prison system. 
Following, therefore, the recommendations by the Ridley Report would lead to the 
solution of temporal appeasements of prison officers before the wider class struggle 
diminish in such level to allow for prison privatisation and possible reactions from 
the side of prison officers. That doesn’t of course mean that privatisation was 
discontinued. Throughout the period from 1979 to 1991 small steps in purging 
policies were taking place. The fragmentation was by the mid-1980s already a 
reality. It started with the allocation of budget for staff hours per branch since 1976, 
then was widened as financial accountability at the establishment level by the May 
Report. Following the same document, the industrial relation resolution was 
localized while field for fresh responsibilities was left open. The majority of those 
recommendations became reality gradually from 1983 to 1986704. The civilianisation 
recommended by the May Report705 was already moving towards privatisation in 
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704 See analytically in Home Office 1979, pp 233, 249, 84-85, D. Evans et al. 2009, pp 138-139 and 
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service provision. What was taking place was a gradual intrusion of private 
contractors in the prison system, which, however, became apparent by the mid-
1980s706.  
This gradual expansion of the purging policies had, however, a distinctive 
characteristic. It was not affecting the working status of the majority of prison 
workers. Disputes on financial issues existed long before the introduction of 
privatisation; therefore, they constitute a different category of contradiction. What 
was taking place at the very same time, however, along with the aforementioned 
purging policies or their preparation was a number of concessions which would 
temporarily appease the labour movement. For example against the overcrowding 
and understaffing problems, the State was taking measures constantly, nonetheless 
not effectively. During the 1960s and 1970s the prison staff manpower has 
doubled707 while from 1979 to 1986 the average number of prison officers rose by 
20% along with a fresh prison building programme708. Regarding the financial 
claims, it is worth noting, that the 1980-1981 strike was suspended by NEC when the 
Common Working Agreement (CWA) was proposed by the Treasury. The idea was 
over a new and fair system of payments that would place employees’ compensation 
over a completely new base. Nevertheless, the fact that it was not finalised along 
with the complexity of the new criteria imposed made it a constant lure from the side 
of the Home Office. CWA was kept on the table as a promise for almost 4 years after 
the 1980-1981 strike, preventing the conservative NEC from calling a national action 
and advising branches to do so on payment issues against the disenchantment of the 
POA members709. When finalised and implemented in1984 new issues have arisen 
turning the attention elsewhere. A similar appeasement policy was implemented after 
the 1986 one-day ban of overtime. The Hennessy inquiry recommendations resulted 
to the ‘Fresh Start’ initiative in which the most prominent measure was addressing 
the working-hours problem. The ‘Time Off in Lieu’ (TOIL) was trying to achieve a 
15% cost saving by restructuring shifts. In practical terms what would happen is that 
in a five year period the average 56 hours worked per week would gradually fall in 
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39. At the same time, every hour worked more than 48 hours per week would be 
compensated by time off in lieu instead of money compensation. The acceptance 
among POA was a detrimental 80%. Nevertheless, as in the previous case there was 
a considerable distance between theory and practice since TOIL never actually 
worked as estimated. At a point during the 1990s the Prison Service was “in debt” to 
its employees the enormous number of 20000 hours. It managed, though, to provide 
once again a temporary appeasement to the prison officers710. Fresh Start also 
included a measure already announced since 1982 that had as well been on the table 
without being implemented until 1986. Prison officers throughout the 20th century 
had the right to stay at special quarters close to the establishment where they were 
working and the rent they had to pay was rather symbolic. The equivalent concession 
of the ‘right to buy scheme’ for city council houses, namely the ‘purchase of 
quarters’ was first reported in 1982 but only took shape in 1986. The statement of a 
POA member is revealing. “Fresh Start was bribery . . . because a) it had all this in it 
about TOIL . . . and b) right to buy . . . I ended up buying a house in North London 
for about £98,000 - very cheap for this area. Suddenly I'm a house owner. Of course I 
put my cross in that box”711. 
Separate reference should be made to the industrial action restriction issue. 
As already mentioned governors suggested to the May committee the restriction of 
the right of prison officers to strike712. The importance of this issue lies on the very 
fact that it was brought forward. Equally important, however, is the reasons for 
which the May inquiry rejected this idea. Two practical issues have to do with the 
definition of strike, since most actions by prison officers do not include withdrawal 
of labour, and the fact that administrative or generally non custodial personnel would 
be necessarily affected. Two more issues, however, refer to considerable strategy 
concerns. On the one hand the prison officers wouldn’t give away their rights 
without be bought out with a significant return. The report expressed the fear that this 
would create a domino effect in the civil service as a whole. It must be reminded that 
the May Report is being written during the peak of the ‘winter of discontent’ where 
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712 The suggestion to restrict strike rights had already appeared at the Ridley Report (Economic 
Reconstruction Group 1977, p. 10) where Police was mentioned among the public services in which 
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this “domino effect” had substantial consequences. On the other hand, had prison 
officers agreed on giving away their right to strike, a significant issue would arise in 
the event of a mass breach of the relevant legislation. In other words, the report is 
wondering how prison officers would be imprisoned for massively breaching the 
relevant legislation. The May Report concludes that, “there is no scope for a change 
in the status quo even if such a change were desirable”713.  
Irrespective of the May Report recommendation, the “desire” was 
incorporated in an imprisonment bill in 1980. In response to the 1980-1981 industrial 
action the parliament granted unprecedented powers to the government to combat the 
strike. As the Home Office minister stated “much as [the Home Secretary] regretted 
the necessity for the wide powers available under the Act, he would not hesitate to 
see their renewal should the prison officers' industrial action and its consequences 
persist”714. The threat, however, remained only a threat, although the strike did 
persist. This constitutes an excellent confirmation of the May inquiry strategic 
concerns over criminalising prison officers’ industrial strike. It’s more significant, 
however, that this incidence reflects all three previous conclusions. The prison 
officer labour movement was a militant one, its actions had considerable 
consequences that had to be handled and no direct confrontation would be expedient. 
What should take place, instead, should be appeasement and gradual erosion of it 
powers until the general hegemonic strategy is ready to tolerate a clash with the “last 
line of defence” namely those who safeguard the capitalist relations reproduction.  
In 1991, at the end of two decades of labour militancy, strikes and riots, the 
Criminal Justice Act allowed for privatisation of prisons, contracting out of escorts 
and gave agency status at the Prison Service. Surprisingly the Act was not faced with 
any reaction at the national level. Accusing the prison officer labour movement as 
being bought off is a rather harsh criticism. What could be seen, however 
retrospectively, is that on the one hand the appeasement and dilatory tactics of the 
hegemonic strategy had actual results and on the other hand the POA reflexes were 
slower in comparison with previous periods especially when it was widely accepted 
                                                 
713 Home Office 1979, pp 288 and 254-255. 
714 In D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 104. According to the POA general secretary “this was the first time in 
contemporary industrial history that a government had passed special legislation to deal with an 
industrial dispute while it was still in progress”. 
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within POA that privatisation would fragment and weaken the Prison Officers' 
Association “. . . In fact it is widely acknowledged that one of the effects . . . and 
purposes of privatising publicly owned industries, services and institutions is the 
undermining of effective trade unionism therein”715. The very creation of agency 
status within the Prison Service aimed to circumvent the only trade union which was 
not subject up to that point to the anti-union legislation of the 1980s716. The final 
blow came in 1994 during which the attempt to call a national action to protest for 
overcrowding, privatisation, contracting-out and market testing caused the reaction 
of the State with the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act which banned industrial 
action for prison officers.  
The above presentation of historic developments allows extending the 
previous conclusions. The prison officer labour movement was not only militant, but 
its mobilisation could be really effective against the smooth operation of the criminal 
justice system. During the economic crisis of the mid-1960s and 1970s as well as the 
wide scale of State transformation that took the shape of privatisations, retaining the 
operation of prisons was of crucial importance. The threat or imposition of violence 
was the most deterrent measure against the social insubordination followed by the 
purging policies. In this framework, the containment of prison officers could not be 
based upon their own subordination but rather on appeasement until the social 
circumstances allow for intervention in that area too. The asynchrony, therefore, 
between the introduction of general and prison privatisation policies could be 
attributed to that specific reason. 
                                                 
715 D. Evans et al. 2009, p. 179. 







An overview of the expansion of prison privatisation would identify a 
temporal gap between the introduction of general and prison privatisation policies in 
England and Wales. Asynchrony between them is based on the common pragmatic, 
systemic and ideological goals. Understanding this asynchrony could not be based on 
historical analogies since they tend to reproduce past assumptions in the present, 
under different conditions. Pragmatic considerations about overcrowding and fiscal 
constraints fail to explain this asynchrony as well since the hard facts used do not 
support such assumptions. Economic explanations, on the other hand, constitute a 
rather debated issue to become a firm basis for a political decision. Social interaction 
is far more capable in explaining the asynchrony but not every approach in that 
framework. Crude globalisation analysis cannot account for national differences. 
Elaborated analyses, on the other hand, are either obliged to develop the history of 
Criminal Justice System from the middle class point of view as in the case of 
Garland and Simon, or to resort at the mystifying concepts of morality and culture as 
in the case of Christie and Melossi. The commodification theory by Cavadino and 
Dignan and Lacey analyses social development dynamically but in a limited way so 
that present social attributes are projected at the future. Moreover, Lacey's work 
presents serious methodological deficiencies. Similar problems with globalisation 
analysis, occur in the political culture approach which leads to the apotheosis of the 
society through the use of the obscure cultural factor. In an attempt to overcome 
those problems from a Marxist point of view, the critical analysis of the work by 
Marx, Pashukanis, Ferrajoli and Zolo, Rushe and Kircheimer, Melossi and Pavarini 
would conclude that the Criminal Justice System can only be approached through the 
State, which depends on the class struggle. What is needed, therefore, is a State 
theory encompassing class struggle. 
In this context, this Thesis adopts a structural Marxist approach that views 
the State as neither a random formation nor a tool in the hands of dominating classes. 
It's in essence, a relationship between the dominant and the dominating classes, the 
struggle of which forms its structure. By acquiring the monopoly of violence, the 
State channels the opposition in the political level. Role of the State is to ensure the
290   Conclusions 
 
long-term interest of the dominating classes without provoking a direct contradiction 
with the dominated. This is accommodated through Hegemony; a set of strategies 
operating a mixture of coercion and consent along with material concessions in an 
“unstable equilibrium of compromise”. It's materialised in the State Apparatuses, in 
which the domination is contested in the class struggle. The chaotic State policy, 
therefore, is the vector of the class struggle in all its apparatuses. State Apparatuses 
are differentiated among Ideological, Repressive and Economic State Apparatuses 
that administer consent and coercion. The latter are not in a zero-sum relationship, 
since the one exists because of the other. State Personnel is a social category that cuts 
vertically through social stratification and connects its members by reference to their 
common position in delivering “impartially” the State functions.  
State transformations are a response to the class struggle by altering the 
“battlefield”; by that they become important during crises. Crises, condensations of 
the class struggle, appear in every level but in ensemble they form a structural one 
which is essentially a State crisis. In such cases, Repressive State Apparatuses ensure 
class reproduction at the last instance. In this context, the asynchrony of prison 
privatisation should be seen as a form of concession to prison officers in a period of 
economic crisis and of State transformation. The expected privatisation was delayed 
to protect the smooth operation of State mechanisms when they were mostly needed. 
It constitutes, therefore, a State transformation although by absence. The critique and 
counter-critique, further elucidates this structural Marxist approach. For Gramsci 
Hegemony misses the material aspect provided by concessions. Miliband's 
instrumentalist analysis resorts at the problematic of the individual. The work by Hall 
et al. presents problems in the form of over-ideologisation; while, Jessop et al. do not 
avoid a discoursive approach either. 
Following the theoretical analysis, this Thesis continued to an empirical 
reconstruction. From a historical point of view, prison administration has always 
been in the public purview. The concept of privateer exists only under Capitalism; 
therefore, in the Medieval Ages the seemingly private contact had an essentially 
public character. Later in the Modern period levying charges for the provision of 
public services was an established administration policy that was replacing the 
salary. The prison system was legally nationalised in the 19th century until the 
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Criminal Justice Act 1991 that doesn't remove the State from imprisonment but 
expands its stealthy control through contracting out services and the 'corporatisation 
without privatisation'. 
The hypotheses developed in the theoretical part are illustrated in the 
concrete example of the British Social Formation during the second half of the 20th 
century. The British and international capital over-accumulation crisis between the 
mid-1960s and the end of the 1980s threatened the reproduction of the political level. 
Britain was close to a State crisis. The exit from the economic crisis required the 
purging of unprofitable capital and the destruction of labour powers. Therefore, the 
danger of social insubordination was imminent. The purging “record” is evident in 
the privatisations that started much before 1981; while the policy U-turns reflected 
the agonizing need to preserve the unstable equilibrium of compromise. Thatcher 
governments, applied a fully fledged purging policy, although with some 
transformations by absence to prevent major disturbances. The militant prison officer 
trade union had to be contained to ensure the functionality of the whole Criminal 
Justice System. They were appeased and kept generally content until the danger of 
social insubordination ceased. Prison privatisation appeared only when the number of 
stoppages and working days lost fell to unprecedented levels. 
The significance of this research lies with the ascertainment that at the 
centre of social development is the class struggle. Conscious or unconscious, 
economistic or political, futile or prolific, the class struggle pushing forward history. 
But if class struggle is the matrix of history, then violence is its midwife. And 
violence resides in the apparatuses handling its monopoly, namely the Repressive 
State Apparatuses. By understanding the relationship between class struggle and 
Criminal Justice System, we conceive one of the factors that shape history. This is 
what makes their analysis crucial. This is what makes Marxism important as a 
science of history. This also what makes this Thesis different from previous 
approaches, that, apart from their internal inconsistencies they are either 
methodologically unsound, as in the case of historical analogies, or limited in an 
institutional approach, as in the case of pragmatic considerations and economic 
perspective. The fact that this Thesis employs a society-wide approach is what makes 
it differ from the institutional focus of the globalisation theories. This Thesis, instead, 
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accommodates conjuncture-specific characteristics, namely the class struggle, along 
with demystified and observed concepts, namely political developments and 
economic analysis; in contrast with the political culture perspective. It's also an 
attempt to see the tree and the woods at the same time; the wider economic factors 
and the class struggle within the prison system from a longitudinal point of view, 
instead of the limited social dynamic of the commodification theory. 
In this context, having established Marxism as science and internal 
consistency as the validity criterion of theories, non Marxist or different Marxist 
theories are not discredited by this Thesis. Another significance, therefore, is that it 
proves the debate over Poulantzas' theory everything but “dead”. Indeed, the 
analytical capacity of structural Marxism is evident from the explanation of 
phenomena that emerged later than Poulantzas' publications. It could be argued that 
applying this analytical capacity in explaining the temporal asynchrony of prison 
privatisation is an “overkill”. In reality, this is a Columbus' egg. What is argued 
might seem simple but it had to be explained somehow; especially since the 
presented Marxist approaches would have to resort in conspiratorial historical 
approaches, as in the case of instrumentalism, or would be self-contradicted by a 
wrong perception of the State, as in the case of Authoritarian Populism and Two 
Nations. Nevertheless, the most important fact in the use of structural Marxism is the 
opportunity to discuss State theory in conjunction with criminology and criminal 
justice theory; an apparent lack of Marxist criminology. 
The final issue to be addressed regards the aspirations of this Thesis. With 
full understanding of the conditionality of the writer, this Thesis should be 
approached exactly as such; namely, conditioned in the politico-economic 









This research has focused on the political and ideological levels in the 
attempt to structure an explanation of the asynchrony between the introduction of 
general and prison privatisation policies. What has received less focus is the 
economic level and especially the emergence of the economic crisis. The reason for 
that, is certainly not that it's a peripheral issue. Contrariwise, it's the most crucial one 
as long as the economic level is the determining one at the last instance. The issue of 
the capital over-accumulation crisis, however, has been adequately analysed 
numerous times before this Thesis the contribution of which in the general 
knowledge is only limited. What is really important for the general argumentation in 
this research, however, is to empirically confirm the existence of a capital over-
accumulation crisis in the British economy. This would have been a straightforward 
enterprise if there was any adequate reference to the relevant bibliography. 
Nevertheless, no specialized publication was found throughout the research for this 
Thesis. This appendix, therefore, will structure this missing link from the previous 
argumentation. A general reference to the general conditions of the falling rate of 
profit either as tendency or as cyclical crisis will be followed by a detailed analysis 






For any analysis of the phenomenon of the falling rate of profit a reference 
to Marx’s economic writings is a sine qua non. In the third volume of the Capital he 
made a thorough investigation of the norms that govern the Capitalist Mode of 
Production. Possibly the most famous one has been the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall. The social value of the merchandise consists by the constant capital 
(machines, factories, other kind of infrastructure and raw materials) along with the 
variable capital (labour) and the surplus value. In contrast with that, the value of the 
merchandise for the capitalist is constituted only by the first two factors. The surplus
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value, instead, is what is retained; in other words the profit. The surplus value is 
created by the variable capital but it is obscured in the social value of the 
merchandise because of the way of its projection717. In order to give a more 
schematic picture of that process, it could be written that the constant capital presents 
the origin of the profit, while the variable capital the basis for determining its rate. 
More specifically, labour is the actual exercise of those human capabilities that form 
the ‘labour powers’. The value of commodities is determined by the socially 
necessary labour time required for their production. The labour power for the 
capitalists is a commodity which is bought as every other commodity. Therefore, the 
socially necessary labour time for the “production” of labour powers coincides with 
the value of labour necessary for the subsistence of the labourer. Nevertheless, the 
total labour time provided by the labourer is more than the aforementioned. This 
extra time is dedicated in producing the surplus value for the capitalist. As a result, 
since the constant capital only reproduces its value in every cycle of production, the 
commercial value of a product is determined by the amount of labour that goes into 
the production718.  
Capitalists want not just some profit but the highest possible return for the 
capital invested. This is depicted in the Rate of Profit which is the relationship 
between the surplus value and the total invested capital, namely the aggregate of 




From this equation, in which Rp is the rate of profit, S is the surplus value, 
C is the constant capital and V is the variable capital, it’s apparent that the increase 
of the invested capital, namely the denominator, decreases the Rate of Profit. In other 
words, the more one invests in means of production and labour the less profit will 
turn out. This seems to be right according to the above equation but from an 
empirical point of view it doesn’t make much sense. The reason is that a single and 
pioneering capitalist along with the investment in the constant or variable capital 
                                                 
717 Assuming that there wasn’t any labour involved in the production process, there wouldn’t be any 
merchandise. This is not the same, though, with the opposite case, namely the absence of means of 
production.  
718 K. Marx 1867 and J. Gillman 1957, pp 11-12 and 15. 
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gains surplus value which can at least equilibrate the fraction and at most increase 
the rate of profit. The problem starts when the technological innovations become 
widespread. The investment increases the denominator and at the same time the 
numerator has a falling tendency. More specifically, capitalists in order to obtain a 
“market share” they have to be competitive, which further means being able to lower 
the final price of the merchandise or make investments that do not produce surplus 
value as in the case of advertising, legal services, liquidation etc.719.  
Had this schema seen in an extended period of time, more general 
conclusions would be extracted. The competition within a specific sector of the 
market lowers the profit of the investment until it reaches the minimum possible, 
namely the actual cost of production. Since there is no more profit in this enterprise 
or the specific sector of the market, capitalists would invest the surplus capital in 
different sectors until the rate of profit is generally stabilized in the market in its 
minimum possible. This relation is expressed by the general or average rate of profit 
which follows the previous equation. It seems then that the increase of the invested 
capital by a single capitalist would prove to be lucrative. Gradually, though, and if 
others follow the pioneering example, the general rate of profit will decrease.  
To this norm some counteracting influences attempt to stop or reverse this 
outcome. The intensification of labour increases the surplus value but holds stagnant 
the variable capital, namely the salaries. Technological innovations are translated 
into increase of the constant capital but usually they increase unemployment too. 
This can effectively exert pressure on salaries and therefore the variable capital 
remains stable in the long run. The increase of productivity brings more means of 
production in the market and by that lowers their price which further lowers the price 
of investments (e.g. in raw material) in the constant capital. The different levels of 
economic development worldwide allow capitalists to sell their products in other 
countries without lowering the rate of profit. Often the State intervenes with austerity 
measures to keep salaries low or with subsidisations over constant and variable 
                                                 
719 The previous analysis over the productive labour (ibidem p. 105) may clarify this point. See also 
the extended analysis in J. Gillman 1957, chapter 6. 
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capital to “reflate” the economy. This is why the phenomenon of the falling rate of 
profit is characterized as tendency720.  
Marx was not the only to acknowledge this since Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo have done it before the publication of the Capital. Marx, however, offered a 
new approach which lies at the contradiction between the goal of the capital and the 
means towards this goal; in other words, the contradiction between maximum 
utilisation of capital and the sacrifice of part of it for the rest to be utilized. Adam 
Smith in contrast had only seen part of the broader image and accused just 
competition for the falling rate, while Ricardo attributed this phenomenon to the 
decreasing productivity of the means of production as in the case of fields’ 
fertility721.  
The centrality of this norm in Marxism caused long debates since its 
publication. Part of criticism has been product of misunderstanding as in the case of 
Benedetto Croce who sees that investment in constant capital just increases the 
productivity and therefore the rate of surplus value leads to equilibrium in the 
previous fraction. He misses, though, the fact that increased productivity requires 
also more raw materials to be processed and therefore more investment in the 
denominator of that fraction. More serious objections, though, were raised because 
Marx seems to analyse only the relationship between the denominator and the result 
of the fraction by leaving the numerator untouched. This is partly attributed to a 
misunderstanding of the Marxian method of presentation - showing the relations in 
pairs by keeping other factors stable – which is solved in the same volume of the 
Capital722. If this criticism was extended, though, an important objection could be 
raised. In an equation in which both the numerator and the denominator of a fraction 
are independent variables, how could one assume that the rate of profit moves 
towards a specific direction instead of other?  
Before answering this objection, a significant remark should be made. The 
formula for the rate of profit as given above is rather elementary. It refers to the rate 
of profit as deducted from a single cycle of production. Nevertheless, neither the 
                                                 
720 K. Marx et al. 1894, chapter 14. See also G. Polymeridis 2003a, G. Polymeridis 2003b, G. 
Kakoulidis 2010, Teoria e Prassi 2007, J. Gillman 1957, p. 7.  
721 G. Stamatis 1984. See S. Clarke 1994 for a detailed account of Marxian refutations over previous 
approaches.  
722 E. Ioakimoglou 2000, p. 39. 
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machinery stops working nor the labourers are fired after a batch of raw materials 
has been processed. What happens instead is that the means of production, either the 
infrastructure or the labour powers, keep working continuously and the rate of profit 
is calculated accordingly. In order to accommodate this fact, the previous formula 
should be percentified. Given that surplus value is created by the value of labour that 
is not dedicated in producing the labourer’s salary, the rate of surplus value is exactly 
the ratio of surplus to the total of the salaries, namely the variable capital. 
Accordingly, the ratio of the total invested capital to the variable capital would 
produce what Marx calls the organic composition of capital. Therefore, the previous 




From the previous equation seems that there is an internal relationship 
between the denominator and the numerator. Any fluctuation in the variable capital 
affects equally and similarly the organic composition of capital as well as the rate of 
surplus value. What is significant then is the relationship between the constant capital 
and the rate of surplus value. Aside any mathematical calculation, it should be 
reminded that this equation also represents concrete reality. Surplus value does not 
appear as an isolated factor but it’s the direct product of the process that requires the 
use of both the means of production and the labour powers. The organic composition 
of capital and the rate of surplus value, therefore, are not independent but interrelated 
variables. Assuming, for example, that in a perfect world without competition the 
constant capital remains stable and the number of workers is decreased. In achieving 
the same rate of surplus value as before the rate of exploitation, namely the working 
hours dedicated to the production of surplus should be increased. Nevertheless, those 
working hours are finite because the bodily ability to be productive is also finite. 
Additionally a certain number of working hours must be dedicated for the production 
of the value of the salary instead of surplus value for the capitalist. Therefore, the 
increase of the rate of exploitation may “apply the brakes” to the falling rate of profit 
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but cannot stop it completely723. What is left then for its increase is investment in 
constant capital which usually increases the need for labour power724. The question 
that should be posed instead is whether the increase of surplus value as a 
consequence of the increase of organic composition of capital is possible to surpass 
the later.  
Before answering that question a necessary deviation should be made. At 
the core of criticism against the norm of the falling tendency of the rate of profit is 
the misconception about the context in which it takes place. Marx insists on the 
especially capitalist methods of production in which that norm applies725. Due to the 
generally increasing wages of labourers, capitalists in order to achieve an increase of 
the surplus value they have to increase the productivity of labour to a degree that it’s 
higher than the increasing rate of salaries. Given that productivity of labour equals to 
the aggregate of the value of labour along with the surplus value, the degree of its 
increase is as high as the increased surplus value achieved. Nevertheless, in order to 
increase productivity, the technical composition of capital, namely the aggregate 
value of constant and variable capital, should also increase since the outcome of the 
production process is exactly the application of labour powers upon the constant 
capital. The increase rate of technical composition of capital allows increasing both 
the productivity and the rate of surplus value as far as its increase is higher than the 
incrementing real wages. But the increase of the technical composition of capital 
surpasses the increase of productivity achieved and more specifically of the rate of 
surplus value that requires capital to be amassed before being invested and translated 
into technical composition of capital. Therefore, the rate of profit is falling because 
the value of capital, which is either invested in the denominator of the fraction or 
reserved for investment when it reaches the minimum value required, is higher than 
the surplus product as represented in the nominator.  
This is again an elementary analysis of the concepts involved. A more 
detailed one would require reference to the Marxian figure of the “rate of hoarding”. 
The pertinent equation extends the previous one by including the relation between 
                                                 
723 Teoria e Prassi 2007. 
724 The case of a surplus increasing innovation that leaves unaffected the number of workers – 
something that would imply stability in the overall fraction – will be dealt with in the analysis of the 
following norm regarding the secular tendency of capitalist production.  
725 G. Stamatis 1984 and G. Stamatis 1986. 
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value of worn out capital and of variable capital and the time needed for the 
recycling of constant capital. It finally concludes at the rate of hoarding which 
according to Marx is the relation between the rate of profit and the value of capital 
that needs to be amassed in every cycle of the production process in order to be 
reinvested as constant capital and which further decreases the rate of profit726. This 
analysis, however, surpasses the needs of this section. In order to connect the 
previous discussion with the objections against the falling tendency of the rate of 
profit it could be concluded that if that criticism was seen outside the context of the 
especially capitalist methods of production it would have been right. Theoretically 
(or mathematically) someone could increase the organic composition of capital and 
at the same time increase the rate of surplus value in such degree that the rate of 
profit remains positive even within a competitive environment. That would require 
though labourers willing to receive less salary or even nothing. Slavery or serfdom, 
however, is not the typical method of production in capitalism. 
From an empirical point of view, the norm of the falling rate of profit has 
been generally proven until the 1920s. The technological innovations, though, 
managed to overturn this image. Investment in constant capital doesn’t seem to affect 
the rate of profit anymore727. Gillman, however, brings forward the issue of 
unproductive investments that has been allusively touched before. Marx includes in 
the concept of surplus what we would today call gross profit, namely what is directly 
produced from the production process. He couldn’t do otherwise because the main 
way of production by the time he was writing was operating in low competition 
basis. The direct link between offer and demand constitute advertisement 
superfluous. At the same time the medium scale of production could be handled by 
only few administrative employees if not by the capitalist himself. In monopoly 
capitalism, though, the expenses for taxation, advertisement, administration etc. 
should be deducted from the surplus value. Had this been done, the statistical link 
between organic composition of capital and rate of surplus value would return to the 
image described by Marx728.  
                                                 
726 G. Stamatis 1984. 
727 See for example J. Gillman 1957 for the statistical data regarding the United States and G. Stamatis 
1986 for a general overview of the issue.  
728 J. Gillman 1957, chapter 8. Stamatis (1984) disagrees with Gillman on the effect of unproductive 
capital as disabling the latter to realise its profit and insists on the especially capitalist methods of 
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Based on the previous equation and by focusing on the rate of surplus value 
would lead to another significant norm, that of the secular tendency of capitalist 
accumulation. In the third volume of his magnum opus Marx states that “there would 
be absolute over-production of capital as soon as additional capital for purposes of 
capitalist production equals to 0. The purpose of capitalist production, however, is 
self-expansion of capital, i.e., appropriation of surplus-labour, production of surplus-
value, of profit. As soon as capital would, therefore, have grown in such a ratio to the 
labouring population that neither the absolute working-time supplied by this 
population, nor the relative surplus working-time, could be expanded any further 
(this last would not be feasible at any rate in the case when the demand for labour 
were so strong that there were a tendency for wages to rise); at a point, therefore, 
when the increased capital produced just as much, or even less, surplus-value than it 
did before its increase, there would be absolute over-production of capital; i.e., the 
increased capital C + ΔC would produce no more, or even less, profit than capital C 
before its expansion by ΔC. In both cases there would be a steep and sudden fall in 
the general rate of profit, but this time due to a change in the composition of capital 
not caused by the development of the productive forces, but rather by a rise in the 
money-value of the variable capital (because of increased wages) and the 
corresponding reduction in the proportion of surplus-labour to necessary labour”729. 
To make this more understandable, one must take into consideration the 
components of the rate of surplus value as described before, namely as the rate of 




The obvious conclusion is that in case that salaries increase, the rate of 
surplus value will decrease because the money-value of labour needed to compensate 
the workers will have a rising tendency in contrast with the money-value of labour 
                                                                                                                                          
production as the cause of the overturn of the image in monopoly capitalism. Nonetheless, both views 
could be accommodated under the idea that “the growth of monopoly, therefore, has been a necessary 
and natural resultant of the stresses inherent in the process of capitalist development” (J. Gillman 
1957, p. 71). In other words, the especially capitalist method of production lies at the heart of both the 
rise of monopoly capitalism and its consequent need to “increasingly drive the realisation of surplus 
value into channels of unproductive expenditures” (J. Gillman 1957, p. 110).  
729 K. Marx et al. 1894, chapter 14.  
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necessary to produce surplus value which remains stable. Such a significant increase 
of the variable capital would take place in conditions of lack of labour powers in 
relation with the needs of the invested constant capital. These are periods in which 
labourers have significant negotiation power and as a result they can exert pressure 
for increasing their salaries. If this relation was seen isolated from the previous 
fraction regarding the rate of profit, Marx would seem to be doing again a logical 
leap. He only shows the connection between the variable capital and the rate of 
surplus value and therefore leaves the fluctuation of the nominator unaltered. 
Nevertheless, it must be reminded that Marx in his definition is writing about the 
“absolute over-production of capital” which is caused by the lack of labour powers – 
a rare but not impossible case as the case of some countries in Europe after the 
Second World War shows. Therefore, the salaries of labourers may rise but at the 
same time the labour input in the cycle of production is not enough to equally 
increase the production of surplus value. It is still true, though, that at the same result 
could also lead other factors like the duration of the working day because a relevant 
increase or decrease could affect similarly the extraction of the surplus value and its 
rate. Moreover, the degree of exploitation, namely the value of labour necessary to 
produce surplus value, is also relevant to the rate of productivity. The first factor, 
however, is external in relation to the economic logic of the norm and depends on a 
number of variables within a specific Social Formation, apart from the class struggle, 
as in the case of geographical latitude and the relevant daylight, the nature of labour 
etc. As for the second factor, it should be taken as stable exactly as the organic 
composition of capital is dealt in this case730. Both factors, though, will be revisited 
shortly in the counteracting influences. 
An important note should be made at this point. Marx uses the definition of 
“absolute over-accumulation of capital” as an extreme in order to show the 
relationships present in the course of capitalist production731. As a matter of fact he 
gives this definition in the third part of the 15th chapter of Capital Vol. 3 with the title 
“excess capital in conditions of excess population” which prepossesses the reader 
about the application of the norm in conditions of surplus rather than lack of labour 
powers. Marx states that “over-production of capital is never anything more than 
                                                 
730 E. Ioakimoglou 2000, pp 37-39 and E. Ioakimoglou et al. 1991. 
731 E. Ioakimoglou et al. 1991. 
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over-production of means of production - of means of labour and necessities of life - 
which may serve as capital, i.e., may serve to exploit labour at a given degree of 
exploitation; a fall in the intensity of exploitation below a certain point, however, 
calls forth disturbances, and stoppages in the capitalist production process, crises, 
and destruction of capital. It is no contradiction that this over-production of capital is 
accompanied by more or less considerable relative over-population. The 
circumstances which increased the productiveness of labour, augmented the mass of 
produced commodities, expanded markets, accelerated accumulation of capital both 
in terms of its mass and its value, and lowered the rate of profit. These same 
circumstances have also created, and continuously create, a relative overpopulation, 
an over-population of labourers not employed by the surplus-capital owing to the low 
degree of exploitation at which alone they could be employed, or at least owing to 
the low rate of profit which they would yield at the given degree of exploitation”732. 
This excerpt apart from bringing the issue of over-production in conditions of surplus 
labour it also provides a genealogy of the crisis as it will be seen shortly.   
Marx is consistent in his method of presentation as already explained, 
namely assuming other factors stable and “testing” the relation between one 
independent and the dependent variable. In fact the norms of the tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall and that of secular tendency of capitalist accumulation are exactly the 
two sides of the same coin. In the first case the rate of surplus value while in the 
second the organic composition of capital are considered stable. The two norms, 
therefore, should be seen in tandem733. Before that, however, it would be good to 
further analyse the organic composition of capital with the introduction of a new 
modulus; the net product of labour or value added (presented as Y) is the aggregate 
of surplus value and labour power (S+V). 
 
 
                                                 
732 K. Marx et al. 1894, chapter 15. In this source which is referenced in details in bibliography the 
title of the third part of the chapter in question is translated as “Excess capital and excess population” 
while in the German original text the title is “Überfluß an Kapital bei Oberfluß an Bevölkerung” 
which means excess capital in conditions of excess population. 
733 Marx himself acknowledged that his account for the tendency of the profit to fall would have been 
incomplete by focusing only on the organic composition of capital and ignoring the rate of surplus 
value due to the variety of reasons that counteract in that tendency. According to Clarke, Marx is 
concerned to assess the relationship between conflicting tendencies rather than deriving mechanical 









It can be now observed that the rate of profit boils down in the relationship 
between the rate of surplus value (S/V) and the fraction C/Y which represents the 
amount of constant capital needed for the production of a unit of product. This 
acknowledgement allows bringing the longitudinal structural tendencies of the 
capitalist method of production, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall that is, in 
conjunction with special circumstances caused by the secular tendency of capitalist 
accumulation734.  
The net product rate (C/Y) shows the ability of a corporation to cutback in 
constant capital which further allows the particularisation of the abovementioned 
counteracting influences. The latter are divided between cutbacks that tend to reduce 
the organic composition of capital as such and those in which the constant capital 
cutback is accompanied with increased productivity. In the first category Marx 
includes the duration of the working hours per day; given that the value of the 
constant capital remains the same irrespective of its use for 8, 10 or 12 hours per day, 
their extended use effectively reduces the fraction of constant capital to net product. 
Additionally, the concentration of means of production and their use in wide scale, 
what is otherwise called ‘economies of scale’, allows the capitalists to reduce their 
cost for a given production. The other side of the coin is the socially combined 
labour which brings together a variation of specialisations in labour powers to man 
the concentrated means of production. Moreover, economies in labour conditions in 
the expense of workers equals to increased economy in constant capital. In the 
second category Marx includes the recycling of refuse material which practically 
means such sophistication of means of production to reduce the raw material that 
                                                 
734 See more analytically E. Ioakimoglou 2000, pp 43-44 and 49. It must be noted that the specific 
publication of the book (2000) contains a non-acknowledged erratum in the analysis of the equations 
which was clarified after a personal correspondence with the writer. Here is the correct version of the 
formulas. 
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remains unprocessed and or to reduce their operation costs. Decreased investment in 
constant capital in connection with increased productivity also occurs from the 
accumulation of experience among labourers and their further education. At the latter 
Marx also includes the subordination of the worker to the needs of the capitalist 
production, namely the creation of a “conscientious” labourer who would be actively 
engaged in cutbacks in the production, rather than work recklessly735.  
The significance of those counteracting influences is in the prevention of 
any crisis. The secular tendency of capitalist production turns to over-accumulation 
(synonymous to over-production) when the decrease of the rate of surplus value is 
not counterbalanced by cutbacks in the use of constant capital. Accordingly, an over-
accumulation crisis may appear even when an increasing rate of surplus value is 
accompanied by a higher increase of the rate of capital to net product, namely an 
inability of companies to cutback in constant capital. The importance of this 
acknowledgement and particularly the connection between crisis and over-
accumulation will be seen in the following paragraphs through the role of 
technological innovation and unemployment.   
The most important factor of economizing constant capital and at the same 
time increasing the surplus value is technological innovations. As a non-economic 
factor it has been conscientiously excluded by Marx in the formulation of the 
aforementioned equations. He acknowledged the importance of science and its 
applications in the category of counteracting influences that could possibly reduce 
the use of constant capital and at the same time increase the surplus value; 
nevertheless, this is a different type of argument since he was forming it on the basis 
of a given constant capital which is used in a different way because of a 
technological innovation. A more important approach of the issue has been made in 
the first volume of Capital in relation with the degree of employment. Two 
interconnected issues appear at that point. On the one hand, the application of 
technological innovations increases both the surplus value and the constant capital 
given the investment for the change of machinery. On the other hand it usually 
reduces the employment rate. An expansion of constant capital in a given 
technological level would inescapably increase the variable capital because of the 
                                                 
735 K. Marx et al. 1894, chapter 5, E. Ioakimoglou 2000, pp 45-47 and E. Ioakimoglou et al. 1991. 
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higher need in labourers to use the expanded means of production (assuming that the 
working hours remain the same). Technological innovations, though, tend to replace 
the human force with machinery and as a result they put a number of labourers 
outside employment. As mentioned above, though, investment in new technology 
equals to a relevant increase of the constant capital with the relevant consequences in 
the employment rate. In the total increase of constant capital the labour force 
connected to it, increase as well but in a descending analogy736. Therefore, the 
replacement of labour by machinery along with the increase of productivity tends to 
displace from production large masses of workers737.  
The significance of the employment rate is related with the other side of the 
coin in this discourse. Over-production of capital could also be seen as under-
consumption caused by under-demand738. The latter is by no means the cause but a 
consequence of over-production. The formulation of production process in capitalism 
as explained above leads to such levels of accumulation that cannot be absorbed739. 
The “absorption inability” takes the form either of merchandise that cannot be sold or 
of capital that has to be “purged” or remain inoperative. Obviously the two categora 
in this distinction are tantamount since products are themselves capital as far as they 
are not circulated, namely sold. They rather present a time sequence; exactly because 
products cannot be sold anymore, production process should slow down or constant 
capital should be taken away. In any case, the developments lead to increased 
unemployment. Therefore, under-demand comes also in the form of unused labour 
force. The latter, though, after a point becomes an independent factor that gives a 
new dynamic in over-accumulation crisis. The spending capability of a society is 
highly related to the employment rate and generally the level of real salaries (wage 
                                                 
736 See for example K. Marx 1867, chapter 15. From a fragmented point of view this doesn’t make 
much sense because the replacement of human labour by machinery in a department of a factory 
clearly reduces the number of workers. It should be reminded, though, that there wouldn’t be any 
technological innovation unless there was any increase in productivity. That development “opens 
vacancies” in other departments of an enterprise like logistics, administration or liquidation. 
737 See also J. Gillman 1957, pp 139-144. 
738 The Marxist interpretation of over-production, under-demand and crisis is different than other 
approaches as in the case of Karl Rodbertus (1898) who sees in crisis “misdirected production” due to 
disproportional wages for labourers and profit for capitalists. In this case, one could assume that this 
situation would be corrected by self-restriction from the side of capitalists, which, however, comes in 
contrast with the internal logic of capitalism which is to use the available capital for maximum return. 
739 See J. Gillman 1965, pp 25-43 for a detailed analysis of under-consumption and other approaches 
as opposed to the Marxist one. 
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per working hour that is)740. The consequence, then, is the falling rate of profit which 
this time is not caused by the increase of the organic composition of capital as such 
but by its over-efficiency. In this context, the furtherance of unemployment caused 
by the falling rate of profit aggravates the crisis itself.  
Under-demand in the course of the crisis has multiple roles. In the first 
instance its role is “positive” because of the recession it causes. The occasion for 
“purging” the unused, inefficient and generally non-lucrative capital is set exactly by 
the under-demand. In other words it’s presented as the perfect tool for the restructure 
of the capitalist process of production by removing the less able investments, 
increasing unemployment, diminishing the power of trade unions and generally 
restructuring the social relations. At the second instance, though, when all the 
conditions are set for the achievement of rising profit rate, under-demand may hinder 
the resurgence by putting obstacles in the realisation of profit741.  
 
In the beginning of the section, the economic crisis has been characterized 
as cyclical. This implies that there is a recurrent tendency in its appearance. Once 
again this is not a solely Marxist idea. In fact Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi 
expressed his idea about the economic cycles in 1819. Still today the concept of 
‘business cycles’ is widely accepted742; the discussion rather concentrates on 
corrections among the various approaches (Kitchin, Juglar, Kuznets and Kondratiev 
cycles). The Marxian account is demonstrated in the Communist Manifesto where 
Marx and Engels pose the question “how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? 
On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, 
by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old 
ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive 
crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented”743. This brings 
                                                 
740 It should be noted, though, that consumption and demand are also influenced by other factors such 
as monetary depreciations, import duties etc. Thus, employment rate is only a factor among the many 
but certainly the most important. 
741 E. Ioakimoglou 2000, pp 56-62 and E. Ioakimoglou et al. 1991. See also J. Gillman 1957, pp 124-
129 and J. Gillman 1965, p. 15. 
742 J. Gillman 1965, p. 14 and pp 54-56 for Keynes’ account of the “trade cycle”. 
743 K. Marx et al. 1848, chapter 1. 
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forward the idea that the economic contraction after every expansion is always more 
severe, but this analysis exceeds the needs of this research744. 
Any quotation, however, is superfluous since from the previous exposition 
it has already became clear that the components of both the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall and of the secular tendency of capitalist accumulation, namely the 
constant capital, the variable capital and the surplus value are always interacting in 
the context of the Capitalist Mode of Production, they are always present in the 
reproduction of class relations. The contraction of the business cycles therefore 
depict the periods in which the counteracting influences failed to restrain the falling 
rate of profit and have been replaced by restructuring processes in order to prepare 
the forthcoming expansion. The internal contradictions of the Capitalist Mode of 
Production will later lead again in over-production, under-demand and finally in 
crisis. In Poulantzas' words, then, crisis could be defined as those circumstances in 
which the internal contradictions of the Capitalist Mode of Production are 
significantly condensed745.  
Moreover, crisis cannot be seen as a “black out” of the Capitalist Mode of 
Production; as a period of rupture with the previous “normality”. On the contrary, the 
crisis period is a much needed opportunity for restructuring the reproduction of 
capital. Under the prerequisite that the core relations of property and appropriation 
remain in the first instance intact, they are reaffirmed in the second instance because 
of a wave of mass depreciation of constant capital, increase of unemployment, 
diminished power of trade unions, decreased wages and generally developments 
directed in reverting the falling rate of profit. Crisis, therefore, plays an organic role 





Possibly the event which dominates the common understanding of the 
financial history in relation to the 1970s is the impact of the 1973 international oil 
crisis upon the international economy. Such a simplified approach, however, is under 
                                                 
744 See further in J. Gillman 1957, chapter 9. 
745 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 22. 
746 See also K. Marx 1862, K. Marx 1894 et al., chapter 15, S. Clarke 1994 and N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 
20. 
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the danger of mixing symptoms and causes which are further based in different 
premises. This would be better illustrated if the oil crisis was seen in the context of 
the economic environment of that period since the oil embargo from the Arab leg of 
OPEC signifies the last knot in a chain of facts and consequences that initiated the 
economic downturn between 1973 and 1975. More specifically, the contraction of 
the British economy could not be attributed to the oil embargo as such, since UK 
received oil almost uninterruptedly. It was rather the rising oil prices in conjunction 
with the coal miners’ strikes of 1973 that played significant role. On the other hand, 
it’s the stock market crash between 1973 and 1974 which signifies the most 
important manifestation of the international crisis in reference to the UK. What is 
behind, though, both the oil crisis, either as embargo or price rise, and the stock 
market crash is the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement.  
After 1944 and with the view of preventing a recession similar to that of the 
1930s, 44 countries agreed in a renewal of the “gold standard” rule747. This would 
mean that all participating economies would follow such monetary policies that 
would keep stable to a pre-accorded value the exchange rates between their 
currencies. The feasibility of this was based on the use of a stable exchange rate 
between each currency and gold that would practically be the common denominator. 
Therefore, currencies should not fluctuate more or less than 1% from a pre-accorded 
rate with gold. The substantial difference with the previous system was that, 
although, the exchange rates on the one hand between currencies and on the other 
between each one of them and gold would be “pegged”, those currencies wouldn’t be 
directly exchangeable to gold. This possibility would only be available to dollar with 
a fixed price of 35 dollars per ounce of gold. The rest of currencies would be related 
to the value of gold in a mediated way by fixing their exchange rates to dollar. Thus, 
dollar became a central currency used for leverage of the whole monetary system 
represented in the Bretton Woods agreement. The maximum of 1% divergence from 
the agreed price of each exchange rate would be achieved by the obligation of 
countries to sell to or buy from the United States the relevant amount of gold. 
                                                 
747 The historical data presented in this section are derived, unless otherwise mentioned, from R. 
Brenner 2006 and B. Eichengreen 2008. 
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As expected, this monetary system allowed economic stability and increase 
of international trade turnover by removing unpredicted changes in exchange rates748. 
Gradually though, external factors like the war in Vietnam or the increasing domestic 
spending due to President Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ policy, overturned the American 
balance of payments and increased the trade deficit and inflation749. The consequence 
was that gold coverage of dollar was decreased from 55% to 22% by 1970 in a short 
period of time. This fact along with West Germany unilaterally abandoning the 
Bretton Woods system in May 1971 (followed by Austria, Holland and Switzerland) 
increased the worries of other economies which applied the “promise to pay” rule 
and received from the United States the amount of gold that equals to 241 million 
dollars (50 million by Switzerland and 191 by France). On the 15th of August the 
United States unilaterally abandoned the Bretton Woods system in a movement that 
has been marked as “Nixon shock”. At the same tine a policy of salaries and wages 
freeze was issued for 3 months to alleviate the immediate consequences. 
This movement gave the opportunity to dollar to “float” and consequently 
depreciate. The basic idea was that in that way exports would increase and the trade 
deficit would start closing. In reality, this has not been a one-off process. What 
practically happened on the 15th of August 1971 was the suspension of convertibility 
of dollar to gold. Short after that, in December 1971 ten industrialized economies 
agreed to appreciate their currencies against dollar and the latter be fixed at 38.02 per 
ounce of gold. What has been named as Smithsonian agreement was short lived, 
though, since dollar was realigned at 42.22 per ounce by 1973 and fully floated in the 
end of March 1973.  
Dollar gradual depreciation and generally the agitations in the economy 
from abandoning the Bretton Woods system, brought American economy into 
recession especially after the end of the 3-months freeze in salaries and wages. The 
7.2% GDP growth in 1972 fell to -2.1% in 1974. The opposite direction had 
inflation, since it rose in the same period from 3.4% to 12.3%. This image was 
represented in the falling rate of New York stock market from January 1973 until the 
end of 1974. The interconnections between financial markets offered the opportunity 
for the transmission of the crisis to the London stock market. The turn to fiat 
                                                 
748 P. Garber 1993, p. 461. 
749 See further in R. Brenner 2006, p. 124. 
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currency along with a long-standing property market crisis and a secondary banking 
one meant that the UK GDP from 5.1% growth in 1972 recessed down to -1.1% in 
1974. An interesting fact is that, although, the UK stock market crisis was over in 
1974, inflation continued rising reaching 25% in 1975.  
The stock market crisis, however, should not be solely attributed to the 
agitations from abandoning the “gold standard” but to the oil crisis as well. An effect 
of the free floating dollar was related to its centrality in the world monetary system 
as leverage currency. Transactions in international oil trade were in dollars as it’s 
still the case. The depreciation of dollar, therefore, had the immediate effect for the 
oil producing countries to sustain great losses. The Yom Kippur war, offered to 
OPEC the perfect opportunity to exert pressure against their financial losses. 
Therefore, steeply rising oil prices affected a large number of countries including the 
UK and full embargo was directed to some others as in the case of the United States 
from December 1973.  
It is evident, therefore, that both the stock market crash and the oil crisis 
have been epiphenomenal to the central incident of Bretton Woods system collapse 
since the first - being related to financial structure of the economy - is by default 
highly vulnerable to changes in other financial markets as well as changes to the 
“real economy”. On the other hand, understanding the oil crisis as a consequence of 
the free floating dollar is only one side of the coin. The other side is that it represents 
a separate diplomatic incident the pressure of which couldn’t be absorbed by the 
specific development of capitalist economies of that period750. This last 
ascertainment brings this discussion at its central point which, as will be seen, is the 
common ground under both the Bretton Woods system collapse and the emergence 
of the oil crisis.  
The economic conjuncture of the1970s was a particular articulation of a 
number of factors that could be included in three groups. At first the contradictions in 
the production process has been intensified. The organisation of the production chain 
reached a limit in increasing the output. More specifically, the fordist production 
paradigm has been brought to its limits and proved to be inflexible in the changing 
economic circumstances. On the one hand, the organized production in the form of 
                                                 
750 S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004. p. 34 et seq. 
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assembly line couldn’t minimize the “dead periods”751 of the process anymore. On 
the other hand, intensification of labour was prevented by the relatively strong and 
active trade unionism. Increasing the output, therefore, was possible only by 
investing in constant capital which has the tendency to lower the rate of profit as 
already explained. The intensification of economic or labour class struggle has been 
only part of the image. The increased trade union membership and the increasing 
industrial actions that were creating the aforementioned inflexibility of labour 
compensation and conditions were coupled by the rising political and ideological 
class struggle in advanced capitalist countries. Numerous movements across the 
world with most prominent the events of May 1968 in Paris, signify exactly this 
image. It’s not by coincidence that the Italian Communist Party in 1976 gathered 
34.4% of total votes or that the French Communist Party was representing around 
21% of the electorate during the 1970s.   
The third set of changes should be located in the international field. The 
contradictions between countries and economies took a number of forms. 
Detachments from the imperialistic chain (anti-colonialist movements, liberation 
fronts, guerrilla wars in Central America and political unrest in Eastern Europe) or 
the creation of new poles of power as in the case of China in contrast to Soviet Union 
constitute only one aspect. The other has been the competition between capitalist 
economies themselves. The collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement constitutes its 
most prominent manifestation.  
As explained before, in that monetary system the maintenance of stable 
exchange rates did not require direct transactions of gold but the same result could be 
achieved by dollar transactions. This required, however, enough liquidity from the 
side of the United States. The problems started by the mid-1960s when the ration of 
invested capital to output reached a maximum at least for the G7 of that period. In 
other words, the massive influx of products in the market, especially from the 
manufacturing sector, meant that an over-capacity or over-production could be 
witnessed. The subsequent result was a gradual decrease of the profitability due to 
the increasing number of products on offer. This image, nonetheless, was not 
uniform among the advanced economies. It was mainly German and Japanese 
                                                 
751 The period during which the machinery stays unused as in the case between shifts.  
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products that were taking over the markets in the expense of American ones leading 
to external surpluses for the first and deficit for the latter752. The increased offer of 
dollars was practically decreasing the value of that currency, but in order to keep the 
exchange rates stable and avoid any devaluation of the dollar from the rate of $35 per 
ounce of gold, local central banks were obliged to buy the excessive amount of 
dollars from the FOREX market. For this to be done, however, more of the other 
currencies should be issued; something which increased inflation in other economies. 
In other words, the external deficit of the United States was exporting inflation to the 
other economies-members of the Bretton Woods system. Central banks, could still 
avoid this problem by intervening in the amount of gold owned by each State in 
comparison to the United States753. But by the time that the American gold reserves 
started falling, it was predictable that the fixed exchange rate system was heading 
towards a dead-end. 
In the view of this problem, the available options were ranging between the 
appreciation of non-reserve currencies to dollar, the realignment of the latter to a 
higher price in relation to gold and the decrease of inflation through domestic 
austerity policies. What was finally decided was a combination of the first two 
options regardless of the initial objections of other major exporting economies. What 
is particularly significant is that the third option was rejected due to the unpopularity 
of an “internal devaluation” which implies that it was the equilibrium of power in the 
American Social Formation that was not allowing such a movement754. As a matter 
of fact, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the 
consequent free floating of currencies didn’t resolve the other problems of the 
economic conjuncture and mainly that of the inflexibility of salaries and wages. This 
is why the advanced economies of that period, didn’t manage to absorb the agitations 
caused by the aforementioned collapse. It has to be stressed, though, that it was not 
the labour’s share in the total output that caused the crisis. The available data do not 
support a claim of falling profitability due to rising variable capital, since the total 
output has always been exceeding the percentage of labour’s compensation. The 
                                                 
752 R. Brenner 2006, pp 122 and 142. 
753 P. Garber 1993, p. 475 
754 See for example R. Brenner 2006, pp 126-127. 
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latter rather created a high degree of inflexibility in the economy that intensified the 





Marxist researchers approach those facts as an essential manifestation of the 
secular over-accumulation crisis theory756. The latter has been defined as the case in 
which “the decrease of the rate of surplus value is not counterbalanced by cutbacks 
in the use of constant capital. Accordingly, an over-accumulation crisis may appear 
even when an increasing rate of surplus value is accompanied by a higher increase of 
the rate of capital to net product, namely an inability of companies to cutback in 
constant capital”. Having this definition in mind it would be important to detect any 
signs of over-accumulation crisis in the British economic history. The reason, as 
already seen, is that the falling rate of profit is the index and at the same time 
symptom of deeper transformations in the relations of production. In parallel, it’s a 
sign of the role as well as the form of the State changes according to the specific 
needs for counteracting influences757. In other words, identifying the particular 
elements of the crisis would explain the articulation of the class struggle in the 
conjuncture and consequently the specific transformations of the State. 
The net annual rate of return for private non-financial companies is readily 
available from the National Accounts publication of the Office for National 
Statistics. The image described coincides with that of the previous literature on 
international economic environment. A steadily falling profitability acquired 
excessive characteristics after 1973 and until 1976. A possible difference may be 
witnessed in the way that profitability fluctuated until 1981 after which gradually 
increased until the short contraction of profits in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, 
several caveats should be raised before those data are used for the extraction of 
conclusions. The data in question constitute the ratio of the profits made from selling 
the output created, to the invested capital less the capital consumption but not less the 
intermediate consumptions, namely the cost of using raw materials or services. In 
                                                 
755 R. Brenner 2006, p. 141. 
756 See indicatively E. Ioakimoglou 2000, S. Sakellaropoulos et al. 2004 and R. Brenner 2006. 
757 N. Poulantzas 1978, p. 35. 
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other words, this is the simplest form of the ratio of the trading profits to the constant 
capital. The basic reason, however, this chart cannot be used in this research is that it 
measures profits in the way they are created in the market. Therefore they are subject 
to offer and demand rules. From a Marxist point of view this adds a serious distortion 
in measuring the actual value created in the production process. The fact that those 
data include also the trading profits from the oil extraction companies illustrates this 
specific problem. Oil prices are subject to worldwide competition and they are used 
as a means of political pressure as already seen. Furthermore, it’s not clear from the 
accompanying documents if the labour compensation is deducted from the numerator 
to form the actual profit and added to the denominator to form the organic 




Source: National Statistical Office. PNFC stands for Private non Financial Companies.  
 
What could be done instead is to approach the economic situation by using 
some basic indexes that allow the empirical analysis of the special characteristics of 
over-accumulation crisis in the UK. It has to be stressed right from the beginning that 
the over-accumulation crisis refers to ‘values’ that are not quantifiable concepts 
themselves since they are products of a deductive theoretical process. What are 
quantifiable, though, are indexes that constitute “representatives” of those values. 
The immediate consequence is that the presentation of data and the compilation of 
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indexes based on them should not be understood as linearly connected to the values. 
Indexes rather represent the characteristics of the values themselves like their 
direction, their significant increase or decrease etc. Therefore, they don’t depict the 
reality of the over-accumulation crisis but rather the tendency of the economy 
towards it.  
Having in mind the formula used to present the norms related to the 
tendencies of the rate of profit (Rp), what could serve as its index is the rate of return 




In which R stands for rate of return of invested capital before taxation, 
henceforth called efficiency. Y is the net value added namely the value of the total 
output less the intermediate consumption and capital depreciation. L stands for the 
compensation for employees including not only the salaries or wages but also 
employers’ contributions to employees’ insurance schemes, bonuses etc. K is the 




In this formation, the index L/Y represents the contribution of labour in the 
net value added, otherwise the percentage of the net value added that is reserved by 
labour for its compensation. On the other hand, the index Y/K represents the 
contribution of constant capital in the net value added or the ability of a company to 
use effectively the capital stock aside the labour compensation. In other words, while 
R is an index of the rate of profits (Rp), L/Y is an index for the rate of surplus value 
(S/V) and Y/K is an index that shows both the rising tendency of the composition of 
capital and the counteracting influences for the use of constant capital (C/Y). If in 
those concepts were added the number of employees (N), then the final indexes 
would boil down to the ratio of capital stock per labourer or what is otherwise called 
capital intensity (K/N), to the ratio of output per labourer or the phenomenal 
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productivity of labour (Y/N) and to the amount of salaries and wages to the number 
of employees or otherwise the cost of labour per labourer (L/N)758. 
Before the presentation of the indexes in detail, it should be highlighted that 
the data have been compiled in order to include only the productive sector of the 
British economy. The reason for that should be sought at the previous analyses 
regarding the definition of productive labour and its differences from the service 
sector, namely the production of value rather than its circulation and liquidation that 
depend on the “wealth” created in the former. The data available show that, from the 
1980s onwards, British economy has turned mainly to service provision759. A 
comparison of the indexes in question, therefore, would have been expedient for 
some peripheral conclusions. Serious consistency problems, however, prevented such 
an enterprise. Those problems do not refer solely to lack of data beyond a time point 
but also to the issues posed by services like defence, health, law and order and 
administration. More specifically, although they have central role in the reproduction 
of the relations of production, they don’t contribute directly to the circulation and 
liquidation nay in the production of value. In a different note, the productive sector 
of the economy in this research is understood as industries operating in agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, mining, quarrying, manufacturing, construction and distribution of 
electricity, gas and water. Apart from manufacturing, it’s not self-understandable that 
the rest of those industries should be considered as productive. Having in mind, 
though, the definition of productive labour used earlier as the process that increases 
the value of capital by adding to it the surplus-value which is extracted by labour, it 
could be seen that all those industries involve processes that use capital as raw 
material and transform it into new forms of capital with the use of labour760. Lastly, it 
should be pointed that the following data do not make any differentiation between 
public and private sector industries following the Althusserian understanding of the 
public and private spheres as a subordinate distinction to the concept of the State761.  
                                                 
758 E. Ioakimoglou 2000, pp 50-53. 
759 See for example the comparison between productive and service sector of data referring to capital 
services growth or the rate of profit to capital services from ONS available at URL:  
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ downloads/theme_economy/Capital_services_data.xls and M. 
O’Mahony 1999. 
760 See further ibidem p. 105.  
761 Ibidem p. 78.  
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Starting from the estimation of the invested capital, the mere observation of 
its growth over time would have been hardly meaningful. It’s only when seen 
comparatively with other factors that would make sense in identifying the possibility 
of an over-accumulation crisis. Here lies the importance of capital intensity index 
which estimates the rate with which the invested constant capital replaces human 
labour. The first chart refers to the net capital stock per labourer. Capital is net of 
depreciation as well as intangible property of industries like software, patents etc. In 
other words, what has been calculated here is the actual productive capital of the 
productive sector of the British economy. The second chart refers to the net capital 
stock per hours worked in the aforementioned industries. This is not the stricto sensu 
capital intensity index but if the two rates seen in conjunction important conclusions 
could be derived. They are both steadily rising from 1950 to 1981. From that year 
onwards, however, the net capital stock per labourer presents interesting fluctuations 
appearing either as steeper increase in the early ‘80s and ‘90s or as stability in the 
later years of the same decades. On the other hand, the rate of net capital stock per 
hour worked remains almost stable between 1981 and 1996.  
A reference to the data according to which those charts were compiled show 
the reason for those fluctuations. The net capital stock presents constant increase 
from 1950 to 1981 after which it slightly decreases until 1988. The consequent 
increase never reaches the peak year of 1980. On the other hand the constantly 
slightly decreasing number of labourers falls abruptly in 1981 and then decreases in a 
higher rate per year. The number of hours worked remains stable throughout those 
years with a little tendency to decrease. It could be seen, therefore, that up to 1981 
constant capital has been steadily replacing labourers. The fact, however, that 















In k£. Source: Value of net capital stock including depreciation and excluding intangible assets 
compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics. Prices are seasonally adjusted and constant at 




In m£. Source: Value of net capital stock including depreciation and excluding intangible assets 
compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics. Prices are seasonally adjusted and constant at 
their 2006 level. Number of hours worked from M. O’Mahony 1999 (based on unpublished ONS 
data). 
 
Nevertheless, the rate of capital intensity is not meaningful either, if seen 
isolated from the rest of the aforementioned indexes. Turning to the output per 
labourer, it should be stressed before anything else that it describes only the 
phenomenal productivity of labour. The actual, instead, would have been calculated 
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if the product was measured in conjunction with the number of hours worked. The 
purpose of this will be seen in the following steps where capital intensity will have to 
be measured against the phenomenal productivity of labour to come up with the 
productivity of net capital stock. The following chart refers to the gross value added 
per labourer. Ideally, the net value added should be used; scarcity of data, however, 
prevented this calculation. Gross value added means that from the total output the 
intermediate consumptions have been deducted but not the depreciation of capital. 
Having this caveat in mind, the following charts follow largely the image created by 
the course of capital intensity.  
From the 1950s to 1981 the slight increase of the output rate to the human 
factor of the production process looks almost like stable when compared to the steep 
increase after 1981. The complex image created by the previous charts starts now 
getting clearer. Having in mind that the number of labourers had been largely stable 
with a slight decrease between 1948 and 1981 the large investments in constant 
capital did not produce an equally large increase of the production. As a matter of 
fact referring to the hard data available from the Office for National Statistics would 
show that the gross value added had been slowly increasing after the Second World 
War and until 1965. It remained stable, though, for the period commencing at that 
year and until 1984 at around 211 trillion pounds per year. This explains the course 
of the chart depicting the gross value added to net capital stock for the pre-1981 
period. The general image of the advanced economies’ efficiency as described earlier 
seems to be confirmed for the British case. Any increase in productivity required 
extensive capital investments. The period, however between 1965 and early 1980s 
proved to be a stalemate since any increase of the net capital stock was hardly ever 













In k£. Source: Gross value added compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics. Prices are 
seasonally adjusted and constant at their 2006 level. Number of labourers from M. O’Mahony 1999 




Source: Gross value added and value of net capital stock compiled from data of the Office for 
National Statistics. Prices are seasonally adjusted and constant at their 2006 level.  
 
An important clarification, however, needs to be done. As already 
explained, it’s not the constant capital as such that creates the output but the labour 
input in the production process; any investment rather “reproduces” its value in the 
final product while labour “expands” the possibilities given by the machinery and 
creates the final output. This allows for some speculation regarding the role of labour 
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in creating this image. It could be suggested for example that it was the increasing 
cost of labour that was preventing the productivity from increasing substantially and 
“reap” the possibilities offered by the increase in net capital stock. The following 
chart presents the cost of labour per worker in the productive sector of the British 
economy. In other words, this is the average nominal yearly wage for the industries 
described before. It is essential, though, to stress the existence of some caveats. The 
data for the period commencing at 1989 refer to the ‘compensation of employees’, 
therefore, the unit of calculation is the company. The International Comparable 
Framework is the European System of Accounts of 1995 (ESA95) while the 
Standard Industrial Classification follows the regulations of 1992 (SIC92). The data 
between 1970 and 1988 refer to the similar but not the same concept of ‘income from 
employment’ in which the unit of calculation is the labourer. The International 
Comparable Framework is that of ESA79 and the industrial classification follows 
that of SIC80. The ‘income from employment’ appears also in the period between 
1948 and 1969 albeit with a different system of accounts between 1956 and 1969 
while the industrial classification is that of SIC58 and SIC68. Those changes may 
hinder a sound longitudinal comparison but what really counts here is the tendency. 
The constantly rising tendency, though, needs to be seen in combination with the 


















In k£. Source: Cost of labour compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics gathered by 
virtue of the Freedom of Information Act. Prices are seasonally adjusted since 1989. Prices are 
constant at their 2006 level. Number of labourers from M. O’Mahony 1999 (based on unpublished 
ONS data). 
 
The chart that follows presents the cost of labour seen as percentage of the 
total output which in this case is described by the gross value added as already 
explained. As suspected, the average nominal yearly amount of wages and salaries in 
the productive sector of the British economy has been increasing since 1948 and 
peaked in 1975. After a short period of fluctuations it started descending in 1981. 
Interestingly, from 1993 it continues falling even lower than the 1948 level. From 
this point of view, the stagnation of the gross value added in the period between 1965 
and 1984 could be explained given that it is formed after the deduction of the 
intermediate consumptions which include the compensation of employees. On the 
other hand, the falling tendency of the labour’s share of the output after 1980 could 
also explain the fluctuations that appeared after 1981. More specifically, the gross 
value added started increasing substantially after 1985 regardless of a period between 
1981 and 1988 in which the net capital stock decreased. To this tendency the 
decrease of the total number of labourers in production sector industries should be 
added. As already mentioned, the falling tendency up to 1981 increased its rate. 
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Moreover, the intensification of labour appearing after 1981 as has been found from 




Source: Compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics gathered by virtue of the Freedom of 
Information Act. Prices are seasonally adjusted since 1989. Prices are constant at their 2006 level. 
 
No matter how convenient such an explanation might be, no firm 
conclusion could be derived. All the previous charts represent economic indexes that 
do not have linear connections to the conclusions; moreover, there are factors that 
exceed the economic logic as such. In other words, the fluctuations in the labour’s 
percentage of the gross value added may be one among many factors that influence 
the total efficiency. This is even more significant given that efficiency itself it’s only 
an index for the issue in question in this discussion, namely the profitability of UK 
companies. From this point of view, it would have been safer to conclude that the 
course of labour cost to product has been a source of inflexibility in the efficiency of 
companies rather than the cause as such of its falling tendency during the 1960s and 
1970s. In other words, what Brenner holds for the international economic 
                                                 
762 M. O’Mahony 1999 presents a different image of this rate. According to her estimations, the 
labour’s share of total income has been falling steadily in the period she examines, namely between 
1950 and 1996. She only coincides with the previous chart in what regards the abrupt increase in the 
mid-1970s. She uses, however, a different methodology in which the cost of labour is measured 
against the nominal gross domestic product of the British economy rather than the output per 
industrial sector as done here. Additionally, it’s not clear from the accompanying documents if 
intermediate consumption and capital depreciation are calculated and if the measurement is in 
constant or current prices. 
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environment of that period is probably right for the British economy as well. As a 
matter of fact, even at its peak moment in 1975 labour’s share of output rate allowed 
almost 15% of operating surplus for the employers.  
Having the course of those indexes over time in mind, the discussion 
regarding the existence of over-accumulation crisis is now simpler. Even if the initial 
chart referring to profitability was not taken into consideration, the rate of product to 
net capital cost in combination with that of labour’s share of total product would 
have been sufficient to derive some tendencies. As can be seen in the following 
chart, in the period before 1981, the value of the net capital stock needed for the 
production of a unit of product (Y/K) has been constantly increasing. This rate 
represents the ability of corporations to make savings in the use of constant capital, 
which in the formula for the rate of profit has been signified by the rate C/Y. At the 
same time, the labour’s acquisition of the total product (L/Y) had been also 
increasing but at a much lower rate. Therefore, given that the factor of product (Y) is 
the same in both rates, the overall fall in efficiency cannot be attributed solely to the 
compensation of employees. An analysis of the output seen at face value would reply 
to any objections. It’s generally increasing until at least 1970 albeit at a significantly 
lower rate in comparison with that of the net capital stock the increase of which stops 
in 1981. From this point of view, the turning year for the production sector regarding 
the Y/K rate is that of 1958 in which the value of produced output fell behind the 
value of the invested capital. On the other hand the turning point for the overall 
efficiency rate (R) was in 1970 in which year the percentage of output obtained by 
labour surpassed the percentage of output produced by the invested capital. Hence, 
the data available seem to confirm the case that the UK secular tendency of 













Source: Compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics. Data regarding the cost of labour (L) 
gathered by virtue of the Freedom of Information Act. Prices are seasonally adjusted since 1989 for 
cost of labour and since 1948 for net capital stock (K) and gross value added (Y). Prices are constant 






Source: Compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics. NCS stands for Net Capital stock 
and GVA for Gross Value Added. Prices are seasonally adjusted and constant at their 2006 level. 
 
 




Source: Compiled from data of the Office for National Statistics. 
 
As already explained, the other side of over-accumulation and over-
production is that of under-demand which is caused by the former and further fuels 
it. More specifically, the economy’s “inability to absorb” the accumulated capital is 
expressed in the form of non circulated capital (for example unsold merchandise or 
non invested financial capital) that is gradually increased because the overall 
production has initially to slow down and later on some of the constant capital 
invested has to be removed. Both phases lead to decreased use of human labour 
either because constant capital is not invested anymore (first phase) or because 
already employed capital stock is “purged”. Unemployment, however, apart from 
being the consequence of that process is also a factor that further accelerates it since 
the spending capability of the society is diminished along with the “ability of the 
market to absorb” capital763. From this point of view unemployment is also an index 
of the over-accumulation crisis.  
The following charts present the course of unemployment rate in a 
supplementary way. What would have been expedient in explaining the 
consequences of over-accumulation crisis on the human factor of the production 
process would have been the number of redundancies. Nevertheless, they started 
being calculated only after 2001. Unemployment rate as such is not sufficient since 
                                                 
763 See further ibidem p. 305. 
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by default cannot be estimated on economy sector basis (production or services). 
Moreover, the Office for National Statistics uses the ILO definition which is 
accompanied with serious caveats. More specifically it calculates the percentage of 
the population more than 16 years old excluding the economically inactive 
population (for example a single mother who would like to work but cannot due to 
parental obligations), the population that is not actively looking for a job (for 
example the long-term disappointed unemployed population) and those who have 
worked at least an hour in the previous two weeks before the application of the 
questionnaire. From this point of view, these data should be seen in conjunction with 
the workforce and employee jobs, namely the available labour positions in the 
economy. The latter is comprised by those jobs in which the labourer is in an 
employment contract (rather than freelance); in other words, those in which labour 
exploitation occurs. Workforce jobs are comprised by employee jobs, self-







Source: Office for National Statistics. Unemployed population calculated according to the 








In k£. Source: Office for National Statistics. Numbers are seasonally adjusted. Job positions are 
calculated once at the middle of the year from 1959 to 1978. From 1978 onwards they represent the 
average of each year’s quarters.  
 
Irrespective of those shortcomings, both the above charts are still valuable 
in understanding the effects of the over-accumulation crisis to the human factor of 
the production process. At this point, however, it must be stressed that 
unemployment rate is not deterministically connected to profitability or efficiency as 
the previous indexes. As already shown, wage and salaries subsidies are an important 
policy that counteracts the falling profitability. As a matter of fact this strategy has 
been used extensively throughout the 20th century as an important element of 
Keynesian economics. This ascertainment brings the analysis in the political domain 
and more specifically in the political reaction to the economic crisis. Unemployment 
and generally conditions of labour are central not only to the economic class struggle 
but also to the political one764. The political struggle, nonetheless, and consequently 
the political crisis are not quantifiable as the economic ones. Unemployment in this 
context is not an index but rather a symbolic link in a domino of phenomena the 
existence of which can only be assumed. 
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